Lano v. State

Marbury, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant was indicted in Prince George’s County on two counts, the first under Section 585 of Article 27 of the Code and the second under Section 586. He demurred to the indictment, and to each count. The demurrer was overruled.

Thereafter, he was tried before the court, was found not guilty on the first count, and guilty on the second count, and was sentenced to serve ³⁶¹ a year in the Maryland House of Correction. He appeals from the judgment and sentence. The basis of his appeal is that the demurrer should have been sustained. As he was found not guilty on the first count, we are not here concerned with that.

Section 586, on which the second count was based reads as follows: “Any person who with intent to extort money or procure other profit shall falsely accuse or threaten to accuse another of any crime, or of anything which if the accusation were true would tend to bring him into contempt or disrepute, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in jail or the house of correction not exceeding two years.” The second count in the indictment, which appellant admits is laid in the words of the statute is as follows: “And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do further present that the said Sam Lano on the said day, in the said year, at the County aforesaid, with the intent to procure profit from the operation of certain coin operated devices in the County aforesaid unlawfully did then and there threaten to accuse the said John Duffy of the crime of having obtained money by means of a false pretense * * *.” Appellant contends that this count fails to notify the defendant what kind of profit he is accused of seeking, what kind of coin operated devices are meant, or who they belong to, or any of the particulars of the alleged crime of obtaining money by means of false pretenses with which he is charged to have threatened to accuse the defendant. It has been many times held in this State, that where an indictment is for a statutory offense it is sufficient if the language of the statute is followed and the indictment is sufficiently specific to inform the accused of the particular charge on which he is to be tried. And speaking of this rule Chief Judge Bond, in the case of State v. Coblentz, 167 Md. 523, 528-529 , 175 A. 340, 343 , said “There are very few exceptions to the rule that the words of a statute creating and defining a crime are