Kona Properties, LLC v. W.D.B. Corp.

LEAHY, J. We consider appeals from separate orders entered in three foreclosure cases in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. We ⁵²⁵ consolidated the cases, upon motion, 1 because they present equivalent and undisputed factual scenarios. In each case, the owner of a residential property failed to pay property taxes owed to Baltimore City. The City commenced a tax sale, and the winning bidder paid the delinquent taxes and fees and received a certificate of tax sale in exchange.

The balance of the bid price, i.e. the bid surplus, remained on credit to be paid to the property owner. After the requisite statutory waiting period, the holder of each tax sale certificate petitioned the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to foreclose the property owners’ right of redemption. The circuit court entered judgment foreclosing the right of redemption in each case. Though these judgments were entered against them, the initial property owners or mortgage holders for each property, namely, W.D.B. Corp., Inc., N.B.S., Inc., and S & S Partnership (collectively Appellees), filed motions in the circuit court to enforce the judgments because they each wanted to receive the surplus of the bid purchase on their property. 2 The motions to enforce the judgments were opposed by the certificate holders: Kona Properties, LLC, LienLogic REO FI, LLC, and 2009 DRR-ETS, LLC (collectively Appellants).

Appellants raised standing and jurisdictional issues, contending, paradoxically, 3 that the court could not enforce the judgments that Appellants had obtained because Appellants had failed to perfect service upon certain Appellees. Appellants also argued that Appellees’ motions to enforce the judgments ⁵²⁶ should be denied because the General Assembly had made changes to the tax sale statute superseding Hardisty v. Kay, 268 Md. 202 , 299 A.2d 771 (1973), which held, inter alia, that a property owner is entitled to obtain a money judgment to compel a certificate holder to pay the surplus bid. Ultimately, Appellants’ arguments failed. The circuit court granted Ap-pellees’ motions to enforce the judgments and required the certificate holders to pay the bid surpluses to the respective property owners.

The certificate holders appealed. Appellants Kona Properties, LLC (“Kona”) and LienLogic REO FI, LLC (“LienLogic”) present three threshold issues, which we have rephrased: I. Whether the circuit court erred by not vacating the judgments foreclosing the right of redemption because Kona and LienLogic failed to effect service on Appellees WDB Corp. and NBS, Inc. II. Whether the circuit court erred in finding that Appel-lees had standing to bring their motion.

III

Whether the circuit court erred by not striking the judgments foreclosing the right of redemption based upon the motions of Baltimore City and Montego Bay Properties, LLC to strike the judgments because Kona and LienLogic failed to pay the taxes and bid surplus within 90 days of the entry of the judgments, pursuant to Tax-Property Article § 14-847(d). Appellant 2009 DRR-ETS, LLC (“DRR-ETS”) presents the following additional issue: IV. Whether the circuit court erred in denying its motion to strike the motion to enforce judgment filed by S & S Partnership because the motion did not reference applicable law as required by Maryland Rule 2-311(c). All three Appellants present the following issues for our consideration: V. Whether the court erred in relying upon the ruling in Hardisty v. Kay to hold that Appellees could enforce ⁵²⁷ the judgments against Appellants to obtain the surplus bid.

VI

Whether the court erred in failing to find that Appel-lees’ motions to enforce the judgments would lead to unjust enrichment.

VII

Whether enforcing the judgments against Appellants violates public policy. We hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in failing to strike the judgments foreclosing the right of redemption, nor err in entering judgments against the Appellants ordering them to pay the bid surpluses to Appellees. We further hold that Hardisty v. Kay remains good law and that the judgments do not violate public policy nor do they unjustly enrich Appellees. Background These cases contain a common thread tying each together and furnishing the reason we granted the motions to consolidate.

In each case, subsequent to the tax sale, the tax sale certificate was transferred to another limited liability company that shared either the same address, attorney and/or incorpo-rator. The new holder of the tax sale certificate foreclosed the property owner’s right of redemption and, for some unexplained reason, the certificate holder later decided that it did not want the property and failed to pay the bid price or the outstanding taxes and fees—payment of which is a prerequisite to obtaining the deed to the property. The original property owner or mortgage holder in each case later filed a motion in the circuit court to enforce the judgment against the certificate holder, requiring the certificate holder to pay taxes accruing after the tax sale and to pay the surplus bid to the property owner or mortgage holder. The circuit court granted all three motions to enforce and required the certificate holders to pay the taxes and bid surpluses to the collector. 4 ⁵²⁸ Tax Sale Statute To lay a foundation for understanding the mazy foreclosures on appeal, we begin with an explication of the tax sale statute and how the process should normally transpire.

The focus in the present appeal is whether; after the tax sale certificate holder obtains a judgment foreclosing the property owner’s right of redemption, the property owner can move to enforce the judgment ordering the certificate holder to pay the bid surplus to the property owner, and whether, in response, the certificate holder can move to strike or vacate the judgment it obtained earlier to avoid paying the bid surplus and interim taxes. Tax Sale and Payment of Back Taxes The tax sale procedure is set forth in Maryland Code (1985, 2012 Repl.Vol., 2014 Supp.), Tax-Property Article (“TP”) §§ 14-801 through -870. 5 “[F]or a tax sale to be effective substantial compliance with the statute is required.” Simms v. Scheve, 298 Md. 1, 3 , 467 A.2d 499 (1983) (citing Free v. Greene, 175 Md. 36, 42 , 199 A. 857 (1938); McMahon v. Crean, 109 Md. 652, 666 , 71 A. 995 (1909)). The Court of Appeals described the basic steps of the tax sale process: Unpaid taxes on real estate constitute a lien on that property. [§ 14-804]. Generally, within two years from the date taxes become in arrears the jurisdiction’s collector must sell the land. [§ 14-808].

Notice of the proposed sale must be given to the owner at least thirty days before the property is advertised for sale and the owner is notified that if he does not pay the taxes within thirty days, the property will be sold. [§ 14-812]. After the sale is properly advertised, the property is sold at public auction. [§ 14-817]. ⁵²⁹ Scheve v. Shudder, Inc., 328 Md. 363, 369-70 , 614 A.2d 582 (1992) (quoting Simms, 298 Md. at 3-4 , 467 A.2d 499 (citations omitted)), cited with approval in Quillens v. Moore, 399 Md. 97 , 923 A.2d 15 (2007). At the public sale, the purchaser pays the back taxes due on the property and is in turn “given a certifícate of sale which includes a description of the property, the amount for which the property was sold, and information as to the time in which an action to foreclose the owner’s right of redemption must be brought.” Id.; see § 14-820. It is important to note that the tax sale purchaser does not pay the entire bid price at the time of the tax sale.

The purchaser pays the back taxes, and the rest of the bid remains on credit, to be paid after the tax sale certificate holder forecloses the title owner’s right of redemption. The title owner of the property may redeem the property at any time until the right of redemption has been finally foreclosed by paying the required sum to the collector, who transfers the money to the tax sale purchaser in exchange for the tax sale certificate. Id.; see §§ 14-827 to 14-828. Foreclosing the Right of Redemption The purchaser’s ability to foreclose the right of redemption is defined under sections 14-832.1 to 14-848.

These provisions are to be [“construed to ensure a balance between: (1) the due process and redemption rights of persons that own or have an interest in property sold at a tax sale; and (2) the public policy of providing marketable title to property that is sold at a tax sale through the foreclosure of the right of redemption.”] [§ 14-832], The holder of the certificate of sale may file [a complaint] to foreclose the owner’s right of redemption after [six months (nine months in Baltimore City)] from the date of the sale.... The [complaint] must be filed within two years or the certificate is void. The owner may redeem the property at any time until the right of redemption has been finally foreclosed. [§ 14-833]. The purchaser initiates the foreclosure proceeding in the [circuit] court by filing a [complaint as detailed in § 14-835] ⁵³⁰ and attaching the certificate of sale issued by the collector . . . .” [ 6 ] Shudder, 328 Md. at 370-71 , 614 A.2d 582 .

The tax sale statute sets out several steps that must be complied with before a circuit court may enter a final judgment foreclosing the property owner’s right of redemption under § 14-844: (1) the certificate holder must file a complaint, conforming with § 14-835(a) within two years following the sale; (2) the certificate holder must attach the certificate of sale pursuant to § 14—835(b); (3) the certificate holder must attach an affidavit of title search (§ 14-838); and (4) the court must issue process and public notice under §§ 14-839 and 14-840, setting out the time after which the right of redemption will be foreclosed. Liability of the Certificate Holder to Pay Taxes Accruing after Tax Sale Once the court enters final judgment to foreclose the right of redemption, the holder of the tax sale certificate “immediately becomes liable for the payment of all taxes due and payable after the judgment____On the entry of judgment, the plaintiff shall pay the collector any surplus bid and all taxes together with interest and penalties on the taxes due on the property.” § 14-844(d). Section 14-831 clarifies that “[a]ll taxes accruing after the date of sale, together with interest and penalties on the taxes, are additional liens against the property and on passage of the final [judgment foreclosing the right of redemption], are immediately due and payable by the holder of the certificate of sale.” Thus, even though the taxes are not assessed to the certificate holder until the entry of final judgment, upon entry of that judgment, the certificate holder is liable for all taxes, interest, and penalties accruing after the tax sale. 7 § 14-831. Notably, even though the owner ⁵³¹ of the property may not redeem the property after the entry of final judgment, the certificate holder does not receive the deed, and thus, may not take possession of the property, until the certifícate holder pays the collector the surplus bid and all subsequent taxes on the property. § 14-831.

If the certificate holder does not pay the taxes in full, the property is left in limbo: the prior owner may not sell the property and knows that, as soon as the certificate holder pays the collector, it will no longer have title to the property, however, the certificate holder also does not have full rights to the property because the collector has not issued a deed to the certificate holder. Remedies for Further Failure to Pay Taxes The taxing entity, such as the City of Baltimore in the cases before this Court, may bring the property out of the limbo created by the certificate holder’s failure to pay the taxes accruing after the tax sale by selling the property pursuant to the lien against it at a second tax sale. See Prince George’s Homes, Inc. v. Cahn, 283 Md. 76, 79-80 , 389 A.2d 853 (1978). This solution comes with both limitations and costs.

During the two-year period in which a petition to foreclose the right of redemption may be filed, there can be no other tax sale, and taxes continue to accrue until the holder of the certifícate of sale has had an opportunity to file his petition and to secure a deed from the collector. See id. at 79-80, 81-83 , 389 A.2d 853 (holding that the city or county may not sell the property a second time until the court has entered final judgment or has dismissed the case). Once the ⁵³² foreclosure proceedings are concluded, however, resale of the property for nonpayment of taxes is permitted. If the certificate holder fails to pay the bid surplus and taxes on the property, the taxing entity may bring suit against the certificate holder pursuant to § 14-864 within seven years from the date the tax is due.

Thus, the City is limited by the statutory time frames from reselling the property quickly to obtain the delinquent taxes, and the City, as well as the judicial system, is burdened with the costs of having to repeat the tax sale foreclosure process. The failure to pay taxes accruing after the tax sale are pervasive issues in these consolidated cases. As we turn to address the merits of each case, we note that in each circumstance, the tax sale certificate holder, after receiving an entry of final judgment foreclosing the prior owner’s right of redemption, failed to pay the taxes accruing on the property after the tax sale and failed to pay the bid surplus to the owner, as required by §§ 14-831 and 14-844. This contributes to a cycle whereby the owners do not receive compensation for the property, yet cannot sell it otherwise, and the city must wait until the certificate holder forecloses the right of redemption—a process which may take years—before reselling the property to recoup the taxes that the certificate holder failed to pay after receiving final judgment.

We now recount the facts in each of the consolidated cases. Kona Properties, LLC v. WDB Corp. Inc. At some point before April 14, 2007, W.D.B. Corp., Inc. (“WDB”), the owner of a rowhouse • located at 5405 Park Heights Avenue, Baltimore near Pimlico Race Course, failed to pay the property taxes due to the City. On May 14, 2007, the Baltimore City tax collector held a public tax sale and sold the property to Heartwood 88, LLC (“Heartwood”). Heartwood bid $46,953.49 and paid the outstanding taxes on the property along with interest, penalties, and expenses incurred in making the sale, which amounted to $1,943.06. 8 On Novem ⁵³³ ber 16, 2007, Heartwood filed a complaint to foreclose the right of redemption.

Named in the complaint were defendants WDB, Goldscheider Family Trust, 9 Baltimore City, and “[a]ll unknown owners of the property described below; all ... persons having or claiming to have any interest in the property and premises situate[d] in the City of Baltimore,” as required by §§ 14-835 and 14-836. In the complaint, Heartwood averred that it complied with the requirements dictated by the tax sale statute as prerequisites to foreclosure of the right of redemption. Among other things, Heartwood averred (1) it is the owner of the tax sale certificate either by direct purchase or by assignment; (2) it conducted a title search for the past 40 years, which found that fee simple title or other legal interest was vested in the defendants named in the complaint; and (3) it sent two pre-suit notices of the tax sale to the interested parties. Heartwood requested that the court enter a final judgment foreclosing all rights of redemption of the defendants and of all persons having or claiming to have any interest in the property and vesting an absolute and indefeasible title in fee simple or leasehold to the property in Heartwood.

Heartwood also requested that the court send summons to the defendants and issue an order of publication, as required by § 14-840. On November 30, 2007 (entered December 1, 2007), Heartwood filed a separate notice to defendants, pursuant to then Maryland Rule 14—502(b)(3), 10 stating, “[you] are hereby noti ⁵³⁴ fied of the filing of this Complaint and are warned to redeem the property or to file an answer to the complaint on or before ... [t]he expiration date of the period described in the summons. ...” 11 Notice was advertised in The Daily Record and was posted on the property. A process server affirmed that, on February 11, 13, and 15, 2008, he attempted to serve WDB and its resident agent with process without success, and that on February 17, 2008, he personally served Edward Gold-scheider, a trustee for Goldscheider Family Trust. 12 Meanwhile, Heartwood assigned the entire right, title, and interest in the certificate of tax sale for 5405 Park Heights Avenue to Kona Properties, LLC (“Kona”), 13 as reflected in a line filed by Heartwood on October 30, 2012, substituting Kona as plaintiff. Attorneys Anthony J. De Laurentis, John K. Reiff, and John E. Reid represented both Heartwood and Kona. 14 ⁵³⁵ On October 31, 2008 (entered November 3, 2008), Kona certified that a process server was able to substitute service on WDB by serving Ella McDaniel, an administrative assistant at the State Department of Assessments and Taxation (“SDAT”) on June 2, 2008, pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-124(o). 15 On November 19, 2008, the court entered a judgment foreclosing the right of redemption of all known defendants.

The judgment vested in Kona an absolute and indefeasible leasehold title, free of encumbrances, except for taxes and municipal liens accruing after the tax sale. It ordered the Director of Finance to deliver a deed to Kona and ordered the Supervisor of Assessments of Baltimore City to enroll Kona as the leasehold owner of the rowhouse near Pimlico. However, Kona’s receipt of the deed was contingent on its payment of the bid surplus and all taxes, fees, and penalties accruing on the rowhouse after the tax sale. 16 § 14-847(a)(l) (“[T]he judgment of the court shall direct the collector to execute a deed to the holder of the certificate of sale in fee simple or in leasehold, as appropriate, on payment to the collector of the balance of the purchase price, due on account of the purchase price of the property, together with all taxes and interest and penalties on the property that accrue after the date of sale.”). After Kona received judgment foreclosing WDB’s right of redemption, Kona never paid the surplus bid to WDB or the taxes to the City of Baltimore on the Park Heights Avenue rowhouse.

A second tax lien was filed against the property, ⁵³⁶ and Baltimore City was forced to hold a second tax sale. After bidding on the property, Montego Bay Properties, LLC (“Montego Bay”)—another company, with the same resident agent and attorneys as Kona and Heartwood—received a tax sale certificate on July 15, 2010. Throughout this entire time, WDB never entered an appearance, answer, or contested the foreclosure proceedings; however, because neither Heartwood, Kona, nor Montego Bay paid the taxes and surplus bid, no tax sale certificate holder received a deed to the property, leaving WDB in possession of the rowhouse. More than two years later, on March 1, 2013, Montego Bay, as holder of the subsequent tax sale certificate, filed a motion to strike the judgment foreclosing the right of redemption (against WDB) entered on November 19, 2008, pursuant to § 14-847(d).

Montego Bay wanted to strike the judgment because it believed the judgment entered in favor of Kona created a cloud on title that could affect Montego Bay’s rights. It alleged that Kona had failed to pay the purchase price and taxes owed to the collector and that its subsequent tax sale certificate was prima facie evidence that payment by Kona was not made within 90 days as required by statute. Defendant WDB—having not answered the complaint five years earlier and having never received the bid surplus—opposed the motion and notified the court of a conflict of interest between Kona and Montego Bay resulting from the fact that they were under common ownership and represented by the same counsel. WDB argued that the Montego Bay tax sale did not affect the case before the court—viz., Kona owed WDB the bid balance irrespective of a tax sale that took place after the court entered judgment foreclosing the right of redemption.

On March 21, 2013, by the request of the court, Baltimore City responded to the motion to strike judgment, confirming that Kona never picked up the deed for the property at 5405 Park Heights Avenue and never tendered payment for the balance of the purchase price or subsequent tax liens that accrued, causing the property to be placed in the 2010 tax sale. WDB filed a Motion to Enforce Judgment against Kona for the surplus bid owed to WDB as the owner of the property ⁵³⁷ before the tax sale, pursuant to the Court of Appeals’ holding in Hardisty v. Kay, discussed infra. WDB stated that “the residue of the purchase price, $45,010.43 ([ ]“surplus bid”) remained on credit, pursuant to § 14-818(a)(l)(i), Tax-Property Art....” and, “following entry of said Order granting judgment [foreclosing the right of redemption] Kona [] has failed to pay the City as collector its surplus bid amount of $45,010.43 as required by Tax-Property Art. § 14-844(d).” Kona opposed the motion to enforce judgment, by asserting, aberrantly, that because it had not effected proper service on defendant WDB, the court did not have personal jurisdiction over WDB and so the court could not now enforce the judgment. As explained in more detail in our discussion below, Kona also argued that Hardisty v. Kay has been superseded by changes to the tax sale statute, and therefore the title property owner could not enforce the judgment to receive the bid surplus from the certificate holder.

On May 9, 2014, the circuit court held a hearing to resolve the outstanding motions in this case, along with the two other cases consolidated on appeal. After a hearing on May 9, 2014, addressing the motions of all parties in these appeals, Judge Charles J. Peters entered three orders on May 13, 2014 granting Appellees’ respective motions to enforce judgment and requiring Kona and the other Appellants to pay the bid surpluses and taxes due to the collector pursuant to the Court of Appeals’ holdings in Scheve v. Shudder and Hardisty v. Kay. Kona noted a timely appeal on June 11, 2014. Also on June 11, 2014, WDB filed a motion to alter or amend the May 13, 2014, order to reflect that Kona is required to pay WDB the surplus bid, in the amount of $45,010.43 plus post-judgment interest so the amount could be reduced to a money judgment and operate as a lien on the property.

On August 7, 2014, the court granted the motion in part, ordering “that a monetary judgment in the amount of the bid surplus, $45,010.43, is granted against Substituted Plaintiff Kona Properties, LLC and in favor of Defendant W.D.B. Corp., Inc.” 17 ⁵³⁸ LienLogic REO F1 LLC v. N.B.S., Inc. The second case presents a similar factual scenario to the one described above. The title owner of the property, 3015 Virginia Avenue LLC, failed to pay the taxes due. On May 17, 2010, the Baltimore City tax collector held a public tax sale and sold the single family home located at 3015 Virginia Avenue, also near Pimlico, to ETS Maryland, LLC. ETS bid $43,935.24 and paid the outstanding taxes on the property along with interest, penalties, and expenses incurred in making the sale, which amounted to $3,253.58.

On May 18, 2011, ETS Maryland filed a complaint to foreclose the right of redemption, which named as defendants 3015 Virginia Avenue LLC, N.B.S., Inc. (“NBS”), James W. Holderness, Trustee, Daniel Menchel, Trustee, Baltimore City, and all persons having or claiming to have any interest in the property. Similar to the Kona case, in the complaint, ETS averred that it complied with the requirements dictated by the tax sale statute as prerequisites to foreclosing of the right of redemption and that it had served the defendants. The process server affirmed by affidavit that, on June 30, 2011, he personally served Harriette Ladson, the resident agent for 3015 Virginia Avenue LLC, and, on July 5, 2011, he personally served Ben Seiderman, a staff member for NBS. ETS assigned the certificate of tax sale for the 3015 Virginia Avenue property to LienLogic REO FI, LLC (“LienLogic”), and substituted LienLogic as plaintiff on October 1, 2012.

As in the Kona case, ETS and LienLogic were represented by William M. O’Connell and Stefan B. Ades, both operating out of the same office as Anthony J. De Laurentis, John K. Reiff, and John E. Reid—3604 Eastern Avenue, Suite # 300. 18 Also on October 1, 2012, LienLogic filed an affidavit of compliance and request for judgment that substantiated the claims and relief prayed for in the original complaint filed by ⁵³⁹ ETS. The affidavit of compliance detailed the methods of service and affirmed that service was proper on all defendants. The circuit court entered a judgment on December 5, 2012, foreclosing the rights of redemption of the defendants and allowing LienLogic to obtain the 'deed to the property contingent upon its payment of the bid surplus and all taxes, fees, and penalties accruing after the tax sale. § 14-847(a)(l). Similar to the Kona case, LienLogic did not pay the bid surplus, taxes and fees, and did not receive the deed to the property.

Again as in the Kona case, on March 7, 2013, months after the court entered judgment foreclosing the right of redemption, NBS answered the complaint to foreclose its right of redemption and asked the court to enter a monetary judgment against LienLogic for the surplus bid owed to NBS under a purchase money deed of trust, dated October 25, 1994. Lien-Logic also moved to vacate the judgment foreclosing the right of redemption arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction because the property owner was not properly served. 19 After the May 9, 2014 hearing, mentioned supra, on May 13, 2014, Judge Peters entered the orders discussed supra, including an order directing LienLogic to pay the bid surplus and taxes due. The court also denied LienLogic’s motion to vacate. LienLogic noted a timely appeal on June 11, 2014.

On July 8, 2014, after LienLogic noted its appeal to this court, NBS asked the circuit court to enter a money judgment for payment of the surplus bid in the amount of $40,681.66. On August 7, 2014, the court granted the motion and entered an amended order. 2009 DRR-ETS LLC v. S & S Partnership In the third case, similar to the first two, a bidder purchased the tax sale certificate for a property in Baltimore ⁵⁴⁰ City, assigned the tax sale certificate to a different, but related, LLC, which subsequently foreclosed the right of redemption. 20 Approximately one year later, on November 18, 2013, S & S Partnership asked the court to enter a monetary judgment against ETS for the surplus bid owed to S & S Partnership as a mortgagee of the property under a mortgage assigned from the title property owner. DRR-ETS moved to strike or, in the alternative, opposed the motion by asserting grounds similar to those argued by the two tax sale certificate holders in the two other cases consolidated here. After the May 9, 2014 hearing, mentioned supra, on May 13, 2014, Judge Peters entered the orders discussed supra, including an order directing DRR-ETS to pay the bid surplus and taxes due and denying its motion to vacate.

DRR-ETS noted a timely appeal on June 11, 2014. 21 Discussion I. Post-Judgment Proceedings In each case, subsequent to the entry of judgment the defendant below requested that the circuit court amend the order to reflect the exact amount owed by the certificate holder. 22 We do not decide the propriety of the circuit court’s ⁵⁴¹ entry of particular monetary judgments, 23 because no party appealed from the amended orders. 24 The question remains whether the May 2014 orders from which Appellants appealed were final judgments. For there to be an entry of a final judgment that triggers the time for filing an appeal, the following must be present in the record: a final judgment that has the effect of putting the ⁵⁴² parties out of court, set out in a separate document that specifies the judgment and that is a document separate from the docket entry. Hiob v. Progressive Am. Ins.

Co., 440 Md. 466, 503 , 103 A.3d 596 (2014). The document must declare judicial action that grants or denies specific relief in an unqualified way. Id. Further, the document must have been signed by the judge or the clerk, and, finally, the clerk must have docketed the judgment in accordance with the practice of the court.

Id. To be a final judgment in the traditional sense, an order must not only settle an entire claim but also must “be intended by the court as an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy!!]” Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 40 , 566 A.2d 767 (1989). An order is an “unqualified final disposition” if it determines and concludes the rights involved, or denies the appellant the means of further prosecuting or defending his rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding. Schuele v. Case Handyman & Remodeling Servs., LLC, 412 Md. 555, 570-71 , 989 A.2d 210 (2010).

The orders granting, inter alia, Appellees’ motions to enforce judgment from which Appellants appealed constituted final judgments because they were entered as separate documents from the docket entry, were signed by the judge, and decided the issue of whether Appellants were obligated to pay the bid surplus and taxes, interest and penalties due under the original judgments to foreclose redemption rights. The orders had the hallmark of finality in that they put the parties out of court. The bid surplus is a sum certain and is calculated by subtracting the amount the bidder paid in taxes and fees at the tax sale to obtain the tax sale certificate from the amount bid on the property. TP § 14-818(a)(l).

By directing Appellants to, “within 30 days of the date of this Order, pay the Collector any surplus bid and all taxes together with interest and penalties on the taxes due on” the properties, there was nothing left for the court to do to ensure that Appellees received the bid surplus because the parties knew the amount of the bid surplus pursuant to TP § 14-818(a)(l)— and therefore knew exactly how much they had to pay. 25 ⁵⁴³ Normally, to receive the bid surplus, the former property owner requests the surplus funds from the collector. For example, in Allstate Mortgage & Co. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City, the party entitled to the bid surplus did not request that the court determine the amount of the bid surplus and instead went directly to the collector to receive the sum. 214 Md.App. 395, 398 , 76 A.3d 492 (2013). This is because the tax sale statute provides that the collector is required to pay this amount to the person entitled to it, unless there is a dispute regarding the “proper distribution of the balance.” TP § 14-818(a)(4)(ii). It was not necessary for the Appellees to request the amended judgments in order to receive the bid surpluses.

They would have received the bid surpluses from the collector soon after Appellants paid the collector, as they were required to do by the orders. As stated in their motions to amend judgment, however, the Appellees requested monetary judgments in order to avail themselves of the enforcement procedures contained in the Maryland Rules (and not because the sum owed was uncertain). Therefore, the orders entered by the court on May 9, 2014 were not qualified in any sense— they determined and concluded the rights involved by requiring Appellants to pay the Collector any surplus bid and all taxes together with interest and penalties.

II

Standing and Jurisdiction to Enter Judgment Foreclosing the Right of Redemption We quickly dispense with the threshold standing and jurisdiction arguments made by Appellants LienLogic and Kona Properties. Appellants contend the circuit court did not have jurisdiction under Maryland Rule 2-507(b) to enforce the judgments against them because Appellees NBS and WDB were never properly served. They also make the corollary argument that Appellees do not possess standing to enforce ⁵⁴⁴ the judgment because the court did not obtain jurisdiction over them. Appellees counter that Appellants cannot assert the due process rights of Appellees and that, even if they could, Appellants performed valid service on WDB, and NBS had actual notice of the proceedings.

Further, Appellees maintain they have voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, which gives them standing to enforce the judgment. Finally, Appellees argue that Appellants cannot now contest service because they had previously submitted affidavits to the court stating that proper service was effected in each case. The Court of Appeals in Shudder, supra, confronted and rejected arguments similar to those Appellants now make. 328 Md. 363 , 614 A.2d 582 . That case also presented factual circumstances similar to those of the instant case—“where the tax sale purchaser has filed suit to foreclose the right of redemption and taken all necessary steps to perfect the foreclosure of the right of redemption, but thereafter changed its mind.” 328 Md. at 366 , 614 A.2d 582 .

In Shudder, the Scheves were tax sale certificate holders who appealed the entry of judgment foreclosing the rights of redemption by the appellees, Shudder, Inc. and Bama, Inc. Id. The Scheves attempted to assert Shudder’s rights to dismiss the case because the Scheves failed to conform to the requirements for certifying service of process. Id. at 375 , 614 A.2d 582 . The Court described the Scheves’ argument: The Scheves’ next contention is that the circuit court could not enter a final judgment since they did not comply with the notice provisions of § 14-839; specifically, the Scheves point to their own failure to file an affidavit certifying the method and time of service. § 14—839(a)(5).

Thus, they argue, all the prerequisites under the statute were not met and the circuit court was without jurisdiction. Id. In rejecting this argument, the Court stated: Our prior case law indicates that the requirement of filing an affidavit of service of process is not a jurisdictional requirement where there are no allegations that the owners ⁵⁴⁵ lacked notice of the foreclosure proceedings. See Hauver v. Dorsey, 228 Md. 499, 503-04 , 180 A.2d 475, 478 (1962).

The Scheves’ contention has no merit. The defendants here have all been personally served with process and have submitted to the court’s jurisdiction in these proceedings by filing motions for judgment. In addition, the Scheves are not the proper party to raise issues concerning the notice provisions. The Legislature intended property owners, not tax sale purchasers, to be the beneficiaries of the tax sale notice provisions and enacted these provisions to provide greater due process protection for them.

See St. George Church v. Aggarwal, 326 Md. 90, 96 , 603 A.2d 484, 487 (1992). Id. at 375-76 , 614 A.2d 582 (emphasis added). As made crystal clear by the Court in Shudder, tax sale purchasers “are not the proper parties] to raise issues concerning the notice provisions.” Id. Tax sale certificate holders retain all the right, title, and interest of the original purchasers. § 14-821.

Thus, in the instant case, Appellants, as tax sale certificate holders, cannot assert allegedly defective service as justification for vacating the judgment foreclosing the rights to redeem. The circuit court, therefore, had authority to enforce the judgments against Kona and LienLogic. In sharp contrast to Shudder, where there was a failure to file an affidavit certifying the method and time of service, here such affidavits were filed, and Appellants assert that their own affidavits incorrectly claimed that service was proper. 26 Additional support for the propriety of the circuit court’s orders against Kona and LienLogic derives from the undisputed fact that Appellees had actual notice of the respective actions. Appellee NBS filed an affidavit stating that NBS received service, and counsel proffered that Charles “Bud” ⁵⁴⁶ Runkles would testify, as an officer of both NBS and WDB, that Appellees each received notice of the actions.

For these reasons, we hold that the circuit court did not err in disregarding Appellants’ challenges to jurisdiction. See Shudder, 328 Md. at 375 , 614 A.2d 582 . Moreover, because Appellants cannot dispute the validity of the judgments on jurisdictional grounds, we also reject Appellants’ arguments that Appellees lacked standing to file their motions to enforce judgment.

III

Motions to Strike for Failure to Pay Taxes Accruing after Tax Sale Appellants LienLogic and Kona assert that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the motions to strike filed by Baltimore City and Montego Bay Properties, respectively. 27 Generally, a judgment foreclosing the right of redemption is conclusive after 30 days. Section 14-845(a) (“A court in the State may not reopen a judgment rendered in a tax sale foreclosure proceeding except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or fraud in the conduct of the proceedings to foreclose.”); see also Maryland Rule 2-535. Section 14—847(d)(1), the statute invoked by Montego Bay Properties, provides: If the holder of the certificate of sale does not comply with the terms of the final judgment of the court within 90 days as to payments to the collector of the balance of the purchase price due on account of the purchase price of the property and of all taxes, interest, and penalties that accrue after the date of sale, that judgment may be stricken by the court on the motion of an interested party for good cause shown. ⁵⁴⁷ Consistent with the above statute, because the certificate holders failed to pay the surplus bid and the taxes that accrued after the tax sale, the court could have stricken the judgment that foreclosed the property owners’ (Appellees’) rights of redemption, for good cause shown. However, even though Baltimore City and Montego Bay respectively moved to strike the judgment, the court denied their motions.

In reviewing the decision of the circuit court, “the only issue before the appellate court is whether the trial court erred as a matter of law or abused its discretion in denying the motion.” Canaj, Inc. v. Baker & Div. Phase III, LLC, 391 Md. 374, 400-01 , 893 A.2d 1067 (2006) (quoting In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 93321055/CAD, 344 Md. 458, 475 , 687 A.2d 681 , cert. denied sub nom. Clemy P. v. Montgomery County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 520 U.S. 1267 , 117 S.Ct. 2439 , 138 L.Ed.2d 199 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We first note that § 14-847(d)(l) vests discretionary power in the circuit court—the “judgment may be stricken by the court.” (Emphasis added). Accordingly, the determination of what constitutes “good cause” is also within the discretion of the court. A circuit court abuses its discretion when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the court, “or when the court acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles.” In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295, 312 , 701 A.2d 110 (1997) (quoting North v. North, 102 Md.App. 1, 13 , 648 A.2d 1025 (1994)) (internal citations, alterations, and quotations omitted). In their respective motions, Baltimore City and Montego Bay Properties recited the predicates to judicial action pursuant to § 14-847(d)(l)—that the tax sale certificate holder had not complied “with the terms of the final judgment of the court within 90 days as to payments to the collector of the balance of the purchase price due on account of the purchase price of the property and of all taxes, interest, and penalties that accrue after the date of sale.” However, the motions stopped there; they did not elucidate any other reason to strike the judgment.

Appellee WDB opposed the motion to strike filed by Montego Bay Properties, arguing that Montego ⁵⁴⁸ Bay Properties failed to show good cause—any reason to strike the judgment beyond the failure to pay taxes. WDB also asserted that Montego Bay Properties and Appellant Kona Properties are under common ownership and represented by the same counsel; thus, because of an extant conflict of interest, the motion to strike should not be granted. NBS did not file a response opposing Baltimore City’s motion to strike; however, during the hearing, counsel for Baltimore City stated that the City is not concerned about whether the court enters an order directing a monetary judgment for the property owners. In these circumstances, we cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion in not finding good cause to strike the judgments foreclosing the right of redemption.

Neither Baltimore City nor Montego Bay Properties specified “good cause” to strike the judgments, i.e., they did not provide the court with evidence of anything more than the threshold requirement for striking the judgments—that the certificate holders had not made payment to the collector within 90 days.

IV

Motion to Strike by 2009 DRR-ETS, LLC In the proceedings before the circuit court, Appellant DRR-ETS asked the court to strike, pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-311(c), S & S Properties’ motion to enforce judgment because the motion allegedly did not reference the appropriate sections of the