Lester v. Mayor of Baltimore

Alvey, J., delivered the opinion of the court. The main question in this case, (the determination of which dispenses with the necessity of deciding any other raised by *the record,) is, whether the money sued for was paid by the appellant to the appellees, or to. their use, undér such circumstances as to entitle the former to recover it back. And, upon a careful examination of the record, we are clearly of opinion that it was not. No principle is better settled than that where a person, with full knowledge of the facts, voluntarily pays a demand unjustly made upon him, though attempted or threatened to be enforced by proceedings, as appears to have been the case in this instance, it will not be considered as paid by compulsion, and the party thus paying, is not entitled to recover, though he may have protested against .the unfounded claim at the time of payment made.

As in Knibbs v. Hall, 1 Esp. 84, where a party under a threat' of distress, paid money as rent in order to avoid the distress, it was held that it could not be deemed a payment by compulsion, as the party 'paying might, by a replevin, have defended himself against the distress; and that, therefore, after a voluntary payment so made, he could' not be" allowed to dispute its legality. And so, in Brown v. McKinally, 1 Esp. 279, a party was sued on a claim which he knew to be unfounded, but, notwithstanding, paid it, declaring at the time that he did it without prejudice to his right to recover it ⁴¹⁹ back. In an action for the money thus paid, it was held to have been voluntarily paid, and, therefore, not recoverable. There is no pretense here that the money sued for was paid under mistake of the facts, or under circumstances of fraud and extortion; nor is this a case where money has been paid as a necessary means to obtain the possession of goods wrongfully withheld from the party paying the money, as in Shaw v. Woodcock, 7 B. & Cr. 73.

In such cases, an action may be maintained for the money wrongfully exacted. But it is the naked case of a party making payment of a demand rather than resort to litigation, and under the supposition that the claim, which subsequently turned out to be unauthorized by law, was enforceable against him or his *property. For the appellant himself tells us that he “ did not want to unite in any litigation about the legality of the law; but, as his property was advertised for sale, he thought he had better settle the bill; that he paid it because he did not want the city to sell