Lewis v. Clark

Roberts, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This suit is brought to recover a balance of rent claimed to be due from the appellant to the appellees under a lease signed and sealed by the said parties. On the 6th of June, 1894, the appellees let to the appellant their property, known as Arnvoir, in Baltimore County, for a period beginning June 6th, 1894, and ending April 30th, 1895, for four hundred dollars, payable one hundred dollars in advance, and the balance in monthly or three equal instalments, of which rent three hundred dollars is claimed to be still due and unpaid. The lease provides that whatever alterations or repairs the tenant shall be permitted to make shall be done at his own expense.

The declaration contains but one count, which is a special count on the lease. The pleas are : 1st, fraud in the procuring of the lease ; 2nd, eviction; 3rd, release ; 4th, that the defendant was compelled to remove from the premises by reason of their unhealthy and untenantable condition at the time of the execution of the lease, known to the appellees and unknown to the appellant. At the healing in this Court, but little attention, if any, was paid to the defences set up of an eviction and a release, and from a careful examination of the testimony contained in the record, we have failed to discover any evidence in support of either of said pleas. The only questions which the controversy presents relate, first, to the manner in which the lease was procured; and second, to the condition of the premises, at the time the lease was made, whether untenantable and unhealthy and known to the appellees, but unknown to the appellant.

The appellant after having rented said premises from the appellees, in June, 1894, voluntarily removed therefrom in August of the same year, before the expiration of his term, without the consent of the appellees, ³³⁰ and refused to pay rent for the balance of the term. The reasons assigned for such refusal were that the water gave out, and for sometime prior thereto was unfit to drink or wash with, and that he had executed the lease relying on the representations of the appellees that the water was excellent in quality and plentiful in quantity. Before signing the lease, the appellant had gone over the property with one of the appellees, and was fully aware of the fact that it was supplied with water by means of a cistern only, and that the quantity of water in the cistern, at any time, was solely dependent upon the amount of rain falling. The appellees had never occupied the property, having obtained it in the fall of 1893 under an exchange with the former owner.

The statement made by one of the appellees to the appellant as to the quality and quantity of the water, was a mere repetition of what the former owner had said to the appellee, and in making such statement the appellee had made known to the appellant the source of his information. There is but one exception in the record relating to the admissibility of the evidence. The appellees having proved by Mr. Clark the execution of the lease, and the amount of rent paid, rested their case, whereupon the appellant proceeded to cross-examine the witness by asking him to state the conversation which had taken place between the appellant and witness prior to the execution of the lease, with reference to the property therein mentioned, but the appellees objected to the admissibility of the same, and the Court sustained the objection and refused to allow the question to be answered. It is very clear that it was not a proper cross-examination of the witness and we agree with the appellant’s statement on his brief, that “ the exception is not very material.” The second exception relates to the granting of all of the prayers of the appellees and the rejection of all of the appellant’s prayers.

The appellees’ prayers presented the law of the case very fully as