Laurie v. State

Lowe, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. John Archibald Laurie, Sr. was convicted by a jury, presided over by Judge H. Kemp MacDaniel, of the assault of a detective and of hindering two detectives in the lawful performance of their duty. After exhaustively analyzing his reasons for leniency, notwithstanding a presentence report recommending incarceration, Judge MacDaniel imposed the sentence as follows: “For the reasons stated, I am going to fine Mr. Laurie on count one $100 and costs, and I am going to fine him on count two, which is unlawfully hindering the detectives in the performance of their duty, $100 and costs, and place him generally on probation with the understanding that he doesn’t need supervision to the extent of appearing in front of a Probation Officer or anything of that nature.” Counsel for appellant asked: “What will be the period of probation?”, to which the judge replied: “General probation. I am not going to set a period.

Normally I would sentence an individual to a year ⁶¹¹ in jail, place them on probation for two years, something of that nature. I am not doing it. The main thing I want a general probation for is just in the event Mr. Laurie gets involved in any other problems he can be brought back in. It will be more or less an unsupervised probation.

He is not going to have to appear. He has to be interviewed and give some information to the Probation Officer. By the way, this Probation Officer is not the one who made the recommendation of sending him to jail. But any information he needs today, it will be a general probationary type of thing that in short order will be lifted.

MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. He will be given time, it can be worked out through the Probation Department, to pay the fine.” I Appellant now argues that: “PLACING APPELLANT UNDER ‘PROBATION GENERALLY’ AFTER SENTENCING HIM TO PAY A FINE OF TWO HUNDRED DOLLARS WAS IMPROPER AND A COMPLETE NULLITY.” His argument relies upon Costello v. State, 240 Md. 164 , which held that “Maryland law authorizes probation only before verdict and upon the suspension of sentence,” id. at 167 , and Comm’r of Motor Vehicles v. Lee, 254 Md. 279 holding that the imposition of a fine upon plea or finding of guilt is inconsistent with the granting of probation before verdict.

Appellant loses sight of the fact that both Costello and Lee were decided before the Maryland General Assembly enacted a short but comprehensive delineation of a court’s authority to suspend sentences or to grant probation after a verdict. ⁶¹² By Chapter 480 of the Acts of 1970, Md. Code, Art. 27, § 641A was adopted. It reads: “Upon entering a judgment of conviction, the court having jurisdiction, may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation upon such terms and conditions as the courts deem proper. The court may impose a sentence for a specified period and provide that a lesser period be served in confinement, suspend the remainder of the sentence and grant probation for a period longer than the sentence but not in excess of five years. Probation may be granted whether the offense is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.

If the offense is punishable by both fine and imprisonment, the court may impose a fine and place the defendant on probation as to the imprisonment. Probation may be limited to one or more counts or indictments, but, in the absence of express limitation, shall extend to the entire sentence and judgment. The court may revoke or modify any condition of probation or may reduce the period of probation.” (Emphasis added). Clearly the court is authorized to “impose a fine and place the defendant on probation as to the imprisonment.” From the first sentence of § 641A, it would appear that the court may impose and execute 1 the fine but suspend imposition of the imprisonment, predicating the latter suspension upon terms of probation for a period “not in excess of five years.” Although the suspension of the imposition of a sentence was recognized prior to the statute, Skinker v. State, 239 Md. 234, 238 ; the Court of Appeals has said that it is a better practice to impose the penalty and then, if advisable, suspend its execution upon probationary conditions.

Kelly v. State, 151 Md. 87, 100 . ⁶¹³ The “general probation” given here obviously was not predicated upon the suspension of