Lawrence v. Commercial Banking Corp.

Pattison, L, delivered the opinion of the Court. An attachment was issued on the 27th day of June, 1932, upon a confessed judgment for the sum of $303.03, with interest from the 24th day of Junei, 1932, and costs. The judgment was entered in favor of the Commercial Banking Corporation, the appellee, against Esther Y. Lawrence, a young unmarried woman, one of the appellants, and was laid in the hands of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea. Company, the other appellant, as garnishee. ⁵⁶⁰ The garnishee confessed that, at the time of laying the attachment, there was justly due and owing by it to Esther V. Lawrence the sum of twenty-seven dollars, “the installment of wages now due and owing under the terms of a parol contract of employment.” A motion to quash the attachment was filed, the ground therefor being that the fund or money owing by the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company to Esther V. Lawrence was payable to her on account of salary or wages, and that the amount so owing was less than the sum of one hundred dollars.

The granting of this motion, was opposed by the appellee, the Commercial Banking Corporation, because of the fact that Esther V. Lawrence, the judgment debtor, had “waived her right to all exemptions under the laws of the State of Maryland” by the note upon which the judgment was confessed and entered. .The motion to quash the attachment was overruled and a judgment of condemnation was entered for the sum of twenty-seven dollars, the amount confessed by the garnishee to be in its hands belonging to the defendant, Esther V. Lawrence. It is from that judgment that the appeal in this case is taken. Article 9, section 33, of the Code of Public General Laws of this state provides that: “No attachments of the wages or hire of any laborer or employee, in the hands of the employer, whether private individuals or bodies corporate, shall affect any salary or wages of the debtor which are not actually due at the date of the attachment; and the sum of one hundred dollars, of such wages or hire due to any laborer or employee by any employer or corporation shall always be exempt from attachment by any process whatever.” It does not appear from the record or the briefs that any contention is made as to the salary or wages of the debtor not being actually due at the date of the attachment.. The fact that it was due at such time seems to' be conceded.

This being so, the only question presented is what effect did the waiver of the defendant expressed in the note upon which the judgment was obtained have upon the statute providing that one hundred dollars of the wages or hire are to be exempt ⁵⁶¹ from attachment. It is contended by the appellee that the exemption found in the statute was for the benefit alone of employees, and that it was within the power of Esther Y. Lawrence to waive that exemption by the waiver in the note upon which the judgment was entered, and that, she having such power, her wages were attachable, notwithstanding the existence of the statute. Whether the exemption under the above-quoted statute may be effectively waived has never been before this court, but it is well established by the decisions of this state that the exemptions created by the general exemption statute (article 83, section 8, of the Code) may be waived. State, use of Young, v. Boulden, 57 Md. 317 ; Muhr v. Pinover, 67 Md. 489 , 10 A. 289 ; Fowler v. Gray, 99 Md. 598 , 58 A. 444 .

The last-cited statute provides : “One hundred dollars in property, whether * * * of money, land or goods, of every defendant, * * shall be exempt from execution or seizure in satisfaction of debt or claim upon any judgment in any civil proceedings,” etc. The language of that statute is very similar to' the language of the statute under consideration, applicable to this case, where it is said: “The sum of one hundred dollars of such wages or hire due to any laborer or employee by any employer or corporation shall always be