Knox v. Stamper

Henderson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal is from an order of the Circuit Court of Baltimore County, in Equity, sustaining demurrers to the appellant’s amended bill of complaint and dismissing the bill. The amended bill of complaint alleged, amont other things, that Edith E. Knox died testate on January 15, 1943. In her will she specifically bequeathed and devised practically her entire estate to her five children, Edith E. Stamper,.Miriam Thim, Louis P. Knox, Walter F. Knox and Philander Chase Knox.

John R. Stamper, husband of Edith E. Stamper, and Clarence- Thim, husband of Miriam Thim, were joined in the proceeding because of their curtesy rights in fee-simple property. Letters testamentary on the estate were granted by the Orphans’ Court of Baltimore County on January 21, 1943, to Edith E. Stamper and Fred J. Van Slyke, who filed a personal inventory listing personal estate in the amount of $5,303.12, consisting' of a $5,000 Mortgage Guaranty Company Bond on the Madison Hotel, Atlantic City, N. J., valued at $4,590 and cash in the sum of $713.12. No administration account was filed, but on May 16, Í944, the executors filed a petition in the Orphans’ Court alleging that the debts, costs and expenses of administration amounted to approximately $3,000, and that they had on hand cash in the amount of only $713.12. The petition prayed that the court “direct a sale of all or such parts of the personal property” as might be necessary to “discharge the just debts and claims against the decedent and against the estate.” After answer and hearing, .the Orphans’ Court passed an order on July 31, 1944, directing the executors to sell, at public or private sale, “all of the personal property in the estate,” for this purpose.

No appeal was taken from that order, but on ²⁴¹ August 2, 1944, the original bill in equity was filed, challenging the validity of the order of sale. The amended bill alleged that if the order of the Orphans’ Court were carried out, the complainant would be deprived of his rights and benefits in and to a specific bequest of a $10,000 mortgage; that by a proper interpretation of the will the debts of the estate should be prorated equally among the several specific bequests and devises according to their respective values; and that the specific devisees have refused to make any contribution. The bill also alleged that it was to the interest and advantage of all parties concerned that their respective liabilities be adjudicated. The prayers of the bill were (a) that the executors be restrained from making the sale, pending determination of the liabilities of the parties, (b) that the equity court assume jurisdiction of the estate and construe the will to determine the liability of the several specific devises and bequests for the payment of debts of the estate, and to further order sale of such property as may be decreed to be liable, (c) that the devisees and legatees contribute proportionately to the payment of the debts, costs and expenses of administration of the estate, and (d) for other and further relief.

While the record does not disclose the exact nature or amount of the “debts, costs and expenses of administration,” it is stated in the reply brief of the appellant that they consist solely of Orphans’ Court costs, medical bills, taxes, commissions, counsel fees and funeral bills. To understand the points raised in the amended bill, it is necessary to summarize the provisions of the will, which was filed as an exhibit with the bill. By item 1, the executors were directed to pay all the just debts and funeral expenses of the testatrix. By item 2, the testatrix left to Miriam Thim a mortgage of $2,500 “made to me by my brother-in-law, Charles Knox” upon his property in Anne Arundel County but if it had been paid and released at the time of her death, then in lieu thereof, the sum of $2,500.

She also left to this daughter ²⁴² her “share” in certain fee simple property in Harford County. By item 8 she provided: “I give, devise and bequeath to my son, Walter Knox, the mortgage for ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) covering the store property and premises situate at the Southwest corner of Taylor Avenue and Loch Raven Boulevard, Baltimore County, Maryland, free, clear and discharged of said lien. In event that at the time of my death said mortgage shall have been paid and released, then-in lieu thereof I bequeath to my said son, Walter Knox, the sum of ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) absolutely.” By item 4, she left to Edith E. Stamper and Fred J. Van Slyke, in spendthrift trust for her son Louis P. Knox, for life, with remainder to his children, a mortgage guarantee bond of $5,000 on hotel property in Atlantic City, N. J. In the event the bond had been “redeemed” at- the time of her death, she bequeathed a sum equivalent to the “net proceeds derived from the sale of said bond,” upon the same trusts. By item 5, she left her home property of some fourteen acres in Baltimore County, to Edith E. Stamper and Philander Chase Knox in fee simple, but on condition that they have the joint right to occupy the premises free of rent until Philander reached the age of twenty-five years, with a right in Edith, after Philander became twenty-one years of age, to buy his interest for $10,000, said sum to be held in spendthrift trust for him until he became twenty-five, with the remainder over if he died before twenty-five without children.

By item 8 she provided that the explosive business of Louis P. Knox Company should “continue as at present using my home place for a place of sale and paying a reasonable rental as provided in the will of my late husband, until my said home place is finally disposed of.” In other items she confirmed conveyances of other properties to her children, made or to be made in her lifetime, but provided that if she should convey to them any property specifically mentioned in the will, the grantee shall have “such property or properties deducted from his or her share,” but this provision “shall not be construed to include deeds ²⁴³ of lots out of my home place.” By item 11, she left the residue to her five children, share and share alike. Louis P. Knox, Jr., and Margaret Knox, his wife, filed an answer to the amended bill, submitting to the jurisdiction of the court. Identical demurrers to the amended bill were filed by the other defendants on several grounds: (1) Misjoinder of parties, (2) multifariousness, (3) lack of jurisdiction, (4) that “it clearly appears that the specific legatees are not entitled to contribution from the specific devisees, and the will being plain and unambiguous there is no reason for construction of same,” and (5) that the amended bill is prematurely brought. The chancellor, ignoring other objections, held that the specific devisees could not be required to contribute ratably with the specific legatees, for payment of debts and costs of administration, in the absence of an expressed intention for contribution in the will.

He sustained the demurrers on this ground and dismissed the amended bill. The order of the Orphans’ Court which prompted the filing of the original bill directed the sale of “all of the personal property in the estate.” This order was somewhat unusual, in that it did not specify the particular property to be sold. The petition upon which the order was based is not in the record. However, we assume that the order was intended to apply only to the personal property included in the personal inventory, i. e., the $5,000 bond.

See Bagby, Exec. & Admrs., Secs. 50, 57; Code, 1939, Art. 93, Sec. 292. Ordinarily, and for most purposes, the mortgages' owned by the testatrix which she left to Miriam Thim and to Walter Knox would be classified as personal property, but under the established practice in the Orphans’ Court such assets are not listed in the personal inventory but are listed as debts due to the estate. Handy v. Collins, 60 Md. 229, 239 , 45 Am. Rep. 725 ; Code, 1939, Art. 93, Sec. 232.

If we are correct as to the scope of the order, there would be no occasion for a court of equity to enjoin the sale, at the instance of a party other than the person to whom ²⁴⁴ the particular asset was bequeathed, even if the equity court could interfere in a matter clearly within the jurisdiction of the Orphans’ Court. Compare Gaver v. Gaver, 176 Md. 171, 189 , 4 A. 2d 132 . Equity has jurisdiction, however, to construe a will (Legge v. Canty, 176 Md. 283 , 4 A. 2d 465 ), and we see no force in the suggestion that a bill for that purpose is prematurely brought, merely because it is filed before rather than after a sale. Certainly such a bill might be brought on the theory of declaratory relief.

It may be noted, in this connection, that Louis P. Knox did not oppose the sale, and that the will itself, in the phrase “net proceeds derived from the sale of said bond,” seemed to contemplate the sale of the bond, under some circumstances. If a proper case is presented for the construction of a will, obviously all of the beneficiaries, and their respective spouses, are proper parties, and a bill for this purpose is not multifarious merely because their interests are not identical. The question presented, therefore, is not whether equity has jurisdiction, but whether, and to what extent, Louis P. Knox is entitled to contribution from the complainant, Walter Knox, for the prospective deficiency in his legacy of the bond, or its cash equivalent, due to the insufficiency of the residue to pay debts, costs and expenses of administration. Louis P. Knox has not claimed any right of contribution, but he has submitted his case to the jurisdiction of the court.

The learned chancellor took the view that Walter Knox was liable to contribute pro rata with Louis P. Knox and Miriam Thim, to the extent of the value of their legacies of personal property, but was not entitled to contribution from any devisees of real property. In reaching these conclusions, he assumed that the question of contribution between legatees should be determined and enforced in the Orphans’ Court and that Walter Knox was a legatee of personal property. In Miller v. Weber, 126 Md. 658 , 95 A. 962 , on direct appeal from an order of distribution in the Orphans’ ²⁴⁵ Court, this Court construed the will, and held that certain legatees should contribute pro rata to debts and costs. Likewise in Braden v. Coale, 165 Md. 150 , 166 A. 730 , it was held, on direct appeal from the Orphans’ Court, that leasehold property should contribute ratably to payment of costs and expenses.

See also Childs’ Estate v. Hoagland, 181 Md. 550 , 30 A. 2d 766 . The general rule is that the personal estates of deceased persons should ordinarily be administered and finally distributed in the orphans’ courts. Woods v. Fuller, 61 Md. 457 . It is recognized, however, that equity will lend its aid where the Orphans’ Court is unable to afford a complete and satisfactory remedy.

Miller, Constr. of Wills, Sec. 7, p. 27. But the mere fact that it is necessary to surcharge a distributive share of personal property is not alone sufficient to require the intervention of equity. We think the mortgage passing to Walter Knox was personal property. In Chase v. Lockerman, 11 Gill & J. 185, 35 Am.

Dec. 277 , a bill in equity was filed by a creditor of the estate, against the executors of Chase and his legatees and devisees. The creditor’s claim was based upon a partial assignment of a promissory note executed by the testator in his lifetime. The executors set up in their answer that the personal estate of the testator was insufficient to pay his debts, and contended that all of the specific legatees and devisees should contribute ratably to the payment of this and certain judgment debts.- Pursuant to an order of the