Levin v. Hewes

Stockbridge, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This case not merely involves, but its determination depends upon the validity or invaldity of an Act of the last session of the Legislature of this State, popularly known as, “the People’s Court Act.” The General Assembly of Maryland at the Session of 1912 passed an Act, Chapter 823, bearing the following title: “An Act to repeal section 629 of Article IV of the Code of Public Local Laws ■ of Maryland, title “City of Baltimore,” sub-title “Justices of the Peace and Constables,” to repeal and re-enact with amendments section 206, sub-title “Constables,” and 623, 624, 625, 627, 628 and 648, subtitle “Justices of the Peace and Constables,” of said Article ⁶²⁹ IV and to add three additional sections to said Article IV to follow' immediately after said section 625 as amended, and to be known respectively as sections 62 5A, 62533 and 6250.” The Act thus entitted was approved by the Governor on the eleventh of April, and by its terms provided that it should take effect on the second of May following. The evident design in the passage of this law was to bring about certain radical changes in the trials of petty civil cases before justices of the peace. The provisions contained in the body of the Act had reference only to such causes in the City of Baltimore and defined and prescribed the jurisdiction, powers and duties of justices of the peace in respect to such trials.

Ho change was made in the existing law for any other portion of the State, or in the local laws relating to the powers and jurisdiction of justices in criminal cases. The general scope of the Act was as follows: Power was given to the Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to appoint one hundred and one justices of the peace, for the City of Baltimore, an increase of five over the number previously fixed by law. Of the total number, six were to be appointed from each legislative district, one from each of the wards comprising the district, and six at large, and the remaining fifty-three were to be appointed from the city at large, from such ward or wards as the Governor might elect. After the appointments had been made the Governor was empowered to designate from the justices of the peace so appointed, a “presiding justice of the peace of the People’s Court and four associate justices.” Those thus selected for these positions were to receive salaries of $2,500 and $2,100 respectively in lieu of the fees previously paid to justices in the civil causes tried before them.

Civil suits instituted before any of the one hundred arid one justices might be made returnable before the presiding justice of the People’s Court, or before the magistrate issuing the summons, and the right was given to either party to a litigation to have his case removed from the magistrate issuing the ⁶³⁰ summons to the People’s Court for trial, by presenting a request in writing for such removal. Other justices than those named to act as of the People’s Court were to receive a salary of ten dollars per annum, in lieu of the costs as theretofore provided. The hours of holding sittings for the trial of eases were also prescribed, and the place. The remainder of the Act was taken up with the appointment of constables, prescribing their duties and fixing their compensation.

The appellant in this case having been sued by William R. Pardwell before a magistrate not so assigned as one of the justices of the People’s Court, presented his request for a removal as provided in the Act and was refused, and thereupon made application to the. Superior Court for a writ of mandamus to compel such removal. His application was dismissed upon the ground that the applicant had a right of appeal from any judgment which the justice might render to the Baltimore City Court, and before that tribunal the petitioner could have the equity and right of his case determined. But it is not enough that a tribunal should be found in which a litigant can have his case fairly heard and determined; he is entitled to have it so heard and determined in the forum provided by law.

Sweet v. Hulbert, 51 Barb. 312 ; Wyman v. Spokane, 2 L. R. A. n. s. 568. The Act of 1912 was intended to provide such tribunal, and if the Act was valid, then the law provided the appropriate forum in which either party was entitled, as matter of right, to have his case passed upon, and he could not be deprived of this right merely because there was some other forum before which upon appeal his case might be heard and the equity and right of his controversy established. This is in exact conformity with the long established practice in the City of Baltimore with reference to suits brought before a magistrate, other than the one of the ward in which the defendant resided. In such cases the right of appeal existed equally with the present case, but the existence of that right ⁶³¹ has never been construed to take away from a defendant his statutory right to have such a case removed for trial before the justice of the ward or election district of the defendant, and the writ of mandamus has been not infrequently resorted to, and allowed to enforce this statutory right of removal.

If, therefore, Chapter 823 of the Acts of 1912 was valid legislation, the petitioner was entitled to the issuance of the writ; if invalid, the respondent, Janies Hewes, was right in his refusal to grant the application for removal, and the petition for the writ of mandamus was properly dismissed. This leads to a consideration of the Act of 1912, the validity of which is attacked as being in contravention of the Constitution of the State. The first objection which is made to this Act relates to the title, which is claimed to be in conflict, with the provisions of section 29 of Article TIT of the Constitution. ' This section requires that “every law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but one subject, and that shall be described in its title”; and it is insisted that the present Act is not sufficiently descriptive of the contents of the Act itself. This objection is one which is frequently made when the constitutionality of an Act of the Legislature is called in question.

In the. case of the County Commissioners of Calvert County v. Hellen, 72 Md. 603 , this Court had under consideration an Act the title of which was “An Act to create a Treasurer for Calvert. County, and to provide for the collection of taxes therein.” In the body of the Act provision was made that the treasurer might appoint a deputy and pay him a salary, and the contention was that this not having appeared in the title, it was defective and void under the constitutional requirement, but the contention was not sustained. The rule by which to test the sufficiency of a title is stated in Bond v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 116 Md. 683 , as follows: “It (the provision of the Constitution) has been invariably held to mean that the title shall sufficiently describe the subject-matter of the legislation, but that it need not give an abstract ⁶³² of the Act.” See also Worcester Co. v. School Commissioners, 113 Md. 309 ; Phinney v. Sheppard, 88 Md. 637 , Mealey v. Hagerstown, 92 Md. 744 . In Devery v. Coler, 173 N. Y. 103 , the rule was stated in this way: “It is sufficient if the title expresses substantially the subject.

It is not necessary that the most perfect expression should be adopted. The object of the requirement of the Constitution is that legislators and the public may be informed by the title of the general nature of the provisions proposed to be enacted, and to prevent deception.” In this case the title of the Act apprised both the members of the Legislature and the public that a number of sections relating to justices of the peace and constables in the City of Baltimore were proposed to be repealed, and that some of them at least were to be -re-enacted with amendments, and three additional sections were to be added. That was sufficient to put anyone who was interested in the subject-matter upon inquiry, and there was nothing which could mislead as to the main object of the Act. Every objection which can be urged against this Act on the ground of supposed defect in the title was urged against the validity of a somewhat similar Act, Chapter 117 of the Acts of 1900, relating to justices of the peace in Baltimore County.

That Act was before this Court in the case of Herbert v. Baltimore County, 97 Md. 639 , and the Act was sustained, and so far as the present contention rests upon objection to the title of the Act, it must be regarded as conclusively settled by the Herbert case. The next objection to the validity of the act under consideration is a discrepancy between the title and the enacting clause of the first section. • That clause reads as follows: “Sectiou 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland, That section 629 of Article TV. of the Code of Public Local Laws of Maryland, title “City of Baltimore,” sub-title “Justices of the Peace and Constables,” be and the same is hereby repealed and re-enacted so as to read as follows :” ⁶³³ The discrepancy first appearing is that by the title, section 629 is said to be repealed, while by the enacting clause it is declared to be repealed and re-enacted. This presents a condition very similar to that before this Court in Stiefel v. Maryland Institution, 61 Md. 144 , where the title of an act was to repeal only while in the act itself there was contained a second section which enacted new and affirmative legislation.

In the present case the title of the act is to repeal section 629. but it does not stop the?’e as did the act considered in the Stiefel Case, but names certain additional sections, said to deal with the same general subject-matter, which are said to be repealed and re-enacted, thus giving notice that the act was not a repealing one merely, but that it did contain affirmative enactments relating to justices of the peace. Jf then the body of the act be examined to ascertain what the affirmative action proposed was, the following condition is disclosed: There is no provision in any way akin to the matter contained in the section 629 said to be repealed, and which section read: “Each of the justices of the peace appointed for any legislative district shall keep his office within the limits of the legislative district for which he may have been appointed, except as provided in the succeeding section.” It is, therefore, evident that the legislative purpose was, as set forth in the title, to repeal section 629 entirely. The remaining sections named in the title were 206, which dealt only with constables and which will be considered separately later, and 623, 624, 625, 627, 628 and 648, which related both to justices of the peace and constables. None of these sections were mentioned in the enacting clause, but in the body of the act we find provisions fully covering the subject-matter contained in each and all of these sections.

It is further to be observed in the reading of the act that while there is a section 1 and sections 3 and 4, there is no section bearing the number 2. That there was an ei*ror committed in copying the bill, either when it was being enrolled or engrossed seems probable, the error consisting in the omis ⁶³⁴ sion of the section number and the enacting words in what had been a second section, and the addition to the first section of the words, “and re-enacted to read as follows.” That such was the real state of the facts is apparent in the following manner. At the April Term of this Court there was argued the case of Little v. Schul, 118 Md. 454 . The printed volume of the Acts of 1912 had not appeared at the time of that argument, but there was included in the record in that case what purported and was agreed by counsel to be a copy of the Act now before us, and it was accepted as such by this Court in that case, though the act was not deemed material to the decision of it.

In that supposed copy the first section of the act was a repeal of section 629 and nothing further, then followed a section 2 in which sections 623, 624, 625, 627, 628 and 648 were repealed and re-enacted exactly as set forth in the title of the act. For a proper consideration of the case, it is necessary to divide it into two parts, one the provisions relating to justices of the peace, the other those dealing with constables. As to justices of the peace: The discrepancies between the title of the act and the enacting clause being as pointed out, the first question for determination is, how far can the title of an act be looked n for the purpose of helping out the b 'dv of it. Undoubtedly the earlier cases, and particularly the English cases, held that the title was no part of the act, and therefore couhi not be regaided at all.

The other extreme view is that j-epissented by the case of Wilcoxon v. City of Bluffton, 153 Ind. 267 , which held that a constitutional provision that the subject of every act shall be expressed in the title, operated to make the title a part of the act itself. The rule adopted in kiaryk-md in the case of the Canal Co. v. The R. R. Co., 4 G. & J. 90 , and adhered to consistently ever since, is thnc given in n.y/7? erland on Statutory Construction sec. 410, taken from the leading case of Nazro v. Insurance Co., 14 Wis. 295 , that “legislative enactments are not to be defeated on ⁶³⁵ account of mistakes, errors or omissions, provided the intent of the legislature can be collected from the whole statute. If a mistake in the act of the legislature renders the intention doubtful, the Courts may look to the title and preamble, as well as the body of the act for assistance in determining such intention.” See also, 26 Am. & Eng. Ency. 629, Henderson v. Md. Home Ins.

Co., 90 Md 47; State v. Archer, 73 Md. 61. That there was an error committed and what that error was is perfectly apparent, but it is equally clear from a reading of the body of the act what was intended to be accomplished by it. To permit a mistake of this nature to defeat a clearly expressed purpose of the legislative body would be to set the letter above the spirit of an enactment, and to put a premium upon tampering with a measure while on its course through the Legislature. The section numbers prefixed to the paragraphs of an act are no vital part of the act itself.

Standing alone, they impart neither force, meaning or vitality to a measure, and while of convenience for the purpose of orderly arrangement, or to facilitate the finding of a particular provision, they are not so essential that their omission or transposition ought to be permitted to set aside completely provisions in themselves clear and unambiguous. Wilson v. Spaulding, 19 Fed. 304 . What has just been said is equally applicable to the apparent omission of an enacting clause for a second section of the act. Instances of similar omissions have occurred several times in this State.

In McPherson v. Leonard, 29 Md. 377, the words “by the General Assembly of Maryland” were omitted from an enacting clause, but the omission was held not to invalidate the act. A like omission was before this Court in County Commissioners v. Railroad Co., 113 Md. 182 , and in the Postal Tel. Co. v. State, 110 Md. 611 , the enacting clause of the act under consideration read, “Be it enactced by the people of the State of Maryland represented in the General Assembly,” but in each instance the act was sustained. It was for a time supposed that the rule laid down in McPherson v. Leonard, Supra, had been modified, if not overruled ⁶³⁶ by the decision in Archer v. State, 74 Md. 449 , the opinion of the Court being written by Judge Milled, biit that such was not its effect is conclusively shown in the two subsequent cases above cited, in opinions written by Chiee Justice BbYD and Judge Thomas, respectively.

In the present case, the several paragraphs to which are prefixed various numerals, might be construed to take the place of the single section declared to have been repealed and re-enacted in the enacting clause, and inasmuch as the fourth section of the act repeals all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with the act then passed, no confusion would result. We come now to consider the alleged grounds of unconstitutionality of the Act of 1912 other than those relating to the title and the enacting clause. Foremost among these is the objection that if the proposed Act is permitted to •stand it will operate to create classes among the Justices of the Peace by providing for some a salary of $10 per annum, for others a salary of $2,100 per annum, and for one other of $2,500 per annum. This is not the first time when distinctions have been drawn in the compensation provided by the General Assembly to be paid to Magistrates.

Many years ago the Legislature provided for the designation by the Governor from among the Magistrates appointed by him, and confirmed by the Senate, of a certain number to sit at the station houses in the City of Baltimore, and that those thus selected should be paid a salary of $125 per month, while the compensation of the rest of the justices was dependent on fees; this created a distinction of the very nature now complained of, yet it was universally accepted and acquiesced in. In 1900 the Legislature, by Chapter 147, provided for a like designation, by the Governor from among the Magistrates appointed for Baltimore County, of certain ones to sit at the station houses, and provided that they should receive for services rendered in criminal cases a sum not exceeding $40 per month, and that other justices in the county should not be entitled to receive more than $10 per month for any services which they might render in criminal cases. This ⁶³⁷ distinction so drawn was attacked as in violation of the Constitution, but was upheld in the case of Herbert v. Balto. Co., supra, and in 1904 the Legislature by Chap. 521, provided in the City of Baltimore for an additional justice of the peace, at large, to be known as the “Magistrate for Juvenile Causes,” gave to such justice the power to appoint a clerk, conferred upon him exclusive jurisdiction in certain classes of cases and provided that he should be paid a salary of $2,500 per annum; and the validity of the Act of the Legislature in so doing has never been called in question.

In view of these several, successive, similar Acts and the decision before cited, this Court can not at this time, under the facts as they appear in this case, set aside the Act of the Legislature in question upon the ground of the creation of classes by the making of different bases of compensation. It will hardly be questioned that it was competent for the General Assembly to provide for the remuneration of justices upon either a fee basis, or by way of definite salaries, and such being the case it is difficult to see any constitutional objection to the power of the Legislature to change from one method of compensation to the other. But it is urged that when the Act which seeks to make the change provides a salary of $2,100 for a few and $10 per annum for the great majority, it is for the purpose of driving out from the justices all but the favored few, and that as this can not be done directly, neither can it be done by indirection. The case of the People v. Howland, 155 N. Y. 270 , strongly sustains this view, though that case was decided by a bare majority of the Court, and so eminent a jurist as Chief Justice Parker dissented from the conclusion reached by the majority.

An Act of the Kansas Legislature was far more drastic than the one now before us. Tt took from justices of the peace jurisdiction in all suits where the amount involved was in excess of one dollar, and the constitutionality of the Act was attacked on the same ground as that now under consideration, viz, that it amounted to virtually an abolition of the' office, which as an office recognized by the Constitution, the Legislature had no power ⁶³⁸ to do. But the Act was sustained, the Court saying, “That while little more than the name remained to the' office, yet inasmuch as it was not abolished, the Act was valid because it was left by the Constitution to the Legislature to define the powers and duties of justices.” In re Greer, 58 Kan. 268 . The opinion in the case of The People v. Howland, supra, can not therefore be regarded as necessarily controlling of this case.

Moreover, the Act of 1912, Chapter 823, does not restrict the compensation of justices to the salary of $10 per annum, but expressly gives them “the right to . charge and retain all fees arising from the taking of acknowledgments and affidavits.” It is argued that the Constitution has been violated by the Act of the Legislature now under consideration in that it provides for the appointment of magistrates at large, whereas, the constitutional provision is, “That the Governor by and with the advice and consent of the Senate shall appoint such number of justices of the peace * * * for * * * the several wards of the City of Baltimore as are now or may hereafter be prescribed by law,” and that therefore, there can be no appointment unless it be an appointment for a definite ward. Possibly some little light may be thrown on this contention by reviewing very briefly, the history of the appointment of magistrates. Under the Constitution of 1776, Article 48, it was provided that, “The Governor for the time being with the advice and consént of the Council may appoint the Chancellor and all judges and justices * * * and all other civil officers of government,” but prescribed no number, even inferentially or for what territory they should act, or from or for what political sub-division they should be appointed. The General Assembly by an Act passed in June 1777, Chapter 12, prescribed the jurisdiction of justices as to amount, and laid, down the method of their procedure.

By its terms the Act was to be effective for three years, but it was continued in force by successive Acts down until 1835. By Chapter 201 of the Acts of the General Assembly of that year, there' was provision made ⁶³⁹ for a Justices’ Court, under which they were styled “District Judges” were vested when not sitting as a Court with all the powers,