Levin v. Levin

Parke, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The amended bill of complaint of Esther Levin against her husband, Louis Levin, and Nathan Levin, his son by a former marriage, was demurred to by the defendants, and the demurrer was sustained by the chancellor, and the bill of complaint dismissed. The appeal of the plaintiff presents for consideration these facts. The plaintiff married Louis Levin on September 10th, 1929, and they separated about ⁴⁵² July 1st, 1932, because of the cruelty of the husband.

On August 4th, 1932, suit was begun by the wife against the husband for divorce a mema et thoro, alimony, and counsel fee. The decree was entered on May 11th, 1933, divorcing a mema et thoro the plaintiff from her husband, and awarding to the plaintiff as permanent alimony the sum of ten dollars a week and $300 as counsel fees, and the costs. The husband declined to pay the allowance for counsel fees, and has paid the alimony in part, and to- this extent only after the plaintiff had presented his failure to the court and obtained the aid of its process. Within six or seven days after the separation of the spouses, the husband, who knew that his wife was about to institute proceedings against him either for a divorce a mema et thorn or for separate maintenance and support, as she actually did on August 4th, 1932, granted unto his son, Nathan Levin, the unencumbered leasehold interest of the said husband in an improved lot of land in Baltimore City, which is subject to an annual ground rent of seventy dollars, and which the husband occupies as his home.

The bill of complaint further alleges that the grant was without valid consideration, and divested the grantor of all bis property; that the grantee had full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances of the separation of his father and the plaintiff; that the grant by the father was fraudulent and in prejudice of the marital rights of his wife, and that her stepson accepted the grant to- him purely for the purpose of prejudicing and defrauding the wife of her marital rights in her husband’s estate-,' and with the knowledge that the assignment was fraudulent, and made solely for the purpose of hindering and delaying the- wife in asserting her right to maintenance and support from her husband. Upon these allegations, which were .admitted by the demurrer, the plaintiff prayed for the annulment of the deed from the father to- the son, and an injunction against the grant or incumbrance of the leasehold interest pending the proceedings; and for general relief. ⁴⁵³ A decree for alimony is a debt within the meaning of the statute of Stat. 13 Elizabeth, chapter 5, which relates to the setting aside of conveyances in fraud of creditors; and is dearly within the scope of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, Code, art. 39B. Feigley v. Feigley, 7 Md. 537, 561 ; Livermore v. Boutelle, 11 Gray (Mass.) 217 ; Code, art. 39B, Secs. 1, 6-7, 10, 11. So, a conveyance made by the husband in anticipation of the wife’s proceedings for divorce, or for alimony without divorce, and to' prevent her from obtaining alimony, is fraudulent, and may be set aside unless the purchaser took in good faith, without notice; and for value.

Code, art. 39B, secs. 1, 10; Feigley v. Feigley, 7 Md. 537, 561-562 . See Sanborn v. Lang, 41 Md. 107, 113, 114 ; Collins v. Collins, 98 Md.