Lewis v. Accelerated Transport-Pony Express, Inc.

Prescott, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a judgment n.o.v. in favor of the appellee, defendant below, after a verdict had been found by the jury for the appellant-plaintiff. The action was for slander and a verdict was returned against the appellee and its employee, who was alleged to have spoken the slanderous words. Because of errors in its instructions to the jury, the court, of its own volition, ordered that the verdicts be stricken and a new trial granted.

The appellee, alone, filed a motion for a judgment n.o.v., and the court, having reserved its decision on a motion by the appellee for a directed verdict ²⁵⁴ (Maryland Rule 563 a 2), entered a judgment n.o.v. in favor of the appellee. From this judgment, the plaintiff below has appealed. In 1956, Robert Broderick was the Safety Supervisor for the appellee, Accelerated Transport-Pony Express, Inc. In July of that year Mr. Broderick called at the place of business of the appellant, Cecil E. Lewis, which is known as “Whitey’s Truck Stop” and is located a few miles from Oakland, Maryland. Lewis at that time had a business arrangement with Broderick’s employer, the appellee, to service equipment owned by that company, store and install truck tires and other related services.

Uncontradicted testimony indicated that Br°derick urged Lewis to enter into a “shakedown” arrangement with him at the expense of Broderick’s employer. When Lewis refused, Broderick threatened reprisals and was able to use his official position with his employer to assist in having Whitey’s Truck Stop placed “off limits” to all of the appellee’s drivers and causing the company to rescind its business arrangement with Lewis. In October, 1956, a driver named Kennedy was accused of having stopped at Whitey’s Truck Stop in violation of the “off limits” order of the company. For this violation of rules, he was given a suspension.

The other drivers, thinking the length of the suspension was unwarranted, indicated they were not “going out” that night and were going to stage a protest meeting. J. Edward Davey, President of the appellee, and his Director of Operations invited the drivers into Mr. Davey’s office. According to the testimony, Broderick came in after the meeting had started. Witnesses place him at various places in the room but all agree that his remarks were heard generally throughout the gathering.

Between 50 and 80 drivers attended the meeting. It was called by Davey primarily to persuade the men to “go out” that night on their respective trips. The main grievance that was holding up the normal operations of the company was the suspension of Kennedy. During the course of the discussion, someone asked why Whitey’s Truck Stop was “off limits,” and Broderick loudly stated that it was “nothing but a whore-house.” The president of the appellee admitted hear ²⁵⁵ ing the remark, but made no effort to repudiate or contradict it.

The parties concede that the words are slanderous per se. The granting of the appellee’s motion for a judgment n.o.v. was, in effect, a granting of its previous motion for a directed verdict; hence it is our duty to determine whether the evidence and the reasonable and proper inferences to be drawn therefrom were sufficient to require the submission to the jury of the issue as to whether Broderick was acting within the scope of his employment at the time the slanderous words were uttered by him. It will be unnecessary here to discuss the ancient law, when, because of the lack of body, mind or soul, it was held that a corporation was incapable of committing a tort or a crime. This old doctrine has been completely repudiated in modern jurisprudence.

In Hopkins C. Co. v. Read Drug & C. Co., 124 Md. 210 , 92 A. 478 , this Court stated that a corporation is liable for the slanderous words of its employees if such words were acts within the scope of the employee’s employment. In that case, the Court, quoting with approval from the case of Sawyer v. Railroad, 142 N. C. 1 , 54 S. E. 793 , said: “The simple test is whether they were acts within the scope of his employment; not whether they were done while prosecuting the master’s business, but whether they were done by the servant in furtherance thereof, and were such as may fairly be said to have