Lawrence v. State

Couch, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Murphy, C. J., and Cole J., concur in the result. The sole question presented here is whether, in this criminal case, the trial judge erred in overruling an accused’s objection to the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude individuals from the jury allegedly on the basis of race. Because the record before us does not show any evidence that the excluded individuals were so excluded solely because of their race, we perceive no error and shall affirm.

James Ivory Lawrence was charged with murder and related offenses. In a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, he was found guilty of first degree murder and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, for which he received a life sentence plus a concurrent term of fifteen years. Upon appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, the judgments were affirmed, Lawrence v. State, 51 Md. App. ⁵⁵⁹ 575, 444 A.2d 478 (1982). We granted certiorari to consider an issue of public interest.

In light of the limited question before us, it is unnecessary to recite the underlying facts giving rise to the charges against Lawrence. What does give rise to the question for our consideration is shown by the following portion of the record made during the jury selection process after it became apparent that the State had peremptorily struck the three potential jurors who were black: 1 "MR. TURNBULL [Defense counsel]: At this point I would point out the fact we have three black jurors, but they were all stricken by the State, and we would ask the Court to — indicate to the Court that under that situation obviously it prejudices the Defendant, and the fact that I object to that.” The trial judge overruled the objection without comment. The thrust of Lawrence’s argument is that "the strictures against racially biased conduct in juror and grand juror selection have been applied with increasing strictness while the reasons given in Swain [v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 , 85 S.Ct. 824 , 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965)] for not granting relief have been eroded.” He further contends that we should attach greater significance to more recent State court opinions in interpreting provisions similar to Articles 21 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights "than a dubious nineteen year old federal precedent.” Patently, what we are concerned with here is the right to equal protection and the right to a trial by an impartial jury as guaranteed by the fourteenth and sixth amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as Articles 21 2 and ⁵⁶⁰ 24 3 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

Judge Digges, writing for the Court in Attorney General v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 704-05 , 426 A.2d 929, 940-41 (1981), stated in part: "It is the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution which is here involved, where it provides in pertinent part: 'No State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’ U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. Although the Maryland Constitution contains no express equal protection clause, we deem it settled that this concept of equal treatment is embodied in the due process requirement of Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights. Board of Supervisors of Elections v. Goodsell, 284 Md. 279 ,293 n.7, 396 A.2d 1033, 1040 (1979); Governor v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410 , 438 n.8, 370 A.2d 1102, 1118 (1977) aff'd, 437 U.S. 117 (1978); Bruce v. Dir., Chesapeake Bay Aff., 261 Md. 585, 600 , 276 A.2d 200, 208 (1971); see Detroit Automotive Purchasing Services v. Lee, 463 F.Supp. 954, 970 (1978).

It is, perhaps, because this State has no express equal protection clause that Article 24 has been interpreted to apply 'in like manner and to the same extent as the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution,’ United States Mortgage Co. v. Matthews, 167 Md. 383, 395 , 173 A. 903, 909 (1934), rev’d on other grounds, 293 U.S. 232 (1934); see Detroit Automotive Purchasing Services v. Lee, supra, so that 'decisions of the Supreme Court on the Fourteenth Amendment are practically direct authorities.’ Bureau of Mines of George’s Creek, 272 Md. 143, 156 , 321 A.2d 748 , 755 ⁵⁶¹ (1974). While it is true, as our later discussion will show, that the equal protection guaranties of Article 24 and the fourteenth amendment are independent, capable of divergent effect, it is apparent that the two are so interwined that they, in essence, form a double helix, each complementing the other. Because the decisions of the United States Supreme Court are not only controlling as to our interpretation and application of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment but also persuasive as we undertake to interpret Article 24, we first examine the currents of the federal analysis prior to determining the impact of these constitutional guaranties in this case.” (Footnotes omitted). The Court went on to say: "When evaluating an equal protection claim grounded on Article 24, we utilize in large measure the basic analysis provided by the United States Supreme Court in interpreting the like provision contained in the fourteenth amendment.

Consequently, when under the auspices of federal equal protection, certain important private interests are vindicated by the High Court through an active scrutiny of legislative classifications, it is not surprising that most of the decisions of this Court reflect the same trend. Although the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and the equal protection principle embodied in Article 24 are 'in pari materia,’ and decisions applying one provision are persuasive authority in cases involving the other, we reiterate that each provision is independent, and a violation of one is not necessarily a violation of the other. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Company, [ 449 U.S. 456 , 101 S.Ct. 715 , 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981)], 49 U.S.L.W. at 4112-13 n.6.” 289 Md. at 714 , 426 A.2d at 946 . Likewise, in Stewart v. State, 282 Md. 557, 570 , 386 A.2d 1206, 1213 (1978), Judge Orth stated: ⁵⁶² "In Harris [v. State, 194 Md. 288 , 71 A.2d 36 (1950),] we declared the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution to be self-executing. 194 Md. at 295 .

In Smith v. State, 276 Md. 521, 526-527 , 350 A.2d 628 (1976), we discussed the interplay between the two constitutional provisions. We concluded 'that the opinions of the Supreme Court interpreting the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial are "very persuasive, although not necessarily controlling,” as to the proper construction of Maryland’s parallel Article 21 right.’ Id. at 527 . In Erbe [v. State], 276 Md. [541,] at 545-46[, 350 A.2d 640 (1976)], however, we pointed out that '[t]he language used in Art. 21 of our Declaration of Rights relative to speedy trial is virtually identical with that in the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.’ ” Accordingly, whether we review the matter under the federal amendments and/or the State articles, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court will either control or be persuasive. In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 , 85 S.Ct. 824 , 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), the Supreme Court traced the history of peremptory challenges, observing that although there is no constitutional right to peremptory challenges, "the challenge is 'one of the most important rights secured to the accused [.]’ ” 380 U.S. at 219 , 85 S.Ct. at 835 , 13 L.Ed.2d at 772 (quoting Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 , 38 L.Ed. 208, 214 , 14 S.Ct. 410 ).

Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice White stated: "The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court’s control. While challenges for cause permit rejection of jurors on a narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality, the peremptory permits rejection for a real or imagined ⁵⁶³ partiality that is less easily designated or demonstrable. It is often exercised upon the 'sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another,’ upon a juror’s 'habits and associations,’ or upon the feeling that 'the bare question [a juror’s] indifference may sometimes provoke a resentment[.]” It is no less frequently exercised on grounds normally thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action, namely, the race, religion, nationality, occupation or affiliations of people summoned for jury duty. For the question a prosecutor or defense counsel must decide is not whether a juror of a particular race or nationality is in fact partial, but whether one from a different group is less likely to be.

It is well known that these factors are widely explored during the voir dire, by both prosecutor and accused [.] This Court has held that the fairness of trial by jury requires no less. Hence veniremen are not always judged solely as individuals for the purpose of exercising peremptory challenges. Rather they are challenged in light of the limited knowledge counsel has of them, which may include their group affiliations, in the context of the case to be tried.” 380 U.S. at 220-21 , 85 S.Ct. at 836 , 13 L.Ed.2d at 772-73 (citations and footnotes omitted). Moreover, in Swain , the Supreme Court made clear that while a Negro defendant is not entitled to a jury containing members of his race, a State’s purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of race of participation as jurors in the administration of justice violated the equal protection clause.

The Court, however, also made clear that ’’purposeful discrimination may not be assumed or merely asserted. It must be proven.” 380 U.S. at 205 , 85 S.Ct. at 827 , 13 L.Ed.2d at 764 . (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted). In considering the fact that, in Swain , of the eight Negroes on the petit jury venire none actually served, two being exempt ⁵⁶⁴ and six being struck by the prosecutor in the juror selection process, the Court said in pertinent part: "In the light of the purpose of the peremptory system and the function it serves in a pluralistic society in connection with the institution of jury trial, we cannot hold that the Constitution requires an examination of the prosecutor’s reasons for the exercise of his challenges in any given case.

The presumption in any particular case must be that the prqsecutor is using the State’s challenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury to try the case before the court. The presumption is not overcome and the prosecutor therefore subjected to examination by allegations that in the case at hand all Negroes were removed from the jury or that they were removed because they were Negroes. Any other result, we think, would establish a rule wholly at odds with the peremptory challenge system as we know it. Hence the motion to strike the trial jury was properly denied in this case.” 380 U.S. at 222 , 85 S.Ct. at 837 , 13 L.Ed.2d at 773-74 .

Prior to Swain , this Court clearly indicated that there had to be evidence that Negroes had been intentionally excluded before an attack on the jury from which Negroes had been excluded would be successful. For example, in Jackson v. State, 180 Md. 658, 661 , 26 A.2d 815, 816 (1942), Judge Sloan stated in part: "It is not the mere fact that they are [black] and their names omitted from the jury lists that determines the question of prejudice, but it must appear from some substantial evidence that the manner and practice of selecting jurors shows that [blacks] are intentionally excluded. When this appears, prejudice is inferred.” (Citations omitted; emphasis added). See also Adair v. State, 231 Md. 255, 256 , 189 A.2d 618, 619 (1963) (mere absence of Negro jurors does not establish denial of fair and impartial trial); Giles v. State, 229 Md. 370 , ⁵⁶⁵ 378, 183 A.2d 359, 362 (1962), appeal dismissed, 372 U.S. 767 , 83 S.Ct. 1102 , 10 L.Ed.2d 137 (1963) (defendant not denied fair and impartial trial where absence of Negroes from jury is not by design).

Although we agree with Lawrence that peremptory challeges may not be exercised to exclude individuals from the jury solely on the basis of race, we are dissuaded by his argument that Swain should be abandoned. The Supreme Court cases relied upon by Lawrence merely demonstrate the well established and undisputed principle that grand jury and petit jury selection processes that systematically exclude a well-defined class of citizens are unconstitutional. For example, in Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 , 92 S.Ct. 2163 , 33 L.Ed.2d 83 (1972), the Supreme Court, for the first time, considered whether a white defendant could challenge discriminatory jury selection on the basis that Negroes were arbitrarily excluded. Answering the affirmative, the Court concluded that if the allegations were true, Peters had been denied due process.

Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975), a male defendant challenged the Louisiana jury system on the basis that it "systematically excluded [women] from the venire”, thereby denying him of his right to a fair and impartial jury. 419 U.S. at 524 , 95 S.Ct. at 694-95 , 42 L.Ed.2d at 694 . The system automatically excluded females from jury service unless they filed a written declaration that they wished to serve as jurors. The State stipulated that while 53% of the population eligible for jury service was comprised of females, only 10% of the "jury wheel” were females.

The Supreme Court agreed with Taylor that such systematic exclusion of women denied him his right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. The Texas grand jury selection was challenged in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 , 97 S.Ct. 1272 , 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977). There, respondent asserted that