Lemley v. Lemley

DAVIS, Judge. This appeal by Daniel Lemley is from an order of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (Turner, J.) that denied exceptions to the report and recommendations of a domestic relations master and affirmed a judgment of absolute divorce in favor of appellee, Suzanne Lemley. Appellant presents the following questions for our review: I. Did the chancellor err when he made no specific findings concerning the specific allegations of error set out in the appellant’s exceptions and pre-hearing memorandum?

II

Did the chancellor err in refusing to permit additional testimony to be adduced at the exceptions hearing?

III

Did the chancellor err with regard to matters of law? A. Were the facts found by the Master a sufficient basis to show constructive desertion as a matter of law? B. Should an award of child support be computed on an inflated income, absent voluntary impoverishment? C. Should no recognition have been given to Dan’s non-marital interest in the jointly owned house?

D. Should all contribution have been denied when a pendente lite order diverted Suzanne’s child support payment to pay the joint mortgage debt? E. Should rehabilitative alimony have been awarded? ²⁷³ FACTS Suzanne Bastían and Daniel Lemley were married in 1975. Mr. Lemley was thirty-five and had three daughters from a prior marriage. Ms. Bastían was twenty-two and had never been married.

Two children were born as a result of this union: Stuart, born in 1981, and Warren, born in 1985. At the time of the marriage, Mr. Lemley was retired from the District of Columbia Fire Department, having suffered a knee injury in the line of duty, for which he received a disability pension. Mr. Lemley made some effort at being employed during the marriage, including stints in real estate sales and a video filming business, but neither venture was successful. He characterized himself as “Mr. Mom,” and it appears that he was the primary caretaker of the children.

Mr. Lemley’s disability income was supplemented throughout most of the marriage by the earnings from Mrs. Lemley’s employment. Mrs. Lemley worked part-time at first, then began to work full-time as a legal secretary in 1989. She was still employed in that capacity at the time of trial. In May of 1991, Mrs. Lemley left the marital home and took the two boys with her.

Mr. Lemley filed a petition for “immediate return of the children, custody and child support.” Mrs. Lemley filed a cross-complaint for divorce on grounds of constructive desertion. Mr. Lemley supplemented his earlier pleading with a complaint for divorce on grounds of desertion. In the midst of this imbroglio, Mr. Lemley regained possession of the children through “self-help,” and Mrs. Lemley’s visitation rights were bitterly contested. An attorney for the children was appointed in July of 1991.

On July 5, the court issued an interim order for visitation and child support, whereby Mrs. Lemley was required to pay $948 per month. A hearing on the merits was begun in December, 1992. It ended in April, 1993 after five days of testimony. Mr. Lemley’s attorney withdrew after the fourth day of hearings, and Mr. Lemley proceeded pro se during the fifth and final day.

On June 10, 1993, the master issued her report and recommendations, and the court granted Mrs. Lemley’s complaint ²⁷⁴ for absolute divorce in a judgment dated June 21. The judgment awarded custody to Mrs. Lemley and ordered Mr. Lemley to pay $673.22 per month in child support. All requests for use and possession, alimony, attorney’s fees, and a monetary award were denied. Mr. Lemley, still proceeding pro se, filed a thirty-three page statement of exceptions to the report and recommendations of the master.

Although the exceptions were filed two days late, the chancellor agreed to consider them. 1 Mr. Lemley hired new counsel, and a hearing was held on September 22, 1993. The exceptions were denied in full by an order dated September 28, and Mr. Lemley filed this appeal. LEGAL ANALYSIS The legal effect of Mr. Lemley’s exceptions and the chancellor’s handling of the issues raised therein are broadly disputed by the parties. Mr. Lemley contends that the chancellor erred in failing to provide an adequate statement of the reasons for his decision on each exception, as required by Domingues v. Johnson, 323 Md. 486 , 593 A.2d 1133 (1991).

Mrs. Lemley contends with equal vigor that the issues raised by Mr. Lemley have been waived because the “rambling incoherent exceptions” do not contain the specificity required by Maryland Rule 2-541. We consider each of these procedural claims in the context of constructive desertion, then apply the same analysis to the other substantive issues as appropriate. I. Constructive Desertion In considering the complaint and cross-complaint for di- ' vorce, the master’s report states: ²⁷⁵ The Master finds from the evidence that: the conduct on the part of [Mr. Lemley] during the marriage, including constant derogatory remarks and criticism of [Mrs. Lemley] in private and public, resulted in anxiety and depression on the part of [Mrs. Lemley] requiring treatment; the problems between the parties gave rise to a reasonable fear on the part of [Mrs. Lemley] for her physical as well as emotional well-being; and it was necessary for her to leave the home to protect her physical and emotional health. The order and opinion of the chancellor, issued after the exceptions hearing, concurs with that conclusion: The Court finds that the facts contained in the Report and Recommendations of the Domestic Relations Masters’ Office are in fact well founded from the testimony presented and although the Court is not bound to accept the recommendation of the Master’s Office, in this case he has used his own independant [sic] review of the facts and finds that a divorce to Mrs. Lemley is justifiable.

Mr. Lemley contends that he took specific exceptions to the fact-finding of the master, and that the chancellor erred when he made no specific findings concerning those allegations of error. In light of our decision in Bagley v. Bagley, 98 Md.App. 18 , 632 A.2d 229 (1993), cert. denied, 334 Md. 18 , 637 A.2d 1191 (1994), we must agree. We vacate the judgment of divorce and remand for a more definite statement from the court. Mr. Lemley also contends that the facts found by the master are legally insufficient to support a judgment of divorce on grounds of constructive desertion.

After addressing the particularity of his exceptions and the appropriate standard of review by the chancellor, we offer guidance on the substantive issue raised by Mr. Lemley. Particularity.—While the role of masters generally is governed by Rule 2-541, Rule S74A sets forth specific standards that apply to the use of masters in a domestic relations case. Rule S74A(d) states in part: Exceptions shall be in writing and shall set forth the asserted error with particularity. Any matter not specifi ²⁷⁶ cally set forth in the exceptions is waived unless the court finds that justice requires otherwise.

Compare Rule 2—541(h)(1) (containing identical language). If the court is reasonably able to rule on the exception, and the opposing party is reasonably able to frame a response, then the exception is sufficiently “particular” to satisfy the requirements of the Rule. James v. James, 96 Md.App. 439, 449 , 625 A.2d 381 (1993). Cf.

Pfoff v. State, 85 Md.App. 296, 301-02 , 583 A.2d 1097 (1991), and G & H Clearing and Landscaping v. Whitworth, 66 Md.App. 348, 354-55 , 503 A.2d 1379 (1986) (both discussing vagueness in context of a complaint). While Mrs. Lemley complains about Mr. Lemley’s “rambling incoherent exceptions,” her answer to those exceptions directly addressed the main issues raised in this appeal, and we cannot say that the form of the exceptions prevented Mrs. Lemley from framing an adequate response. Mr. Lemley’s thirty-three page statement of exceptions is indeed rambling, but it nonetheless contains many specific allegations of error that satisfy the requirements of Rule S74A(d). Mr. Lemley’s exceptions include the following statements, which we number for the sake of convenience: 1) ... [T]he Master erred when she said she finds from the evidence of improper conduct on the part of the plaintiff during the marriage including “constant derogatory remarks and criticism of the defendant in private and public, resulted in anxiety and depression requiring treatment.” There was absolutely no evidence____ [at page 2] 2) The statement that this conduct, which is unspecified, resulted in a mental condition which required treatment, is unsubstantiated.

There was never a diagnosis presented as to any mental condition or illness that required treatment, [at page 3] 3) There was never an incident in the entire marriage that would cause a reason for fear, [at page 4] The master’s recommendation with regard to constructive desertion is grounded in factual findings that Mr. Lemley ²⁷⁷ engaged in certain behaviors, and that those behaviors caused fear, anxiety and depression in Mrs. Lemley. Mr. Lemley plainly contests those findings. While Mrs. Lemley and the chancellor may have preferred that Mr. Lemley omit needless words, number his exceptions, and refrain from arguing about evidence not in the record, we could not ask for a more direct assignment of error. Review by the chancellor.—The sometimes troubled relationship between master and chancellor has been the subject of several recent opinions by this Court and the Court of Appeals.

The difficulty arises in large part from the role that masters play in our judicial system. As we explained in Ellis v. Ellis, 19 Md.App. 361, 365 , 311 A.2d 428 (1973): Litigants in a custody proceeding, as in all judicial proceedings, are entitled to have their cause determined ultimately by a duly qualified judge in a court of competent jurisdiction. Accord Domingues, 323 Md. at 492 , 593 A.2d 1133 . Simply put, the master is not a judge and is not vested with any part of the State’s judicial power.

In re Anderson, 272 Md. 85, 106 , 321 A.2d 516 (1974) cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000 , 95 S.Ct. 2399 , 44 L.Ed.2d 667 (1975) Broseus v. Broseus, 82 Md.App. 183, 198 , 570 A.2d 874 (1990); Levitt v. Levitt, 79 Md.App. 394, 398-99 , 556 A.2d 1162 , cert. denied, 316 Md. 549 , 560 A.2d 1118 (1989). It is the chancellor’s role, not the master’s, to determine the ultimate rights of the parties. When a litigant files exceptions to the report and recommendations of a master, the chancellor must “exercise independent judgment to determine the proper result.” Domingues, 323 Md. at 496 , 593 A.2d 1133 . Accord Kirchner v. Caughey, 326 Md. 567, 572 , 606 A.2d 257 (1992).

The chancellor must also state, for the record, the reasons for his or her decision. Maryland Rule 2-522(a) provides: In a contested court trial, the judge, before or at the time judgment is entered, shall dictate into the record or prepare and file in the action a brief statement of the reasons for the decision and the basis of determining any damages. ²⁷⁸ In Kirchner, the Court of Appeals concluded that Rule 2-522(a) applies to “a final judgment in every non-jury action, whether legal or equitable in nature.” 326 Md. at 573 , 606 A.2d 257 . As Judge McAuliffe explained, “the chancellor’s opinion should reflect consideration of the relevant issues and the reasoning supporting the chancellor’s independent decisions on those issues, and we observe that Rule 2-522(a) requires no less.” Id. In Bagley , we concluded that something more is required when a litigant alleges that the master’s findings of fact are unsupported by the record.

Each of the parties to that dispute adopted an erroneous view of the appropriate standard: Mrs. Bagley draws no distinction between exceptions alleging erroneous fact-finding and allegedly improper conclusions of law made by the chancellor. Dr. Bagley, on the other hand,- argues that Domingues mandates only that the ■ trial court independently evaluate the record and not merely ‘automatically accept’ the master’s findings. Dr. Bagley appears to deny that Domingues would ever require the chancellor to make specific findings of fact on the record. Neither party correctly understands Domingues.

Bagley, 98 Md.App. at 29 , 632 A.2d 229 . Lest there be any lingering confusion, we elaborate further on the requirements of Domingues and Bagley . A master’s fact-finding is merely tentative and does not become binding until approved by the court. Wenger v. Wenger, 42 Md.App. 596, 603 , 402 A.2d 94 , cert. granted, 286 Md. 755 (1979), appeal dismissed per stipulation, January 1, 1980.

When the master’s fact-finding is challenged, the chancellor must state for the record how each challenge was resolved. Domingues, 323 Md. at 496 , 593 A.2d 1133 . The chancellor may resolve the challenge by relying on the record created before the master. Wenger, 42 Md. at 598-99, 402 A.2d 94 . 5 In the case at hand, Mr. Lemley’s specific exceptions to the master’s fact-finding are swept aside with a broad ²⁷⁹ statement that the facts found by the master “are well founded from the evidence presented.” That statement does not comport with the requirements of Domingues, Kirehner, and Bagley .

The chancellor does not address each challenge separately, nor does he state for the record how he resolved each challenge. At a minimum, he was required to summarize briefly the evidence 2 in the record that supports each challenged fact. See Bagley, 98 Md.App. at 29 , 632 A.2d 229 (concluding that chancellor who rules on exceptions must sometimes “make specific findings of fact on the record”). This should have been clear from the ruling in Domingues , wherein the Court held that the chancellor must determine “which facts are properly before him [or her]” before exercising independent judgment to determine the proper result.

Domingues, 323 Md. at 496 , 593 A.2d 1133 . Compare Cousin v. Cousin, 97 Md.App. 506, 517 , 631 A.2d 119 (1993) (holding that there is no need to address each finding of fact where appellant does not allege specific fact-finding error). Because the chancellor failed to state how he resolved each challenge to the master’s findings of fact, we must remand for a more definite statement of his decision. We are not unmindful of the burden that the chancellor faces in reviewing a challenged finding of fact, particularly in a case such as this where the appellant has submitted a “record extract” containing more than 1,800 pages in ten volumes.

See Bagley, 98 Md.App. at 30-31 , 632 A.2d 229 ; Domingues, 323 Md. at 497 , 593 A.2d 1133 . In light of the argument presented during the exceptions hearing, which contains many specific citations to the record, we do not believe that the burden here will be unreasonable. Constructive desertion.—In addition to his procedural concerns, Mr. Lemley raises a substantive issue: the facts found by the master, he contends, “were insufficient to show con ²⁸⁰ structive desertion as a matter of law.” In her report and recommendations the master reached three conclusions, which we restate for clarity: 1) That Mr. Lemley’s conduct—including constant criticism of Mrs. Lemley—resulted in anxiety and depression requiring treatment; 2) That Mr. Lemley’s conduct caused Mrs. Lemley to have a reasonable fear for her physical and emotional well-being; and 3) That it was necessary for Mrs. Lemley to leave in order to preserve her physical and emotional health. Mrs. Lemley’s description of the circumstances is more direct.

Mr. Lemley’s conduct, she contends, amounted to “ABUSE” (emphasis in original). During the merits hearing, Mrs. Lemley described one incident in detail: So, I told him to stop it and to leave, and at this point he really got upset and he sat on top of me. He straddled me and he pinned my arms back and said we were going to talk about it. I told him to get off me, I wanted him to get off me and to leave me alone.

So, he let go of my arms and I started coming up to push him away and he said, “Oh, you want to fight. Is that what you want to do, you want to fight? Well here,” and he grabs my wrist with his hand and he is squeezing it very hard and he starts slamming it against the side of his head. Mrs. Lemley testified that she suffered a bad sprain in her wrist and was required to wear a brace for a week.

On another occasion, Mr. Lemley allegedly slammed his fist into the refrigerator door and the basement door. Mrs. Lemley also asserted that Mr. Lemley poured water in her ear when she was trying to sleep, compelled Mrs. Lemley to engage in “coerced sexual relations,” and inappropriately discussed the couple’s sexual relations in front of the children. The testimony concerning Mr. Lemley’s “constant derogatory remarks and criticism” came from several sources. Jane West, an appraiser hired to assess the value of the Lemleys’ personal property, testified that Mr. Lemley held a “running conversa ²⁸¹ tion” with himself throughout her appraisal, and that much of that “conversation” centered on “derogatory remarks” about Mrs. Lemley.

Both Mrs. Lemley and her therapist testified concerning the impact of these various behaviors on Mrs. Lemley’s self-respect and emotional well-being. Because Mr. Lemley has taken exception to the Master’s factual findings, the chancellor must determine whether this evidence is properly before the court. Assuming, arguendo, that it is, the chancellor may not grant a divorce on grounds of constructive desertion unless those facts are legally sufficient. Ches v. Ches, 22 Md.App. 475, 483 , 323 A.2d 651 (1974).

We conclude that they are. With the introduction of “no-fault” divorce based on a voluntary one-year separation, Md.Code Ann., Family Law § 7-103(a)(3) (1991 Repl.Vol.), or an involuntary two-year separation, § 7-103(a)(5), the issue of constructive desertion as grounds for divorce rarely reaches this Court. The question, as framed by the Court of Appeals, is whether Mr. Lemley has engaged in “such conduct as would make a continuance of the marital relationship inconsistent with the health, self-respect and reasonable comfort of the other.” Soles v. Soles, 248 Md. 723, 726-27 , 238 A.2d 235 (1968) (quoting Geisey v. Geisey, 190 Md. 618, 627 , 59 A.2d 319 (1948)). Accord Sharp v. Sharp, 58 Md.App. 386, 393 , 473 A.2d 499 (1984).

There must be “a pattern of persistent conduct which is detrimental to the safety or health of the complaining spouse, or so demeaning to his or her self-respect as to be intolerable.” Murphy v. Murphy, 248 Md. 455, 460 , 237 A.2d 523 (1968) (emphasis added); Accord Ches, 22 Md. App. at 483 , 323 A.2d 651 . As the italicized language suggests, it is not necessary in every case to show that the safety or physical health of a spouse is threatened; a grave threat to a spouse’s self-respect alone may be sufficient. Murphy, 248 Md. at 460 , 237 A.2d 523 . See also Dupree v. Dupree, 26 Md.App. 481, 487 , 338 A.2d 323 (1975) (noting that there is no need to show “adverse medical effects” in every case); Liccini v. Liccini, 255 Md. 462, 470-71 , 258 A.2d 198 (1969) (holding that wife’s repeated allegations of homosexuality and “lack of ²⁸² manhood” were so demeaning to husband’s self-respect as to be intolerable).

In a case involving constructive desertion, the central issue is whether the offending conduct is so intolerable that the complaining spouse was justified in leaving. Murphy, 248 Md. at 460 , 237 A.2d 523 . Unlike a case involving ordinary desertion, there is no need to show that the “pattern of persistent conduct” was intended to end the marital relationship. See Bryce v. Bryce, 229 Md. 16, 23-24 , 181 A.2d 455 (1962) (holding that a wife’s conduct amounted to constructive desertion despite her “lack of control” due to mental illness).

It is true, as Mr. Lemley Suggests, that a single act of direct physical violence may not be sufficient to constitute a basis for divorce. See, e.g., Murphy, 248 Md. at 460 , 237 A.2d 523 . It is equally true that nagging, rudeness, and abusive language, standing alone, will generally not justify one spouse in leaving the other. Stewart v. Stewart, 256 Md. 272, 279, 260 A.2d 71 (1969) (citing Stevens v. Stevens, 183 Md. 599, 602 , 39 A.2d 690 (1944)).

One single straw will never break the camel’s back; but the camel’s back may nonetheless be broken. The chancellor must consider the totality of the circumstances, and “where a husband habitually addresses his wife in vile and profane language, and occasionally resorts to acts of physical violence, the entire course of conduct” may constitute grounds for divorce, even though the language or violence alone may not be sufficient. Scheinin v. Scheinin, 200 Md. 282, 292 , 89 A.2d 609 (1952). Accord Carpenter v. Carpenter, 257 Md. 218, 225-26 , 262 A.2d 564 (1970); Dupree, 26 Md.App. at 486-87 , 338 A.2d 323 .

Much of Mrs. Lemley’s testimony was corroborated by the testimony of Jill Ladd, a social worker and psychologist who had counseled both of the Lemleys. In regard to the allegations of coerced sexual relations, Ms. Ladd explained: [The reason why] Mrs. Lemley reported that she gave in to him in those circumstances was that she was so concerned that the children might hear him screaming at her and hear the content of their screaming, that she would rather suffer ²⁸³ onto [sic] herself and have intercourse with him to shut him up rather than have the children hear or witness a scene. The importance of these allegations should not be underestimated. It is well established that the practice of “abnormal” sexual relations by one spouse and a demand for their continuance is indeed “inconsistent with the health, self-respect and comfort of the other spouse,” and the spouse who suffers from such demands will be justified in leaving the marital home.

Soles, 248 Md. at 727 , 238 A.2d 235 , citing Maranto v. Maranto, 192 Md. 214, 220-21 , 64 A.2d 144 (1949). See also Carpenter, 257 Md. at 220-21 , 262 A.2d 564 (where conduct included requests that wife engage in prostitution and other “repulsive” sexual practices). While the petitioning spouse in Soles complained of acts that some people may not regard as “abnormal,” 3 that is beside the point. The key to understanding Soles and the line of precedent that it follows is to recognize that any coerced sexual performance must be regarded as “abnormal,” regardless of the specific sexual acts involved, and a persistent demand for such relations may be so demeaning that continuance of the marital relationship becomes intolerable.

In Dupree , we placed great weight on the fact that the spouse who suffered abuse left the family home immediately after the last act of violence directed against her. 26 Md.App. at 490 , 338 A.2d 323 . Mr. Lemley points out that Mrs. Lemley continued to live in the family home for ten months after the injury to her wrist. Because she did, he argues, the situation cannot be described as “intolerable.” In his view, Mrs. Lemley’s departure was motivated by nothing more than her unhappiness with the “sluggardly pace” of the mediation, her unhappiness with the tensions in the marriage, and “her belief that [he] was going to be intransigent in the mediation.” ²⁸⁴ While Mrs. Lemley’s departure may have been carefully planned and did not follow closely on the heels of some precipitous event, that does not mean that the situation could or should have been tolerated. As the Court of Appeals explained in Stewart, 256 Md. at 282 , 260 A.2d 71 , “The fact that the wife did not leave immediately does not make the husband’s conduct proper____” Recent scholarship on “battered women’s syndrome” has taught us that spouses often remain in intolerable situations long after another person might have left.

See generally Jeanne-Marie Bates, Expert Testimony on the Battered Woman Syndrome in Maryland, 50 Md.Law Rev. 920 (1991). No spouse should be penalized for trying to make an intolerable situation work. We must caution that our discussion of constructive desertion has relied on both the record and the factual findings of the master. While those facts may be legally sufficient to constitute constructive desertion, they do not lead mechanically to a single conclusion.

Even if the chancellor finds that those facts are supported by the record, the chancellor must exercise his independent judgment to determine the correct result. Domingues, 323 Md. at 496 , 593 A.2d 1133 . The central issue here is whether the chancellor concurs with the master’s conclusion that “it was necessary for [Mrs. Lemley] to leave the home to protect her physical and emotional health.” So long as the court’s reasoning and the facts underlying that reasoning are adequately stated for the record, the chancellor’s independent judgment on that issue must stand unless the decision fails to conform to law or constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. Cousin v. Cousin, 97 Md.App. 506, 512 , 631 A.2d 119 (1993); Robinson v. Robinson, 328 Md. 507, 513-514 , 615 A.2d 1190 (1992).

II

Custody In recommending that custody be awarded to Mrs. Lemley, the master concluded that Mr. Lemley, “while a loving father, is not the best custodian for the children.” Underlying that conclusion were three broad findings of fact with regard to Mr. Lemley’s conduct: ²⁸⁵ A. The master finds that throughout the separation [Mr. Lemley] has inappropriately delegated parental authority to the children, now ages 12 and 8. B. The master also finds from the testimony that [Mr. Lemley] has interfered and damaged [Mrs. Lemley’s] relationship with the minor children.... C. Finally, the Master finds that [Mr. Lemley] provides an inappropriate role model for the children. The master also found that Mrs. Lemley “is capable of providing well balanced care for the children, meeting their physical and emotional needs, and doing so without disparaging [Mr. Lemley].” Each of these broad conclusions is supported, in detail, with other facts found in the record.

In his exceptions, Mr. Lemley plainly objects to each of those findings. We think it unnecessary to set forth those objections in detail; one example should suffice. At page twelve of his exceptions, Mr. Lemley states: The Master finds in error that Mr. Lemley delegates parental responsibility to the children. In ruling on Mr. Lemley’s exceptions to the custody order, the chancellor’s order and opinion addresses only one of the four broad findings discussed above: While there are many factors to be considered in rendering a custody decision, one of the most important is the ability of the parents to allow a child to maintain a meaningful relationship with the other parent.

Unfortunately the Court does not find that this has always been the case in this matter. Again the Court has carefully reviewed the testimony and the facts adduced therefrom by the Master and feels that they are well supported by the evidence. Although we do not think the chancellor was required to address each and every point raised by Mr. Lemley’s rambling exceptions, we conclude that the chancellor’s opinion fails to comport with the requirements of Bagley. The chancellor’s custody award rests on four broad findings of fact, and Mr. Lemley takes exception with each of those findings.

At a minimum, the chancellor was required to address each of ²⁸⁶ those findings separately, and to state for the record how he resolved each challenge. Because he failed to do so, the issue of custody is remanded. Mr. Lemley also contends that the chancellor erred by refusing to admit certain testimony at the exceptions hearing. The evidence he wished to present included testimony from three witnesses: 1) Dr. Milton Shore, a clinical psychologist who performed an evaluation of the children; 2) Dr. Robert Lazun, a court-appointed social worker who met with the children and parents weekly for many months; and 3) Michele Glen, “an individual who knows the Lemley family.” He also requested that the chancellor conduct an interview with the children.

Mr. Lemley broadly suggests that the chancellor’s refusal to hear additional evidence was somehow “constitutionally wrong, Md. Rules S72A(f)(l)(A) and 2—541(i) to the contrary notwithstanding.” His only authority for that proposition is Stack v. Stack, 83 Md.App. 36 , 573 A.2d 409 (1990). In Stack , a standing master recommended that temporary physical custody be awarded to one spouse, and an order was immediately entered, despite the fact that timely exceptions had been filed. 83 Md.App. at 39 , 573 A.2d 409 . The appellant contended that the order was unconstitutional “because it improperly vests the judicial power and function in a master.” Id. at 38 , 573 A.2d 409 . While we held that the order was improper, our ruling was based solely on issues of statutory construction.

Id. at 40-41 , 573 A.2d 409 . Indeed, we acknowledged that an immediate order would be proper under different circumstances. Id. at 43 , 573 A.2d 409 , citing Magness v. Magness, 79 Md.App. 668 , 558 A.2d 807 (1989). The gist of Mr. Lemley’s argument is that the chancellor’s refusal to hear additional evidence somehow vests the master with the court’s judicial authority.

See Ellis, 19 Md.App at 365, 311 A.2d 428 (concluding that a master may ²⁸⁷ not usurp the “ultimate role” of the judge). We find no merit in that argument. The master, in her ministerial capacity, was plainly authorized to hear testimony and make findings of fact. Maryland Rule S74A; See Rand v. Rand, 33 Md.App. 527, 531-34 , 365 A.2d 586 (1976), vacated on other grounds, 280 Md. 508 , 374 A.2d 900 (1977) (discussing historic role of master in chancery with regard to fact-finding).

The chancellor had broad authority to accept those findings (provided that they