Langley v. Jones

Bartol, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This suit was brought by the appellants; the parties on each side claimed title under Robert F. Chew. The title of the defendants was derived under a seizure and sale by the sheriff by virtue of a writ of fieri fiadas against Robert F. Chew. In support of which they offered in evidence the judgment and execution, with the return of the sheriff thereto, and also the deed of the sheriff conyeying the land to the purchaser.

This title was assailed upon the ground that the seizure made by the sheriff under the fieri fiadas so far as respected the tracts called “ Gidor” and “Gileard” was insufficient and void for uncertainty in the 'description of the land taken under the levy; and consequently no title passed to the purchaser. . The schedule returned by the sheriff of the property seized is as follows: ¹⁷⁷ “A schedule of the several tracts of land of Eobert F. Chew, levied on and taken in execution at suit of Hanson Clarke, to wit: All the right, title, claim, interest and estate, in and to the several tracts, parts of tracts of land lying in Prince George’s county, named as follows: Moore’s Part of Barbadoes, enlarged, containing 193 acres, part of a tract called Gidor, containing 20 acres, and part of a tract called Gileard, containing 61J acres, more or less.” The advertisement of sale accompanying the return, described the property in the same way. The sale was made on the 13th day of April, 1829. On the 15th day of the same month, the sheriff executed a deed to the purchaser, reciting that he had levied upon a tract of laud called “Barbadoes,” a tract of land called “Gidor,” and a tract of land called “Gileard,” and sold the said several tracts of land so as aforesaid taken in execution, &c.

The point raised by the first prayer of the appellants is that no title passed to the purchaser in the tracts called “Gidor” and “Gileard;” because the sheriff in his schedule and return to the fieri facias and in the advertisement, states that he had seized and levied upon part of Gidor and part of Gileard, without indicating with sufficient certainty what part of said lands were so seized and levied upon by him. Unquestionably the return to the fieri facias of the seizure and sale is wholly defective and insufficient. In Clarke vs. Belmear, 1 G. & J., 443 , it was held that “a return by the sheriff to a writ of fieri facias that he had levied upon * part of a tract called B, containing, &c.,’ is not sufficient, would be quashed on motion, and would be unavailable in ejectment to prove title in a purchaser.” The same proposition was decided in Thomas’s Lessee vs. Turvey, 1 H. & J., 435 , and such has always been the uniform and established doctrine in Maryland; because such a return is altogether uncertain, and affords no means for locating the property seized and sold. ¹⁷⁸ Bat the appellees contend that the purchaser is not confined to the return made to the fieri facias, that he has a right in support of his title to resort to all the official proceedings of the sheriff; that when the return to the fieri facias is defective, it may be amended and rendered certain, by the return of the sheriff to the vendi, or by the sheriff’s deed to the purchaser; and that the defective seizure in this case has been cured by the recitals in the sheriff’s deed. In support of this position we have been referred to Clarke vs. Belmear, 1 G. & J., 443 , and Wright vs. Orrell, 19 Md., 151 .

It is necessary to examine those cases in order to see how far they sustain the position of the appellees. In Clarke vs. Belmear, the return to the fieri facias and the schedule therewith, stated the levy to be upon “ part of Burgess’s Delight, part of Clarke’s Fancy, and part of • Hickory Thicket, supposed to contain 275 acres.” A writ of venditioni exponas was thereupon issued, and in the sheriff’s return to this writ he describes the land seized and sold by metes and bounds, describing the same as being “ the whole of the said several tracts of which the defendant was in possession at the time of the sale,” thereby rendering certain the land which had been seized, and thus the defective description in the return to the first writ was cured. Anri so in Wright vs. Orrell, the seizure was of “the following property, the farm where Edward Potts now lives, containing 200 acres,” and it was held that the deed of the sheriff containing a full and particular description of the land seized and sold, as the “farm on which Potts lived,” was legal and competent evidence in support of the purchaser’s title, and for the purpose of supplying a more accurate and intelligible description of the property actually seized and sold under the execution. To this extent and for this purpose, the purchaser is entitled to rely upon the sheriff’s deed,- as part of his official