LaChance v. LaChance

Orth, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The martial attitude of William George LaChance (Husband) and Georgina C. LaChance (Wife) did not end with the dissolution of their marital status. The war between them over their domestic difficulties, marked by numerous skirmishes, both judicial and extra-judicial, could have ceased upon the signing of a decree on 14 January 1975 by the chancellor in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. 1 Each could have withdrawn from the field of battle without dishonor; neither was obliged to surrender unconditionally. Both obtained what they primarily sought — the termination of their status as husband and wife by the grant of a divorce a vinculo matrimonii on the ground of voluntary separation.

Code, art. 16, § 24. The decree also determined the custody of their minor children, provided for the support of the children, and bestowed visitation rights. It disposed of the property of Husband and Wife as they had previously ⁵⁷³ agreed. And it further ordered that Husband pay Wife $20 a week “not to exceed a period of two years accounting from December 20, 1974.” It was the last that rankled Husband.

Not that he deemed the amount unreasonable considering her need and his ability to pay. It was simply, it seems, that he did not want to pay her anything at all. So husband, not content to live in peace, renewed hostilities, this time on the appellate level. Wife did not counterattack by way of cross-appeal, but she defended her position resolutely.

The decree was the result of a Supplemental Bill of Complaint filed by Wife on 2 October 1974 in the action then pending. By it she sought a divorce a vinculo matrimonii on the ground of voluntary separation, and in it she prayed, among other relief sought, that she “be awarded a reasonable sum as permanent alimony.” Courts Art. § 3-603. Answering the Supplemental Bill, Husband alleged: “By paragraph 8 of the Separation Agreement between the parties [Wife] waived her right to claim technical alimony, the only type of alimony this Court has jurisdiction to award, by agreeing to non-technical alimony, if she is so entitled.” 2 The precise language of the decretal order for support of Wife read thus: “ORDERED that the said WILLIAM GEORGE LaCHANCE also pay unto the said GEORGINA C. LaCHANCE, the sum of Twenty Dollars ($20.00) per week as alimony, also payable bi-weekly [ 3 ] at the rate of Forty Dollars ($40.00) and payable through the Probation Department of this Honorable Court, and not to exceed a period of two years accounting from December 20, 1974, all subject to the further order of the Court in the premises, . . . .” The decree contained a further order “that the pertinent terms of the agreement by and between the parties hereto ⁵⁷⁴ dated September 27, 1973, be and they are hereby approved and made a part hereof as if fully set forth herein, . . . A statement filed on appeal pursuant to Maryland Rule 1026, § g, described the Agreement: 4 “The Agreement contained the facts of the marriage, the date of the separation, the voluntariness of the separation, the names, ages and other provisions relating to the custody and support of the minor children of the parties and the settlement of the property rights of the parties.” It quoted paragraph 8 of the Agreement: “It is agreed between the parties hereto that the Wife hereby reserves her claim to alimony, maintenance and support.

The Wife further agrees that she will not assert said claim until one of the parties hereto files action for an absolute divorce, and if so filed for a period of time not to exceed two (2) years.” An executed original of the Agreement, received in evidence, shows on its face that the concluding phrase of paragraph 8 — “and if so filed for a period of time not to exceed two (2) years” — was added after the Agreement was first typed. The initials of Wife and the initials of Husband are subscribed at the end of the phrase to attest its addition. 5 Husband argues on the premise that the chancellor awarded non-technical alimony and therefore erred by directing payment of an amount “not specifically agreed between the parties hereby modifying the contractual agreement of the parties as to the amount of alimony.” It is his position, as best we understand it, that Wife, by agreeing to limit the period during which she was to receive support, waived any right to technical alimony, and by failing to designate an agreed amount to be paid for her support and maintenance, precluded the court from setting an amount in ⁵⁷⁵ the decree as non-technical alimony. Wife, claiming that although technical alimony may not be enlarged upon, it may be restricted, contends that it was indeed technical alimony the chancellor awarded, and that he had authority to award it for a period of only two years. We are not in complete accord with the position of either Husband or Wife.

Powers, J., speaking for this Court in Simpson v. Simpson, 18 Md. App. 626 (1973), after carefully considering the cases of the Court of Appeals concerning the question whether money allowance for a wife’s support was alimony or not, at 628-629, concisely summarized the law as established: “1. Alimony is a money allowance payable under a judicial decree by a husband at stated intervals to his wife, or former wife, during their joint lives or until the remarriage of the wife, so long as they live separately, for her support and maintenance. t 6 l a. It must terminate on the remarriage of the wife. b. It must terminate on the death of the wife. c.

It must terminate on the death of the husband. d. If the parties have entered into an agreement providing for payments which meet the required characteristics of alimony, the court may adopt the agreement in ordering the payment of alimony. e. Alimony ordered by the court is always subject to reconsideration and modification by the court in the light of changed circumstances. ⁵⁷⁶ f. Payment of alimony may be enforced by the court by the exercise of its contempt power including attachment and imprisonment of the person. 2, If the parties have entered into an agreement providing for payments which do not meet all of the requirements of alimony, the court may nonetheless incorporate all or part of the agreement in its decree.

However, the obligation to pay rests upon the agreement of the parties, and does not become alimony. a. Such payments may not be modified by the court in the absence of collusion, mistake or fraud. [ 7 ] b. Such payments do not take the character of alimony because they are described as alimony. c. Such payments do not take the character of alimony because the parties by their agreement or the court in its decree attempt to give the court or reserve continuing jurisdiction to modify the payments. d.

Such payments, if approved by a decree of the court, may be enforced by the court by the exercise of its contempt power, including attachment and imprisonment of the person.” [ 8 ] ⁵⁷⁷ It is manifest that alimony is sui generis. A money allowance payable to a wife must meet the definition of alimony precisely or it is not alimony. The elements of alimony may not be enlarged, and they may not be diminished. Neither more nor less than alimony is alimony.

What constitutes alimony depends, not upon what the money allowance is called, but upon who is to receive it, who is to pay it and how long it is to be paid. The payment of alimony can no more be extended beyond the marriage or death of the former wife than it can be limited to a period short of the happening of those events. 9 By clause 8 of the Agreement, Husband and Wife agreed that Wife reserved her “claim to alimony, maintenance and support.” Wife agreed, (1) not to assert such claim until either Husband or Wife filed an action for an absolute divorce, and (2) if so filed, she would not seek to have such allowance paid to her for longer than two years. Paragraph 8 is notable first, by the omission of a designated amount to be paid Wife by Husband, and, second, by the addition of the clause limiting the period for which she is to receive the allowance. We believe that when Wife agreed to restrict whatever allowance was paid her by Husband to a period of time not to exceed two years, she thereby relinquished any claim to alimony.

As we have seen, contrary to Wife’s view, such a limitation is not consistent with alimony, so that the addition of the phrase limiting the period of payment negated the reservation of alimony. This leaves paragraph 8 reading that Elusband and Wife agree that Wife reserves her ⁵⁷⁸ claim to maintenance and support, as distinguished from alimony. The two qualifications agreed to by Wife remain in full force and effect, however, with regard to maintenance and support. She shall not seek maintenance and support until one of the parties files an action for an absolute divorce, and, in any event, she shall not seek payment of maintenance and support for a period in excess of two