LeCronier v. United Parcel Service

KEHOE, J. May a claimant aggrieved by a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission seek judicial review in the circuit court for the county in which he or she is employed, in addition to the circuit courts for the counties in which he or she resides and in which the accident occurred? The Circuit Court for Baltimore City construed § 9-738 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (the “Act”), codified as Md.Code (1991, 2008 Repl.Vol.), Lab. & Empl. § 9-101 et seq., as providing that a worker cannot, and transferred the case to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. We reach the opposite conclusion. Accordingly, we shall vacate the judgment entered against appellant, Jeffrey D. LeCronier, in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County and remand this case to that court with instructions for it to transfer this case to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for a new trial.

This case arises from a workers’ compensation claim filed by Mr. LeCronier against his employer, United Parcel Service, an ¹³³ appellee. 1 Before this Court, appellant raises one issue, which we have slightly rephrased: Did the Circuit Court for Baltimore City err in granting appellees’ motion to transfer venue to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County? Facts and Procedural History Appellant alleged that he was injured on December 4, 2006 while training a tractor trailer driver for UPS in Harrington, Delaware. The injury developed into a serious medical condition. Appellant filed an employee’s claim for benefits with the Workers’ Compensation Commission (“Commission”).

The record does not indicate the date of the filing of appellant’s claim or the specifics of the claim itself. On August 16, 2007, the Commission held a hearing regarding appellant’s claim. On September 5, 2007, the Commission denied the claim on the basis that “the claimant did not sustain an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment.” On September 14, 2007, appellant filed a petition for judicial review of the Commission’s decision in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. He asserted, inter alia, “[tjhat the claimant, Jeffrey D. LeCronier, carries on regular business, is employed, and regularly engages in a vocation in Baltimore City, State of Maryland.

This venue is proper with this Honorable Court.” Appellant also filed an election for jury trial. Appellee filed a motion to transfer venue to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County pursuant to LE § 9-738, 2 ¹³⁴ arguing that, as appellant’s place of employment was located in Baltimore County, and his county of residence was Anne Arundel County, Baltimore City was not an appropriate venue. Appellee’s motion stated that it was based on Maryland Rule 2-327(b) (improper venue) and Rule 2-327(c) (forum non con-veniens). 3 The motion did not, however, present any grounds to justify transfer of the case on the basis of forum non conveniens. Appellant filed a response asserting, under oath, that he had been employed with UPS for 24 years, that he routinely went to Baltimore City to fulfill the terms of his employment, and that the UPS facility in which appellant primarily worked was located on both sides of the boundary line dividing Baltimore County from Baltimore City. ¹³⁵ A hearing was held before the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on November 2, 2007.

At the hearing, the parties argued substantively the same contentions presented in their motions, that is, appellee asserted that the provisions of LE 9-738 precluded Baltimore City as a venue and appellant argued that it did not because he was regularly employed and carried on business in the City. Appellee did not present an argument based upon forum non conveniens and the circuit court made it clear that it was not considering forum non conveniens as a ground for transferring the case. 4 ¹³⁶ During the course of the hearing, the circuit court asked appellee’s counsel if appellee disputed whether appellant regularly conducted business[ 5 ] in Baltimore City; appellee’s counsel replied, “[n]ot vigorously.” The court concluded: The question is whether we have jurisdiction[ 6 ] over [appellant]. Yes, we have jurisdiction as to where he lives, but we also have jurisdiction over him as to where he regularly does business under the circumstances and the facts submitted. And it’s properly in Baltimore City and the Motion to Transfer is denied.

On that same day, the circuit court issued an order denying the motion to transfer. On November 12, 2007, appellee filed a motion to reconsider judgment or, in the alternative, revise, alter or amend judgment arguing substantively the same arguments presented to the circuit court on November 2, 2007. While the motion for reconsideration again referred to Maryland Rule 2-327(c) and stated, in passing, that UPS conducted business in Anne Arundel County, none of the substantive arguments in the motion pertained to transferring the case on the basis of forum non conveniens. Appellant filed a response, presenting the same arguments raised at the hearing.

On December 6, 2007, the circuit court granted appellee’s motion, without a hearing or explanation, and transferred the ¹³⁷ petition for judicial review to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. 7 The matter then proceeded to a jury trial conducted on January 6 and 7, 2009. The transcript of the trial is not included with the record. The jury found in favor of appellee. Appellant filed this timely appeal. 8 Discussion The issue in this case — whether the applicable statute permits Mr. LeCronier to pursue his petition for judicial review in the City of Baltimore — is purely legal.

Therefore, we review the circuit court’s decision de novo. Payton-Henderson v. Evans, 180 Md.App. 267, 276 , 949 A.2d 654 (2008) (“The venue chosen by the plaintiff is either proper, as a matter of law, or it is not.”) The outcome of this case turns upon our construction of LE § 9-738. The statute reads, in pertinent part: Venue, (a) Filing with circuit court. — To take an appeal, a person shall file an order of appeal with the circuit court: (1) that has jurisdiction over that person; or ¹³⁸ (2) for the county where the accidental personal injury, compensable hernia, or last injurious exposure to the hazards of the occupational disease occurred. Appellant asserts that LE § 9-738 must be read in conjunction with Maryland’s general venue statute, CJ § 6-201(a). 9 He contends that, because he is regularly employed in Baltimore City, he can be sued in the City pursuant to CJ § 6-201(a).

From that premise, he suggests that the City is a permissible venue for his petition for judicial review pursuant to LE § 9-738. Thus, the circuit court erred in transferring the case to Anne Arundel County. Appellee contends that the circuit court did not err in transferring the case. It contends that the general venue provisions of CJ § 6-201 are explicitly subject to the proviso “unless otherwise provided by law.” UPS posits that LE § 9-738 is such an exception.

It argues that, as “the Court of Appeals has consistently found that the county that has jurisdiction over a person is the county in which the person resides ...,” appellant’s argument that the Baltimore City Circuit Court is a proper venue because he is regularly employed in the City is irrelevant. According to appellee, “the sole determination of the jurisdiction of a person in the context of determining venue of a Workers’ Compensation appeal, is the county in which the person resides.” As we will explain, application of principles of statutory construction leads to the conclusion that, when the General Assembly enacted the statutory predecessor to LE § 9-738, it intended that a person aggrieved by a decision of the Commission could file an appeal in the county in which that person was employed or resided as well as the county in which the ¹³⁹ accident took place. The relatively few decisions of the Court of Appeals construing the statute do not suggest to the contrary. (A) Statutory Construction We begin our analysis by considering the language of the Act itself.

LE § 9-737 authorizes the filing of a petition for judicial review by an “employer, covered employee, dependent of a covered employee, or any other interested person aggrieved by a decision of the Commission.... ” Section 9-738 provides that the various persons authorized to seek judicial review of a decision of the Commission may do so by filing an appeal “with the circuit court: (1) that has jurisdiction over that person; or (2) for the county where the accidental personal injury ... occurred.” The language of LE § 9-738 is problematic. Did the General Assembly’s use of the singular — “the circuit court”— indicate that it intended that only one venue would be available to a person intending to file a petition for judicial review? If so, in light of the other venues listed in CJ § 6-201, how can courts determine which should be considered “the” venue? In construing a statute, our goal is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent.

We first examine the primary source of legislative intent, the words of the statute, giving them their ordinary and natural meaning. If the meaning of the language is unclear or ambiguous, we must consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of the enactment, in our attempt to discern the construction that will best further the legislative objectives or goals. Whack v. State, 338 Md. 665, 672 , 659 A.2d 1347 (1995) (citations and quotation marks deleted). As a means of obtaining insight into the legislature’s intent, we examine contemporaneous statutory and case law to determine which circuit courts would have had “jurisdiction over [a] person” seeking to file an appeal at the time the Act became ¹⁴⁰ law.

See Liverpool v. Baltimore Diamond Exchange, 369 Md. 304, 317-18 , 799 A.2d 1264 (2002) (citing Webster v. State, 359 Md. 465, 480 , 754 A.2d 1004 (2000)). Maryland’s Workers’ Compensation Act was enacted by Chapter 800 of the Laws of 1914. Section 55 of that statute provided: Any employer, employee, beneficiary, or persons aggrieved by a decision of the Commission ... may have the same reviewed by a proceeding in the nature of an appeal and initiated in the Circuit Court of the County or in the Common Law Courts of Baltimore City having jurisdiction over the place where the accident occurred or over the person appealing from such decision---- 1914 Md. Laws 1459 . Chapter 800 § 55 was codified as Article 101, § 56.

Article 101, § 56 was in effect without relevant substantive modification until the Act was recodified as Title 9 of the Labor and Employment Article by Chapter 8 of the Laws of 1991. At that time, what had been Article 101, § 56 became LE § 9-738. 1991 Md. Laws 961 . At common law, venue for a transitory action, such as contract or negligence, “would he wherever the defendant could be reached with process.... ” Kane v. Schulmeyer, 349 Md. 424, 432 , 708 A.2d 1038 (1998); Eck v. State Tax Comm’n., 204 Md. 245, 250 , 103 A.2d 850 (1954). The General Assembly frequently modified the common law rule.

Judge Wilner traced Maryland’s rather tortuous path from the common law to our current venue statutes in Kane, 349 Md. at 427-38 , 708 A.2d 1038 , and Swanson v. Wilde, 74 Md.App. 57, 61-68 , 536 A.2d 694 (1988). For the purposes of this opinion, it is sufficient to note that, as Judge Wilner explained in Swanson , the General Assembly enacted Chapter 456 of the Laws of 1888, which amended Article 75, § 87, Md.Code Ann. (1860), to provide that “ ‘any person who resides in one county but carries on any regular business, or habitually engages in any avocation or employment in another county, may be sued in either county....’” Swanson, 74 Md.App. at 62 , 536 A.2d ¹⁴¹ 694 (quoting 1888 Md. Laws ch. 456). This statute, although renumbered as Article 75, § 147, was in effect without relevant amendment in 1914. One of the fundamental precepts of statutory interpretation is that the General Assembly is aware of existing law when it enacts new legislation.

Proctor v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 412 Md. 691, 720 , 990 A.2d 1048 (2010) (citing Collier v. Nesbitt, 79 Md.App. 729, 734 , 558 A.2d 1242 (1989)). With this in mind, we conclude that, when the General Assembly enacted the Act in 1914, it was aware that, pursuant to Article 75, § 147, a natural person could be sued both in his or her county of residence as well as in his or her county of employment. Thus, when it provided that an appeal could be initiated “in the Circuit Court of the County or in the Common Law Courts of Baltimore City having jurisdiction over the place where the accident occurred or over the person appealing from such decision ...,” it intended that a person could file an appeal in either forum, as well as in the county in which the accident occurred.

That the legislature used the singular—“in the Circuit Court” — does not change the result. In 1860, the legislature incorporated guidelines for statutory interpretation into the Code as Article 1, including what is now Md. Code Ann. (1957, 2005 Repl Vol.), Article 1, § 8 which provides that, in interpreting provisions of the Maryland Code: The singular always includes the plural, and vice versa, except where such construction would be unreasonable. 1860 Md. Laws 4 . Applying this rule of construction to § LE 9-738 yields a reasonable result; not applying it would yield an unreasonable one, forcing courts to determine which of multiple fora constituted “the Circuit Court ... having jurisdiction over ... the person appealing from such decision,” without guidance from the legislature as to how the choice should be made. ¹⁴² (B) Court of Appeals’ Decisions Construing the Statute In the nearly 100 years since the Act became law, the Court of Appeals has construed § 9-738’s statutory predecessor on five occasions. The first was Brenner v. Brenner, 127 Md. 189 , 96 A. 287 (1915), the only case in which the Court considered an appellant’s contention that it could file an appeal in multiple venues.

In that case, the accident occurred in Washington County and the employer and the