Lemen v. McComas

Irving, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant was purchaser at a sale made by the appellees under a power of sale in a mortgage, and objected to the ratification of the sale, on the ground that. ¹⁵⁵ the mortgagors did not have a good title. His exceptions-having been overruled by the Circuit Court for Washington County, he has appealed. The only question in this-case is what title the second clause of the will of Jacob-T. Towson, gave his daughter Sarah Coakley?

The will reads thus: “I give and bequeath to my son, William Towson, hereinafter named, and his heirs, the following property in trust for my beloved daughter, Sarah Coakley, wife of Philip H. Coakley of Baltimore, and her heirs, that is to say, the farm lying in Washington County, State of' Maryland, on the Potomac River, now in possession of one Jacob Dellinger, and containing four hundred and forty-six acres, more or less, together with all the improvements and appurtenances thereto belonging; also all that new brick house in the town of Williamsport and county and State aforesaid, situate upon the north east corner of' Potomac and Conococheague streets, and now occupied in part by the Washington County Bank, and in part by Dr. Samuel Weisel, together with so much of the lot on which it stands, and of such outhouses as have been, or are now attached to and rented with it. The said William Towson is to hold the aforesaid property in trust as aforesaid, for and during the life of the said Philip H. Coakley, the rents and profits thereof, after paying thereout of taxes,, repairs and other expenses by the trustee, to he paid in the meantime to the said Sarah and her heirs, for her and their separate use, and after the decease of the said Philip-H. Coakley, the whole of the aforesaid property herein devised, is to vest in and helong to the said Sarah and her heirs, in her or their own right forever.” The question presented seems to us free from difficulty. The suggestion, that under this will Mrs. Coakley took only a life estate finds no support, we think, in the language of the will. During the life of her husband, Mrs. Coakley certainly took an equitable fee, whilst the trustee took the legal fee in trust for her and her heirs, until the- ¹⁵⁶ husband’s death.

At the death of her husband the trust immediately was to end, and Mrs. Coaldey was to take the legal fee. Pending the life of her husband, Mrs. Ooakley took only the equitable fee ; but she took in reversion the absolute fee at her husband’s death. By the express language of the will, during her husband’s life, the trust or equitable estate which she took was a separate estate, and there is no restraint put upon her in respect to anticipation or alienation. Such an estate is, beyond doubt, the subject of alienation.

Hulme vs. Tenant, 1 White and Tudor’s Leading Cases in Equity, 679 ; Cooke vs. Husbands, et al., 11 Md., 503 . In the case of Cooke vs. Husbands, et al., this Court adopted the language of Lord Thublow in Hulme vs. Tenant, wherein he says, “ there is an unbroken current of