Langworthy v. Goicochea

BISHOP, Judge. On December 22, 1993, appellant, John A. Langworthy, filed a claim with the Health Claims Arbitration Office of Maryland (“HCAO”) against appellee, Juvenal R. Goicochea, M.D. On April 11, 1994, Langworthy filed a complaint for assault and battery against Goicochea in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Langworthy claimed $300,000 in damages. On April 14, 1994, the HCAO granted Langworthy a ninety-day extension to file a certificate of merit of qualified expert.

Langworthy failed to file the requisite certificate and the HCAO dismissed Langworthy’s claim. On April 22, 1994, Goicochea filed a motion to dismiss Langworthy’s circuit court action, asserting that the court lacked jurisdiction because Langworthy had failed to arbitrate his claim before the HCAO. The circuit court granted Goicochea’s motion. Lang-worthy filed a motion for reconsideration which the circuit court denied.

On August 11, 1994, Langworthy filed an amended complaint. Subsequently, Goicochea filed a motion to strike the amended complaint, which the circuit court granted. Issues Langworthy presents numerous issues, which we rephrase and consolidate into a single issue: Did the trial court properly dismiss Langworthy’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction? Facts In his original complaint, Langworthy made the following allegations: ²⁶⁸ 1.

On November 27, 1992, ... against Plaintiff’s will and without the Plaintiffs consent, the Defendant intentionally assaulted and battered Plaintiffs left inguinal area with the full force of Defendant’s left forefinger for approximately five (5) minutes. 2. This assault and battery by the Defendant has inflicted a permanently painful injury in Plaintiffs left groin. 3. This assault and battery was aggravated by Defendant’s malice to physically hurt the Plaintiff. 4. On November 27, 1992, Plaintiff had verbally contracted with Defendant for Defendant to provide Plaintiff with a routine hernia examination and surgical consultation for two hundred dollars ($200.00).

As a licensed general surgeon in the State of Maryland, the Defendant intentionally violated this contract by Defendant’s intentionally hurting and permanently injuring Plaintiffs left groin as described in paragraphs 1-3 above. Wherefore, Plaintiff sues Defendant in the amount of three hundred thousand dollars ... for the permanent physical pain and suffering inflicted by Defendant---- The circuit court ruled that, pursuant to Maryland law, “compliance with the Health Claims Malpractice Act is a condition precedent to court action[,]” and dismissed the complaint. The court stated: It is clear to the Court from a review of ease law that [Langworthy’s] cause of action should first be submitted to arbitration before the [HCAO]. In Jewell v. Malamet, 322 Md. 262 [ 587 A.2d 474 ] (1991), a case factually similar to the one at bar, the Court held that in the absence of a concession that the conduct complained of had no conceivable validity as part of the examination being conducted, the Court could not conclude, as a matter of law, the allegations were not subject to the Act.

Similarly, in the instant case the Court cannot determine that Langworthy’s allegations suffice to take the complaint outside the Act. In the typical case when the Circuit Court determines that the [HCAO] should first hear a case, the Circuit Court ²⁶⁹ should stay the proceedings before it pending the outcome of arbitration. However, in the instant case the Health Claims Arbitration Office dismissed [Langworthy’s] action for his failure to file a Certificate of Merit of a Qualified Expert. ^ ^ ^ ^ In the instant case, [Langworthy’s] failure to file the required Certificate of Merit under Section 3-2A-04 is fatal to his case. Because the Health Claims Arbitration Office dismissed [Langworthy’s] case for his noncompliance, it is clear that [Langworthy] has not exhausted his administrative remedies.

It would be inappropriate for the Circuit Court to stay this action when the Health Claims Arbitration Office has dismissed the case for failure to follow the proper procedures. Discussion Langworthy contends that the circuit court has jurisdiction to hear his case because his complaint alleges assault and battery and therefore his claim is not within the scope of the Health Claims Malpractice Act (“the Act”). The Act requires that [a]ll claims, suits, and actions, including cross claims, third-party claims, and actions under Subtitle 9 of this title, by a person against a health care provider for medical injury allegedly suffered by the person in which damages of more than the limit of the concurrent jurisdiction of the District Court are sought are subject to and shall be governed by the provisions of this subtitle. Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann., § 3-2A-02(a) (Supp.1994).

A medical injury is defined as an “injury arising or resulting from the rendering or failure to render health care.” Id. § 3-2A-01(f). In Brown v. Rabbitt, 300 Md. 171 , 476 A.2d 1167 (1984), the Court clarified the legislature’s intent regarding the scope of the Act: ²⁷⁰ [I]t was clear to us that the legislature intended to include in the scope of the Act only those claims for damages done to or suffered by a person originating from the giving of or failure to give health care. Thus the critical question is whether the claim is based on the rendering or failure to render health care and not the label placed on the claim, that is, tort or contract. If health care is or should have been rendered and damage results therefrom, then it is a claim under the Act and must first be arbitrated.

Id. at 175 , 476 A.2d 1167 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Jewell v. Malamet, 322 Md. 262 , 587 A.2d 474 (1991), the Court discussed the “elaborate scheme for the arbitration of medical malpractice claims[,] ... set out in the Maryland Code (1974, 1989 Repl.Vol.) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article as subtitle 2A of title 3.... ” Id. at 264-65 , 587 A.2d 474 . The Court held that “ ‘the Act covers only those claims for damages arising from the rendering or failure to render health care where there has been a breach by the defendant, in his professional capacity, of his duty to exercise his professional expertise or skill.’ ” Id. at 266 , 587 A.2d 474 (quoting Cannon v. McKen, 296 Md. 27, 36 , 459 A.2d 196 (1983)). In Jewell , the appellant filed a complaint against her doctor for sexual abuse and assault.

When it dismissed the appellant’s complaint the circuit court ruled: [The appellant] characterizes the physician’s actions as sexual abuse or assault. However considering the purpose and extent of the examinations—to determine discomfort and disability caused by rheumatic conditions of the muscles, tendons, joints, bones or nerves by a professional health care provider—the “aggregate of operative facts” should be weighed by an Arbitration Panel for its judgment as to whether there has been a violation of this doctor’s duty to exercise care. Id. at 271 , 587 A.2d 474 . The Court agreed with the circuit court that “ ‘[t]he determination of jurisdiction in cases involving an intentional tort of ²⁷¹ a professional nature lies not in ... the label given to the tort ..., but on the factual context in which the tort was allegedly committed.’ ” Id. at 271-72 , 587 A.2d 474 .

The Court noted that, in oral argument, it asked the doctor’s attorney whether he planned to defend against the patient’s action by a denial of the allegations of the complaint, or did he plan to offer medical testimony tending to show that the insertion of Tthe doctor’s] finger in [the patient’s] vagina and the touching of her breasts were not a departure from the standard of care in a physical examination to determine the extent of disability arising from chronic musculoskeletal pain. Id. at 275 , 587 A.2d 474 . The Court explained that it pursued this line of inquiry because, if counsel had conceded that the conduct complained of had no conceivable validity as part of the examination being conducted, the resolution of the case would be for the trier of fact in the circuit court as an action for assault and battery, not as a medical malpractice claim action for the arbitration panel. Id.

The Court stated that, in the absence of such a concession, it could not conclude, as a matter of law, that the appellant’s allegations were not subject to the Act. Id. In the case sub judice, the circuit court determined