Kranz v. State

Berger, J. William Louis Kranz, appellant, was convicted, following a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Cecil County, of two counts each of assault in the first degree and reckless endangerment. The court then sentenced Kranz to a total term of five years’ imprisonment, to be followed by three years’ supervised probation. Thereafter, Kranz filed a petition, under the Maryland Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act, seeking to vacate his convictions on the ground that the State had committed a Brady violation—that, at the time of his trial, an Assistant State’s Attorney in Cecil County, although not involved in Kranz’s criminal case, was representing the two victims in that case in a separate civil action against Kranz, arising out of the same incident, but that that conflict had not been disclosed to the defense. The postconviction court ruled that the State had, indeed, failed to make a required disclosure to Kranz, but it nonetheless denied his petition on the basis that the State’s ⁶⁰³ nondisclosure was not “material” because it did not “create a reasonable probability of a different result.” Subsequently, Kranz filed an application for leave to appeal from that decision, which this Court granted.

It, therefore, appeared that the issue before us was whether the postconviction court had erred in concluding that the State’s nondisclosure was not “material” and, concomitantly, whether the postconviction court had applied the correct materiality standard under the facts of this case. 1 However, unbeknownst to the applications panel, sometime after Kranz had filed his application for leave to appeal but prior to the granting of that application, Kranz completed serving his sentence, including the three-year probationary period. In its brief, the State has included a motion to dismiss, asserting that, upon the completion of Kranz’s sentence, this Court was divested of appellate jurisdiction and therefore must dismiss this appeal. For the reasons that follow, we shall grant that motion, BACKGROUND We quote the memorandum opinion of the posteonviction court for factual background: ⁶⁰⁴ Kranz was convicted of first degree assault and reckless endangerment by a jury in the Circuit Court for Cecil County, for shooting victims Brandi Schaffer and George McSwain when they were accidentally driving on his property. After his conviction, but before sentencing, Kranz learned that Ms. Schaffer and Mr. McSwain had filed a civil suit against him over the same incident.

They were seeking damages in excess of one million dollars. They obtained Kevin Urick as counsel in the civil suit. Mr. Urick (hereafter ASA Urick) serves as a full time [Assistant [Sjtate’s [Ajttorney while also maintaining a private practice. [2] As an ASA, Mr. Urick worked under the State’s Attorney, Christopher Eastridge: the prosecuting attorney in Mr. Kranz’s criminal trial. ASA Urick was in no way involved in the criminal prosecution of Mr. Kranz and had no contact with Mr. Eastridge regarding preparation for the case.

However, Mr. Eastridge was aware of ASA Urick’s representation of Ms. Schaffer and Mr. McSwain in the civil suit and at no time disclosed this information to Mr. Kranz nor to his attorney. Mr. Kranz’s criminal trial may reasonably be considered close as he was tried twice as a result of a hung jury in his first trial. [3] In the latter trial the [Sjtate’s case was put on primarily by use of circumstantial evidence as the [Sjtate was not able to present any direct evidence against Mr. Kranz. Likewise, victims Ms. Schaffer and Mr. McSwain were the [Sjtate’s key witnesses. The record states that neither Ms. Schaffer nor Mr. McSwain could positively identify Mr. Kranz as the shooter and instead could only testify as to seeing a shadowy figure immediately prior to the shots being fired.

Mr. Kranz’s trial counsel cross-exam ⁶⁰⁵ ined both witnesses but ultimately was unsuccessful in persuading the jury to find in favor of Mr. Kranz. After the jury’s verdict but prior to being sentenced, Mr. Kranz was notified of the civil suit filed against him by Ms. Schaffer and Mr. McSwain. Subsequently, he notified his trial counsel of the information. Prior to sentencing defense counsel filed a motion for new trial that did not include claims regarding a Brady violation by the [Sjtate for failing to disclose ASA Urick’s representation of Ms. Schaffer and Mr. McSwain in the civil suit.

The trial court denied this motion. Mr. Kranz filed an appeal on August 17, 2009. On September 23, 2009 another motion for new trial was filed. A hearing for this new trial motion was held on December 11, 2009 before Judge Kahl.

This motion was denied. Subsequently, the Court of Special Appeals issued Judge Moylan’s unreported opinion on November 9, 2010 affirming Judge Kahl’s denial of Mr. Kranz’s motion for a newtrial. [4] Kranz v. State, No. 07-K-06-000806, slip op. at 2-3 (Cecil Cnty. Cir. Ct. May 20, 2013). Kranz was sentenced, on July 31, 2009, to two consecutive five-year sentences for the first-degree assault convictions, the latter suspended, to be followed by three years’ probation. 5 He was thereafter released (apparently through operation of diminution credits, see Correctional Services Article, §§ 3-701 to ⁶⁰⁶ 3-711), and his probation concluded on April 7, 2015. 6 Thereafter, on August 31, 2016, his application for leave to appeal from the denial of his postconviction petition was granted.

As we shall see, that timeline is crucial to our disposition of the instant appeal. DISCUSSION I. This appeal turns upon an issue of statutory construction, which is a question of law that we review de novo. Moore v. State, 388 Md. 446, 452 , 879 A.2d 1111 (2005). The canons of statutory construction are well settled and begin with the “cardinal rule”—that is, we must “ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature.” Jamison v. State, 450 Md. 387 , 396 n.9, 148 A.3d 1267 (2016) (citation and quotation omitted). “In ascertaining legislative intent, we first examine the plain language of the statute, and if the plain language of the statute is unambiguous and consistent with the statute's apparent purpose, we give effect to the statute as it is written.” Id.

II

Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol.),. Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”), § 7-101, the first section of the Maryland Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act, provides as follows: This title applies to a person convicted in any court in the State who is: (1) confined under sentence of imprisonment; or ⁶⁰⁷ (2) on parole or probation. (Emphasis added.) That provision, known as the “custody” requirement, Obomighie v. State, 170 Md.App. 708 , 712 n.2, 908 A.2d 132 , cert. denied, 396 Md. 13 , 912 A.2d 649 (2006) (citing McMannis v. State, 311 Md. 534, 539 , 536 A.2d 652 (1988)), “is jurisdictional in nature.” Id. at 713 , 908 A.2d 132 .

In Obomighie , we examined the application of that jurisdictional requirement to a person who, at an earlier stage of a postconviction proceeding, had been eligible to seek relief under the Act, but subsequently, during the pendency of that proceeding, became ineligible because he had finished serving his sentence. For reasons that will become clear, Obomighie bears closer scrutiny. Obomighie had been convicted of assault in the second degree and sentenced to a term of eighteen months’ imprisonment, all of which was suspended in favor of eighteen months’ supervised probation. Id. at 710 , 908 A.2d 132 .

While on probation, he filed a postconviction petition, but, before a hearing could be scheduled and his petition heard, Obomighie completed serving his sentence. Id. The postconviction court subsequently conducted a hearing and “entered an order dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction because Obomighie was no longer on probation.” Id. He filed an application for leave to appeal from that ruling, which this Court granted, and, thereafter, we affirmed the postconviction court’s order, dismissing Obomighie’s petition for lack of jurisdiction.

Especially pertinent here, we noted that the “apparent conflict” between CP § 7-101, “which limits the scope of the title, and the jurisdiction of the circuit court, to persons imprisoned or on parole or probation,” and CP § 7-102, 7 which (subject to the ten-year statute of ⁶⁰⁸ limitations, CP § 7-103), “on its face, permits initiating” a postconviction proceeding “at any time,” was resolved by the Court of Appeals in