Lambros v. Brown

Marbury, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Two appeals are here considered. Both are by the same appellant from judgments similarly entered against him in the Baltimore City Court, heard there on appeals from the People’s Court of Baltimore City. Both cases involve the jurisdiction of the Maryland civil courts to enforce the provisions of the Emergency Price Control Act of January 30, 1942, c. 26, 56 Stat. 23 , 50 U. S. C. A. Appendix, Sec. 901 et seq.

Appellant kept a store in Baltimore City, and had a license to sell liquor. The appellee Brown made two separate purchases, each of one-fifth of a gallon of whiskey, from him, being charged for each purchase the sum of $3.94. The maximum prices established by the Office of Price Administration for the brands purchased and in force at the time of the purchases, were $3.30 and $3.44. Brown was therefore overcharged 64 cents on one purchase and 50 cents on the other.

The appellee Waldman bought one-fifth of a gallon for $3.85. The maximum price on this was $3.44, so he was overcharged 41 cents. Section 205(e) of the Emergency Price Control Act permits a buyer to recover either $50 or treble the amount of the overcharge, whichever is the greater. Brown was given a judgment in the People’s Court for $100 and Waldman a judgment for $50.-Both cases were appealed, and, after trial de novo in the Baltimore City Court, judgments in the same amounts were entered there against the appellant.

From these judgments, he has appealed. Appellant contends that these appeals are properly before this Court because they involve the jurisdiction ³⁵³ of the People’s Court of Baltimore City and of the Baltimore City Court. He raised this question, in each case in the Baltimore City Court, by a motion for a reversal of the judgment entered in the People’s Court. His motions were overruled, and exceptions were allowed him.

The ground of each of the motions was the claimed lack of jurisdiction, because the cause of action was penal in nature, and the Court had no authority to enforce a penalty provided by Act of Congress. Appeals from judgments of the People’s Court of Baltimore City are to the Baltimore City Court under the provisions of Article 5, Section 93 of Flack’s Annotated Code of Public General Laws, 1939. The Baltimore City Court acts in such cases in an appellate jurisdiction, and there is no further appeal to this Court. An exception, however, is made in cases where the jurisdiction of the magistrate (in this case the People’s Court) or of the Court is attacked.

The method of raising such jurisdictional question seems to have varied. In some of the cases, it was done by a writ of certiorari directed to the magistrate, and by an appeal to this Court from the decision of the lower court on that writ. Such cases are Hall v. State, 12 Gill & J., 329; Rayner v. State, 52 Md. 368, 376 ; Rehm v. Cumberland Coal Co., 169 Md. 365 , 181 A. 724 . In other cases there was a direct appeal to this Court without any special procedure in the lower court, and this court considered the jurisdictional question.

See Mears v. Remare, 33 Md. 246 ; Wilmer v. Mitchell, 122 Md. 299 , 89 A. 612 . In still other cases the question was raised, as here, by a motion to quash the action of the justice of the peace. Such cases are Cole v. Hynes, 46 Md. 181 ; Shippler v. Broom, 62 Md. 318, 319 ; and Josselson v. Sonneborn, 110 Md. 546 , 73 A. 650, 652 . This Court in the last case said that the method there, and here, used was “an appropriate method to have the question of jurisdiction of the lower court determined.” The question of the jurisdiction of the People’s Court and of the Baltimore City Court in the instant case is, therefore, before us on these appeals. ³⁵⁴ Appellant also contends that he was summoned to the September, 1944 Term of the Baltimore City Court, that he was compelled to try the cases in the May Term, and that the court had no right to advance them, and to compel him to go to trial at an earlier date, when he was unable to be present in person, and give his testimony.

He cites the provision of the Code of Public General Laws, 1939 Ed., Article 5, Section 97 and of the Code of Public Local Laws (City Charter, Sec. 414, 1938 Ed.) as authority for his contention. But whatever may have been his rights not to have his cases advanced, he does not here present a jurisdictional question. The Baltimore City Court had jurisdiction over appeals from the People’s Court, and had jurisdiction over the appellant. If the Court had no discretion to advance the cases, or improperly exercised its discretion to his detriment, we cannot review that action on these appeals.

Here, we have before us, on appeals such as these, only jurisdictional questions. Randle v. Sutton, 43 Md. 64 ; Shippler v. Broom, 62 Md. 318, 319 . We cannot, in these cases, pass upon the use or abuse of the discretion of the Baltimore City Court, and, therefore, we refrain from any comment on that subject. The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 was passed by Congress “in the interest of the national defense and security and necessary to the effective prosecution of the present war.” The purposes of the Act are stated therein .to be “to stabilize prices and to prevent speculative, unwarranted, and abnormal increases in prices and rents,” etc. The Act creates the Office of Price Administration which is under the direction of a Price Administrator, who has power by regulation or order to establish maximum prices for commodities.

Various methods of enforcement are provided, such as enjoining orders or restraining orders upon application of the Administrator, and criminal prosecution. Section 205(c) of the Act provides: “The district courts shall have jurisdiction of criminal proceedings or violations of Section 4 of this Act, and, concurrently with State and Territorial courts, ³⁵⁵ of all other proceedings under Section 205 of this Act (this section). * * *” Section 205(e), as it was in force at the time of the sales in the instant case, provides : “If any person selling a commodity violates a regulation, order, or price schedule prescribing a maximum price or maximum prices, the person who buys such commodity for use or consumption other than in the course of trade or business may bring an action either for $50 or for treble the amount by which the consideration exceeded the applicable maximum price, whichever is the greater, plus reasonable attorney’s fees and costs as determined by the court.” And further: “Any suit or action under this subsection may be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction, and shall be instituted within one year after delivery is completed or rent is paid.” The People’s Court of Baltimore City is a civil court established by the Constitution, Article IV, Part V-A. Its jurisdiction includes civil suits which involve amounts equal to those sued for in the instant cases. Appeals from its judgments are made to the Baltimore City Court, which is one of the civil law courts of Baltimore City. The People’s Court of Baltimore City and the Baltimore City Court are, therefore, state courts of competent jurisdiction, to entertain suits of the general nature of those before us.

The appellant, however, says that the state courts of Maryland lack jurisdiction to impose or enforce penalties when such penalties are created by Act of Congress. His claim is that the excessive damages in these cases amount to penalties, that such excessive damages in contract suits are against the public policy of this State, and, hence, are unenforceable in our courts. The Administrator of the Office of Price Administration, by leave of court, filed a brief as amicus curiae. He answered appellant’s contentions by the statements that a consumer or tenant action under Section 205(e) of the Emrgency Price Control Act is remedial and not penal in its nature.

He further contends that even if such ³⁵⁶ action is held to be penal, it is not one authorized by the laws of a foreign State, but is one authorized by the laws of the United States, which is not a foreign sovereignty as respects the several States of the Union. There is ample authority, both in this Court, and in ■the Supreme Court of the United States, for the doctrine that competent state courts should take jurisdiction of suits authorized by Acts of Congress. This is sometimes placed upon the express wording of the Acts of Congress giving authority to bring action in state courts such as we have here, and sometimes upon the theory that where exclusive power is not given to the United States by the Constitution, the state courts retain their general jurisdiction over all matters not thus taken away. In the case of Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130, 136 , 23 L. Ed. 833 , an assignee in bankruptcy sued in a court of the State of New York to recover a preference, voidable under the National Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. A., Sec. 1, et seq.

The Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of the State Court, saying: “The laws of the United States are laws in the several States, and just as much binding on the citizens and courts thereof as the State laws are. The United States is not a foreign sovereignty as regards the several States, but is a concurrent, and, within its jurisdiction, a paramount sovereignty. Every citizen of a State is a subject of two distinct sovereign-ties, having concurrent jurisdiction in the State, — concurrent as to place and persons, though distinct as to subject-matter. Legal or equitable rights, acquired under either system of laws, may be enforced in any court of either sovereignty competent to hear and determine such kind'of rights and not restrained by its constitution in the exercise of such jurisdiction. * * * So rights, whether legal - or equitable, acquired under the laws of the United States, may be prosecuted in the United States courts, or in the State courts, competent to decide rights of a like character and class; subject, however, to this qualification, that where a right arises under a law of the .

United States, Congress may, as it sees fit, give ³⁵⁷ to the Federal courts exclusive jurisdiction. * * * If an act of Congress give a penalty to a party aggrieved, without specifying a remedy for its enforcement, there is no reason why it should not be enforced, if not provided otherwise by some act of Congress, by a proper action in a State court. The fact that a State court derives its existence and functions from the State laws is no reason why it should not afford relief; because it is subject also to laws of the United States, and is just as much bound to recognize these as operative within the State as it is to recognize the State laws. The two together form one system of jurisprudence, which constitutes the law of the land for the State; and the courts of the