Lewis v. State

RAKER, Judge. Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 1997 Supp.), Article 27, § 286(f) 1 prohibits, inter alia, the possession with the intent to distribute 50 or more grams of crack cocaine. The penalty provision of § 286(f) states: (3)(i) A person convicted of violating paragraph (1) of this subsection is guilty of a felony and shall be sentenced as otherwise provided for in this section, except that it is mandatory upon the court to impose no less than 5 years’ ⁶⁵¹ imprisonment, and neither that term of imprisonment nor any part of it may be suspended. (ii) The person may not be eligible for parole---- The issue presented for decision in this case is whether the limitation on parole eligibility expressed in § 286(f)(3)(ii) applies only to the 5 year minimum term of imprisonment the trial court must impose, or whether that prohibition against parole applies to the entire sentence imposed.

We conclude that the General Assembly clearly intended the limitation on parole eligibility to apply only to the minimum term of imprisonment which the trial court must impose. Accordingly, we shall hold that the parole prohibition of § 286(f)(3)(ii) applies only to the mandatory, minimum 5 year period of incarceration. I. During the evening of February 6, 1996, law enforcement agents from the Kent County Narcotics Task Force, the Kent County Sheriffs Office, the Chestertown Police Department, and the Maryland State Police executed two search warrants simultaneously at separate residences in Chestertown, Maryland. From one of the homes searched, the agents seized 211.2 grams of crack cocaine.

Petitioner Richard Lewis later admitted that the cocaine seized belonged to him. On February 23, 1996, the Grand Jury for Kent County indicted Lewis on the following charges: unlawfully acting as a drug kingpin in a conspiracy to distribute a controlled dangerous substance in violation of § 286(g), possession of 50 or more grams of crack cocaine with an intent to distribute that substance in violation of § 286(f), possession of cocaine with an intent to distribute that substance in contravention of § 286(a)(1), possession of cocaine with an intent to distribute that substance in a drug-free school zone in violation of § 286D, and simple possession of cocaine in violation of § 287(a). At a bench trial in the Circuit Court for Kent County on May 20, 1996, the trial court found Lewis guilty on all five counts. The court sentenced Lewis to: 20 years, ⁶⁵² without the possibility of parole, for violating § 286(g); a concurrent 20 year term of imprisonment, without the possibility of parole, for violating § 286(f); and a consecutive 5 year term of incarceration for violating § 286D.

For sentencing purposes, the trial court merged Lewis’s convictions for possession of cocaine and possession of cocaine with an intent to distribute that substance into his conviction for possession of 50 or more grams of cocaine with an intent to distribute that substance. Lewis noted a timely appeal. Before the Court of Special Appeals, Lewis argued, inter alia, that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence pursuant to his conviction for violating § 286(f). Rejecting that argument, the intermediate appellate court affirmed both of Lewis’s convictions and his sentence in an unreported opinion.

This Court then granted Lewis’s petition for writ of certiorari to address that issue.

II

The State argues that by its plain terms, § 286(f)(3) bars parole for Lewis’s entire 20 year term of imprisonment. The State reasons that subparagraph (3)(ii) unambiguously states that “[t]he person may not be eligible for parole.” Therefore, the parole limitation applies to the entire duration of any sentence imposed. The State distinguishes prior cases, which construed similar language in a contrary manner, by noting that § 286(f) is structured differently than the statutes we have previously interpreted. Specifically, the State contends that the parole limitation of § 286(f)(3)(h) is offset as a discrete subparagraph, whereas previously construed provisions limiting parole were written in such a way as to render their application ambiguous.

Hence, the State argues, the wording of § 286(f)(3)(h) clearly and unambiguously extends the limitation on parole under § 286(f) to the entire sentence imposed by the trial court. Conversely, Lewis notes that in two prior cases, this Court has found language similar to that of § 286(f)(3) to be ambiguous. Lewis argues that any minor stylistic differences be ⁶⁵³ tween § 286(f)(3)(ii) and the similar statutory provisions previously construed do not signify that the General Assembly intended those provisions to be interpreted differently. Thus, § 286(f)(3) is ambiguous, and the rule of lenity applies.

In addition, Lewis contends that if the Legislature had intended § 286(f)(3) to mean “not less than five nor more than twenty years without the possibility of parole,” it would have said expressly that, given the fact that the General Assembly used precisely that language in simultaneously enacting § 286(g).

III

In construing a legislative enactment, the paramount objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Harris v. State, 344 Md. 497, 510 , 687 A.2d 970, 976 , cert. denied sub nom. Koenig v. Maryland, — U.S. —, 118 S.Ct. 605 , 139 L.Ed.2d 492 (1997); Tapscott v. State, 343 Md. 650, 657 , 684 A.2d 439, 442 (1996); Frazier v. Warfield, 13 Md. 279, 301 (1859). To discern legislative intent, we look first to the language of the statute, giving those words their ordinary and natural meaning.

Gardner v. State, 344 Md. 642, 647-48 , 689 A.2d 610, 612-13 (1997). When the plain meaning of the language is clear and unambiguous, and consistent with both the broad purposes of the legislation, and the specific purpose of the provision being interpreted, our inquiry is at an end. Philip Electronics v. Wright, 348 Md. 209, 216-17 , 703 A.2d 150, 153 (1997); Frank v. Baltimore County, 284 Md. 655, 661 , 399 A.2d 250, 254 (1979). If, however, the meaning of the plain language is ambiguous or unclear, we seek to discern legislative intent from surrounding circumstances, such as legislative history, prior case law, and the purposes upon which the statutory framework was based.

Haupt v. State, 340 Md. 462, 471 , 667 A.2d 179, 183 (1995). As we recently observed in Greco v. State, 347 Md. 423, 429 , 701 A.2d 419, 421 (1997), in the context of statutory construction, “ambiguity” is most accurately defined as “reasonably capable of more than one meaning.” ⁶⁵⁴ When the words of a statutory provision are reasonably capable of more than one meaning, and we examine the circumstances surrounding the enactment of a legislative provision in an effort to discern legislative intent, we interpret the meaning and effect of the language in light of the objectives and purposes of the provision enacted. Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 435 , 639 A.2d 675, 678 (1994); see Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513-16 , 525 A.2d 628, 632-33 (1987). Such an interpretation must be reasonable and consonant with logic and common sense.

Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 56 , 673 A.2d 221, 229 (1996). In addition, we seek to avoid construing a statute in a manner that leads to an illogical or untenable outcome. Greco, 347 Md. at 429 , 701 A.2d at 422 ; Fraternal Order of Police v. Mehrling, 343 Md. 155, 174 , 680 A.2d 1052, 1062 (1996). Bearing these principles in mind, we turn now to the statutory provision at issue in this case.

IV

As set forth below, we initially agree with Lewis that the plain language of § 286(f)(3) is ambiguous with respect to the issue in this case. Yet, our further examination of the legislative history and circumstances surrounding the enactment of § 286(f) convinces us that the General Assembly intended the parole limitation of that subsection to apply only to the mandatory, minimum period of incarceration which may not be suspended. A. Section 286 of Article 27 provides multiple penalties for, inter alia, the possession of a controlled dangerous substance in sufficient quantity to reasonably indicate an intent to distribute that substance. Under the statutory framework, a person convicted of that offense faces varying degrees of punishment based upon the quantity and nature of the illegal substance possessed, or based upon the prior criminal history of that offender. ⁶⁵⁵ Subsection (a) of § 286 codifies the offense of possession of a controlled dangerous substance with the intent to distribute that substance, and § 286(b) provides the garden variety penalty for violating § 286(a).

Subsections (c), (d), and (e) of § 286, which we have previously referred to as the “two-time loser,” “three-time loser,” and “four-time loser” provisions of § 286, form a comprehensive scheme of graduated mandatory punishment for repeat violators of the statute. See Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 440-41 , 639 A.2d 675, 680-81 (1994). Subsection (f) of § 286, at issue here, provides, inter alia, an enhanced, mandatory penalty upon conviction for possession with the intent to distribute 50 or more grams of cocaine base, commonly known as “crack.” Also relevant in this case, Maryland’s “drug kingpin” prohibition, codified as § 286(g), compels the imposition of an enhanced, mandatory penalty when the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt both that an individual possessed with the intent to distribute controlled dangerous substances in the amount proscribed under subsection (f), and that the individual was a coconspirator and occupied the position of an organizer, supervisor, financier, or manager in a conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, dispense, bring into, or transport in the State controlled dangerous substances. The qualification on parole eligibility at issue in this case is codified within the sentencing provision of § 286(f), and reads in pertinent part as follows: (3) (i) A person convicted of violating paragraph (1) of this subsection is guilty of a felony and shall be sentenced as otherwise provided for in this section, except that it is mandatory upon the court to impose no less than 5 years’ imprisonment, and neither that term of imprisonment nor any part of it may be suspended.

(ii) The person may not be eligible for parole.... On two previous occasions, we have construed statutory language similar to the provision at issue in this case, and in both cases we have found the language to be ambiguous. In Malcolm v. State, 314 Md. 221 , 550 A.2d 670 (1988), the ⁶⁵⁶ defendant was convicted of possession with the intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance. The trial judge sentenced Malcolm to twenty years without the possibility of parole for that offense.

Id. at 225 , 550 A.2d at 672 . In addressing Malcolm’s argument that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence, we interpreted the relevant sentencing provision, then codified as § 286(b)(2) of Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol., 1985 Supp.), Article 27. 2 That provision declared that a person convicted of violating § 286(a) was: guilty of a felony and ... subject to imprisonment for not more than 20 years____ Any person who has previously been convicted under this paragraph shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 10 years. Neither the sentence nor any part of it may be suspended, and the person shall not be eligible for parole.... The Court agreed with Malcolm that this language did not authorize the trial court to impose a limitation on parole eligibility beyond the length of the mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years.

We reasoned that: [T]his language is ambiguous with respect to whether the limitation of eligibility for parole applies only to the mandatory ten year sentence, or may be applied as well to any longer sentence that is imposed. Malcolm, 314 Md. at 234 , 550 A.2d at 676 . Because the provision enhancing the sentence was ambiguous, the Court concluded that this ambiguity must be resolved in favor of