Lewis v. Rippons

Smith, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. We shall here affirm the determination of a trial judge (Edmondson, J.) in the Circuit Court for Dorchester County relative to a land dispute. Appellee, Chandus T. Rippons (Rippons), invoked the provisions of Maryland Code (1974) § 14-108, Real Property Article, and brought a bill of complaint against appellants, Leon E. Lewis, Sr., et ux. (Lewis), to quiet title.

The chancellor decreed that Rippons “has absolute ownership of all that property described in a deed to [him] from James Ira Johnson, Sheriff, dated May 3, 1973 and recorded among the Land Records of Dorchester County, Maryland, in Liber P.L.C. No. 179, folio 354, and that he has the complete right of disposition thereof____” We granted certiorari prior to consideration by the Court of Special Appeals of Lewis’ appeal. The facts will be better understood by reference to the plat which we append and direct the reporter to reproduce. The parties agree that this plat accurately portrays the land situation at the site. Rippons bought Tract 2 as shown on the attached plat at a Dorchester County sheriff’s sale.

Lewis’ predecessor in title purchased what was called Tract 3 at the same sale. That parcel included within its description all of Tract 2. The deed for Tract 3 was recorded first, thus generating this dispute. In April 1941, the former owners of the property here involved acquired what appears as Tract 2 on the plat, a lot described as having a frontage of 200 feet on “the Old Steamboat Wharf Road, leading from the Old Steamboat Wharf to the Samuel M. Simmons Store Property” at ¹⁵⁷ Hoopersville on Middle Hooper’s Island in Dorchester County.

The same parties later purchased from the same grantor an additional 115 feet south of what was known “as the ‘Sail Loft’ property,” in December 1943. It will be noted that the designation “Sail Loft” appears on the plat on the parcel immediately north of Tract 3. A son of one of the grantees in the first deed said this additional land was procured because a warehouse was needed for the adjoining canning house located on Tract 2. The description used in this second deed called for a frontage of 315 feet on the county road.

It thus embraced within its metes and bounds all of the land described in the original conveyance plus the additional 115 feet. Just why the deed was drawn in this manner we do not know, but this same son speculated at the trial below that the grantees desired that all their adjoining land be described in one deed. This statement has a familiar ring to those who have drawn conveyances for some unsophisticated buyers or sellers in this State and have found such people under the impression that “a deed” is maintained for their land at the courthouse of their county in such manner that it is necessary to have a new deed drawn as one adds to or subtracts from his adjoining landholdings so that the new deed will reflect the total land then owned and its proper description. 1 In 1954 the partners to whom the 1941 and 1943 conveyances had been made transferred these two lots and other land to a corporation. Tract 2 in that deed was described as it appears on the attached plat, and referred to the original 1941 conveyance to the partnership.

Tract 3 referred to the 1943 conveyance and described it as it was set forth in that deed. However, the 1954 document first referred to the 1943 deed and then said: “wherein the lands herein sought to be granted and conveyed as Tract No. 3 of this deed are more ¹⁵⁸ particularly described as follows, (including within the lines of said description all of the above described Tract No. 2 of this deed),” before going on to describe the land. Receivers for the corporate grantee of the 1954 deed conveyed the land in 1957 to yet another corporation. It purported to grant Tracts 2, 3, 4, and 5 from the 1954 deed, referring to the tracts, as is the usual Dorchester County practice, by the numbers of the prior deed.

Tract 2 was again described as it appears on the attached plat, and as it was described in the 1941 instrument. Tract 3 was similarly described in the language of the 1943 conveyance, except for the addition of the reference used in 1954 to the fact that Tract 3 included within its metes and bounds the land described as Tract 2. The grantee of the 1957 deed became indebted to the State of Maryland. In due season a writ of fieri facias was directed to the Sheriff of Dorchester County for the purpose of satisfying that indebtedness.

He seized and sold what appears as Tracts 2, 3, 4, and 5 on the attached plat. The description used in the advertisement of sale was that used in the 1957 deed, including as to Tract 3 the statement that there was included “within the lines of said description all of the [previously] described Tract No. 2____” Sale was held at the Dorchester County Courthouse on March 13, 1968. Rippons and Lewis were present. Rippons purchased Tract No. 2.

Mr. Lewis bid on Tracts 2 and 3. Tract 2 sold for $5,000. Lewis’ immediate predecessor in title purchased Tract 3 for $1,350. Rippons explained this difference in the selling price between the two parcels by pointing out that Tract 2 had a deep well and a septic system which could be used.

It also had a bulkhead in front of it. As he put it, “You could erect a new building there without too much trouble.” He added that this was his “purpose in buying it.” Tract 3 had none of these advantages. Rippons claimed that immediately after his purchase at the sale he was approached by Mr. Lewis, who owned adjoining property. Lewis asked if he were obliged to move poles which he had placed upon Tract 2 and was informed in the negative.

The purchase price in each instance was paid to the Sheriff on the day of sale. On April 3, 1968, ¹⁵⁹ the Sheriff of Dorchester County conveyed Tract 3 to its purchaser by the same metes and bounds description which had been used from the time of the 1943 conveyance, but without explicit reference to the fact that it included within its lines all of Tract 2. Lewis acquired Tract 3 in 1972 from Oliver Harding and wife, the purchasers at the sheriffs sale. The same metes and bounds description was used, again without the reference to the fact that Tract 2 was embraced within Tract 3.

Rippons did not obtain a deed from the Sheriff until May 1973. He explained this delay as having been caused by his desire to have Tract 2 and Tract 4 included in the same deed and his difficulty in identifying the location of a former steamboat wharf on Tract 4. Lewis is now claiming all of Tract 2. There is a dispute as to the order in which the land was sold.

Lewis and his witnesses testified that the sale was made in inverse order, beginning with Tract 5 and ending with Tract 2. Rippons and his witnesses, including the original purchaser of Tract 3, said that Tract 2 was sold first, followed by Tract 3, etc. The Sheriff of Dorchester County testified to this order of sale, referring to his notes which he said were made at the time and which substantiated the order of sale. The chancellor said relative to this: “[T]he Court finds that from the evidence that it’s heard that the property was sold as it was advertised. We have had an abundance of testimony; we had the Sheriff’s notes taken at the time of the sale, and I never saw a sale yet sold in reverse order.

And if there is any question as to how it was sold, everyone is relying on memory except the Sheriff. His notes show that the property was sold in numerical order, two, three, four and five.” Harding and the Sheriff testified that they visited Hooper’s Island after the sale, at which time the Sheriff pointed to the area which is labeled on the plat as Tract 3, having a frontage of 115 feet on the road, as the land actually sold to Harding. The Sheriff said the purchaser “had some knowledge of what he was going to buy,” and that he showed Tract 3 to Harding ¹⁶⁰ as “being between the canning house and what is called the Sail Loft property of Mr. Leon Lewis.” He further said that Harding “walked it off.” The Sheriff thought Harding“came up with something like 115 or 120 feet” as the road frontage. Tract 2 had had a canning house on it which at some time prior to the sale had been partially destroyed by fire.

Harding said specifically that “[t]o [his] knowledge [he] didn’t buy any part thereof.” On cross-examination it was pointed out to Mr. Lewis that Tract No. 3 sold for $1,350 and Tract No. 2, which he was then claiming as having been included within Tract No. 3, sold at $5,000. He was then asked why he did not bid higher on Tract 3, which was purchased by Harding, not Mr. Lewis. He replied: “I had gone as far that time as I wanted in any of it, and I knew there was something wrong with the deed to start with. You couldn’t sell the property twice.

In fact, I told the Sheriff he couldn’t sell it twice, but it was sold twice.” Lewis also adduced testimony from another individual to the effect that the witness protested to the Sheriff the fact that Tract 2 was being sold twice. The chancellor held that “what Mr. Lewis owns is 115 feet on the road and about 250 feet to the river ... and what Mr. Rippons owns is the canning house property, running north up the road 200 feet and east to the river approximately 250 feet, which is the land described as tract number two in the advertisement of sale.” Under Maryland Rule 886 “the judgment of the lower court will not be set aside on the evidence unless clearly erroneous and due regard will be given to the opportunity of the lower court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” There obviously was ample testimony here, if believed, to support the conclusion of the trial judge that Tract 2 was sold prior to Tract 3. It thus follows that the chancellor’s determination as to the order of sale was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we shall proceed in our consideration of the case upon the premise that Tract 2 was sold first. ¹⁶¹ Lewis’ sole contention to us is that since the deed from the Sheriff for Tract 8 was recorded first, it “conveys land therein described and defeats title to the same land as described in a subsequent deed.” The present statute relative to priority of first recorded deeds is Code (1974) § 3-203, Real Property Article.

It became effective July 1,1974. But for stylistic changes, it is the same as its predecessor, Code (1957, 1973 Repl. Vol.) Art. 21, § 3-203, which took effect on January 1, 1973. The latter statute is virtually the same as