Knighton v. Young

Bowie, C. J., delivered the opinion of this Court. Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Baltimore City, overruling and refusing the application for an injunction, and the appointment of a receiver, and dismissing the bill. The order- appealed from, is based, in the opinion of the learned Judge below, on three grounds, either of which, if good, is sufficient to require its affirmance, viz: 1st. “The Court has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter as presented by the bill.” 2nd. If it had jurisdiction, “a proper case is not made for an injunction, or the appointment of a receiver.” 3rd.

There is no right of dower in Maria Young in the estate of William Young, deceased. The learned Judge does not refuse the application for want of jurisdiction generally, in cases of dower, or because the bill was filed by the heir at law, but because the case presented by the heir at law did not warrant the assignment of dower, or the exercise of the extraordinary powers of the Court, by injunction and receiver. The mere fact that an estate may be subject to dower, “does not, in the absence of all adverse claim thereto, authorize parties to make a case, to elicit the decision of ³⁷¹ the Courts, upon points which are only potential and not actual; — under such circumstances the Judiciary would be overwhelmed with ingenious difficulties suggested by the learned zeal of the counsel, or the nervous apprehensions of clients.” After a careful examination of the bill, it appears there is no positive allegation of the seizin by the testator, William Young, during his coverture with Maria Young, of any other real estate in which she could have dower, except the Holland street property, and this the bill expressly declares it is not designed to bring into this suit. It is true the will makes William H. Young residuary legatee of,all the estate of the testator, real and personal, not otherwise devised, but it is nowhere alleged in the bill, that any other real estate, than the Holland street property, has come to the possession of the complainant, or that he is entitled to any other, in which Maria Young, as widow of William, might or could claim dower.

In the absence of this material allegation, there was no subject-matter to give jurisdiction to the Court, as a bill for the assignment of dower. It is not enough that Courts of Equity have concurrent jurisdiction generally with Courts of Law in matters of dower, (of which there is no doubt,) but there must be a foundation laid to authorize the Court to exercise its jurisdiction, before a complainant can invoke its aid. In this sense, we apprehend, the Court below intended to be understood in the first reason assigned for dismissing the bill, in which, as interpreted, we entirely concur. There is no allegation of any positive claim or demand of dower by the widow of William Young, deceased, or of William H. Young, but it is alleged that the former claims, that by the true construction of the will she is not debarred of dower.