Knight v. Princess Builders, Inc.

⁵²⁸ ADKINS, Judge. In this dispute over the right to purchase estate property, we shall hold that a contract purchaser whose agreement required approval by the orphans’ court qualifies as a “party” with the right to appeal to the circuit court from the orphans’ court’s decision not to approve that contract. This appeal is authorized by Md.Code (1974, 2002 Rep. Vol.), section 12-502 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJP).

FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS In 2002, Mary Martha Isabella Knight died intestate, leaving 12 heirs with claims to, inter alia, Lots 20 and 21 at 1614 Severn Road in Severn. The successor personal representative offered the property for sale through a realtor and eventually entered into contracts to sell both lots to appellee Princess Builders, Inc., for a total of $145,000. Appellant Diana Knight, an heir to the estate, objected to the sale in the Orphans’ Court for Anne Arundel County. The orphans’ court ordered that the property be sold to Diana 1 for $146,000 unless, within ten days, the estate received an offer to purchase the property at a higher price.

Princess Builders appealed that order to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. After an evidentiary de novo hearing, the circuit court ordered that the property be sold to Princess Builders under the terms of their contracts. Diana noted this timely appeal, raising two issues for our review, which we rephrase as follows: I. Did the circuit court lack subject matter jurisdiction to entertain Princess Builders’ appeal from the orphans’ court decision?

II

Is Princess Builders’ contract of sale still enforceable, or did it expire on its own terms before the hearing in circuit court? ⁵²⁹ DISCUSSION I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction A. Appeal Of Orphans’ Court Decision Appeals may be taken from a decision of the Orphans’ Court for Anne Arundel County to either the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County or to this Court. CJP section 12-501 provides that “[a] party may appeal to the Court of Special Appeals from a final judgment of an orphans’ court.” Alternatively, CJP section 12-502 permits a de novo appeal to the circuit court, with the subsequent right to appeal the circuit court decision to this Court, pursuant to CJP section 12-801. 2 See Brees v. Cramer, 322 Md. 214 , 219 n. 2, 586 A.2d 1284 (1991). Section 12-502 extends the right of de novo appeal to any “party”: (a) In general ... (l)(i) Instead of a direct appeal to the Court of Special Appeals pursuant to § 12-501 of this subtitle, a party may appeal to the circuit court for the county from a final judgment of the orphans’ court.

(ii) The appeal shall be heard de novo by the circuit court. (iii) The de novo appeal shall be treated as if it were a new proceeding and as if there had never been a prior hearing or judgment by the orphans’ court. (iv) The circuit court shall give judgment according to the equity of the matter.[ 3 ] (Emphasis added.) ⁵³⁰ Diana argues that “the lower court ... had no jurisdiction to hear the ‘appeal’ taken by Princess Builders[.]” Her challenge to the circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction rests on two related premises. First, Diana understands section 12-502 to extend the right to appeal an orphans’ court decision only to those who participated in the orphans’ court proceedings as parties.

Her construction of the statute relies on Milburn v. Milburn, 142 Md.App. 518, 533-34 , 790 A.2d 744 (2002), in which we recognized that the term “party” is not defined in the Maryland Rules, but has been judicially construed to be limited to “persons who are entered on the record as plaintiff or defendant” and to exclude “other persons who may be affected by the outcome of the cause of action, either indirectly or consequently.” Second, Diana contends that there was no timely appeal by the successor personal representative, which would otherwise have given the circuit court jurisdiction to consider the substance of Princess Builder’s arguments regarding the contract since the personal representative has consistently favored enforcement of the contract on the same grounds advocated by Princess Builders. According to Diana, the personal representative had the right to appeal the orphans’ court order, but did not do so within the permitted 30 days. 4 Therefore, she contends, the circuit court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. Princess Builders counters that it has standing to appeal the orphans’ court decision rejecting its executed contract to purchase the estate property, even though it was not a party to the orphans’ court proceedings. Milbum, the company points out, is inapposite because, instead of construing the ⁵³¹ meaning of the term “party” in CJP section 12-502, we interpreted Md. Rule 2-506 governing dismissal of civil actions.

Princess Builders argues that Diana’s narrow construction of section 12-502 contradicts “a long line of Maryland cases” concerning appeals from an orphans’ court. These cases, the company says, generally hold that “[t]he term ‘party’ is not used in a technical sense but means anyone whose interest the Order has a direct tendency to affect adversely.” Davis v. Gerhard, 35 Md.App. 243 , 244 n. 1, 370 A.2d 1140 (1977). As a threshold matter, we recognize that, although there is precedent holding that one need not be a party to the orphans’ court proceedings in order to appeal to this Court under CJP section 12-501, there is no analogous authority with respect to an appeal to the circuit court under CJP section 12-502. Nor is there a Maryland case specifically permitting an appeal by a contract purchaser aggrieved by an orphans’ court decision.

We shall hold, for the reasons set forth below, that CJP section 12-502 authorized Princess Builders’ appeal to the circuit court. B. Statutory Construction When we construe the statutory right to appeal to the circuit court from an orphans’ court decision, [o]ur analysis begins with an examination and interpretation of ... Section 12-502 ... and related Maryland Rule 6-463 concerning appeals to the Circuit Court from judgments rendered in the Orphans’ Court. The principal goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the legislative intent behind the enactment.

The statutory language serves as the primary source for determining legislative intent. Beyer v. Morgan State Univ., 369 Md. 335, 349 , 800 A.2d 707 (2002). Nonetheless, “statutory language is not read in isolation, but ‘in light of the full context in which [it] appear[s], ⁵³² and in light of external manifestations of intent or general purpose available through other evidence.’ ” Stanford v. Md. Police Training & Corr. Comm’n, 346 Md. 374, 380 , 697 A.2d 424 (1997) (citations omitted).

For that reason, [w]hen we pursue the context of statutory language, we are not limited to the words of the statute as they are printed.... We may and often must consider other “external manifestations” or “persuasive evidence,” including ... its relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation, and other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal, which becomes the context within which we read the particular language before us in a given case. State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 717 , 720 A.2d 311 (1998). The Court of Appeals, affirming this Court’s decision, agreed that CJP section 12-502, authorizing de novo appeal to the circuit court, must be read “in conjunction with” CJP section 12-501, authorizing direct appeals to this Court.

See Lowenthal v. Rome, 45 Md.App. 495, 502 , 413 A.2d 1360 (1980), aff'd, 290 Md. 33, 34 , 428 A.2d 75 (1981). We have held that case law interpreting predecessor statutes remains valid precedent for construing the right to appeal an orphans’ court decision. [Section] 12-501 expressly gives a party the right to appeal to the Court of Special Appeals from a final judgment of an orphans’ court. The section combined former §§ 9 and 10 of Art. 5, giving effect to recent legislation regarding appellate jurisdiction, but otherwise, according to the Revisor, making only changes in style. The progenitors of § 12-501, however, appeared to speak in absolutes.

Art. 5, § 64 as it appeared in the Codes of 1924, 1939 and 1951, and as § 60 in the Code of 1904, read: ‘From all decrees, orders, decisions and judgments, made by the orphans’ court, the party, who may deem himself aggrieved by such decree, order, decision or judgment, may appeal to the court of appeals.’ ⁵³³ Chapter 399(4), Acts 1957, amended the section, and as codified as Art. 5, § 9 it read: ‘Any party may appeal to the Court of Appeals from any decree, order, decision or judgment of an orphans’ court.’ The amendment, in effect, merely omitted the language about an aggrieved party, presumably, in the view of the Court of Appeals, as surplusage. Wright v. Nugent, 23 Md.App. 337, 356-57, 328 A.2d 362 (1974), aff'd, 275 Md. 290 , 338 A.2d 898 (1975). C. A Contract Purchaser May Be A “Party” Within The Meaning Of CJP Section 12-502 The Court of Appeals has long permitted persons not named as parties in a matter before an orphans’ court to appeal an adverse decision, under the predecessors to current CJP sections 12-501 and 12-502. In Dorsey v. Warfield, 7 Md. 65, 66 (1854), the Court of Appeals construed an 18th century statute permitting appeal of an orphan’s court decision by “the party who shall deem himself aggrieved[.]” In that case, a legatee challenged the orphans’ court decision to revoke and annul the probated will creating her interest.

The Court observed that “there can be no doubt of this case being properly before us, inasmuch as there is not, nor can there be, any question as to the right to appeal of Rebecca Dorsey, who is directly interested in the decision of the orphans court.” Id. at 75 . In Cecil v. Harrington, 18 Md. 510, 512 (1862), the Court explicitly recognized that the right to appeal from an orphans’ court decision does not require party status. The appellant in this case was not a party to the original proceedings in the orphans court, but being interested as heir and distributee, he might be said to be aggrieved by the decision, which was adverse to his interest. Under the rulings of this court he was entitled to an appeal, although not technically a party. ⁵³⁴ Similarly, in Meyer v. Henderson, 88 Md. 585 , 41 A. 1073 (1898), in which a legatee appeared as a non-party in orphans’ court proceedings in order to oppose a caveat, the Court of Appeals broadly construed the term “party” to allow the appeal.

It is also said that appellant is not a party to the proceedings, and cannot appeal from the order of the court below. While the appellant was not a party of record, yet she is the one most interested in sustaining the validity of the will, and is consequently the party aggrieved by the order of the Orphans’ Court improperly revoking the probate. By Code, Art. 5, sec. 58, it is provided that from all decrees, orders, decisions and judgments made by the orphans’ court, the party who may deem himself aggrieved by such decree, order, decision or judgment may appeal to the Court of Appeals. In Stevenson v. Schriver, 9 Gill and J. 335, it was said: “The term ‘party,’ in this section of the Act, is not used in a technical sense necessarily importing a litigant before the Court in the proceedings in which the decree or order passed at the time of or antecedently to its passage; but may also mean one in whose interest the decree or order has a direct tendency