Langley v. State

Smith, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. At the trial of this criminal case before a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County a trial judge refused to ask the following question on voir dire: “Is there anyone here who would give more credit to the testimony of a police officer over that of a civilian, merely because of his status as a police officer?” The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the conviction in an unreported opinion. (Langley v. State, No. 165, September Term 1976.) We granted the writ of certiorari in order that we might consider the overall problem and any conflict between the holding of the Court of Special Appeals in this case and its holding in Tisdale v. State, 30 Md. App. 334, 338-39 , 353 A. 2d 653 (1976). We shall hold that under the facts and circumstances here it was prejudicial error for the trial judge to refuse to ask this question.

The facts are relatively simple. Appellant, Lawrence Langley (Langley), was tried and convicted of robbery. Pursuant to Maryland Rule 828 g the parties agreed to a statement of facts in lieu of a printed record extract in this Court. This statement included the following relevant to the alleged crime and the Langley defense: On June 13, 1975, between 1:30 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. a taxicab driver notified the police that his cab had just been stolen.

A police officer in Chillum observed the cab in question shortly thereafter and gave chase at a high rate of speed. The cab crashed. The driver fled and has never been apprehended. Langley, a passenger in the cab, was arrested.

The officer testified that ³³⁹ Langley was attempting to flee from the scene when he was arrested. His flight was impeded by a jammed door on the passenger side of the cab. The officer further testified that Langley had only three cents on his person at the time of his arrest. This testimony was contradicted by Langley who stated that he was not attempting to flee, that he could have successfully emerged from the cab but chose not to, and that he had $2.00 on his person at the time of his arrest.

He claimed that he had left a restaurant in the District of Columbia at closing time, hailed a cab to return to his home in Chillum (intending to use the $2.00 to pay the fare), and, to his surprise, had become involved in a high speed chase and crash. He denied any knowledge of or participation in the robbery which preceded his entry into the cab. 1 The Court of Special Appeal said it “f[ound] dispositive the decisions of Gorin v. United States, 313 F. 2d 641 (1 Cir. 1963), and Rose v. United States, 374 F. 2d 97 (8th Cir. 1967), to the effect that such a question does not establish challenge for cause and is therefore not mandated,” adding that it “s[aw] no abuse of discretion.” Tisdale, 30 Md. App. 334 , also involved a case in which the testimony of a police officer was very important, but not so important as in the case here. There on voir dire the prospective jurors were asked: “Now, are there any of you here who are inclined or would be inclined to give more weight to a police officer’s testimony merely because he is a police officer than the testimony of any other witness in the case?” Two jurors answered in the affirmative. The trial judge declined to disqualify the jurors for cause, pointing out that each juror had “indicated there’s no reason at all that he would not render a fair and impartial verdict based on the evidence.” Since the defendant had to use two peremptory challenges to eliminate those jurors, the Court of Special ³⁴⁰ Appeals held that “[t]he failure of the trial court to allow [Tisdale] 20 peremptory strikes was reversible error.” 2 Almost a century ago Judge Robinson observed for the Court in Waters v. State, 51 Md. 430 (1879): “It is a fundamental principle underlying the trial by jury, that each juror shall so far as it is possible be entirely impartial and unbiased, in order that he may hear the evidence, and decide the matter in controversy uninfluenced by any extraneous considerations whatever.

We say, so far as it is possible, for after all, it may not be practicable even by the most rigid rules of exclusion to secure that impartiality which the law in the abstract contemplates. “Every day’s experience teaches that all human institutions are affected to some extent at least, by the common infirmities of those by whom they are framed, or by whom they are administered. To secure, however, a fair and impartial trial so far as it may be practicable, the law has from the earliest times prescribed certain qualifications for jurors; and has carefully excluded from the panel all persons who from partiality or prejudice, arising either from their relations to the parties or from a fixed opinion in regard to the matter in issue, cannot be expected to give an impartial consideration to the questions submitted to them.” Id. at 436 . ³⁴¹ This Court has observed on a number of occasions that there is no statute in Maryland prescribing the objects of inquiry in determining the eligibility of jurors, and the subject is not covered by rigid rules, but is committed largely to the sound discretion of the trial court in each case. See, e.g., Casey v. Roman Catholic Arch., 217 Md. 595, 605 , 143 A. 2d 627 (1958); Corens v. State, 185 Md. 561, 564 , 45 A. 2d 340 (1946); and Whittemore v. State, 151 Md. 309, 314 , 134 A. 322 (1926). Judge Hammond explained for the Court in McGee v. State, 219 Md. 53 , 146 A. 2d 194 (1959): “It is settled in Maryland that in examination of jurors on their voir dire, the court may frame its own questions and not permit cross-examination by counsel, that the extent of the examination rests in the sound discretion of the court, and that the purpose of the inquiry is to ascertain ‘the existence of cause for disqualification and for no other purpose.’ Adams v. State, 200 Md. 133, 140 , and cases cited; Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565 .

Questions not directed to a specific ground for disqualification but which are speculative, inquisitorial, catechising or ‘fishing’, asked in aid of deciding on peremptory challenges, may be refused in the discretion of the court, even though it would not have been error to have asked them. Whittemore v. State, 151 Md. 309, 311-316 ; Handy v. State, 101 Md. 39 ; Gillespie v. State, 92 Md. 171, 174 ; Emery v. F. P. Asher, Jr. & Sons, Inc., 196 Md. 1, 6-9 ; Cf. Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 217 Md. 595, 605 .” Id. at 58-59. See also Grogg v. State, 231 Md. 530, 532 , 191 A. 2d 435 (1963); Giles v. State, 229 Md. 370, 378 , 183 A. 2d 359 (1962); Casey, 217 Md. at 605 ; Grossfeld v. Braverman, 203 Md. 498, 500-01 , 101 A. 2d 824 (1954); Adams, Nelson, and Timanus v. State, 200 Md. 133, 140 , 88 A. 2d 556 (1952); and Cohen v. State, 173 Md. 216, 224 , 195 A. 532 (1937).

In Casey Judge Horney said for the Court: “[P]arties to an action triable before a jury have a right to have questions propounded to prospective ³⁴² jurors on their voir dire, which are directed to a specific cause for disqualification, and failure to allow such questions is an abuse of discretion constituting reversible error.” Id. at 605 (Emphasis in original.) He there referred to Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565 , 115 A. 2d 502 (1955), where Judge Delaplaine said for the Court: “In the exercise of that discretion, the trial judge should adapt the questions to the needs of each case in the effort to secure an impartial jury. Any circumstances that may reasonably be regarded as rendering a person unfitted for jury service may be made the subject of questions and a challenge for cause. Accordingly an examination of a juror on his voir dire is proper as long as it is conducted within the right to discover the juror’s state of mind in respect to the matter in hand or any collateral matter reasonably liable to unduly influence him. Corens v. State, 185 Md. 561, 564 , 45 A. 2d 340 ; Grossfeld v. Braverman, 203 Md. 498 , 101 A. 2d 824 .” Id. at 583 .

One of the first reported cases we have found ruling upon the question here before the Court is that of Sellers v. United States, 271 F. 2d 475 (D. C. Cir. 1959). The appellant there was convicted of violations of narcotics laws “based upon the testimony of an undercover police officer who had befriended him.” The court found an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge when he declined to make inquiry on voir dire as to whether any of the prospective jurors were “inclined to give more weight to the testimony of a police officer merely because he [was] a police officer than any other witness in the case.” (Emphasis supplied by the court.) The same court considered the matter again, referring to Sellers , in Brown v. United States, 338 F. 2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Judge Burger (now Chief Justice) said for the court in Brown : “The Gorin case is, of course, not controlling in this jurisdiction and should not be followed by the ³⁴³ District Court at the expense of our own holding in the Sellers case. In the present case, as in Sellers ’ ‘virtually the entire case for the prosecution’ consisted of testimony from law enforcement officers.

The circumstances of the Sellers case are very similar and compel reversal here; moreover, we do not read Sellers as having been narrowly decided. We construe that case as establishing that when important testimony is anticipated from certain categories of witnesses, whose official or semi-official status is such that a juror might reasonably be more, or less, inclined to credit their testimony, a query as to whether a juror would have such an inclination is not only appropriate but should be given if requested. Failure to make appropriate inquiry, when requested, does not necessarily require reversal; the issue turns on the degree of impact which the testimony in question would be likely to have had on the jury and what part such testimony played in the case as a whole. In this case, at the opening of trial, the Government had announced that it would not be able to produce the complainant, who had left the jurisdiction, but would rely on the testimony of the two military police officers who had witnessed the assault and apprehended appellant.

That the two Metropolitan Police Officers were also members of this police category serves only to emphasize the need for the requested inquiry to the panel. Responses to the requested query might have supplied defense counsel, or indeed the prosecutor, with relevant and useful information for exercising peremptory challenges or challenges for cause. We hold that under the Sellers case failure to inquire of the jury panel as requested regarding possible predilections concerning police testimony was reversible error in this case. We emphasize that independent of the scope of the requested query, the phrasing of the court’s inquiry should include whether any juror ³⁴⁴ would tend to give either more or less credence because of the occupation or category of the prospective witness.” Id. at 545 .

(Emphasis in original; footnotes omitted.) Judge Burger had earlier noted for the court that Chavez v. United States, 258 F. 2d 816, 819 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied sub nom. Tenorio v. United States, 359 U. S. 916 (1959), in dicta had taken an approach similar to that in Sellers. The court