LaGrange v. Hinton

ALPERT, Judge. Alexander LaGrange, appellant, appeals the decision (grant of appellee’s motion and denial of his cross-motion for summary judgment) of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, which upheld an order of the Orphans’ Court. The Orphans’ Court rescinded its October 13, 1987 order, which established appellant as personal representative of his mother’s estate (the late Lucille A. LaGrange), ostensibly because appellant had been convicted of an unnatural or perverted sexual practice (oral sex; see Md.Code Article 27, § 554). In his stead, the Orphans’ Court, by its order of August 4, 1988, placed Linda Hinton, appellee and daughter of Lucille LaGrange, as successor personal representative. ²⁹⁶ Lucille LaGrange passed away on August 22, 1987.

She left behind four children, two of whom are parties in the present action. Her will, admitted to probate, listed appellant as personal representative and appellee as successor personal representative. On August 27, 1987, acting upon appellee’s petition for judicial probate, the Orphans’ Court for Anne Arundel County appointed appellee as special administrator contingent upon the filing of proper papers and the posting of a $10,000 bond. The reason for the court’s August 27, 1987 order apparently rested, in part, on appellant’s conviction.

Although her brother, Alexander LaGrange, was named as Personal Representative in the Last Will & Testament, he has been convicted and is awaiting sentence for a crime he committed. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS Appellant filed a petition for probate on September 21, 1987, listing himself as personal representative. Subsequently, on October 6, 1987, the court conducted a hearing. The court listened to the various testimonies and arguments, and received two exhibits.

Shortly thereafter, on October 13, 1987, the court issued its decision, in which it appointed appellant as personal representative of Lucille LaGrange’s estate upon his filing of the proper papers and the posting of a $10,000 bond. Appellant did not post the bond. Appellee took an appeal of the court’s October 13th order to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. She dismissed that appeal, pursuant to a stipulation between the parties, on June 20, 1988.

Two days later, appellant sent a letter to the Orphans’ Court requesting that it grant him “letters of administration.” Much to appellant’s dismay, the court, on August 4, 1988, apparently acting sua sponte, rescinded its previous order of October 13, 1987. Appellant’s attorney dispatched a letter to the court, in which he requested the court to vacate its latest order and ²⁹⁷ to conduct a hearing as he had previously asked. The letter provides, in relevant part: I [Robert S. McNeill, appellant’s counsel] recently received the Court’s August 4, 1988 Order which rescinded the October 13, 1987 Order which appointed Alexander LaGrange as Personal Representative. There was no prior notice to me, nor was any hearing held on the matter, contrary to my request.

I am now reiterating my request for a hearing on this matter, and am requesting that the August 4,1988 Order be vacated____ Not receiving the hoped for reply and results, appellant filed an appeal with the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. On appeal, the court granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment, and denied appellant’s cross-motion for the same. And the Court concludes, after having heard all the evidence — all the argument today, that it is a serious crime, and therefore the Court is going to grant the Summary Judgment [motion] of Linda Hinton, deny the Summary Judgment [motion] of Alexander LaGrange, and the Court finds that Linda Hinton should perform the duties of personal representative. And it is further Ordered [that] Alexander LaGrange has committed a serious crime, and in accordance with Section 5-105 of the Estates and Trusts Articles [sic] of the Maryland Annotated Code, is not entitled to serve as personal representative.

And it’s further Ordered that the Order of the Orphan’s [sic] Court of Anne Arundel County, dated August 4,1988, appointing Linda Hinton as personal representative, is in full force and effect. Before turning to other matters, the court gave appellant some advice. I might say that if you don’t agree with the Court’s conclusions, it seems to me you can get yourself a quick hearing up at the Court of Appeals on — Court of Special ²⁹⁸ Appeals on the stated facts, because you’ve got the facts, you can get an expedited appeal. Appellant followed that recommendation, for he comes before us and asks two questions: 1.

Did the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County err in failing to appoint the Petitioner personal representative of the Estate of Lucille LaGrange because both it and the Orphans’ Court lacked jurisdiction to vacate its October 13, 1987 order appointing the Petitioner personal representative of the Estate of Lucille LaGrange? 2. Did the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County err in deciding that Petitioner’s conviction under Article 27, Section 554 was a “serious crime” for purposes of Section 5-105(b)(3) of the Estates and Trusts Article, and excluded him from appointment as personal representative of the Estate of Lucille LaGrange? 1. Appellant’s jurisdictional argument is unavailing. He argues that the Orphans’ Court lacked jurisdiction to rescind its October 13, 1987 order, in which the court appointed appellant as the personal representative, contingent upon his completion of procedural matters. 1 He overlooks the point that the status that he sought did not go into effect, for he did not file the necessary bond.

Appellant is correct to note that appellee “could not have appealed the Orphans’ Court's October 13, 1987 order a second time on August 4, 1988____” Johnson v. Johnson, 265 Md. 327, 331-32 , 289 A.2d 318 (1972) (res judicata). Appellee’s appeal, filed October 23, 1987, took the fight from the Orphans’ Court to the Circuit Court. Subsequently, appellee, pursuant to a stipulation, dismissed that appeal. Thus, judicial resolution of issues relating to Lucille ²⁹⁹ LaGrange’s estate was once again in the Orphans’ Court’s domain.

Then, on August 4, 1988, the Orphans’ Court rescinded its October 13, 1987 order. The status accorded appellant by the latter order was never perfected because appellant did not file a bond. Furthermore, and fatal to his jurisdictional position, is the appeal he took to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County (filed on September 6, 1988). The Orphans’ Court should have held a hearing before it decided to revoke appellant’s status as personal representative, Schmidt v. Chambers, 265 Md. 9, 38 , 288 A.2d 356 (1972); Richards v. Richards, 27 Md.App. 1, 14 , 338 A.2d 377 (1975); however, appellant waived any error by instituting his appeal.

The Circuit Court, under the authority of § 12-502 of the Courts Article, considered the parties’ arguments as if they were raised for the first time. That section provides in part: (a) In general; exception in Harford and Montgomery counties. — (1) Instead of a direct appeal to the Court of Special Appeals pursuant to § 12-501 of this subtitle, a party may appeal to the circuit court for the county from a final judgment of an orphans’ court. The appeal shall be heard de novo by the circuit court. The de novo appeal shall be treated as if it were a new proceeding and as if there had never been a prior hearing or judgment by the orphans’ court.

The circuit court shall give judgment according to the equity of the matter. Thus, appellant triggered the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County’s jurisdiction over Lucille LaGrange’s estate, and the issues arising out of its probate. Late last year, the Court of Appeals in Kaouris v. Kaouris, 324 Md. 687, 715 , 598 A.2d 1193 (1991), discussed the Orphans’ Court’s jurisdictional province and said: [W]e hold that a circuit court’s jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an orphans’ court de novo depends upon whether the orphans’ court had jurisdiction over the case in the first place. ³⁰⁰ As discussed supra, the Orphans’ Court had jurisdiction over Lucille LaGrange’s estate. By issuing an order appointing a personal representative, the court implicitly made a determination of jurisdiction.

The Orphans’ Court was empowered to settle disputes arising out of the estate’s probate until appellee’s appeal. Once appellee dismissed her appeal, the court’s jurisdiction attached again. Appellant’s present appeal, however, divested that court of jurisdiction, and placed all contentions, de novo, before the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. § 12-502 of the Courts Article; Brees v. Cramer, 322 Md. 214 , 219 n. 2, 586 A.2d 1284 (1991). Our present duty is limited to a review of the Circuit Court’s granting of appellee’s motion for summary judgment, and its converse ruling on appellant’s cross-motion for summary judgment. 2 2.

Appellant begins his barrage with the following sentence. A conviction under Article 27, Section 554, has absolutely no bearing on the ability to discharge the duties of a personal representative, [and] is therefore not a “serious crime” in that context, and cannot be the basis for exclusion from appointment as personal representative. For reasons that we will explicate, we conclude that a conviction under Md.Code Article 27, § 554 fits into the category of “serious crime,” as enumerated in § 5-105(b)(3) of the Estates and Trusts Article, and can, by itself, disqualify an individual from serving as a personal representative. The statute at issue is § 5 — 105(b)(3) of the Estates and Trusts Article. ³⁰¹ (b) Persons excluded. — Letters may not be granted to a person who, at the time a determination of priority is made, has filed with the register a declaration in writing that the person renounces the right to administer or is: (3) Convicted of a serious crime[.] As appellant notes, no Maryland court has published an opinion interpreting the words “serious crime” as used in § 5-105(b)(3).

Thus, we turn to the statute’s legislative history as an alternative avenue to discern its meaning and intent. In 1968, § 5-105 would have been found in Md.Code Article 93, § 59. 3 If any person named as executor in a will shall be, at the time when administration ought to be granted, under the age of twenty-one years or of unsound mind, incapable according to law of making a contract or convicted of any crime rendering him infamous according to law, or if any person named as executor shall not be a citizen of the United States, letters testamentary or of administration (as the case may be) may be granted in the same manner as if such person had not been named in the will. (Emphasis added.) Senate Bill 316 (1969), in part, repealed § 59 and, in its place, offered Md.Code § 5-105(b)(3). (b) Exclusions. — Letters shall not be granted to a person who, at the time any determination of priority is made, ³⁰² has filed with the register a declaration in writing that he renounces his right to administer or is (3) Convicted of a serious crime[.] The Governor’s Commission to Review and Revise the Testamentary Law of Maryland (Henderson Commission) played a key role in the creation of the “Decedents Estates” title of the Md.Code.

The Henderson Commission’s second report contains comments pertaining to § 5-104. Unfortunately, none of the comments addresses the change of words from “infamous” to “serious crime.” Garitee v. Bond, 102 Md. 379 , 62 A. 631 (1905), is the only published Maryland opinion which discusses whether an executor should lose his standing if convicted of an infamous crime. Charles E. Garitee, an attorney, by charging a