Liddy v. Lamone

BELL, C.J. This is the second of two cases involving the eligibility requirements of a candidate for the office of the Attorney General of Maryland. In Abrams v. Lamone, 398 Md. 146 , 919 A.2d 1223 (2007), this Court considered a petition by Stephen A. Abrams (“Abrams”) 1 challenging the eligibility of Thomas E. Perez (“Perez”) to hold the office of the Attorney General. In Abrams , a case of first impression for this Court, this Court was required to interpret Article V, Section 4 of the Maryland Constitution, which provides: “No person shall be eligible to the office of Attorney-General, who is not a citizen of this State, and a qualified voter therein, and has not resided and practiced Law in this State for at least ten years.” (Emphasis added). Concluding that Perez had not met the eligibility requirements, ie., he had not been a member of the Maryland Bar for ²³⁶ the requisite period, we reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, 398 Md. at 150-51 , 919 A.2d at 1225-26 , which had ruled that Perez met the necessary qualifications to run in the 2006 Gubernatorial Primary Election. 2 The instant challenge was brought by Nikos Stanford Liddy (“Liddy”), the appellant, against Douglas F. Gansler (“Gansler”), one of the appellees, the victor in the September 12, 2006 primary election, thus the Democratic Party’s nominee for the office of the Attorney General.

In addition to Gansler, the appellant also named Linda H. Lamone (“Lamone”), the State Administrator of Elections, and the State Board of Elections (“the State Board”), collectively, the appellees, as defendants. It was filed on October 20, 2006, more than three months after the Abrams suit, almost two months after this Court’s Order in that case, and just 18 days prior to the November 7, 2006 general election. In the complaint, he asserted that Gansler, like Perez, was ineligible to run for the office of the Attorney General, arguing that Gansler has not “practiced Law in this State for at least ten years.” There is, however, a threshold issue which must be addressed, whether the appellant waited too long to bring this action and, thus, is barred, by the equitable doctrine of laches, from bringing it now. 3 We shall hold that this action is barred by laches. ²³⁷ A. As stated earlier, in order for one to run for the office of the Attorney General, one must be qualified to do so. Article Y, § 4 of the Maryland Constitution prescribes those qualifications.

In addition, under the current Election Law Article, see Maryland Code (2003, 2006 Cum.Supp.), §§ 1-101, et seq., a candidate wishing to hold the office of the Attorney General must register his or her candidacy by filing, with the State Board, pursuant to § 5-301(a), 4 a certificate of candidacy, under oath. 5 On June 28, 2006, Gansler filed his certificate of candidacy, in which he certified that he is “a registered voter and a citizen of Maryland and meet[s] all other requirements for the ... office [of the Attorney General].” The State Board accepted Gansler’s certificate and, pursuant to § 5-601(1) 6 of the Election Law Article, placed h is name on the ballot for the 2006 Gubernatorial Primary Election. ²³⁸ The Election Law Article also provides that any registered voter may seek judicial relief if he or she alleges that an “act or omission relating to an election, whether or not the election has been held, is inconsistent with th[e Election Law AJrticle or other law applicable to the elections process and may change or has changed the outcome of the election,” provided that the action is filed “within the earlier of 10 days after the act or omission or the date the act or omission became known to the petitioner or 7 days after the election results are certified, unless the election was a gubernatorial primary or special primary election, in which case 3 days after the election results are certified.” 7 As stated earlier, Liddy brought a challenge to Gansler’s qualifications. He did so on October 20, 2006, when he sought declaratory and injunctive relief against Gansler, Lamone, and the State Board because, he ²³⁹ claimed, Gansler’s legal experience did not satisfy Article V, § 4’s requirement that a candidate for that office “practice[ ] Law in this State for at least ten years.” Gansler filed a Motion to Dismiss Or, In The Alternative, for Summary Judgment, contending that he met all eligibility requirements for the office. Moving to dismiss and expedite scheduling, the other appellees contended that Liddy’s action was barred by limitations and by laches. In support, they alleged that their sole interest in the action was to ensure an orderly administration of the election process, the deadlines of which would be jeopardized if the action were not adjudicated expeditiously. 8 Following a hearing at which it heard extensive testimony pertaining to the merits of Gansler’s constitutional eligibility for the office of the Attorney General, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County denied the dispositive motions filed by the appellees and Gansler. 9 Although the Circuit Court ad ²⁴⁰ dressed, in addition to laches, the issues of the applicable statute of limitations and the merits of the case, we will confine our discussion to the equitable doctrine of laches. 10 On the issue of laches, the appellees argued that the appellant’s claim was “an eleventh hour lawsuit that threaten [ed] to disrupt the entire elections machinery, to sew doubt in the minds of voters, to create voter confusion and uncertainty, and generally to defeat voters’ choices.” The appellees maintained “voters ought to be able to make their choice intelligently and based on the ballots that have been created and in accordance with the election law.” The appellees’ paramount concern was the prejudice this action would have on the electorate and its choice of Attorney General candidates.

In addition, they outlined the various procedures which had already taken place, and which were in the process of taking place, and insisted that the appellant’s claim was simply brought too ²⁴¹ close to the general election to allow any changes or alterations to be made. The process was well underway, and to grant the appellant the relief he requested, i.e. the removal of Gansler’s name from the general election ballot, at such a late stage “would lead to an unmanageable disruption of the general election and disenfranchise thousands of voters.” Conversely, the appellant argued that the constitutional issue, the interpretation of Article V, § 4, outweighed any merit found in the laches defense. In rejecting the appellees’ arguments, the Circuit Court, citing Ross v. State Board of Elections, 387 Md. 649, 671 , 876 A.2d 692, 705 (2005), held that application of laches was inappropriate in a situation such as the case sub judice. It determined that Liddy was “not responsible for any inexcusable delay in the processing of his complaint [and found] it inappropriate to allow the general election to go forward without examining whether a candidate who may become this State’s next Attorney General is constitutionally eligible to hold that office.” The court further noted, on the issue of prejudice, that “Mr. Gansler cannot be prejudiced because if, in fact, he does not meet the eligibility requirements, he ought not to be on the ballot.

The Sftate] B[oard of] Ejections] is not prejudiced because it is undisputed that at this late date, there is nothing that can be done to alter the makeup of the ballot for this election.” On the other hand, the court noted that “Plaintiff [Liddy] and similarly situated voters would be prejudiced if an ineligible candidate were to remain on the ballot because of a delay in finding out about the lack of eligibility.” Although the appellant prevailed on the dispositive motions, the Circuit Court ultimately ruled in favor of Gansler and his continued candidacy for the office of the Attorney General. The appellant, pursuant to § 12-203(a) 11 of the Election Law ²⁴² Article, in response, noted an appeal to this Court and to the Court of Special Appeals. In addition, he filed, in this Court, a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which this Court granted. Liddy v. Lamone, 395 Md. 420 , 910 A.2d 1061 (2006).

The appellees and Gansler subsequently filed a Joint Cross-Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Oral argument was heard on November 2, 2006, and, on that same day, the Court issued its Order vacating the judgment of the Circuit Court and remanding the case to that court with directions to dismiss it on the ground of laches. We now set forth the reasons for that Order. B. Laches is one of the affirmative defenses recognized and expressly listed in M d.

Rule 2-323. 12 Generally, it must be pled, but it can be invoked by a court on its own initiative. See, e.g., Ipes v. Board of Fire Comm’rs of Baltimore, 224 Md. ²⁴³ 180, 183, 167 A.2d 337, 339 (1961) (recognizing that laches is a proper ground for refusing to issue a writ of mandamus); Baltimore County v. Glendale Corp., 219 Md. 465, 468 , 150 A.2d 433, 435 (1959) (noting that, although it is essential to raise the defense of laches in the pleadings, “equity may decline relief for a stale claim after the facts are fully developed”); Warburton v. Davis, 123 Md. 225, 231 , 91 A. 163, 165 (1914) (recognizing that a court, in a proper case and on its own motion, may refuse to grant relief to a complainant who on the final hearing appears to have been guilty of laches, although the defense was not interposed by the defendant), citing Syester v. Brewer, 27 Md. 288, 319 (1867). 13 This Court has held that laches “is a defense in equity against stale ²⁴⁴ claims, and is based upon grounds of sound public policy by discouraging fusty demands for the peace of society.” Ross, supra, 387 Md. at 668 , 876 A.2d at 703 , quoting Parker v. Board of Election Supervisors, 230 Md. 126, 130 , 186 A.2d 195, 197 (1962); Buxton v. Buxton, 363 Md. 634, 645 , 770 A.2d 152, 158 (2001); Berman v. Leckner, 193 Md. 177, 187 , 66 A.2d 392, 396 (1949); Kaufman v. Plitt, 191 Md. 24, 28 , 59 A.2d 634, 635 (1948). In its application, “[tjhere is no inflexible rule as to what constitutes, or what does not constitute, laches; hence its existence must be determined by the facts and circumstances of each case.” Ross, 387 Md. at 669 , 876 A.2d at 704 , quoting Parker, 230 Md. at 130 , 186 A.2d at 197 , citing Brashears v. Collison, 207 Md. 339, 352 , 115 A.2d 289, 295 (1955); Bowie v. Ford, 269 Md. 111, 122 , 304 A.2d 803, 810 (1973); Day v. Day, 237 Md. 229, 236 , 205 A.2d 798, 803 (1965). It is, however, well settled that laches “applies when there is an unreasonable delay in the assertion of one’s rights and that delay results in prejudice to the opposing party.” Frederick Road Ltd. Partnership v. Brown & Sturm, 360 Md. 76, 117 , 756 A.2d 963, 985 (2000), citing Inlet Assoc. v. Assateague House Condominium Ass’n, 313 Md. 413, 438-39 , 545 A.2d 1296, 1309 (1988); See Ross, 387 Md. at 669 , 876 A.2d at 704 (“[L]aches must include an unjustifiable delay and some amount of prejudice to the defendant”); Schaeffer v. Anne Arundel County, 338 Md. 75, 83 , 656 A.2d 751, 755 (1995) (“[LJaches is an inexcusable delay, without necessary reference to duration in asserting an equitable claim”) (emphasis in original); Simpers v. Clark, 239 Md. 395, 403 , 211 A.2d 753, 757 (1965) (“[F]or the doctrine [of laches] to be applicable, there must be a showing that the delay [in the assertion of a right] worked a disadvantage to another”); Hungerford v. Hungerford, 223 Md. 316, 320-21 , 164 A.2d 518, 521 (1960) (“Only two requisites are necessary in order to invoke the doctrine of laches.

There must have been some lapse of time during which plaintiff failed to assert his rights, and the lapse must have caused some prejudice to the defendant”). Prejudice is “generally held to be any thing that places- [the defendant] in a less favorable position.” Ross, 387 Md. at 670 , ²⁴⁵ 876 A.2d at 704 , quoting Buxton, 363 Md. at 646 , 770 A.2d at 159 ; Parker, 230 Md. at 130 , 186 A.2d at 197 ; Roberto v. Catino, 140 Md. 38, 43 , 116 A. 873, 875 (1922). Moreover, this Court has recognized that in the context of election matters, “any claim against a state electoral procedure must be expressed expeditiously,” Ross, 387 Md. at 671 , 876 A.2d at 705 , quoting Fulani v. Hogsett, 917 F.2d 1028, 1031 (7th Cir.1990) (noting that “[a]s time passes, the state’s interest in proceeding with the election increases in importance as resources are committed and irrevocable decisions are made”), cert. denied 501 U.S. 1206 , 111 S.Ct. 2799 , 115 L.Ed.2d 972 (1991); Kay v. Austin, 621 F.2d 809, 813 (6th Cir.1980), without unreasonable delay, so as to not cause prejudice to the defendant. Fulani, 917 F.2d at 1031 .

See, e.g., MacGovern v. Connolly, 637 F.Supp. 111, 115 (D.Mass. 1986) (stating that “in awarding or withholding relief, a court should ... endeavor to avoid a disruption of the election process which might result from requiring precipitate changes that could make unreasonable or embarrassing demands on a State in adjusting to the requirements of the court’s decree”), quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585 , 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1394 , 12 L.Ed.2d 506, 541 (1964); Farnum v. Burns, 548 F.Supp. 769, 774 (D.R.I.1982) (noting that “equitable principles may require a court not to interfere with the conduct of rapidly upcoming elections where the election machinery is already in gear”) (emphasis added); Barthelmes v. Morris, 342 F.Supp. 153, 160 (D.Md.1972) (stating that although “the election process is one fraught with uncertainty[, i]t does not follow [ ] that a court should add a further element of wholly unanticipated uncertainty into the process at the eleventh hour”); cf. Ross, 387 Md. at 671 n. 9, 876 A.2d at 705 n. 9 (outlining instances where the application of laches in the election context may not apply). We note that, in reviewing the Circuit Court’s decision, the issue of laches, in this case, is a mixed question of fact and law. Whether the elements of laches have been established is one of fact, see, e.g., Schmidt v. Farm Credit ²⁴⁶ Services 977 F.2d 511, 516 (10th Cir.1992) (noting that whether a party’s delay is unreasonable is a question for the trier of fact); Harman v. Masoneilan International, Inc., 442 A.2d 487, 503 (Del.1982) (stating that a finding of unreasonable delay is a factual question); Everett v. Bosch, 241 Cal.App.2d 648 , 50 Cal.Rptr. 813, 820 (1966) (noting that whether there has been delay amounting to laches is a fact question); Leathers v. Stewart, 108 Me. 96 , 79 A. 16, 18 (1911) (“The circumstances in a given case which are claimed to constitute laches is, of course, a question of fact”), while the question of whether in view of the established facts, laches should be invoked, is a question of law. See, e.g., Waddell v. Small Tube Products, Inc., 799 F.2d 69, 77 (3d Cir.1986) (“[T]he conclusion that a delay is ‘inexcusable’ comprehends both the application of a legal standard and an exercise of the trial court’s sound discretion in assessing the equitable circumstances of a particular case”), quoting Churma v. United States Steel Corp., 514 F.2d 589, 593 (3d Cir.1975); Freeman v. Martin Robowash, Inc., 61 Tenn.App. 677 , 457 S.W.2d 606 (1970) (“The question whether in view of the established facts, relief is to be denied-that is, whether, it would be inequitable or unjust to the defendant to enforce the complainants’ right-is a question of law”); Leathers, 79 A. at 18 (“[T]he conclusion whether upon the facts it would be inequitable to enforce the right, and whether the claimant is barred by laches, involves a question of law”).

Maryland Rule 8-131, providing: “c) Action tried without a jury. When an action has been tried without a jury, the appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence. It will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, and will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses,” (emphasis added), governs the standard of review for questions of fact, i.e. whether the elements of laches have been established. In addition, this Court has held that questions of law, i.e. whether the facts taken together are sufficient to sustain the defense of ²⁴⁷ laches, are subject to review under the de novo standard.

See In re Karl H., 394 Md. 402, 411 , 906 A.2d 898, 903 (2006); Ehrlich v. Perez, 394 Md. 691, 708 , 908 A.2d 1220, 1230 (2006); Renbaum v. Custom Holding, Inc., 386 Md. 28, 43 , 871 A.2d 554, 563 (2005); Mohan v. Norris, 386 Md. 63, 67 , 871 A.2d 575, 577 (2005); Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 370 Md. 38, 48 , 803 A.2d 482, 487 (2002). With respect to the standard of review for mixed questions of fact and law, in Bowers v. Eastern Aluminum Corp., on the other hand, we held that this Court must affirm the trial court’s decision on mixed questions of fact and law when “we cannot say [that its findings] were clearly erroneous [,] ... [a]nd we find no error in [its] application of the law to the facts.” 240 Md. 625 , 214 A.2d 924 (1965). Thus, we have stated that mixed questions of fact and law are entitled to deferential review on judicial review. See, e.g., Charles County Dept. of Social Services v. Vann, 382 Md. 286, 296 , 855 A.2d 313, 319 (2004) (noting that when an agency decision under judicial review involves a mixed question of fact and law, the reviewing court applies the same standard of review it would apply to the review of an agency factual finding); NCR Corp. v. Comptroller of the Treasury, Income Tax Div., 313 Md. 118, 133-34 , 544 A.2d 764, 771 (1988) (stating that a reviewing court must defer to a tax court’s expertise on determinations involving mixed questions of fact and law); Pemberton v. Montgomery County, 275 Md. 363, 368 , 340 A.2d 240, 243 (1975) (asserting that, on questions of mixed fact and law, it is not the function of the appellate court to substitute its assessment of the facts, as they relate to the issues of a particular case, for those of the administrative agency).

Where, however, an administrative agency decision is not being reviewed and, thus, the expertise of the decision-maker is not implicated, critical or germane, we have held that the de novo standard of review is appropriate, see Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 282 , 753 A.2d 519, 525 (2000) (“Issues of law and mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo ”), at least with respect to application of law to facts. See also Whiting v. State, 389 Md. 334, 345 , 885 A.2d 785 , 791 ²⁴⁸ (2005) (“Although we extend great deference to the hearing judge’s findings of fact, we review independently the application of the law to those facts”); Winder v. State, 362 Md. 275, 310-11 , 765 A.2d 97, 116 (2001) (“The trial court’s determination of whether a confession was made voluntarily is a mixed question of law and fact. As such, we undertake a de novo review of the trial judge’s ultimate determination on the issue of voluntariness”) (internal citations omitted). 14 The latter formulation is precisely this case. A trial court is in no better position to apply, and has no more expertise in applying, the law to facts, even those it has found, than an appellate court.

See United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201-02 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 824 , 105 S.Ct. 101 , 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984). 15 Accordingly, where the ²⁴⁹ issue is whether a party is precluded by laches from challenging an action of another party, we shall review the trial court’s ultimate determination of the issue de novo, just as we do in similar circumstances. 16 Thus, we hold that the Circuit Court erred in not invoking the doctrine of laches as a bar to the appellant’s untimely claim when it placed the determination of ²⁵⁰ a candidate’s eligibility ahead of the urgency of the election itself and the possible disenfranchisement of Maryland voters. C. As stated earlier, “any claim against a state electoral procedure must be expressed expeditiously.” Ross, 387 Md. at 671 , 876 A.2d at 705 . The reason for this is plain. As the Supreme Court of the United States stated recently in Purcell v. Gonzalez, — U.S.-, 127 S.Ct. 5 , 166 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006), reversing a lower court’s injunction, in an election case, enjoining operation of voter identification procedures just weeks before an election, “[a] State indisputably has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election process.” — U.S. at-, 127 S.Ct. at 7 , 166 L.Ed.2d at 4 , quoting Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 , 109 S.Ct. 1013, 1024 , 103 L.Ed.2d 271, 287 (1989).

The Court articulated further that “[cjonfidence in the integrity of our electoral processes is essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy.” -U.S. at -, 127 S.Ct. at 7 , 166 L.Ed.2d at 4 . The Purcell Court, moreover, addressed the issue of the applicability of laches on an election challenge, stating: “[the lower court] was required to weigh, in addition to the harms attendant upon issuance or nonissuance of an injunction, considerations specific to election cases and its own institutional procedures. Court orders affecting elections, especially conflicting orders, can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls. As an election draws closer, that risk will increase.” Id.

(Emphasis added). The Supreme Court, ultimately, held that, “[g]iven the imminence of the election and the inadequate time to resolve the factual disputes, [its] action [ ] shall of necessity allow the election to proceed without an injunction.” — U.S. at-, 127 S.Ct. at 8 , 166 L.Ed.2d at 5 . Thus, it made clear that injunctive relief may be inappropriate in an elections case if the election is too close for the State, realistically, to be able to implement the necessary changes before the election. It is such pragmatic imperatives related to the implementation of ²⁵¹ the elections process, coupled with the statutory scheme governing the process itself, that result in the need for expedited resolutions of disputes.

See also Reynolds, supra, 377 U.S. at 585 , 84 S.Ct. at 1394 , 12 L.Ed.2d at 541 (stating that “a court is entitled to and should consider the proximity of a forthcoming election and the mechanics and complexities of state election laws, and should act and rely upon general equitable principles”); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 547 , 89 S.Ct. 1234, 1237 , 22 L.Ed.2d 535, 539-40 (1969) (finding no error when court allowed an election that was only three months away to proceed “despite its constitutional infirmities”); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120, 121 , 87 S.Ct. 820, 821 , 17 L.Ed.2d 771, 774 (1967) (affirming ruling to allow an election, “constitutionally infirm in certain respects,” to proceed). In the case sub judice, this Court is faced with the same quandary as the Purcell Court and must contemplate the “considerations specific to election cases,” i.e. the potential harm to the appellees and, more important, to the electorate, which, we believe, the Circuit Court failed to do. The Circuit Court, citing Ross v. State Board of Elections, and relying more specifically on Melendez v. O’Connor, 654 N.W.2d 114 (Minn.2002), dismissed the appellees’ laches argument, concluding that “it would be inappropriate to allow the general election to go forward without examining whether a candidate who may become this State’s next Attorney General is constitutionally eligible to hold that office.” We do not agree. To be sure, this Court has stated, see Ross, 387 Md. at 671 n. 9, 876 A.2d at 705 n. 9, that there may be instances where laches would be inapplicable, and even further, that, perhaps, a dispute concerning the eligibility requirements of a candidate to run for office should not be given a laches analysis, id., the facts presented by the case sub judice, however, do not constitute such an instance.

In Melendez , the court held that a petition brought by citizens to have a candidate for state representative removed from the ballot on the grounds that he did not meet the residency requirements was not barred by laches. 654 N.W.2d at 117 . The court reasoned that “regardless of wheth ²⁵² er there has been an unreasonable delay by petitioners in filing their petition, there would be no prejudice to [the candidate] or others in granting the relief ... [t]here is nothing in the record indicating that [the candidate] was prejudiced by the timing of the filing of the petition.” Id. Melendez is distinguishable from the case sub judice for two distinct reasons. First,