Latty v. St. Joseph's Society of the Sacred Heart, Inc.

ZARNOCH, J. This case arises out of an affair between a Josephite priest and a church organist which allegedly occurred over fifty years ago. The priest, Father Francis E. Ryan (“Fr. Ryan”), ²⁶⁰ allegedly fathered two children, appellants, Carla A. Latty and Adrian Senna. According to appellants, the Josephite Fathers and the priest covered up the affair and concealed the identity of their father.

Appellants are now in their late fifties (Latty) and sixties (Senna), and claim that they recently learned through DNA testing that the priest, Fr. Ryan, now deceased, was “most probably” their father. In April of 2009, appellants brought suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against the St. Joseph’s Society of the Sacred Heart, Inc. (“the Josephite Fathers” or “the society”) 1 of which Fr. Ryan was a member, the Archdiocese of Baltimore, the Archbishop of Baltimore, and Fr.

Ryan’s estate, alleging fraudulent concealment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring, negligent supervision and retention, and breach of fiduciary duty. 2 They said that the Josephite Fathers had a legal duty to disclose the identity of their father, that the failure to disclose this information led to great emotional distress, and that the society should be held liable for failing to put an end to the affair. The Archdiocese and the Archbishop were dismissed from the case and Fr. Ryan’s estate was never served. The Josephite Fathers moved to dismiss the claims, and the circuit court granted the motion.

Appellants timely filed this appeal, and present the ²⁶¹ following question for our review: 3 Did the circuit court err in dismissing all of appellants’ claims? For the reasons that follow, we affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of all of the claims. FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Anna Maria Franklin Senna was an organist for a Roman Catholic church where Fr. Ryan was a priest. 4 Fr.

Ryan and Senna met and became romantically involved. Subsequently, Anna Senna gave birth to two children: Carla A. Latty, in 1952, and Adrian Senna, apparently in the 1940s. 5 Anna Senna gave Carla up for adoption in 1952, but raised Adrian herself. Appellants Carla and Adrian were never told the identity of their biological father. ²⁶² Anna Senna and Fr. Ryan have both since passed away.

Carla currently resides in New Jersey, and Adrian resides in British Columbia, Canada. In their complaint, they asserted that DNA testing revealed that they are biological siblings and that their father was “most probably” Fr. Ryan. On April 1, 2009, Carla and Adrian filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against the Josephite Fathers.

They alleged that the society knew about Fr. Ryan’s breach of a vow of celibacy and the birth of the children and asserted that the society worked to cover up the affair and conceal the fact that Fr. Ryan was their father. The complaint did not allege that Anna Senna disclosed these facts to appellants.

They also asserted that the Josephites forced Anna Senna to give Carla up for adoption, forced her to conceal the identity of appellants’ biological father, and never provided any financial support to the children. Appellants, in their brief, allege the society was “the sole keeper of Fr. Ryan’s finances and income.” They requested $5 million in compensatory damages, in addition to $5 million in punitive damages, and costs. The society moved to dismiss the complaint on numerous grounds.

On November 23, 2009, the circuit court heard arguments on the motion to dismiss. That same day, in a brief order, Judge M. Brooke Murdoch granted the motion and dismissed appellants’ complaint with prejudice. DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review — Motion to Dismiss Appellants argue that the court erred in dismissing their complaint, specifically their allegations of: fraudulent concealment; intentional infliction of emotional distress; negligent hiring, negligent supervision and retention; and breach of fiduciary duty. A trial court may grant a motion to dismiss if, when assuming the truth of all well-pled facts and allegations in the complaint and any inferences that may be drawn, and viewing those facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, “the allegations do not state a cause of action for which relief may be granted.” RRC Northeast, LLC v. ²⁶³ BAA Md., Inc., 413 Md. 638, 643 , 994 A.2d 430 (2010).

However, the facts set forth in the complaint must be “pleaded with sufficient specificity; bald assertions and conclusory statements by the pleader will not suffice.” Id. at 644 , 994 A.2d 430 . On appeal, we review a trial court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss for legal correctness. Id.

II

First Amendment Cases such as this, which we believe raise issues of religious interpretation, necessarily implicate the First Amendment. The First Amendment provides, through its Free Exercise and Freedom of Religion clauses, that civil courts cannot “entangle[themselves] in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice.” From the Heart Church Ministries, Inc. v. African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, Mid-Atl. II Episcopal Dist., 370 Md. 152, 179 , 803 A.2d 548 (2002). In explaining why Maryland does not recognize the tort of clergy malpractice, this Court stated: [R]ecogniz[ing] the tort of clergy malpractice ... requires ... embroiling] courts in establishing the training, skill, and standards applicable for members of the clergy in a variety of religions with widely varying beliefs ... [and] would require courts to identify the beliefs and practices of the relevant religion and then to determine whether the clergyman had acted in accordance with them.

These requirements, quite obviously, have a large potential to restrain the free exercise of religion[.] Borchers v. Hrychuk, 126 Md.App. 10, 23-24 , 727 A.2d 388 , (1999) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Thus, we cannot determine whether Fr. Ryan breached an alleged vow of celibacy (or any other vow) or whether the Church is liable for enforcement of the vow. 6 Appellee asks us, right off the bat, to dispose of appellants’ case as barred by the First Amendment. Because this case ²⁶⁴ may be disposed of on other grounds, we will adhere to the “established policy to decide constitutional issues only when necessary,” and avoid any First Amendment issues as they relate to appellants’ claims.

VNA Hospice v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 406 Md. 584, 604 , 961 A.2d 557 (2008). As such, in our discussion below, we will attempt, if possible, to treat the society as though it were a secular employer in determining the legal merits of appellants’ case.

III

The Josephite Fathers Had No Legal Duty to Appellants In order to survive a motion to dismiss, appellants’ claims of fraudulent concealment and breach of fiduciary duty require the existence of an underlying duty that the society owed to them. See Blondell v. Littlepage, 413 Md. 96, 119 , 991 A.2d 80 (2010) (“[T]he essential elements of a claim of fraudulent concealment include ... the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff to disclose a material fact[.]”); Kann v. Kann, 344 Md. 689, 713 (1997) (holding that a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty requires that the plaintiff “identify the particular fiduciary relationship involved”). Appellants assert that a special relationship existed between them and the Josephite Fathers, giving rise to a duty, because they are the children of one of its priests. The Court of Appeals has explained that a duty exists when there is: ... [a]n obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another.

In essence, the determination of whether an actionable duty exists represents a policy question of whether the specific plaintiff is entitled to protection from the acts of the defendant. Blondell, 413 Md. at 120 , 991 A.2d 80 (internal citations omitted). Because we find that the society owed no legal duty to appellants arising out of a special relationship, we affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of appellants’ breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent concealment claims. ²⁶⁵ A. Special Relationship Appellants argue that a special relationship existed based on either a confidential or fiduciary relationship. First, they assert that a confidential relationship arose because Fr.

Ryan, a priest, exercised “dominion and influence” over appellants, who they argue must have been considered parishioners since birth. See Midler v. Shapiro, 83 Md.App. 264, 268 , 364 A.2d 99 (1976). Second, appellants assert there was a fiduciary relationship because there was “actual reposing of confidence,” see Thiede v. Startzman, 113 Md. 278 , 77 A. 666 , (1910), and “one party trust[ed] in and relie[d] on another,” see Anderson v. Watson, 141 Md. 217, 234 , 118 A. 569 (1922). Generally, “there is no duty to control a third person’s conduct so as to prevent personal harm to another, unless a ‘special relationship’ exists either between the actor and the third person or between the actor and the person injured.” Remsburg v. Montgomery, 376 Md. 568, 583 , 831 A.2d 18 (2003).

Special relationships can be established: “(1) by statute or rule; (2) by contractual or other private relationship; or (8) indirectly or impliedly by virtue of the relationship between the tortfeasor and a third party.” Id. at 583-84 , 831 A.2d 18 . Under the first prong, there is no rule or statute in Maryland establishing a legal relationship between an employer and an employee’s children, or between a priest and his parishioners. Second, the complaint does not allege that there was any contract between appellants and Fr. Ryan or the society.

Under the third prong, a special relationship between two parties may be “established by either the (1) inherent nature of the relationship between the parties; or (2) by one party undertaking to protect or assist the other party, and thus often inducing reliance upon the conduct of the acting party.” Id. at 589-590 , 831 A.2d 18 . Appellants ask us to find their relationship with the Josephite Fathers and Fr. Ryan was a special relationship under the third prong. For the reasons that follow, we decline to find that the relationship between appellants and appellees constituted any kind of legal ²⁶⁶ relationship, confidential or fiduciary, and did not bestow a duty on appellee. 1.

Confidential Relationship While some confidential relationships arise if there is a familial relationship, “the mere existence of a familial relationship is not indicative of a confidential relationship.” Orwick v. Moldawer, 150 Md.App. 528, 538-39 , 822 A.2d 506 (2003). There may also be a confidential relationship between a priest and penitent. Buxton v. Buxton, 363 Md. 634, 654-655 , 770 A.2d 152 (2001). However, neither a familial or priest-parishioner relationship automatically constitutes a confidential one.

Some relationships, like those between an attorney-client or trustee-beneficiary, presume a confidential relationship as a matter of law. See Upman v. Clarke, 359 Md. 32, 42 , 753 A.2d 4 (2000). This is not true for a parent-child or priest-parishioner/penitent relationship. Whether a confidential relationship exists for a parent-child or a priest-parishioner is “an issue of fact and is not presumed as a matter of law.” Sanders v. Sanders, 261 Md. 268, 276 , 274 A.2d 383 (1971).

See also Buxton v. Buxton, 363 Md. 634, 655 , 770 A.2d 152 (2001) (stating that a confidential relationship “is particularly likely to exist where there is a family relationship or ... between physician and patient or priest and penitent” but such a relationship does not “involve[ ] ... certain consequences as to transactions between the parties that flow automatically as a matter of law from the relation”). To make that factual determination of whether a confidential relationship exists when it is not presumed as a matter of law, we look for a dependent relationship where one party must “necessarily repose trust and confidence in the good faith and integrity of the other.” Orwick, 150 Md.App. at 536 , 822 A.2d 506 . The key is “whether a level of trust and confidence exists between two people.” Id. at 538-39 , 822 A.2d 506 . There is no hint in the complaint that a confidential relationship existed between Fr.

Ryan, the society and appellants. In fact, there was no allegation of any relationship between them at all. Even if we assume that appellants were automatically ²⁶⁷ parishioners of Fr. Ryan’s church from birth, this still does not establish a confidential relationship. 7 There are several examples in the caselaw illustrating what constitutes a confidential relationship if one is not presumed.

A familial relationship can be a confidential one where one family member acts as the care giver for a relative. For example, in Upman v. Clarke, Ms. Upman, an elderly woman, moved in with her nephew and his wife when she could no longer care for herself. 359 Md. 32, 40 , 753 A.2d 4 (2000). Ms. Clarke helped Ms. Upman with most of her daily activities, including: “dressing, eating, bathing, even going to the bathroom.” Id. The Clarkes also took care of her finances.

Id. There was very clearly a dependent relationship between Ms. Upman and the Clarkes. A priest-parishioner relationship can also be a confidential one under certain circumstances. For a priest and a parishioner to have a confidential relationship, there must be actual trust and confidence between the parties.

It is not enough for the parties to have theoretical or assumed trust and confidence, merely by virtue of one party being a member of a church and the other party its spiritual leader. To illustrate, in Sellers v. Qualls, a pastor had a confidential relationship with a church member because the pastor handled most of the church member’s business affairs, including conducting business for her at her bank and assisting her with the sale of some property. 206 Md. 58, 69-71 , 110 A.2d 73 . He also occasionally took her to see the doctor. Id. at 69 , 110 A.2d 73 .

Again, there was clearly a dependent relationship in addition to the pastor’s role as spiritual leader of the church. The relationships in Upman and Sellers are a far cry from the allegations in the complaint here. We cannot infer from ²⁶⁸ the complaint that Fr. Ryan or the society handled appellants’ day to day care or assisted with their financial affairs.

There was simply no contact between the parties that would suggest appellants depended on the Josephite Fathers at all. Appellants appear to believe that because they should have been able to depend on the society or Fr. Ryan for financial and emotional support, and that this is sufficient to constitute a confidential relationship. But Maryland caselaw offers no support for this theory. 2.

Fiduciary Relationship There is also no fiduciary relationship between the parties. A fiduciary relationship is presumed to exist as a matter of law in specific situations: between a “trustee and beneficiary, guardian and ward, agent and principal, attorney and client, partners in a partnership, [or] corporate directors and their corporation[J” Buxton v. Buxton, 363 Md. 634, 654 , 770 A.2d 152 (2001). A fiduciary duty may also arise by agreement. Lasater v. Guttmann, 194 Md.App. 431, 456 (2010) (in Maryland, a husband and wife do not, as a matter of law, have a fiduciary relationship unless they have an agreement that establishes one).

Such a relationship “involves a duty on the part of the fiduciary to act for the benefit of the other party to the relation as to matters within the scope of the relation.” Id. There was no agreement here between the parties from which a fiduciary duty would arise. Nor does the parties’ relationship give rise to a duty presumed as a matter of law: the parties did not have an attorney-client, trustee-beneficiary, principal-agent, attorney-client, or partnership relationship, nor were they directors of a corporation. Even if a guardian-ward relationship were alleged, this would not aid appellants’ claim because a guardian must be appointed by the court, and it is clear that no guardian was appointed here.

See Md.Code (1974, 2001 Repl. Vol.) Estates and Trusts Article (ET), § 13-201. Thus, the Josephite Fathers did not have a fiduciary duty to appellants. ²⁶⁹ B. Financial Dependence on the Society Does Not Create Duty Appellants also argue that the society had a duty to them “as the sole keeper of Fr. Ryan’s finances and income, to inform Appellants of Fr.

Ryan’s paternity, and to take care of his financial support and obligations.” 8 This argument suggests that because the society was solely responsible lor his finances, the society should have acted as a parent to appellants, becoming financially responsible for Fr. Ryan’s children. As we discussed above, the First Amendment requires us to take the religious context out of our analysis, and to consider the Josephite Fathers and Fr. Ryan’s relationship as one of employer-employee.

Given this relationship, there is simply no statute, tort, or caselaw in Maryland making an employer liable for financial support of an employee’s children, even if the salary paid by the employer was the employee’s only source of income. The only legal construct in Maryland we can conceive that approaches appellants’ theory is a guardian-ward relationship between the society and Fr. Ryan. See ET § 13-201.

If Fr. Ryan was considered “disabled,” or “unable to manage his property and affairs,” it is arguable that the society, as the “sole keeper of Fr. Ryan’s finances and income,” would, in effect, have become Fr. Ryan’s guardian.

See id. As guardian, the society would then be responsible for managing Fr. Ryan’s financial affairs, including any viable child support obligations. See ET § 13-216 (“If the exercise of a power is ²⁷⁰ improper, the guardian is liable for breach of his fiduciary-duty to ... interested persons for resulting damage or loss[.]”).

However, this scenario is far-fetched, filled with logical missteps, and is only our attempt to ground appellants’ alleged duty in actual legal principles. Even if we were to presume that third party paternity liability existed, appellants’ argument would still fail because of the significant delay in bringing their claims. In Maryland, in the case of a child born to unmarried parents, paternity must be established in order to obligate the father to financially support the child. See Md.Code (1984, Repl.Vol.2006), Family Law Article (FL), § 5-1001 et. seq.

If the father does not acknowledge paternity, 9 there must be a judicial determination that he is the father in an action brought in a circuit court. FL § 5-1032(a). Such a paternity proceeding must be brought before the child’s 18th birthday. FL § 5-1006(a) 10 ; Trembow v. Schonfeld, 393 Md. 327, 329 , 901 A.2d 825 (2006).

As appellants are now in their fifties and sixties, any possible paternity action has expired long ago. We acknowledge that appellants are not asserting a claim for child support against the Josephite Fathers, but in an attempt to assert a duty where none exists, appellants have argued that the society should be liable for Fr. Ryan’s financial obligations to his children. However, once appellants became emancipated adults, Fr.

Ryan was forever freed of any legal obligation to financially support them. The same is true of any theoretical liability of his employer, the society. 11 ²⁷¹