Langley v. Langley

FISCHER, Judge. This case concerns the effect of § 8-103(c) of the Family Law Article upon a separation agreement entered into by Robert L. Langley, Sr., the appellant, and his former wife, Phylis D. Langley, the appellee. Mr. Langley filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County seeking to modify his support obligation to Ms. Langley. Ms. Langley moved to dismiss the complaint, and the court denied her motion.

Upon reconsideration, however, the judge granted Ms. Langley’s motion and dismissed the suit. From this dismissal, Mr. Langley appeals. At issue is the court’s authority to modify the support provision set forth in the Langleys’ separation agreement. Pursuant to Md. Rule 8-207, the parties have elected to proceed by way of an expedited appeal.

Accordingly, they have submitted an agreed statement of the case 1 from which we distill the following facts. In 1983, the parties entered into a property settlement, separation and custody agreement that was incorporated, but not merged, into their ⁵³⁷ ensuing divorce decree. Paragraph 9 of the agreement states in part: In the event the Husband becomes unemployed and his income becomes substantially less than during the time of his employment, the parties agree to renegotiate the support provisions of this Agreement in good faith or to subject those provisions to a court of competent jurisdiction for determination. Several years later, Mr. Langley filed a complaint to modify his support obligation.

He alleged: (a) a substantial change in circumstances due to his remarriage and birth of two additional children, (b) a decrease in [his] income and an increase in living expenses, (c) a greater ability of [Ms. Langley] to contribute to her own living expenses, and (d) an inequitable result if [he] continues to pay alimony as he is spending more support on [Ms. Langley] than on his new children. The court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the parties intended to limit the modification of support to the sole circumstance provided in the separation agreement. Mr. Langley now contends that paragraph 9 of the separation agreement is “subject to more than one meaning or interpretation thereby permitting the court to modify the terms of alimony under circumstances other than when ‘Husband becomes unemployed and his income becomes substantially less than during the time of his employment.’ ” Ms. Langley responds that “the agreement is unambiguous wherein alimony may be modified by the Court only under the above-stated circumstance.” Two provisions of the Md.Fam.Law Code Ann. are applicable to this dispute. Section 8-103(c) states: The court may modify any provision of a deed, agreement, or settlement with respect to alimony or spousal support executed on or after April 13, 1976, regardless of how the provision is stated, unless there is: (1) an express waiver of alimony or spousal support; or ⁵³⁸ (2) a provision that specifically states that the provisions with respect to alimony or spousal support are not subject to any court modification.

In addition, § 8-105(b) provides: The court may modify any provision of a deed, agreement, or settlement that is: (1) incorporated, whether or not merged, into a divorce decree; and (2) subject to modification under § 8-103 of this subtitle. Sidestepping these statutory provisions, Ms. Langley directs our attention to Mendelson v. Mendelson, 75 Md.App. 486 , 541 A.2d 1331 (1988), a case which she asserts is dispositive of the controversy now before us. The Mendel-sons entered a separation agreement wherein Mr. Mendel-son agreed to pay spousal support to Ms. Mendelson. Support was to cease upon the death of either party or upon the remarriage of Ms. Mendelson.

The agreement further provided that Ms. Mendelson waived “any cause of action she may have to seek additional alimony or change the alimony provisions ... provided that [Mr. Mendelson] does not breach the agreement.” Mendelson, 75 Md.App. at 491 , 541 A.2d 1331 . In addition, the agreement stated that should Mr. Mendelson become disabled or retired at age 60 or greater, “[T]he parties shall attempt to agree on alimony ... payments that are equitable in light of [Mr. Mendel-son’s] changed financial resources.” If the parties were unable to agree, “either party may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction for such relief as may be appropriate.” Mendelson, 75 Md.App. at 491-492 , 541 A.2d 1331 . Upon subsequently learning that Ms. Mendelson had formed a close relationship and was cohabitating with another gentleman, Mr. Mendelson filed a petition to reduce or terminate the support payments. A domestic relations master heard the matter and recommended dismissal of Mr. Mendelson’s petition.

The master determined that “Ms. Mendelson’s [new] relationship ... was not ‘flagrant mis ⁵³⁹ conduct’ that would require termination or a reduction of spousal support, nor did the relationship effect a substantial change in [Ms. Mendelson’s] financial circumstances.” Mendelson, 75 Md.App. at 492 , 541 A.2d 1331 . Mr. Mendel-son noted exceptions to these findings but to no avail. Mr. Mendelson then sought relief in this Court. Denying his request, we opined: [The support payments] were to cease upon the death of either party or upon the remarriage of [Ms. Mendel-son].

By agreeing to these payments [Ms. Mendelson] waived any cause of action she might