Knippenberg v. Windemuth

Hammond, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On July 2, 1965, the appellant drove home for lunch in his 1956 car and, having parked it at the curb of a street having a relatively steep grade, started into his house close by. Then he remembered that on the front seat he had left some tonic ■ — • whether medicinal or an accessory to an alcoholic beverage is not revealed by the record. He went back to the car, opened the door, reached in, took out the tonic and started walking toward his house.

Ten or fifteen seconds later he heard “a thump” or “a thud” and observed that his car had left its parked position, “made a direct turn right in the center of the street” and gone over the opposite curb and down a steep embankment, and had come to rest on the property of the appellees, wedged between a retaining wall and their house. At the trial below the householders testified to the traumatic ■experience of having the appellant’s automobile crash into their house (the husband was asleep in bed at the time after working the night shift), as to the damage to their property and to the fact that the appellant at the time said he would pay for the ■damage done. The appellant then testified that when he parked his car he turned his wheels towards the curb, turned off the ignition, removed the key, and manually pulled on the hand brake, which he thought was “on the drive shaft.” The 1956 car had no parking gear. He had had the brakes checked by a mechanic some three months before the occurrence.

He offered no ¹⁶¹ testimony as to the condition of the brakes after the accident The trial judge denied appellant’s motion for a directed verdict and the jury, quite understandably, returned a verdict for the householders. Appellant then moved for a judgment n.o.v. or a new trial and the trial judge denied his motion. This appeal followed. Appellant says the householders offered no evidence of negligence on his part, merely having shown that an accident occurred which is not enough.

We think appellant misconceives the effect of the proof. The mere occurrence of an accident involving a motor vehicle or an injury inflicted by a motor vehicle does not make applicable the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, but if the accident or injury is one which ordinarily would not result without negligence on the part of the operator of the vehicle the doctrine may come into play. It will come into play if the facts are so clear and certain that the inference arises naturally from them that the operator must have been negligent. Where the vehicle and its