Leuschner v. State

Lowe, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Elwood Leroy Leuschner was a multiple offender felon who came to Maryland as a fugitive from California justice. His atrocities there were of such nature that his wife by petition alleged him to have been a sexual psychopath causing his commitment to the Mendocino State Hospital which, after 90 days, decided he was not so deranged. Violating his parole after imprisonment, Leuschner emigrated to Maryland where he subsequently kidnapped, sodomized and murdered two young boys, 10-year-old Russell Marine by stabbing and 9-year-old Troy Krause by strangulation.

Despite the attendant violence of crimes of that nature, they are nonetheless clandestine. The witnesses are dead, most physical evidence hidden or destroyed and the only living knowledge of it is locked in the mind of the perpetrator. Though he may be suspected because of his past, he cannot be reapprehended for prior crimes; nor can he be deterred from committing future ones of like nature unless law enforcement officials can somehow discover his misdeeds. The obvious, usually the best, and often the only source, is the perpetrator himself and if a confession can be extracted properly, prosecution and subsequent confinement are reasonably assured. * 1 But if that route is followed, ³²⁵ officials must tread carefully lest they trespass upon an accused’s constitutionally sacred grounds; that which provides him the privilege not to "be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself....” U. S. Const, amend.

V. To the extent that this privilege intrudes upon the investigatory aspect of criminal law enforcement, the privilege of silence serves as a checkrein, but not necessarily an unjustifiable restraint, upon police. Even the sanction for involuntarily extracting statements — evidentiary exclusion — is not an unreasonable one in light of the questionable truthfulness of that which was, or might be, coercively extracted by physical or psychological means. However, as the Fifth Amendment right has been interpretively extended, requiring procedural niceties of interrogation formulized to fit precise patterns, it has more and more become an impediment even to legitimate methods of law enforcement. See Harlan, J., dissenting in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 493 (1964).

One such nicety was the blending of the Fifth Amendment right not to speak, with the Sixth Amendment right "to have the Assistance of Counsel for [one’s] defense”. Initially, the right to counsel for one’s defense presupposed an advocate at trial, but was interpretively extended to apply pretrial for an indicted defendant interrogated by the police in a completely extrajudicial environment. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). Perhaps because the exclusionary rule was found to be an effective deterrent to opprobrious police conduct in violation of the Fifth Amendment, any statement elicited in the absence of counsel after indictment, regardless of how elicited, was not admissible at trial against the accused.

Ibid. Soon to follow Massiah was Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), which extended the right to counsel to a suspect — not necessarily indicted — but from the moment the investigatory phase of an interrogation becomes accusatory and focused upon the suspect. "[Where an] investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to ³²⁶ focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied 'the Assistance of Counsel’ in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as 'made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,’ Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US [335 (1963)], at 342, 9 L ed 2d at 804, 93 ALR2d 733, and that no statement elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used against him at a criminal trial.” Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. at 490-491 . Escobedo thus interwove the two rights, binding them together with the sanction of exclusion.

The final touch to this pattern of protection was Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), which provided the striated brocade of procedural niceties. Miranda’s holding first appears as simplicity itself, "... the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” Id. at 444 , but it was the "procedural safeguards” that striated the holding. "Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or ³²⁷ appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” 384 U.S. at 444 .

The Fifth Amendment safeguard was abundantly clear, but that paragraph also suggested that to exercise the Sixth Amendment right to counsel might be a talisman serving to raise the Fifth Amendment shield as well. "If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning.” Id. at 444-445 . The Court then jumps back to the Fifth Amendment. "Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him.” Id. at 445 .

Then, presumably because of the application of the similar sanctions, the Court speaks as if the Fifth Amendment privilege and the Sixth Amendment right are one and the same, "The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right [Fifth] to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney [Sixth] and thereafter consents to be questioned [Fifth].” Id. at 445 (emphasis added), and seems to say that a subsequent waiver must be a knowing and intelligent one. For 45 pages after its initial deceivingly simple holding, the Court sought to explain what was meant, apparently trying to anticipate all situation possibilities of which it could conceive. Again it alternately addressed the right and ³²⁸ the privilege in a single paragraph. With regard to the Fifth Amendment privilege not to speak, it said: "Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear.

If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.” 384 U.S. at 473-474 (footnote omitted). In the same paragraph it anticipated the exercise of one’s Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel.

"If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning. "Id. at 474. Then it .concluded those examples with the third possibility, an amalgam of the two.

"If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent.” Id. at 474 (emphasis added). But, contrary to some interpretations, even if both rights are exercised by one upon whom an investigation has focused, the Court did not by that fact alone command the investigators to cease all interrogation. It does, however, ³²⁹ place upon them a heavy burden if they wish to use in trial that which they elicit thereafter — "If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.” 384 U.S. at 475 . And the Miranda Court went on to make unequivocally clear that mere silence is not enough to overcome that heavy burden.

Id. at 475 . Now, after more than a decade of experience, the Court in North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 , 60 L. Ed. 2d 286, 292 (1979), explained that the heavy burden of proving a waiver need not be restricted to an express waiver by a defendant, but may be inferred by strong evidence of the circumstances of the interrogation. "That [waiver may not be inferred by a silent record] does not mean that the defendant’s silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver, may never support a conclusion that a defendant has waived his rights. The courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution’s burden is great; but in at least some cases waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated.” With these questions of constitutional rights at issue in the case before us, we have independently and carefully reviewed the entire record, Walker v. State, 12 Md. App. 684, 694 (1971).

Silent it is not. Unlike the record in Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469 , 62 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1980), the record here fairly shouts at us, as it did to the trial judge, that this case is one from which "waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated.” Butler , ³³⁰ supra at 292. In so concluding, we scrupulously followed the directive of the Supreme Court which stated in Butler, supra, that "when the right so fundamental as that to counsel at trial is involved, the question of waiver must be determined on 'the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’” Id. at 293 (emphasis added). — Butlefs variations on the Miranda theme — Elwood Leroy Leuschner was convicted in the Circuit Court for Washington County of murdering and sexually offending Troy Krause, a 9-year-old boy. He had previously been convicted in Wicomico County of similarly destroying 10-year-old "Rusty” Marine.

See Leuschner v. State, 41 Md. App. 423 (1979). Having exhausted his appeals in the Marine case, his appeal now is from the Krause conviction. Both cases rested upon Leuschner’s confessions which were elicited almost simultaneously. His assertions of improprieties in eliciting the confessions compel us to review the entire circumstances and events leading up to both confessions.

Following the Butler directive, however, we must first consider him with whom we are dealing. "background, [and] experience” Elwood Leroy Leuschner, as we have indicated, has a "background” and "experience” which show, by repetitive exposure, an assimilated knowledge of judicial proceedings and defendant’s rights. In California, as indicated by a four page criminal record, he had been charged with two crimes against children, two rapes, assault and robbery, firearms violation, forgery, burglary, and was a registered sex offender who had been accused but not proven to have been a sexual psychopath. Such background implies a knowledge, whether, gained from books or experience, that is a distinguishing circumstance to be considered in determining ³³¹ whether his subsequent conduct was an intentional waiver of a known right.

Cf. Escobedo, supra at 491-492 . 1A "conduct of the accused ” For three months the Maryland State Police in Wicomico County had been searching for a missing 9-year-old boy named Troy Krause, when in late October of 1977, another youngster about the same age, named Russell (Rusty) Marine was reported missing also. On October 29, 1977, while investigating Rusty’s disappearance, the State Police were told by Rusty’s stepfather that his neighbor, Elwood Leroy Leuschner (the appellant) had last seen Rusty walking down the road toward a dirt pile near their residences. Trooper David Luce went to Leuschner’s trailer home and inquired about his recollection of last seeing Rusty.

Because Leuschner’s niece had previously related that Leuschner had a California criminal record, the trooper, upon returning to the barracks, entered Leuschner’s description in a National Crime Information Center Computer and found that he was wanted in California for a parole violation. His criminal record was four pages long. On October 30, 1977, in the early morning hours Leuschner was arrested (because California would extradite on the outstanding warrants for parole violation) and immediately advised of his rights, which he admittedly understood. He explained to the police that "he had been communicating with California authorities in an attempt to get his parole problem straightened out, that he only had one more year left on his parole.” Upon arrival at the State Police barracks he was again informed of his Miranda rights and at that time "Mr. Leuschner stated that he wanted an attorney ³³² to represent him on the fugitive charges, as he did not want to go back to California; he had a lot to lose: he would lose his trailer, his job, his girlfriend, and so on.” (Emphasis added).

No questions were asked of him regarding the fugitive charge; however, he was routinely processed and subsequently taken to the Criminal Investigator’s office. There he was questioned "concerning any information he may have [had] as to the location of the missing boy, Rusty Marine.” It is significant to note that his previous request for an attorney was expressly in regard to the fugitive charge only. That request for counsel was "scrupulously honored” as a triggering mechanism for his "right to cut off questioning” in regard to the charge for which he was arrested; however, he willingly agreed to discuss the missing boy. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).

"Q. Did he say anything to you about an attorney at that time? A. Just for the fugitive charge. Q. What do [you] mean? What did he say?

A. He said he would like to have an attorney represent him for the fugitive charge, because he did not want to go back to the State of California. Q. Did he indicate to you at that time whether or not he was willing to talk to you about Rusty Marine? A. Yes, sir. He was willing, and he stated that he would be perfectly willing to talk to us; that he didn’t have any information concerning the location of where the missing person was.

Q. What, if anything, did he tell you concerning an attorney with respect to talking to you about Rusty Marine? ³³³ A. He did not [sic 2 ] say he did not desire an attorney; he didn’t need one. Q. Did he say that? A. Yes, sir, he did.” No questions were asked of Leuschner as to Troy Krause. The sole concern was directed to the missing neighbor Rusty since Leuschner was the last to have seen him.

Presumably, little if any connection was known between Leuschner and Troy. During this time, Betty Larmore, the paramour with whom appellant resided, came in and was permitted to be with, and talk to, Leuschner. Leuschner relayed his request for the retention of counsel to her. "Q. What, if anything, did they talk about?

A. Mr. Leuschner requested that Betty Jean obtain an attorney for him. Q. Did he indicate to her why he wanted an attorney? A. Yes, sir, because he did not want to go back to California; that they would have too much to lose. Q. What, if any, response did Miss Larmore give him at that time?

A. At that time she said that she couldn’t do anything about getting an attorney due to the day it was. Q. What day was it? A. That was Sunday. However, she would go the next day and attempt to get him one.

I believe, I was answering the telephone, but I believe at that time a piece of paper with an attorney’s name was written down and given to Miss Larmore. ³³⁴ Q. By whom? A. By Mr. Leuschner. Q. Other than passing the piece of paper to Miss Larmore, did Mr. Leuschner respond in any way to her indication that she would be unable to do anything about an attorney until the next day? A. No, sir.” With M’s Larmore still there, the conversation to determine the whereabouts of the missing Rusty resumed.

Discrepancies from Leuschner’s previous interviews became apparent but nothing incriminatory or accusatory with regard to Rusty was elicited. Cigarettes, sandwiches and coffee were provided Leuschner around 4:00 o’clock. From that time until 6:00 or 6:30, Lt. Keating, who was called in to "... assist in the investigation of a missing person named Rusty Marine”, participated in the inquiry with the help of TFC Milton Hall.

They were also familiar with the missing Krause boy, but again the focus of investigation was only upon Rusty. Out of an abundance of caution, prior to any discussion, they too advised appellant of his Miranda rights. Leuschner never indicated a desire to stop talking about Rusty; but about an hour after Lt. Keating arrived, he recalled that "Mr. Leuschner said T would like to have an attorney’.” Although the police were not yet aware that either of the boys had been criminally abused, 3 Lt.

Keating again ³³⁵ choosing to err, if at all, on the side of prudence, immediately acquiesced: "Q. What, if anything, did you do when he said that? A. He was sitting right next to the telephone, and I advised him: 'Mr. Leuschner, there’s a telephone. You can call an attorney, or I’ll call one for you.’ [4] A. The telephone was within arm’s reach of him, sitting on the desk. Q. Did you make any comments to Mr. Leuschner about the telephone?

A. Did I make any? Q. Yes. A. I told him that he could use the telephone to call an attorney, or I would call one for him. Q. Did he make any effort to use the telephone?

A. No, sir. Q. Did he ask you to call an attorney for him? A. No, sir. ³³⁶ Q. Did he make any effort to use the telephone directory? A. No, sir.

Q. What, if anything, occurred after you advised him that he could use the telephone? A. He said he wanted to talk to Betty.” Betty Larmore was in the next room and was immediately brought in. Appellant voluntarily continued his conversation without the instigation of any further questions being asked by the officers. "Q. How long did he talk to Betty Larmore?

A. Fifteen, twenty minutes. Q. Were you present in the room when he talked to Betty Larmore? A. Yes, sir. Q. Do you know what they talked about?

A. When she came into the room, I didn’t get all the conversation, but he did ask her if she would contact an attorney or had she contacted an attorney. Q. Do you recall what she responded? A. No, I don’t believe I can say what she said. She might have mentioned the name of an attorney, but I’m not sure.” Although Trpr.

Hall’s testimony indicated that .. he did not desire to talk any further; he wanted to contact an attorney”, Lt. Keating’s testimony was clearly and pointedly that he did not express any desire to terminate the inquiry, "Q. Did he ever at any time during that two or two and a half hours indicate at any time a desire to cut off questioning? A. No, sir.”, ³³⁷ but neither did he express a desire to continue. He simply kept right on talking. 5 "Q. After he talked to Miss Larmore, what, if anything, occurred?

A. He just kept carrying on general conversation. Q. With whom? A. With Trooper Hall and myself, and Betty was in there. Q. How did the conversation get started?

A. He just kept talking that he didn’t know anything about Rusty Marine. Q. How long a period of time transpired from the time he stated that he would like an attorney to the point where he started talking again? A. The conversation never stopped. It was just a continuous conversation with Betty when she came in, and he’d speak to myself or Trooper Hall.

Q. Did the conversation get back to the subject of Rusty Marine? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did it ever leave the subject of Rusty Marine? A. No, sir.

Q. Between the time that Mr. Leuschner stated that he would like an attorney and the next time that he said anything to a Police Officer, did either you or Trooper Hall or any other Police Officer ask him any questions? A. No, sir.” But perhaps because of the discrepancies in Leuschner’s narrations, Trpr. Hornung, who was also participating in the search for Rusty, asked Leuschner ".. . if he had any knowledge of the whereabouts of ³³⁸ Rusty, and at one point in the conversation I asked him if he would be willing to take a polygraph. Q. About what time of day was that?

A. That would have been some time after 7:30 p.m. Q. What, if any, response did he make to your suggestion concerning the polygraph? A. He said that before he would submit to a polygraph examination he would have to discuss it with an attorney. Q. Did he indicate why?

A. No, he just said that he did not... it was not his desire to take a polygraph without first consulting with an attorney.” As a consequence nothing more was said to him about such a test. "Q. Did you say anything further to him at that time or thereafter concerning a lie detector test? A. No, sir.” And the day concluded by appellant being taken before a district court commissioner for charging on the fugitive warrant where once again he was provided his Miranda warnings. These were the references made by appellant expressing a desire for counsel.

In the first instance he restricted his request solely to the fugitive charge and volunteered to help with the search for the missing boy, Rusty Marine. The officers honored the second more general request by refraining from questioning further and by offering assistance in procuring counsel. Appellant, instead of accepting the officers’ assistance, preferred to talk again with Betty whom he had commissioned to get him counsel for the fugitive charge which she expressed an inability to do because it was the Sabbath. Prognosticating this precise possibility, it will be recalled, Miranda said: "If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he ³³⁹ indicates that he wants one before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent.” 384 U.S. at 474 (emphasis added).

But Leuschner did not indicate that he wanted counsel before speaking further to the police. On the contrary, without any prompting, appellant’s continued conversation of the subject under inquiry, both to Betty Larmore in the presence of the police and to the police, belied any inference that he was exercising his Fifth Amendment right. As in North Carolina v. Butler, supra, there was no doubt that appellant had been adequately, effectively, and frequently apprised of his rights; the only question was whether his conduct waived them. The test was first espoused in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962), and quoted in Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 .

" 'The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver.’ ” Here, as in Butler , the actions and words of the appellant clearly implied a knowing and intelligent waiver of the rights of which he was repeatedly advised and from his extraordinary past experience must have been keenly cognizant. Having found so clear a waiver of counsel, we note in passing that it is questionable whether Leuschner was entitled to counsel (regarding the missing Marine boy) at the time of his request. Throughout that entire day there was no crime known for which Leuschner could have been focused upon as a suspect.

The Sixth Amendment right is a right of an accused, at least in jeopardy of a portending criminal proceeding. Escobedo extended the right from one formally accused ( Massiah, supra) to one focused upon as a suspect. No case has yet provided the right as constitutionally available upon a missing person inquiry, absent knowledge that a crime has been committed. If that were the law, not only ³⁴⁰ would legitimate methods of criminal law enforcement be "unjustfully fettered” (as concerned Justice Harlan in Escobedo), public protection would, in manacles and leg irons, be itself imprisoned.

But even if he were entitled to counsel in regard to the missing Rusty Marine,, presumably even the police had made no connection between Leuschner and Troy Krause; no suspicion was expressed or indicated by even a single question. It would be judicially naive to infer that the police had not focused their attention upon appellant in regard to Rusty, especially in light of Leuschner’s record; however, the investigation could hardly turn accusatory, even as to Rusty, until some knowledge that a crime has been committed is apparent to the police. That precise point "when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory ... our adversary system begins to operate ....” Escobedo, supra at 492 . psychological stimulation or psychological coercion The next day, Monday, October 31, 1979, appellant was brought from the jail where he had been confined as a fugitive, back to the barracks for further questioning. He was advised of his Miranda rights which he acknowledged having previously heard and that he understood them.

During this interview Lt. Keating was advised that Rusty Marine’s body had been found. Leuschner was told but, still indicating that he didn’t know anything about it, expressed disbelief. Perhaps to convince him, "[w]e talked it over, Sgt.

Luce and myself, and it was my opinion that Mr. Leuschner didn’t believe anything we were telling him, and I thought if we took him down there and showed him that the body had been recovered, then he’d know that we knew what we were talking about or telling the truth”; perhaps because now the commission of a crime by someone had surfaced and suspicion focused on appellant, he was ³⁴¹ taken to the scene. The reaction of appellant, now that it was known that a crime had been committed, was itself sufficient to focus suspicion upon him as an accused even absent his record. "He had, by the time I saw him, had seen the body, and had become very upset, physically upset. I turned him away from the body at that time and attempted to calm him for several minutes.

We left very shortly thereafter.” Prudently, if not necessarily, no questions were posed at this time. "Q. Did you ask him any questions? A. No, sir. Q. Did he say anything of an incriminatory nature?

A. No, sir. He was just very shaken.” Upon returning to the barracks appellant was permitted to stop by his trailer and ask Betty Larmore to come with him. She arrived a little after he did, and upon her entry into the room appellant told her, in the presence of Hall and Keating, that "he had taken Rusty”. He continued to talk with Betty for five or ten minutes and was then asked by police if he would give them a statement.

Miranda rights were repeated and appellant then signed a waiver form, witnessed by Betty Larmore, prior to giving the statement. Indeed, appellant himself typed part of his statement which described that which he had done to Rusty Marine culminating in the boy’s murder. To this point, still no inquiry had been made with regard to Troy Krause with whom we are here concerned, and when Leuschner was now asked about him, upon concluding the Rusty Marine confession, he at first denied any knowledge and again asked to see Betty Larmore. the case we are considering Now that the police were aware that Rusty had been murdered by Leuschner, in light of the content of his ³⁴² confession, he was apparently suspected of similarly disposing of the missing Troy Krause. After talking to Betty Larmore, he called for Lt.

Keating and asked him, not for a lawyer, nor to recant his former Miranda waiver, but "if Betty could give information with reference to Troy Krause, would she be entitled to the $5,000 reward.” This conduct itself indicates that even at this crucial juncture in the extrajudicial proceedings, the experienced and court-wise accused was capable of conniving for additional benefits as prerequisite to further confession. When the Lieutenant replied that he had no control over the reward offer, appellant "turned to Betty and said words to the effect that T took him, too.’ "When he said that, Betty sort of cried out 'No, you didn’t’ or 'You couldn’t.’ He said 'Yes, I took him.’ He started telling me in her presence what had happened, where he picked him up on the road, and the boy wanted a ride to the YMCA, and as soon as the boy got in the truck he made a right turn, he didn’t know the name of the road. He said shortly thereafter he made another right turn and came to a place where he could pull off the side of the road. He got out of the truck, and he said he could see the roof of an old home or a large home which was red.

The roof was red. He said he couldn’t see the whole house, he could just see part of the roof. He said he pulled the boy out of the truck and tied his hands and took him a short distance in the woods, approximately fifty yards and had sex with him. He said he held his hand over his mouth, and when he left the boy was laying on the ground.

I questioned him, too, as to whether the boy was dead or alive, and he said he didn’t know; that he was just laying there.” ³⁴³ Appellant then agreed to help the police locate Troy and they left the barracks guided by appellant’s direction. They found nothing and returned just before midnight. Precipitously appellant was presented to a commissioner and charged with the murder of Rusty Marine. The next morning Lt.

Keating, Trpr. Lewis, Betty Larmore (whom they picked up at her home) and Leuschner again "rode around”, presumably with Leuschner trying to recall where he had left Troy. Leuschner, apparently recalling the polygraph discussion the previous day, asked then to take the test "to see if it would assist him and help, and he wanted to do everything he could to locate the Krause boy.” Appellant was then taken to the Easton barracks for the polygraph test, after which he was returned to Salisbury for a bond review before "Judge Dallas” of the District Court there. Judge Dallas not only advised appellant of his Miranda rights but "[h]e advised him not to