Lan Buck v. State

DEBORAH S. EYLER, Judge. In the Circuit Court for Charles County, Christopher Alan Buck was charged with first-degree murder, first-degree assault, and carrying a deadly weapon openly with the intent to injure. He entered a plea of not criminally responsible. Before trial, he moved to suppress statements he made to the police.

The court denied the suppression motion. In a trial to the court, Buck was found guilty on all counts. The court further ruled that he had failed to prove that he was not criminally responsible for his actions. The court sentenced him to life in prison for first-degree murder and a three-year concurrent term for carrying a deadly weapon.

The first-degree assault conviction was merged for sentencing. On appeal, Buck raises three questions, which we have reordered and reworded: I. Did the circuit court err in denying his motion to suppress the statements he made to the police?

II

Was the evidence legally sufficient to support his first-degree murder conviction?

III

Did the trial court err in finding him criminally responsible? For the following reasons, we shall reverse the judgments of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings. I. Motion to Suppress Inculpatory Statements to Police The following facts were adduced at the suppression hearing, or are uncontested and included for context. 1 ⁵⁹⁶ This case arises out of the stabbing death of Edward Baroody, age 74. On February 28, 2005, at 6:30 a.m., Bonnie Goldsmith, Baroody’s wife, found his body in the driveway of their home at 6769 Amherst Road, in the Bryan’s Road community in Charles County.

Officer Patrick McDonald, of the Charles County Sheriffs Office, responded to a call from Goldsmith. 2 He found Baroody’s body lying near the sidewalk in front of the house. The body was “very cold to the touch, and had mild rigor setting in.” There was $1,400 in cash in the victim’s pockets. Nothing appeared to have been taken from the body. Sergeant Carlson 3 responded to the scene and saw the victim lying on his back in the driveway.

He and another officer rolled the body over and saw “a puncture hole in the jacket in the center of the back near the top "with a blood stain around it that appeared fresh.” Goldsmith told the police she had returned home from work the evening before (February 27), at about 8:00 p.m., and “everything was fine.” Bonnie Carpenter, the neighbor across the street, told the police that at about 8:20 or 8:30 p.m. that same evening, her daughter told her she was in her bedroom in the front of the house when she heard someone cry out for help. Carpenter went outside, but did not notice anything amiss. Melissa Roberts, also a neighbor, reported that, at about 8:15 p.m. that evening she was driving on Amherst Road when she saw an older man walking at a “moderate stroll,” near a stop sign. She noticed another man quickly walk up behind the older man.

The second man had his right hand “[t]ucked down into [his] waistband.” He was wearing a “Medium gray hoodie” that was pulled so tightly on his face that only his eyes, nose, and mouth could be seen. On the evening of March 1, 2005, Detectives Tim Minor, James Martin, and Charles Bean were in the neighborhood of ⁵⁹⁷ the Baroody killing, investigating. Detective Minor noticed a man (Buck) walking about. He fit Melissa Roberts’s physical description of the murder suspect and was wearing a gray hooded sweatshirt.

The detectives approached Buck and asked him if he had heard of any recent incidents in the neighborhood. He replied no, but within seconds added, “Oh, you mean the stabbing?” When asked where he had been on the night of February 27, 2005, Buck said it was his routine every night at about 8:00 p.m. to walk from his house in the Bryan’s Road neighborhood to the BP station, to buy cigarettes; and that is what he had done on February 27. 4 Detective Minor observed that Buck became nervous as the officers were speaking with him. Detective Bean asked Buck if he could take some digital photographs of him. Buck said yes, and the detective took the pictures.

Also during this encounter, Detective Minor telephoned Detective Joe Piazza, the lead investigator on the Baroody case, and said, “I think we got him.” That call was made in Buck’s presence and was heard by him. Buck told the detectives that he was on his way to the BP station to purchase cigarettes. Detective Martin offered to give him a ride, and he accepted. In the meantime, Detectives Bean and Minor drove to the house where Buck, then 21 years old, was living with his parents and two younger sisters.

The detectives spoke to his mother, Diane Buck. 5 Mrs. Buck told them she feared that her son might have been involved in the Baroody murder. She explained that Buck had been suffering from “severe depression” for three or four years for which he had been prescribed “a couple” of medications. His behavior was unpredictable. He usually would sleep all day while she and her husband were at work.

Often, he would walk around ⁵⁹⁸ the neighborhood at night. Mrs. Buck also told the detectives that, recently, Buck had not been taking his medications. The detectives also learned that both she and Mr. Buck worked during the day and were gone from the home by 9:00 a.m. on weekdays, leaving their son alone in the house at that time. On the morning of the next day, March 2, 2005, the detectives investigating the Baroody murder sought and obtained a search warrant for Buck’s house.

The warrant authorized the seizure of, among other things, knives and clothing. The detectives did not execute the warrant immediately, however. In the early afternoon of that same day, Detective Piazza and Detective Shane Knowlan, wearing plain clothes, drove to Buck’s house in an unmarked car. Detective Piazza had talked to Detective Minor previously and knew what Mrs. Buck had told him.

Detective Piazza planned to have the search warrant executed when Buck was not at home. The detectives arrived at about 12:45 p.m. and found Buck at home. He was wearing shorts and a T-shirt. Detective Piazza asked if Buck would be willing to come to the Sheriffs Office Headquarters (“the station house”) in La Plata for an interview in connection with the Baroody murder.

Detective Piazza told Buck that he would not be under arrest and would be free to leave at any time. He testified: “All he had to do was say the word and I would bring him home. And since, I told him that, I would not be arresting him.” Buck responded that he had to change his clothes before leaving. Detective Piazza followed him upstairs to his bedroom and watched as he got dressed.

Detective Knowlan remained at the bottom of the steps. After Buck had put on clothes, he and the officers went outside. Buck got in the front passenger’s seat of the police cruiser and put his seat belt on. He was not. handcuffed or restrained.

Detective Piazza drove and Detective Knowlan sat in the seat behind Buck. During the 30-minute drive from Buck’s house to La Plata, Detective Piazza asked Buck about his family, friends, and daily activities. Buck answered the detective’s questions. At ⁵⁹⁹ some point, the conversation turned to the Baroody murder.

Buck mentioned that a clerk at the BP station had commented that he (Buck) resembled the suspect the police were looking for. Detective Piazza asked Buck if he thought of himself as a suspect. Buck replied, “I hope I’m not a suspect,” and then paused and said, “because I didn’t do it.” Detective Piazza noticed a faint odor of alcohol and asked Buck how much he had had to drink that day. Buck responded that he had had one beer that morning.

Buck said he was not intoxicated, and Detective Piazza did not observe any signs of intoxication. When the officers and Buck arrived at the station house, Buck was taken to an interview room in a secure part of the building. He was given a pass that permitted him to walk within the station house only if escorted by an officer. The interview room was 10 feet by 10 feet and had two chairs and a table.

There were no windows. There was a one-way mirror by which the detectives could see into the room without being seen. There also was a camera in the ceiling that allowed occupants of another room to watch and hear the interview on a monitor. The interview lasted five hours, from 1:20 p.m. to 6:20 p.m.

There were times when Buck was alone in the interview room. Otherwise, he was accompanied by at least one officer, and more often by two. 6 He never was physically restrained and no weapons were displayed or drawn. Buck did not ask to call anyone. Detective Piazza began the interview.

He asked Buck how he felt and inquired about the last time he had taken his medications. Buck responded that he had taken his medications “last night” and that he felt okay, “just anxious.” The detective asked Buck if he “wanted a drink or needed a restroom”; he responded no. Detective Piazza spoke with Buck about his family and friends and then turned his attention to the night of February 27, 2005. Initially, Buck said his ⁶⁰⁰ only activity that night was to walk to the BP station to buy cigarettes.

Detective Piazza told Buck he had reviewed the BP station’s surveillance tapes from that night and they did not show him there. Buck became “noticeably ... uncomfortable at that point.” Detective Piazza went on to say that the police were at that very moment executing a search warrant for Buck’s house, looking for evidence related to the murder, particularly Baroody’s DNA. The detective asked Buck if he thought the police would find any evidence of the murder at his house. Buck responded, “I don’t think so” or “I doubt it.” Buck asked for a break so he could smoke a cigarette.

Detective Piazza instructed Detective Shankster 7 to accompany him. He told Detective Shankster that Buck was not under arrest and that the detective should “let [Buck] out the door and [ ] let him in when he was done” smoking. Detective Piazza further informed Detective Shankster that, if Buck asked to leave, he (Detective Piazza) would give him a ride home. Although the evidence on this point is unclear, it appears that this conversation did not take place in Buck’s presence.

When Buck returned from the cigarette break, he asked Detective Piazza if the police had found anything when they executed the search warrant. The detective responded by asking Buck what he thought the police might have found. Buck responded, “my pants.” Detective Piazza then asked for, and Buck agreed to give, a DNA sample. At that point, Detective Piazza left the interview room.

Soon thereafter, at about 4:25 p.m., Detective Minor entered the interview room and spoke to Buck about signing a consent form for the DNA sampling. Detective Minor used a buccal swab to collect the sample from inside Buck’s cheek. Buck mentioned that, when the police had interviewed him on the street, he had overheard Detective Minor say, “I think we got him.” He said he took that to mean that the officers thought he had killed Baroody. As Detective Minor collected the ⁶⁰¹ sample, he told Buck that he had spoken with Mrs. Buck the night before.

Detective Minor commented that he himself had thought about killing people before. He asked Buck whether he had ever “thought about killing people.” Buck said he had not. Detective Minor then asked Buck “how it felt to kill that man,” meaning Baroody. Buck proceeded to confess to the murder.

He told the detective that, on the evening of February 27, 2005, he was “pumped up” from listening to rap music all day. He had not taken his medications. He decided to carry a kitchen knife with him on his nightly walk. He stabbed Baroody with the kitchen knife, killing him, because Baroody looked like an “easy target.” His hands had shaken when he stabbed Baroody.

He did not rob Baroody. After-wards, he ran home, washed the blood off the knife, and put it back in the knife block where he had found it. He vomited, smoked some cigarettes, and went to bed. Buck told Detective Minor that right then (during the interview) he was wearing the same sweatshirt and shoes he had worn when he stabbed Baroody.

Detective Minor left the interview room and told Detective Piazza that Buck just had confessed to the murder. Detective Piazza directed Detective Bean to begin drafting a statement of charges for an arrest warrant for Buck. Detective Piazza then rejoined the interview. When Detective Piazza walked into the interview room, Buck apologized for lying to him, saying, “I wanted to tell you the truth, but I felt bad.” Buck shook Detective Piazza’s hand.

At that point, the detectives took Buck’s sweatshirt and shoes and gave them to another officer. It is not clear from the hearing testimony whether Detectives Minor and Piazza asked Buck’s permission to take his sweatshirt and shoes or whether they directed him to remove those items of clothing. Both detectives testified, however, that during the interview neither one “ordered” Buck to do anything. 8 ⁶⁰² Buck asked for another cigarette break. This time, Detective Minor and Detective Moody accompanied him outside.

Detective Minor asked Buck to describe how he had stabbed “the old man.” Buck proceeded to physically re-enact the stabbing. With Detective Minor pretending to be Baroody, walking slowly down the street, Buck demonstrated how he had approached Baroody quickly from behind and stabbed him once in the upper back. At about 5:00 p.m., when the detectives and Buck returned to the interview room from the cigarette break, Detective Piazza took a written statement from Buck about the Baroody killing. Detective Piazza would type a question, Buck would answer it, and Detective Piazza would type in Buck’s answer.

He and Buck then reviewed the statement, page by page, and signed it. (Detective Piazza signed it as well.) The first question, to which Buck answered, “Yes sir,” was: “Do you understand that you are not under arrest and are free to leave at anytime?” When asked why he had killed Baroody, Buck said, “I was angry. I wasn’t planning on killing anyone. I just thought if anyone came, I would stab him.” Buck said he had not taken his medications on the day of the stabbing and that “his nerves hurt.” He identified his medications as “Rispodal [sic], Luvox, and Norotin.” He described how he walked up behind Baroody as Baroody was standing looking at a “For Sale” sign and stabbed him in the back.

Baroody fell down, with the knife in his back. Buck removed the knife and ran home. He had blood on his shoes. He washed the knife off and put it back inside the knife block.

He used toilet paper to wash the blood off his shoes. The second to last question to Buck was: “When I met you at your house earlier today I told you that you did not have to come with me or talk to me. Is that correct?” Buck answered, “True.” After the statement was signed, Detective Piazza showed Buck a photograph, taken when the search warrant was executed, of the knife block and various cutlery in the kitchen at his house. He asked Buck to point out the knife he had ⁶⁰³ used to stab Baroody.

Buck circled one of the knives in the photograph and signed his name next to it. Detective Piazza told Buck he was not under arrest. He instructed Detectives Minor and Moody to drive Buck home. During the drive, Detective Minor asked Buck to show him where the stabbing occurred.

Buck directed Detective Minor to the exact location where Baroody’s body had been found. The detectives accompanied Buck inside his house. In front of Buck’s family members, Detective Moody asked Buck if he had killed Baroody. Buck nodded yes.

At about 6:50 p.m., the detectives left the Bucks’ home. They stayed in the neighborhood, however. Before Buck’s arrival home, at Detective Piazza’s direction, plainclothes police officers had positioned themselves outside the house. Detective Minor called Detective Piazza to say that Buck had been dropped off at home and it was time to submit the application for arrest warrant for approval.

An arrest warrant for Buck was issued by a court commissioner at 7:07 p.m. Minutes later, Detective George Higgs, one of the officers staked out near Buck’s house, received a radio communication instructing him to arrest Buck, which he did. Thus, a little less than 20 minutes elapsed from the time the officers left Buck at his house until the time Buck was arrested. When arresting Buck, Detective Higgs spoke to Buck’s parents.

They told him he was on several medications. Buck was handcuffed and driven to the Charles County Detention Center, also in La Plata. As Detective Higgs was processing Buck’s paperwork, Buck asked if they could speak in private. Detective Higgs escorted Buck to an interview room and advised him of his Miranda rights by reading them to him from a card. 9 This was the first time in the course of the investigation that Buck was given Miranda warnings.

Detective Higgs asked Buck if he understood his rights and wanted to answer some questions. ⁶⁰⁴ Buck responded yes to both questions. He then denied any involvement in Baroody’s death and asked to speak to the investigating detectives. Detective Higgs returned Buck to the processing area. Detective John Elliott took over processing Buck.

He took Buck to an interview room, read him his Miranda rights, and asked him if he understood those rights. Buck said yes and further stated that he knew he had “the right to remain silent.” Detective Bean joined the interview. Buck agreed to speak with the detectives and claimed that he had initially confessed to killing Baroody because “Detective Piazza had hounded him.” Detective Elliott asked Buck if Detective Piazza had threatened him or otherwise treated him unfairly. Buck responded that “he was treated fairly, and that during the interview he knew he was there voluntarily.” Detective Elliott then said, “There’s a lot of other things here other than your statement alone to Detective Piazza.

There’s physical evidence and a lot of other things here that indicate that you committed this.” At that point, Buck “put his head down and said, ‘I told the truth.’ ” 10 Detective Elliott then asked Buck whether the details of the demonstration he had given Detective Minor earlier that day were accurate. Buck replied, “yes.” Detective Bean asked Buck whether “he had taken his medications.” Buck responded that he had not taken his medications on February 26 and February 27, 2005. During the interview, Buck asked to take his medications on “several occasions,” but the detectives did not halt the interview to retrieve the medications. Detective Bean further asked whether Buck had told his parents that he had killed Baroody.

Buck responded that he had told his parents initially that he did not kill Baroody but later told them that he in fact had done so. ⁶⁰⁵ On April 12, 2005, Buck moved to suppress the statements he made to the police in his first interview on March 2, at the station house and during the drive to and from, on the ground that they were obtained by custodial interrogation, but without Miranda warnings. He further moved to suppress the statement he made to the police in his second interview that day, after he was arrested, at the detention center, on the ground that, although he was given Miranda warnings, his statement was elicited in violation of the principles in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 , 124 S.Ct. 2601 , 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004); and also on the ground that they were involuntary. At a suppression hearing on October 19, 2006, the State called Detectives Minor, Piazza, Higgs, and Elliott to testify. The defense did not call any witnesses.

When Detective Piazza was asked on cross-examination why he had chosen not to arrest Buck at the station house, when Buck confessed to killing Baroody, the detective replied, “I promised that I wouldn’t arrest [Buck] that day if he comes down and talks to us.” On redirect, the detective clarified that he did not remember using the word “promise” in speaking with Buck. He had only meant to say that he had “assured” Buck that he was not going to be arrested that day. Defense counsel pressed Detective Piazza as to why he had not read Buck his Miranda rights at the outset of or at some time during the interview at the station house. The following colloquy ensued: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Why did you not read [Buck] his Miranda rights [before or during the initial interview], sir?

WITNESS OFFICER PIAZZA: He came voluntarily. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. Was that a procedure that had been discussed among the members of the Sheriffs Department on how to conduct interviews in general? WITNESS OFFICER PIAZZA: I don’t know how that came about. It’s just one of the ... one of the ways we do it, either in custody or voluntary. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay.

And, so one of the ways is to, as you’ve already talked about, tell someone that ⁶⁰⁶ they’re not under arrest; bring them down; interview them without the benefit of Miranda; bring them home; and then arrest him with a warrant. That’s the procedure you follow? WITNESS OFFICER PIAZZA: It has happened before. In response to a similar line of questioning as to whether it was standard practice of the Sheriffs Office to allow a confessed killer to “wander free on the streets of Charles County,” Detective Minor said, “We’ve done it in the past.” The court reserved decision at the close of the hearing and offered counsel the opportunity to submit memoranda of law, which they did.

Thereafter, at the outset of the first day of trial, the court denied the motion to suppress. The court ruled that Buck had not been “in custody” during the station house interview, and therefore did not need to be read his Miranda rights. Specifically, the court stated: I find that Mr. Buck was not in custody; that these officers would not have arrested Mr. Buck if he had begged them to do so under these circumstances. He has no right to be arrested.

I do find [the police] took care, almost textbook care, to ensure that he was not in custody.... Having so ruled, the court did not reach the question whether the holding in Missouri v. Seibert applied to exclude Buck’s post-arrest, warned confession. The court also found that Buck’s statements to the police were freely and voluntarily made. On appeal, Buck first argues that his statements during the initial, unwarned, interview with Detectives Minor and Piazza were the product of custodial interrogation, but without the benefit of Miranda warnings, and therefore were inadmissible.

Second, Buck argues that the process by which he was subjected to custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings, released from custody, and then arrested minutes later was a deliberate two-step police strategy carried out to render ineffective the Miranda warnings he then was given before the second interview, and hence was prohibited by Missouri v. Seibert, supra. Therefore, his post-Miranda warnings state ⁶⁰⁷ ments also were not admissible. Independent of those grounds for suppression, Buck also argues that his statements were involuntary because they were improperly induced by Detective Piazza’s “promise” that he would not be arrested if he came to the Department; and because he was not on his medications and had told the detectives that he “wasn’t feeling right,” but the detectives improperly “blurred through a reading of the Miranda warning in about twenty seconds.” (A) Admissibility of Unwarned Statements— Miranda “In Custody” Issue In Miranda v. Arizona, 884 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court held that before a person is subjected to custodial interrogation by a government agent, he must be advised of certain important legal rights, including the right to remain silent. Id. at 444-45, 86 S.Ct. 1602 .

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that, on March 2, 2005, when Buck was questioned by various detectives during the ride to the station house, at the station house, and during the ride home from the station house, he was being interrogated. The point in dispute is whether, at those times, Buck was “in custody.” If indeed he was, the detectives violated the rule of Miranda by not advising him of his rights before interrogating him. Buck challenges the circuit court’s ruling that he was not in custody during those critical interrogation periods and therefore did not have to be “Mirandized” before speaking with the police. Whether a person is “in custody” for Miranda purposes is an objective inquiry that is to be made based upon the totality of the circumstances.

Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 , 97 S.Ct. 711 , 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 346-47 , 96 S.Ct. 1612 , 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976). See also Argueta v. State, 136 Md.App. 273, 282 , 764 A.2d 863 , cert. denied, 364 Md. 142 , 771 A.2d 1071 (2001). A court’s examination of the totality of ⁶⁰⁸ the circumstances must be informed by the underlying purpose of the Miranda rule, namely to protect individuals from compelled self-incrimination. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433, 437 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984).

In Owens v. State, 399 Md. 388 , 924 A.2d 1072 (2007), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 128 S.Ct. 1064 , 169 L.Ed.2d 813 (2008), the Court of Appeals gave the following overview of the law of “custodial interrogation” under Miranda: A significant body of law has developed around the questions of what constitutes “custody” and “interrogation” for Fifth Amendment purposes. The Miranda Court defined “custodial interrogation” as “questioning initiated by the law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” 384 U.S. at 444 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 . “Custody,” though typically associated with formal arrest or incarceration ..., is not always so clearly a delineated concept. The Supreme Court declared in California v. Beheler that “the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 , 103 S.Ct. 3517 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (per curiam) (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495 , 97 S.Ct. 711 ) (emphasis added). In fact, a person is considered “in custody” when “a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995); see also Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 662 , 124 S.Ct. 2140 , 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004); accord [State v.] Rucker, 374 Md. [199], 209, 821 A.2d 439 [(2003)]; Whitfield v. State, 287 Md. 124, 141 , 411 A.2d 415 (1980). ^ H« Hi Hi The question of whether a suspect is “in custody” is determined objectively, to the exclusion of the subjective intent of law enforcement, in light of the totality of the circumstances of the situation. [Yarborough,] 541 U.S. at 667 , 124 S.Ct. 2140 ; Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323, 322 , 114 ⁶⁰⁹ S.Ct. 1526; accord Whitfield, 287 Md. at 140 , 411 A.2d 415 .

Among the circumstances which should be considered in determining whether “custodial interrogation” took place are: when and where [the interrogation] occurred, how long it lasted, how many police were present, what the officers and defendant said and did, the presence of actual physical restraint on the defendant or things equivalent to actual restraint such as drawn weapons or a guard stationed at the door, and whether the defendant was being questioned as a suspect or a witness. Facts pertaining to events before the interrogation are also relevant, especially how the defendant got to the place of questioning[,] whether he came completely on his own, in response to a police request or escorted by police officers. Finally, what happened after the interrogation whether the defendant left freely, was detained or arrested may assist the court in determining whether the defendant, as a reasonable person, would have felt free to break off the questioning. 399 Md. at 427-29 , 924 A.2d 1072 (quoting Whitfield, supra, 287 Md. at 141 , 411 A.2d 415 , in turn quoting Hunter v. State, 590 P.2d 888, 895 (Alaska 1979)) (further citations omitted). On review of a circuit court’s suppression motion ruling on the issue of custody for Miranda purposes, we accept the factual findings of the court, unless clearly erroneous, but determine de novo the constitutional significance of those findings, i.e., whether on the facts as found, the defendant was or was not “in custody.” Owens, supra, 399 Md. at 403 , 924 A.2d 1072 .

As noted, in the case at bar, only the State called witnesses to testify at the suppression hearing; Buck did not testify himself, and called no witnesses. The first-level factual findings as adduced at the suppression hearing were not disputed. (i) Buck maintains that his mental illness, which was known to the investigating officers through their communications with his mother, was a factor that should have been considered by ⁶¹⁰ the court in deciding whether he was “in custody” and, had it been considered, would have militated strongly in favor of a finding that indeed he was in custody. The court erred, he argues, by not considering his mental illness in reaching its ultimate “not in custody” decision.

Buck’s assertion that the circuit court should have considered his mental illness in deciding the issue of custody, and should have concluded that a person in his situation, with his mental illness, would have believed he was not free to leave, is not supported by Supreme Court precedent. In Yarborough v. Alvarado, supra, 541 U.S. 652 , 124 S.Ct. 2140 , 158 L.Ed.2d 938 , Alvarado petitioned for federal habeas corpus relief, arguing for vacation of his convictions for murder and attempted robbery on the ground that the state trial court allowed into evidence a statement he gave to the police without being advised under the rule of Miranda. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the trial court had considered the proper factors and reached a reasonable conclusion that Alvarado was not in custody during his police interview. Alvarado, just short of his 18th birthday, and a friend, Paul Soto, were mingling among a large group of teenagers in a shopping mall parking lot when Soto, who was armed with a handgun, decided to steal a truck.

Alvarado agreed to help. Soto approached the driver of the truck, demanding money and the keys to the truck. When the truck driver refused, Soto shot and killed him. Alvarado helped hide the murder weapon.

About a month after the murder, the lead detective on the case “left word” at Alvarado’s house, and with his mother at work, saying the police wanted to speak to him. During a lunch break on a day soon thereafter, Alvarado’s parents drove him to the police station to be interviewed. Alvarado asked for his parents to be able to sit in on the interview, but his request was denied. He was taken to a small interview room.

Questioning started at about 12:30 p.m. The interview, which was recorded, was about two hours long. Alvarado was ⁶¹¹ not advised of his Miranda rights. Only the lead detective and Alvarado were present in the room.

The detective asked Alvarado to recount the events of the night of the shooting. Alvarado said he had been drinking alcohol at a party at a friend’s house; and that a few hours later, a part of the group went home and the rest, including him, walked to the mall to use the pay telephones. At first, he ended the story there. When pressed, he eventually acknowledged being present when another person, whom he later admitted was Soto, tried to highjack a truck; that he knew Soto was armed but did not expect him to kill anyone; and that, after the shooting, he helped Soto discard the murder weapon.

When the interview was almost over, the detective asked Alvarado if he needed a break. He said no. The detective then returned Alvarado to the lobby, where his parents were waiting. His father drove him home.

A few months later, Alvarado and Soto were charged with first degree murder and attempted robbery. Alvarado moved to suppress his statements to the lead detective on Miranda grounds. In an evidentiary hearing, he agreed that his conversation with the detective was “pretty friendly” and that he “did not ‘feel coerced or threatened in any way’ ” during the interview. 541 U.S. at 658 , 124 S.Ct. 2140 (quotation to the record). The motion judge ruled that the interview was noncustodial.

Alvarado was convicted and the convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. In a habeas corpus proceeding in the federal district court, the court agreed that Alvarado had not been in custody during the interrogation. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. It held that the state court had erred by not taking into account Alvarado's “youth and inexperience when evaluating whether a reasonable person in his position would have felt free to leave,” and that “the effect of [Alvarado’s] age and inexperience was so substantial that it turned the interview into a custodial interrogation.” Id. at 659-60 , 124 S.Ct. 2140 (discussing Alvarado v. Hickman, 316 F.3d 841 (9th Cir.2002)).

The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. It rejected the argument that a defendant’s particular characteristics (in ⁶¹² that case young age and inexperience with the law) must be factored into the decision whether he was “in custody,” under the rule of Miranda, when he was interrogated. Emphasizing that its “more recent cases instruct that custody must be determined based on how a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would perceive his circumstances,” the Court held that the objective test for custody under Miranda does not “ ‘place upon the police the burden of anticipating the frailties or idiosyncracies of every person whom they question.’ ” Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 662 , 124 S.Ct. 2140 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, n. 35 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 , in turn quoting People v. P., 21 N.Y.2d 1, 9-10 , 286 N.Y.S.2d 225 , 233 N.E.2d 255 (1967)). See also Beheler, supra, 463 U.S. at 1123-24 , 103 S.Ct. 3517 (holding that how much interrogating police officers knew about the suspect and how much time had elapsed since the crime occurred were not relevant to issue of custody); Stansbury, supra, 511 U.S. at 323 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 (stating that “the initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned”).

The Court reaffirmed its “in custody” test as described in Thompson v. Keohane, supra, 516 U.S. at 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457 : Two discrete inquiries are essential to the determination [of custody]: first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. Once the scene is set and the players’ lines and actions are reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test to resolve the ultimate inquiry: was there a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. 541 U.S. at 663 , 124 S.Ct. 2140 . The Ninth Circuit had framed the “objective” custody issue in the case as what a “reasonable 17-year-old, with no prior history of arrest or police interviews,” would perceive. 316 F.3d at 854-55 . The Court réjected that effort to “subsume a ⁶¹³ subjective factor into an objective test by making the latter more specific in its formulation,” 541 U.S. at 667 , 124 S.Ct. 2140 .

It reasoned that the Miranda “custody inquiry states an objective rule designed to give clear guidance to the police, while consideration of a suspect’s individual characteristics— including his age — could be viewed as creating a subjective inquiry.” Id. at 668, 124 S.Ct. 2140 . The Court explained that it would be improper to consider a suspect’s prior history with law enforcement in deciding the issue of custody because, “[i]n most cases, police officers will not know a suspect’s interrogation history, ... [and] [e]ven if they do, the relationship between a suspect’s past experiences and the likelihood a reasonable person with that experience would feel free to leave often will be speculative.” Id. The holding in Yarborough cuts strongly against Buck’s argument that, in deciding whether he was “in custody,” within the meaning of that phrase in Miranda jurisprudence, during the initial unwarned interrogation, the circuit court should have taken into account his mental illness, asking, in effect, whether a reasonable mentally ill person in Buck’s position would have felt free to terminate the interrogation and leave. To be sure, the interrogating officers knew that, according to Mrs. Buck, Buck had been suffering “severe depression” for several years and had been prescribed medications for that condition.

As we shall discuss, infra, that factor is one of many relevant to whether Buck’s confessions were voluntary. Under Supreme Court case law, however, notwithstanding that Buck had been diagnosed with and was being treated for depression, the Miranda custody issue before the circuit court remained whether a reasonable person in Buck’s position — not a reasonable person experiencing depression or other mental illnesses — would have felt free to break off questioning and leave. The court did not err in the standard it applied in answering that question. (ii) Buck’s more general Miranda “in custody” argument is that, when considered in light of the factors relevant to the ⁶¹⁴ question whether custody exists, the facts in the suppression hearing record cannot reasonably yield the conclusion that he was not “in custody” when he made his initial unwarned statements to the police.

In other words, applying a strictly objective test, as mandated by the Supreme Court, on the facts as established at the suppression hearing, it is unreasonable to conclude that a reasonable person in his position would have felt free to terminate the interrogation and leave; therefore, he was “in custody” during the initial, unwarned interrogation. In advancing this argument, Buck places most reliance upon Bond v. State, 142 Md.App. 219 , 788 A.2d 705 (2002). Bond is readily distinguishable. There, witnesses saw Bond crash his vehicle into two cars, causing damage, and then leave.

The police were called and from information gathered at the scene determined that Bond lived at a particular address in a trailer park. Three uniformed and armed officers went to the trailer and were let in by Bond’s 11 year old nephew, who was the only occupant of the trailer other than Bond. Bond was in his bedroom, undressed and in bed. The three officers entered the bedroom and stood in between the bed and the door.

Bond was awake. The officers questioned him about the hit and run incident. They did not give him Miranda warnings or tell him he did not have to speak with them or could tell them to leave. At the end of the interrogation, the officers told Bond they were not placing him under arrest right then and there because, if they did so, there would be no adult to care for the 11 year old.

On appeal after conviction, this Court held that Bond was “in custody,” for Miranda purposes, when he was questioned in his bedroom: We must determine, from an objective standpoint, and keeping in mind the underlying purpose of the Miranda decision, whether there was a coercive aspect to the circumstances in which [Bond] was questioned, so as to constitute custodial interrogation. We conclude that the factors relevant to this analysis point strongly in favor of [Bond’s] being ⁶¹⁵ in custody when he was questioned by [the officer] in the bedroom of his trailer home. The interrogation ... took place late at night in [Bond’s] bedroom, with [Bond] in bed and partially clothed. To be sure, the questioning did not occur in the potentially coercive atmosphere of a police station, or of a strange and unfamiliar location.

It ran to the other extreme, however. Whether [Bond] was awake or asleep when the officers entered his bedroom, the highly private location of the interrogation, the late hour, [Bond’s] state of undress, the number of officers present, and the accusatory nature of the questioning were such that an ordinary person in the circumstances would be intimidated, and would not think he could end the encounter merely by telling the officers to leave. The interrogation ... was the polar opposite of the questioning that accompanies a traffic stop, which is expected, takes place in a public or semipublic place, and is mutually understood to be brief. The ordinary person does not expect his friends or neighbors, let alone police officers, to appear in his bedroom late at night.

There is a world of difference between a person being questioned during normal daytime hours, at his dining room table, in a relaxed atmosphere (such as in Beckwith [v. United States, supra]), and a person being questioned late at night, in bed, undressed, by three officers blocking the bedroom door (as in this case). Moreover, unlike the routine traffic stop, which is a “known quantity” to most people, the unusual nature of the interrogation in this case was such that [Bond] would have had no way of gauging how long the questioning was going to continue. The atmosphere in which the interrogation in this case was conducted was one of pressure, accusation, and uncertainty that would lead a reasonable person to believe that silence was not an option. 142 Md.App. at 233-34 , 788 A.2d 705 . Buck argues that, because Detective Piazza accompanied him to his bedroom when he got dressed, his case is analogous to Bond .

We disagree. The detectives went to Buck’s house ⁶¹⁶ after already meeting and talking to him on the street the day before. It was mid-day and Buck let them in the house. Detective Piazza did not ask any questions of Buck as Buck was putting on clothes.

He told Buck he was not under arrest and did not have to go to the station house with the officers for questioning. Other than the fact that a police officer was present in the defendant’s bedroom, with the defendant present, the circumstances in Bond have little in common with the circumstances in the case at bar. In arguing that, under the objective totality of the circumstances test, Buck was not in custody, the State relies upon this Court’s opinions in Minehan v. State, 147 Md.App. 432 , 809 A.2d 66 , cert. denied, 372 Md. 431 , 813 A.2d 258 (2002), and Ashe v. State, 125 Md.App. 537 , 726 A.2d 786 , cert. denied, 354 Md. 571 , 731 A.2d 969 (1999). In both cases, we held that a defendant was not “in custody” when he was interrogated by police, even though the interrogation took place at a police station.

In Minehan , in the course of investigating a string of robberies, the police developed Minehan as a suspect. Minehan also was the alleged victim of a supposed “robbery” of the florist store at which he worked. The police decided to question him about the supposed “robbery” as a means to pursue further questioning about the other robberies. After ascertaining Minehan’s work schedule, three officers in plainclothes appeared at the store at 8:30 a.m. one day and asked to speak with him at the police station about the florist store robbery.

He agreed. The officers then “followed him around the shop as he completed his work and walked out with him.” 147 Md.App. at 439 , 809 A.2d 66 . Although Minehan had driven to work, he accepted the officers’ offer to drive him to the police station. One officer patted him down before he got into the police vehicle, which was unmarked.

At the police station, the officers took Minehan to a room used for interviewing victims and witnesses. Another room, designated for suspects, was not used. Minehan sat at the head of a long table, with three officers facing him. The ⁶¹⁷ interview, which was taped, lasted one hour and 45 minutes, with a 20-minute cigarette break.

Minehan started making incriminating remarks about a quarter of the way into the interview. He was not given Miranda warnings at any time. After he confessed, the officers obtained his consent to go to his house right then to collect evidence. When that effort was not fruitful, the officers drove Minehan back to the florist store, to his car, and let him go.

They arrested him one week later. This Court held that Minehan was not “in custody” for purposes of Miranda during the ride to the police station because he agreed to accompany the officers, was not restrained (except for the use of a seatbelt), “and the conversation in the car was unremarkable.” Id. at 441, 809 A.2d 66 . With respect to the interview at the police station, we observed that merely because a person is interviewed by officers in a police station setting does not mean that the person is in custody per se. See Mathiason, supra, 429 U.S. at 495 , 97 S.Ct. 711 (holding that suspect who was questioned in isolation for 30 minutes in police station was not “in custody,” as he had agreed to go to the police station for questioning).

In addition, it is an established rule “that police do not violate Miranda by telling the accused he or she is only a witness, when, in fact, the person is a suspect.” Minehan, supra, 147 Md.App. at 442 , 809 A.2d 66 (citing Mathiason, supra, 429 U.S. at 495-96 , 97 S.Ct. 711 and Beckwith, supra, 425 U.S. at 347 , 96 S.Ct. 1612 ). We went on to comment as follows about the fact that Minehan was released at the end of the interview instead of being placed under arrest: [TJhere is rarely custody when the person questioned leaves the interrogation unencumbered, only to be arrested at a later time. See Bartram v. State, 33 Md.App. 115, 148-49 , 364 A.2d 1119 (1976) [aff'd, 280 Md. 616 , 374 A.2d 1144 (1977)]; Cummings [v. State], 27 Md.App. [361,] 378-79, 341 A.2d 294 [, cert. denied, 276 Md. 740 (1975)]; see also United States v. Scully, 415 F.2d 680, 683-84 (2d Cir.1969) (holding that accused was not in custody when asked to go to the police station and left the station freely); United States v. ⁶¹⁸ Manglona, 414 F.2d 642, 644 (9th Cir.1969) (holding that accused was not in custody when told he was not under arrest and was free to leave, and did in fact freely leave the interview); State v. Patterson, 146 N.C.App. 113 , 552 S.E.2d 246, 252-54 (2001) (holding that accused was not in custody when asked to “give his side of the story” and then left the station unencumbered). Minehan, supra, 147 Md.App. at 442 , 809 A.2d 66 .

After reasoning that all of the above factors weighed against “custody,” we noted as well that Minehan had said, at the outset of his interview, that he had come to the police station of his own free will; that the officers had told him at that point that he was free to leave and did not have to answer any questions; and that, before he confessed, he again was told that he was not under arrest and could leave without saying anything. After the confession, Minehan was told he was not under arrest and that the police probably would contact him in the future to “maybe discuss things here.” Id. at 443 , 809 A.2d 66 . These factors likewise weighed against a determination of custody. Finally, we commented as follows about the intentions of the police in bringing Minehan in for questioning: We recognize that bringing Minehan to the police station to discuss the [florist store] robbery was clearly a subterfuge for extracting a confession from him.

Furthermore, once the officers shifted the interview from the [florist store] robbery to Minehan’s alleged criminality, the pressure in the room increased, a change that was palpable from reading the transcripts and which was captured by Minehan’s anxious question, “What is happening to me?” With a slightly different set of facts, this police action would have jeopardized the admission of the entire confession: it was a risky enterprise. Given Minehan’s unencumbered departure and his statements on the record, how ever, we uphold admission of the confession, after all. Id. In Ashe v. State, supra, 125 Md.App. 537 , 726 A.2d 786 , a victim was beaten to death by an angry mob of people.

Two ⁶¹⁹ days later, investigating officers went to Ashe’s house and asked him to go with them to the police station for an interview. Ashe was told he was not a suspect in the murder (although, in fact, he was). He rode to the station house in the police cruiser; the trip was three to four minutes long. He was told he was not under arrest and would be free to leave at any time.

Under questioning, without Miranda warnings, he made incriminating statements. The interrogation lasted one and one-half hours. After Ashe was charged, he moved to suppress the statements, on the ground that they were obtained by custodial interrogation, without Miranda warnings. Specifically, he argued that, when the police told him he was not under arrest and was free to leave, he thought that meant that he could leave after giving a statement.

The suppression court found that he was told no such thing and that a reasonable person in his situation would not have thought that his freedom was restricted and that he could not end the interrogation and leave. This Court affirmed on that point. Another case that bears some similarity to the case at bar is Allen v. State, 158 Md.App. 194 , 857 A.2d 101 (2004), aff'd, 387 Md. 389 , 875 A.2d 724 (2005). Like this case, Allen involved interrogations by members of the Charles County Sheriffs Department, at the station house, with an arrest following closely thereafter.

At mid-morning one day, the Sheriffs Department received a telephone call from Allen, reporting that he had been assaulted the night before and had stabbed the man who assaulted him until the man stopped moving. He then had driven his car (which in fact belonged to the other man) and had crashed it into a ditch. Uniformed officers responded to Allen’s location and found him partially clad and covered in blood. Without prompting, he reported that he did not know where he was or who the person he had stabbed was, and only knew that the incident had taken place in a shack on a hill.

He volunteered to show the officers the shack. The officers handcuffed Allen and put him in a marked cruiser. He then directed them to the shack. An officer went inside and found the stabbing victim, who was dead.

Allen ⁶²⁰ was not told that the victim was dead, however. He was uncuffed at that point. One of the officers asked Allen if he would be willing to discuss the incident at the station house. The officer explained that Allen was not under arrest and was free to leave without discussing the incident.

Allen agreed to accompany the officers. He sat in the front seat of the police car, restrained only by a seat belt. Upon arrival at the station house, he was taken to an interview room. At 10:55 a.m., one of the officers entered and repeated to Allen that he was not under arrest, was free to leave, and did not have to discuss the incident.

Allen agreed to talk. He answered questions for two hours, in the course of which he confessed to stabbing the victim. During that time, he was given drinks and snacks, when he asked for them. The conversation between the officer and Allen was carried on in normal tones.

The police took Allen’s bloody clothing and gave him a prison jumpsuit to wear. After Allen confessed, he was asked to give a written statement, to which he agreed. The process that was followed was the same as what transpired in the case at bar: the officer typed out the written questions and the answers as given. In the written statement, Allen agreed that he had been told before he came to the station house that he was not under arrest and was free to leave, and reaffirmed that he still had that understanding.

The process of taking the written statement began at 12:56 p.m. and ended at 3:56 p.m. During that time, the police were obtaining 1 an arrest warrant. After the written statement was complete, the officers offered to drive Allen home. He asked to be taken to his parents’ house instead.

The officers complied, and dropped Allen off, at 4:30 p.m. They took his shoes, which were bloody. Plainclothes police kept Allen’s parents’ house under surveillance. Fifteen minutes later, the police obtained the arrest warrant.

They arrested Allen at 5:10 p.m. This Court reviewed the factors that are important in deciding whether a person is in custody, and concluded, “[p]ur ⁶²¹ suant to the ‘reasonable person’ analysis ..., that the trial court was entitled to find from the evidence that [Allen] was not in custody during the [interview].” 158 Md.App. at 236 , 857 A.2d 101 . “Allen was advised that he was not under arrest, was free to leave, and did not have to ‘discuss the incident’ with the detectives.” Id. With respect to the events following the interview, we observed: [T]he Whitfield [v. State, supra,] Court suggested that events after a police interview, such as a formal arrest, may be relevant to the question of whether the suspect was actually in custody during a prior interview. In this regard, we are mindful that when the police transported [Allen] to his home, they already knew that they were going to arrest him as soon as possible.

But, our focus concerns [Allen’s] state of mind during the interview. [The interrogating detective] testified that, when he first encountered Allen, he knew little about the circumstances of [the victim’s] death. In other words, [the detective] had not fixed on [Allen] as the culprit when the interview began. Rather, [Allen’s] statements during the interview led [the detective] to believe [Allen] murdered [the victim]. That the sheriffs decided to monitor [Allen] after they drove him to his parents’ house, because of what was learned during the interview, does not establish that a reasonable person would have perceived he was in custody while at the sheriffs office during the interview. 158 Md.App. at 235 , 857 A.2d 101 .

To be sure, there are aspects of the two main cases relied upon by the State, and Allen , that militate in favor of a legal finding that, considering the total circumstances, a reasonable person in Buck’s position would not have thought he was “in custody” when he was interrogated by the detectives as he was being driven to the police station, while at the police station, and on the drive home from the police station. Buck agreed to accompany the officers when they appeared at his house. He was told then, and later confirmed in his written statement that he had been told, he was not under arrest and was free to leave. He was not physically restrained by ⁶²² handcuffs or otherwise.

The officers came to Buck’s house in mid-day, in plainclothes, and transported him to the station house in an unmarked car. After confessing, Buck was not arrested at the station house. During his later, warned, interview, he said he knew he had been at the station house voluntarily. There are other factors within the total circumstances to be considered here that militate in favor of a legal finding that a reasonable person in Buck’s situation would have thought he was in custody from the time he was driven to the station house to the time he was returned to his house, however.

Buck knew, before he was questioned at the station house on March 2, 2005, that the police had targeted him as the murderer in the Baroody case. When the officers encountered Buck on the street, on March 1, 2005, the murder was discussed. In Buck’s presence, Detective Minor telephoned Detective Piazza and said, “I think we got him” — a clear reference to Buck’s being the person the officers thought had committed the murder. During the interrogation at the station house the next day, Buck reminded Detective Minor of that, and said he had taken those words to mean that the officers thought he had killed Baroody.

Soon thereafter, Detective Minor asked Buck “how it felt to kill that man,” and Buck proceeded to confess to the murder. Just as a defendant’s subjective belief as to whether he is in custody does not control whether, under the objective standard, he is in custody, neither does a police officer’s subjective belief as to whether the defendant indeed committed the crime control the custody question. However, when an officer articulates to the defendant his belief that the defendant committed the crime, the custody inquiry is transformed, and becomes whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation — ie., having been told by the police that they think he committed the crime — would think he was free to break off the interview and leave. In Stansbury v. California, supra, 511 U.S. 318 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 the Supreme Court held that “an officer’s subjective and undisclosed view concerning whether the person being interrogated is a suspect is ⁶²³ irrelevant to the assessment whether the person is in custody.” 511 U.S. at 319 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 (emphasis added).

Likewise, in Berkemer v. McCarty, supra, the Court held that, whether a motorist questioned in a roadside encounter with a police officer during a traffic stop was in custody did not depend upon the officer’s intention — not communicated — to immediately take the motorist into custody and charge him with an offense. The Court in Stansbury explained its reasoning in Berkemer as follows: [T]he officer “never communicated his intention to” the motorist during the relevant questioning. The lack of communication was crucial, for under Miranda, “[a] policeman’s unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question whether a suspect was ‘in custody’ at a particular time”; rather, “the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood his situation. ” 511 U.S. at 323-24 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 (quoting Berkemer, supra, 468 U.S. at 442 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 ) (emphasis added). The Stansbury Court went on to state: An officer’s knowledge or beliefs may bear upon the custody issue if they are conveyed, by word or deed, to the individual being questioned.

Those beliefs are relevant only to the extent they would affect how a reasonable person in the position of the individual being questioned would gauge the breadth of his or- her “freedom of action. ” Even a clear statement from an officer that the