Maryland case law › Lano v. State

Lano v. State

195 Md. 363 (1950) · Court of Appeals of Maryland
Court of Appeals of MarylandDisposition: ReversedGrason✓ Good law
HoldingSam Lano was indicted in Prince George's County on two counts under Article 27, sections 585 and 586 of the 1939 Code.

Grason, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The Grand Jury for Prince George’s County returned an indictment against Sam Lano (appellant). It contained two counts. The first count was based on section 585, and the second count on section 586 of Article 27 of the Code (1939).

The indictment was demurred to generally and to each count thereof, which demurrer was overruled. The cases went to trial on a plea of not guilty before the court; the traverser was found not guilty on the first count but guilty on the second count, and from the judgment and sentence imposed, the case was appealed to this court (No. 173 October Term, 1949) and the judgment was affirmed with costs. 195 Md. 359 , 73 A. 2d 222 . 365 Thereafter, a motion for reargument was filed under Rule 43 of this court, and granted. We were concerned with the pleadings, and indicated our intention to limit the reargument accordingly, that is to say, we wanted to hear the question of whether the second count of the indictment was drawn in the language of the Code provision. As the traverser was found not guilty on the first count, we do not have to consider that count.

The question before us, now, and the sole question, is whether or not the substance of section 586 is properly contained in the second count. When case No. 173 was argued before this court, counsel for the appellant stated that the second count was laid in the words of the section, and the opinion previously filed assumed that such was the case and did not consider the question now before the court, but assumed that this count was drawn and laid in the words of section 586 of Article 27. We will consider whether the second count is demurrable, and that is the only question that will be considered in this opinion. The second count is as follows: “And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do further present that the said Sam Lano on the said day, in the said year, at the County aforesaid, with the intent to procure profit from the operation of certain coin operated devices in the County aforesaid, unlawfully did then and there threaten to accuse the said John Duffy of the crime of having obtained money by means of a false pretense.” Section 586 is as follows: “Any person who with intent to extort money or procure other profit shall falsely accuse or threaten to accuse another of any crime, or of anything which if the accusation were true would tend to bring him into contempt or disrepute, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, * * *.” This case does not involve a statute which in its enacting clause contains matters which are integrated with the act denounced as a crime.

Neither does it involve a statute which after denouncing an act contains a proviso making exception thereto. The law applicable 366 to indictments drawn under such statutes is fully covered in the case of State v. Coblentz, 167 Md. 523 , 175 A. 340 . In that case Chief Judge Bond said that the general rule of criminal pleading was that if an indictment was laid in the language of the law denouncing the act, it was sufficient, and to this general rule there were few exceptions. We followed the Coblentz case in the opinion heretofore filed in this case, 195 Md. 359 , 73 A. 2d 222 .

At the first argument of this case counsel for the appellant, in his brief admitted that the indictment was laid in the language of the said section of the Code, and, of course, had that been so the count would have been good. This court assumed on the basis of this admission that the language of the second count was laid in the language of the section. On the reargument it is contended that such is not the case. The section denounces as a crime, the false accusation or threatened accusation of any crime which tends to bring the victim into contempt or disrepute, as a means of extorting money or other profit.

The section is clear and unambiguous and needs no construction. The count charged that the traverser unlawfully did then and there threaten to accuse the said John Duffy of the crime of having obtained money by means of a false pretense. Section 586 of the Code

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