Krymski v. Kupidlowski

Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a suit for slander, and the appeal is from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The record contains three exceptions, the first and third of which are to rulings of the court below on the evidence, and the second to certain action of the court which the defeni lant has treated as a rejection of a prayer, offered by him at ‘¡lie conclusion of the plaintiff’s testimony, to take the case from the jury. The plaintiff’s son, a young man of about eighteen years of age, had testified that he was with the plaintiff when she went to the store of the defendant to pay him a bill, the correctness of which had been previously questioned by the plaintiff, and that, when the plaintiff entered the defendant’s store, the defendant cursed her, using the words set out iu the declaration, and grabbed her by the arm and pushed her out of the store, and that the conduct of the defendant made the plaintiff “very nervous.” The witness was then asked by counsel for plaintiff what the plaintiff said when she got home.

The court overruled the defendant’s objection to the question, and the first exception is to that ruling. The question does not appear to have been answered by the witness, and the trial court so states in a note to the bill of exception. The defendant could not, therefore, have been injured by the ruling complained of. 2 Poe, Pl. & Pr., sec. 314; King v. Zell & Merceret, 105 Md. 435 . A part of the alleged slanderous statement made by the defendant was in the Polish language and a part in English, and the third exception is to the refusal of the court below to permit the defendant to ask his own witness the following question’: “Q. The declaration states that the words inelud ⁶⁵⁸ ing the two English words are in Polish, and then proceeds to translate all in the English language.

Will you state to the gentlemen of the jury whether a Pole of ordinary intelligence, an intelligent Pole, would use the language as contained in this declaration ?” It is apparent that there was no error in this ruling. The only questions involved were (1) whether the defendant used the language set out in the declaration, and (2) whether the words spoken were actionable. Whether an “intelligent Pole,” or another person, would have used such language was entirely immaterial. At the