Lang v. Levi

ZARNOCH, J. This appeal challenges the correctness of the reduction of a claimed marital award by a Jewish arbitration panel, the Beth Din, 1 and the outright denial of an award on post-arbitration applications by a representative of the Av Beth Din. 2 Appellant Julie Lang and Appellee Zion Levi signed a prenuptial agreement, which stated in part that Levi had an obligation to pay Lang $100 a day from the time they no longer resided ¹⁵⁸ together until Levi granted Lang a get, a Jewish divorce. They also signed an arbitration agreement giving the Beth Din the authority to decide any disputes that arose regarding this prenuptial agreement. When the marriage fell apart, Lang and Levi appeared before the Beth Din in 2008. The panel rejected Lang’s claim that she was entitled to a cumulative amount of $108,000 in stipulated per diems, but granted her an award of $10,200.

However, the award was later reduced to zero by a representative of the Av Beth Din who found, on the basis of Jewish law, that Levi was not obligated to pay any amount to Lang. In 2009, Lang petitioned the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to vacate the arbitration award, and Levi moved for summary judgment. The circuit court found no grounds to vacate the award, and granted Levi’s motion. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the decision of the circuit court.

FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS Appellant Julie Lang and Appellee Zion Levi were married on June 22, 2003, and entered into both a secular marriage under Maryland law and a Jewish marriage. That same day, the parties signed a prenuptial agreement and an arbitration agreement. The prenuptial agreement provided that if the parties did not continue to reside together, Levi would pay Lang $100 a day from the day they no longer resided together until the end of their Jewish marriage. The arbitration agreement provided that if the parties no longer lived together as husband and wife, they authorized an arbitration panel, the Beth Din, to decide all issues involving the Jewish divorce and premarital agreements, including monetary disputes.

This agreement stated: “The decision of the Bet Din[ 3 ] shall be made in accordance with Jewish Law (Halakhah) and/or the ¹⁵⁹ general principles of arbitration and equity (Pesharah) customarily employed by rabbinical tribunals.” The parties had one child together, Victoria, who was bom on September 21, 2004. By 2005, the marriage had deteriorated and on October 1, 2005, the parties separated. In 2006, Levi sued for a divorce and Lang counter-claimed, requesting sole custody, alimony, attorney’s fees, determinations regarding property, and a monetary award. The trial court entered a consent order resolving custody and visitation disputes.

Around the same time, the parties agreed that Levi would pay pendente lite child support. The circuit court entered a decree of absolute divorce on March 28, 2008. The court denied Lang’s request for alimony, ordered the parties to evenly divide their child’s school expenses, required Levi to provide health insurance for the child, and denied both parties’ requests for attorney’s fees. This Court affirmed the trial court’s decision on June 19, 2009.

Levi v. Levi, No. 526, September Term 2008 (June 19, 2009). Levi also petitioned the Beth Din to arrange the get. The Beth Din notified Lang on July 3, 2008 and requested she contact the Beth Din if she wished to participate. When she agreed, the Beth Din scheduled an arbitration session for September 17, 2008 before a panel of three rabbis.

At the session, the Beth Din heard arguments on both the prenuptial agreement and the get. At that time, Levi offered and Lang accepted the get. Six weeks later, the panel addressed the remaining issue and rejected as “unjust and improper” Lang’s claim for a per diem obligation of $108,000, computed up to the moment she was summoned to the Beth Din. 4 Finding that the purpose of the prenuptial agreement was to ensure the timely offering of a get by the husband, the panel concluded that Lang was entitled to $100 a day from October 1, 2005, when the parties no longer resided together, to January 10, 2006, ¹⁶⁰ when Levi first offered her a get, a cumulative amount of $10,200. In November 2008, Lang and Levi both applied for modification of the decision under the Rules and Procedures of the Beth Din.

Rabbi Mordechai Willig, the Segan [Assistant] Av Beth Din, was designated to hear the post-arbitration applications. Although he was not present when evidence was taken before the panel, and he did not entertain argument or hear additional evidence, he rendered a decision. In a March 30, 2009 ruling, he rejected the panel’s determination and eliminated the monetary award to Lang. Rabbi Willig held that he had authority to modify the decision under Section 1(b) of the Beth Din Rules and Procedures. 5 He reasoned that under Jewish law, even when language seems unambiguous, the intent of the parties is still relevant to the interpretation of a contract.

The Segan Av Beth Din also noted that “a beth din is especially empowered to avert an unintended consequence that may result from a literal reading of a contractual provision when the beth din is authorized to decide a case based on the equities of the matter.” 6 For these reasons, he concluded that the intent of the parties in the present case was not “to provide the wife with a mechanism to demand additional money beyond any negotiated or court imposed settlement.” Instead, the intent of the parties was to require Levi to pay economic costs if he failed to give a timely get. Because Levi was willing to give Lang a get soon after the parties stopped residing together and Lang refused, she was not entitled to ¹⁶¹ any award. 7 Further, because Lang consistently failed to demand a monetary award that was supposed to be paid in weekly installments, it was “likely” that she “implicitly waived” her right to it. Finally, Lang already participated in a secular court proceeding on her financial divorce claims and Rabbi Willig found that “[gjenerally, a party that appears before a secular court may not later bring a claim in beth din.” On April 29, 2009, Lang brought an action in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County petitioning the court to vacate the decisions of the Beth Din and Av Beth Din, and alleging breach of contract under the Jewish prenuptial agreement. On July 28, 2009, the court granted Levi’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the parties submitted to the jurisdiction of the Beth Din for arbitration in an arbitration agreement enforceable in Maryland, that the Beth Din had the authority to interpret Jewish law and to delegate to Rabbi Willig the rendering of a decision under the Rules and Procedures of the Beth Din, and that the Av Beth Din’s decision was not “an irrational decision on a question of law that is so extraordinary that it is tantamount to the arbitrator’s exceeding his powers to warrant the court’s intervention.” Lang timely noted this appeal. 8 QUESTIONS PRESENTED Appellant presents the following question for our review: 9 ¹⁶² Did the circuit court err by denying appellant’s petition to vacate the arbitration award?

For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm the decision of the circuit court. DISCUSSION I. Standards of Review A. Summary Judgment Lang argues that, for various reasons, the circuit court should have vacated the Beth Din’s decision instead of granting summary judgment in favor of Levi. A circuit court should grant summary judgment only when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and the moving “party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Md. Rule 2-501(a). On appeal, this Court reviews a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.

Mandl v. Bailey, 159 Md.App. 64, 82 , 858 A.2d 508 (2004). B. Vacating an Arbitration Award Because the Beth Din is an arbitration panel, we must also consider the standard for vacating an arbitration panel’s decision. The Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act (“MUAA”), Md.Code (1974, 2006 Repl.Vol.) Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJP), §§ 8-201 et seq. governs the enforceability of arbitration agreements. Mandl, 159 Md.App. at 85 , 858 A.2d 508 .

The MUAA “severely restrict[s] the role the courts play in the arbitration process” in order to further the “policy [of] favoring arbitration as an alternative method of dispute resolution,” which conserves judicial resources. Id. Under the MUAA, a court may only vacate an arbitration award where: ¹⁶³ (1) An award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means; (2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, corruption in any arbitrator, or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party; (3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers; (4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown for the postponement, refused to hear evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise so conducted the hearing ... as to prejudice substantially the rights of any party; (5) There was no arbitration agreement ... the issue was not adversely determined in proceedings ... and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection. CJP § 3—24(b).

It is important to emphasize that a court’s power to vacate an arbitration award is “narrowly confined” to the above circumstances. Mandl, 159 Md.App. at 85 , 858 A.2d 508 . The circuit court operates under a “tightly restricted scope” when reviewing an arbitrator’s decision under the MUAA. Id. at 92 , 858 A.2d 508 .

This Court has articulated the standard for circuit court review: [Fjactual findings by an arbitrator are virtually immune from challenge and decisions on issues of law are reviewed using a deferential standard on the far side of the spectrum away from a usual expansive de novo standard. An arbitrator’s mere error of law or failure to understand or apply the law is not a basis for a court to disturb an arbitral award. Only a completely irrational decision by an arbitrator on a question of law, so extraordinary that it is tantamount to the arbitrator’s exceeding his powers, will warrant the court’s intervention. Id. at 92-93 , 858 A.2d 508 .

Here, Lang alleges only that the Beth Din exceeded its powers, and that its decision was irrational. She has the burden to prove these assertions. Id. at 86 , 858 A.2d 508 . ¹⁶⁴ II. The Beth Din’s Authority A. The Parties’ Intent & the Plain Language of the Prenuptial Agreement To begin, Lang argues that we must vacate Rabbi Willig’s decision reversing the Beth Din’s award because it is “irrational” based on the plain language of the parties’ contract.

She relies primarily on two Maryland cases —O-S Corp. v. Samuel A. Kroll, Inc., 29 Md.App. 406 , 348 A.2d 870 (1975), and Snyder v. Berliner Constr. Co., 79 Md.App. 29 , 555 A.2d 523 (1989)—for the proposition that if an arbitrator does not follow the plain language of the parties’ contract, the arbitrator has exceeded his authority and the decision was irrational, requiring it to be vacated. O-S Corp., 29 Md.App. at 410 , 348 A.2d 870 ; Snyder, 79 Md.App. at 37 , 555 A.2d 523 . Lang argues that the prenuptial agreement plainly states that from the time the parties no longer reside together until the delivery of the get, Levi must pay her $100 per day under any circumstances.

Because the Beth Din’s award ignored this plain language, she asserts, it was thus irrational and must be reversed. In our opinion, the Beth Din appropriately exercised its authority within the confines of its own rules and procedures, which both Lang and Levi agreed to be subject to under the arbitration agreement. Under that agreement, the parties conferred upon the Beth Din the authority to settle any marital disputes, including monetary disputes, between the parties “in accordance with Jewish law (Halakhah) and/or general principles of arbitration and equity (Pesharah) customarily employed by rabbinical tribunals.” 10 Under Jewish law, the provision in the contract that is the basis for Lang’s claim for $108,000 was intended to facilitate the timely delivery of a get, preventing what is referred to as agunah or ¹⁶⁵ “chained wives.” This is an issue in the Orthodox Jewish community that arises because: [U]nder traditional Jewish law, a civil divorce does not dissolve the marriage. Only a religious divorce, provided by a signed writ of divorce called a “get,” completely dissolves the marriage for a person who wishes to remarry within the Orthodox Jewish religion.

By tradition, only the husband has the power to grant or withhold the get. The rabbinic authorities may not compel the husband to grant the get if he does not wish to do so. Until a woman receives a get she may not remarry within her religion. If she does remarry without the get, the new marriage is not considered valid.

The woman is considered an adulterer, and any children from the new marriage are considered illegitimate. Fiscal and Policy Note on House Bill 324 (2007). 11 Thus, the intent of the parties in signing the $100-a-day-penalty was to prevent Levi from withholding a get from Lang. The provision was not necessary here because Levi was willing to give Lang a get and Lang was reluctant to accept it. Requiring Levi to pay Lang any monetary award under the provision, Rabbi Willig found, would be an “unintended consequence” of a “literal reading of a contractual provision when the beth din is authorized to decide a case based on the equities of the matter.” As Segan Av Beth Din, he determined that it would be inequitable under Jewish law to require any payment because Levi “was willing to give a Get early in the process.” The parties agreed to arbitrate in the Beth Din and granted that body authority to interpret as well as determine matters of Jewish law, including a consideration of the equities.

Since this Court cannot interpret Jewish law or gauge equities as ¹⁶⁶ determined by rabbinical tribunals, we decline to vacate the decision of the Beth Din as contrary to the parties’ agreement. We further point out, as Levi notes, that Rabbi Willig’s interpretation of the $100-a-day penalty is consistent with the prenuptial agreement. The very first line in the instructions for the agreement states: “This Agreement is intended to facilitate the timely and proper delivery of a get” Thus, the agreement was not designed to confer a windfall on a wife, who refuses to receive the get, but rather it was intended only to prevent Lang from becoming a “chained wife.” B. Authority of the Segan Av Beth Din to Modify Panel’s Award Lang argues that Rabbi Willig’s decision reversing the Beth Din’s award was beyond his authority under the arbitration agreement. We disagree for two reasons.

First, the parties agreed to submit any marital disputes to the Beth Din and abide by its rules and procedures, which include the authority of the Av Beth Din to reverse the panel’s decision. See Elmora Hebrew Center, Inc. v. Fishman, 125 N.J. 404 , 593 A.2d 725, 729-32 (1991) (finding parties are bound by Beth Din’s decision because they agreed to submit their disputes to the Beth Din). Second, because of the religious nature of the Beth Din, the First Amendment prohibits us from determining whether reversal by the Av Beth Din is appropriate under Jewish law and the principles of equity as determined by a religious tribunal. See id.

(finding that the First Amendment does not permit civil courts to decide religious doctrine). Thus, we do not find that Rabbi Willig was without authority to reverse the panel’s decision. 1. Beth Din’s Rules and Procedures Allow for Reversal From our review of the record, Rabbi Willig as the Segan Av Beth Din had authority to reverse the panel’s decision under the Beth Din’s rules, to which Lang agreed to be bound. Rabbi Willig was delegated the task of reviewing the applications for modification as part of the appellate arbitration process within the Beth Din.

He reversed the decision of the ¹⁶⁷ three-rabbi panel awarding Lang $10,200 and instead, eliminated the award entirely. Section 31(a)(e) of the rules gave him the authority to modify the award. The Rule states: On written application of a party to the Beth Din within twenty (20) days after delivery of the award to the applicant, the Beth Din may modify the award if ... the Av Beth Din determines that a provision of the Award is contrary to Jewish Law. This authority is supplemented, if not strengthened, by other provisions of the Rules.

Under Section 1(a), the Av Beth Din selves “as the supervisor of the Beth Din and all of its functions ” (emphasis added) and requires the parties to “appoint the Av Beth Din or his designee as the administrator in a Beth Din proceeding or hearing.” See also n. 2, supra. Section 39