Koehler v. State Roads Commission

Briscoe, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. These proceedings were instituted on the 25th day of August, 1914, by the State Roads Commission of Maryland for the condemnation of a small strip of land containing two and forty-four one hundredths (2.44) acres situate near the Belair Road, in Baltimore County, and owned by the defendants. This strip of land was found to be necessary for the construction of a State road in Baltimore County which was being built from a point on the Belair Road at the village of Perry Hall to a point on the road at Kingsville, in Baltimore County, and which was then in progress of construction. The application and condemnation proceedings were instituted under the provisions of Chapter 141 of the Acts of 1908, section 32B, page 247, providing for the establishment of a system of public roads and highways in Maryland, and for the appointment of a commission to be known as the State Roads Commission, with full powers to construct, improve and maintain public roads and highways in the several counties of the State, and also providing the ways and means for their construction, improvement and maintenance.

Section 32B of this Act specially provides that the Roads Commission may “adopt and employ such means, methods or system of road construction, improvement and development as may, in its judgment, be best calculated to promote the objects of this Act; condemn, lay out, open, establish, construct, extend, widen, straighten, grade and improve, in any manner, any main road, of the system, in any county of this State and establish or fix the width thereof; cause to be ⁴⁴⁶ -prepared such surveys, plans, drawings or maps as it may •deem proper in the course of its work; acquire for the State ■of Maryland, by agreement, gift, grant, purchase or condemnation proceedings as prescribed by section 251 to 256 inclusive, or by section 360 to 366 inclusive of Article 23 ■of the Code of 1904 of the Public General Laws, any private road or roads whatsoever, or private property or rights •of drainage for public use, whether belonging to private individuals or to turnpike companies or other corporations, and Including any avenues, roads, lanes or thoroughfares, rights or interests, franchises, privileges or easements, that may be, in its judgment, desirable or necessary to complete said system of roads or to carry out the purposes of this Act.” Upon the return of the sheriff of the inquisition of the ■sheriff’s jury, condemning the property in question and assessing the damages to the owners of the property at the sum ■of $125, the defendants filed certain exceptions. The objections presented by the exceptions were overruled by the Court below, and from an order finally ratifying and confirming the award of the jury this appeal has been taken. The appellants contend that the proceedings in this case are null and void, because the Act of 1908, Chapter 141, known as the State Roads Act, in so far as it conferred power upon the State Roads Commissioners to condemn land and the procedure of condemnation there provided, had been repealed by Chapter 117 of the Acts of 1912 (p. 236) and by Chapter 463 of the Acts of 1914, before the institution of the proceedings in the case. It is conceded by the appellants in their brief, that prior to the Acts of 1912, Chapter 117 (known as the New Condemnation Law of the State), the State Roads Commission -could acquire property for State road purposes in any of the different ways and modes, as provided by the Code of Public General Laws of the State and the several Acts herein referred to.

Code, Art. 23, secs. 269-274-399-405; Code, ⁴⁴⁷ Art. 91, secs. 33-82, sub-title “Public Roads”; Acts of 1908, Chapter 141; Acts of 1910, Chapter 501 (p. 311). It will be seen, then, that the decision of the case turns solely upon the question whether the Act of 1912, Chapter 117, or the Act of 1914, Chapter 463, repeals the Act of 1908, Chapter 141, regulating the procedure in the condemnation of property by the State Roads Commission for State road purposes, and this will depend upon a consideration of the Acts that have given rise to this controversy. The Act of 1912, Chapter 117, the one relied upon as a repeal of the former Acts, is entitled “An Act to add a new Article to the Code of Public General Laws of 1904, to be known as Article 33A, ‘Eminent Domain—regulating the procedure for the acquisition of property for public use by condemnation,’ and also providing that the proceedings therefor shall be before a jury in Court instead of before a sheriff’s jury,” and to read, as provided by the Act. It is clear that