Lightolier v. Hoon

⁵⁴⁴ CATHELL, J. This case arises from the occurrence of a fire that caused substantial damage to the home of David and Texie Hoon (“the Hoons”). At issue is whether the manufacturer of a recessed light fixture that gave rise to the fire when it was later improperly surrounded by thermal insulation can be strictly liable under a product liability theory when warnings existing on both the light fixture itself and the instruction manual accompanying it clearly warned of a risk of fire if the light fixture was placed in close proximity to thermal insulation. On November 15, 1999, the Hoons and their insurer, Federal Insurance Company, respondents, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Kent County against numerous defendants including Lightolier, a Division of Genlyte Thomas Group, LLC (“Lightolier”), petitioner, with the specific claims against Lightolier being for negligence, breach of warranty and product liability — defective design. Lightolier, a designer and manufacturer of lighting products, including the light fixture alleged to have been involved in starting the fire that damaged the Hoons’ home, thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment with the Circuit Court on March 15, 2002.

On April 15, 2002, the Circuit Court granted Lightolier’s motion for summary judgment. The Hoons thereafter filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. On September 15, 2004, the intermediate appellate court issued its opinion, Hoon v. Lightolier, 158 Md.App. 648 , 857 A.2d 1184 (2004), which reversed the Circuit Court’s granting of Lightolier’s motion for summary judgment. On November 1, 2004, Lightolier filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to this Court.

On December 17, 2004, we granted the petition. Lightolier v. Hoon, 384 Md. 448 , 863 A.2d 997 (2004). Lightolier presents one question for our review: “Where a manufacturer supplements its undisputedly sufficient warnings accompanying its product with an additional safety feature, does the manufacturer forfeit its right to assume that those warnings will be read and heeded, such that misuse of the product in direct contravention of those warnings is no longer deemed the proximate cause of dam ⁵⁴⁵ ages under the law, even though the product is safe for use when the warnings are followed?” We hold that, because adequate warnings were placed on the Lightolier light fixture at issue that warned of the risk of fire if thermal insulation was thereafter placed within three inches of the light fixture, and it is undisputed that the fire would not have occurred if these warnings had been heeded, the proximate cause of the fire was the negligent placement of thermal insulation within three inches of the already installed light fixture, thereby resulting in a misuse of the fixture. Therefore, the Circuit Court properly entered summary judgment in favor of Lightolier upon its motion.

I. Facts A. The Hoons’ Home Renovation and Ensuing Fire While in the process of making extensive renovations to their Chestertown, Maryland home, David and Texie Hoon designated that non-IC rated recessed light fixtures 1 be in ⁵⁴⁶ stalled in certain areas of their home. These non-IC rated fixtures were manufactured by Lightolier, Model 1002P1, and purchased in “early 1998.” The actual installation of these non-IC rated fixtures was performed by Westwind Construction Company (“Westwind”), a company partly owned by David Hoon that acted as both the general contractor responsible for the renovations to the Hoons’ home and as the electrical contractor. Printed on each of the Lightolier non-IC rated fixtures in large red letters was the following warning: “WARNING — RISK OF FIRE DO NOT INSTALL INSULATION WITHIN 3 INCHES OF FIXTURE SIDES OR WIRING COMPARTMENT NOR ABOVE FIXTURE IN SUCH A MANNER TO ENTRAP HEAT.” This warning was notice that subsequent improperly installed insulation would constitute a misuse of the previously installed light fixture. Thus, the Hoons were on notice of a responsibility to ensure that installers properly installed the thermal insulation.

An identical warning was also found in a prominent enclosed box on page one of the instruction manual accompanying each of the Lightolier non-IC rated fixtures. Such warnings are in accordance with the language found in § 410-66 of the National Electric Code 2 (“NEC”), which states: “410-66. Clearance and Installation. (b) Installation.

Thermal insulation shall not be installed within 3 in. (76 mm) of the recessed fixture enclosure, ⁵⁴⁷ wiring compartment, or ballast, and shall not be so installed above the fixture so as to entrap heat and prevent the free circulation of air. Exception: Recessed fixtures identified as suitable for insulation to be in direct contact with the fixture.[ 3 ]” [Footnote added.] Attached to each of the Lightolier non-IC rated fixtures was what is known as a self-heating thermal protector (“SHTP”), which was located about three inches from the base of each fixture. 3 4 The SHTP is designed to detect excessive heat entrapped around the fixture and to “open” a small circuit inside the SHTP, causing the electric current to the fixture to be cut off when such a buildup of heat occurs; the lights then would “cycle” (turn off and then back on after the SHTP cooled). The SHTP is designed to begin cycling the light if the temperature around the light fixture exceeds 90C (194F).

This cycling of the light also has an important secondary effect — the blinking effect of the cycling alerts the installer or consumer that there may be a problem with the light that requires inspection. 5 A label attached to each non-IC rated fixture stated: “NOTICE — THERMALLY PROTECTED FIXTURE BLINKING LIGHT MAY INDICATE INSULATION TOO CLOSE TO FIXTURE, OR IMPROPER LAMP.” ⁵⁴⁸ Notwithstanding the addition of SHTPs to non-IC rated fixtures, they remain non-IC rated fixtures and are not considered IC rated. Therefore, a non-IC rated fixture, even with a fully operational SHTP, is not to be used in an insulated ceiling where insulation exists or may come to exist within three inches of the fixture. At some time after the non-IC rated fixtures were installed in the Hoons’ home, Gede Insulation, LLC (“Gede”) installed blown-in cellulose insulation into the ceiling area where certain Lightolier non-IC rated fixtures had been placed. It is undisputed that Gede placed the thermal insulation in direct contact with the non-IC rated fixtures without regard to the warning labels on those fixtures concerning the risk of fire.

On November 2, 1998, a fire caused substantial damage to the Hoons’ home. The fire marshal who investigated the fire concluded that it originated above the ceiling in the rear hallway of the first floor of the Hoons’ home near one of the Lightolier recessed light fixtures, most likely due to a problem with the light fixture itself or with the thermal insulation being placed too close to the fixture. It is now undisputed that the fire started because of direct contact between the thermal insulation and the non-IC rated fixture. The record indicates that at some time prior to the fire two other Lightolier non-IC rated fixtures, which were both located in the Hoons’ kitchen, began to blink.

The Hoons saw the blinking occurring, investigated the cause, and saw that these two light fixtures were covered in insulation in violation of their warnings. Thereafter, the insulation was removed from the area surrounding those two non-IC rated fixtures. The Hoons, however, never examined the proximity of insulation to the non-IC rated fixtures in the rear hallway of the first floor, which is where the fire originated, alleging that the danger was not apparent because the non-IC rated fixture at the fire’s point of origin never blinked as to indicate overheating. B. Circuit Court Proceedings On November 15, 1999, the Hoons filed a multi-count complaint in the Circuit Court for Kent County against numerous ⁵⁴⁹ defendants, including both Lightolier and Gede.

As noted, the claims against Lightolier were for negligence, breach of warranty and product liability — defective design. Basically, the Hoons based these claims against Lightolier on allegations that the SHTP of the non-IC fixture where the fire originated did not work properly and that this malfunction made Lightolier liable for the damages caused by the fire. The claims against Gede were for negligence and breach of contract. Specifically, the Hoons claimed that “Gede breached its duty in that it did install the insulation too close to the light fixture as a result of which heat was accumulated and concentrated and igniting the wood frame and other combustible portions of the residence.” 6 During pretrial discovery, the Hoons identified three experts who agreed that, if Gede had not installed the insulation within close proximity or in actual contact with the non-IC rated fixture, an act in direct contravention of Lightolier’s instructions and warnings, the fire would not have occurred.

One of the Hoons’ expert witnesses, however, Dr: Thomas Eager, additionally commented that the location of the SHTP in the non-IC rated fixture was defectively designed and “unreasonably dangerous.” Dr. Eager based this opinion on his belief that, because “[t]he thermal sensor was not located at the hottest region of the light fixture[,][t]he presence of the insulation made this sensor ineffective in controlling over-temperature conditions.” On March 15, 2002, Lightolier filed a motion for summary judgment in the Circuit Court, arguing: “The well-established doctrine of misuse precludes [the Hoons] from recovering from Lightolier. According to [the Hoons], a non-IC rated, Lightolier recessed light fixture substantially contributed to a fire that caused significant damage to the Hoons’ real and personal property. Even if the Lightolier fixture was the heat source for this fire, the only material that could have combusted was cellulose insu ⁵⁵⁰ lation installed within three inches of the fixture. It is undisputed that (1) someone misused the fixtui’e by installing insulation within three inches of the fixture and (2) by installing insulation too closely to the fixture, Gede Insulation, LLC acted contrary to warnings on the fixture, to warnings in the instruction booklet accompanying the fixture, and to common knowledge in the insulation and construction industry.

According to [the Hoons], had Gede adhered to the warnings on the product, their damages would not have resulted. As a result, [the Hoons] cannot prove that the Lightolier fixture was defective, unreasonably dangerous, or the proximate cause of their damages and Lightolier is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law....” [Alterations added.] On April 15, 2002, the Circuit Court granted Lightolier’s motion for summary judgment, stating: “The Court finds that the warnings placed on the light fixture and in the instructions were adequate. The Court finds that the manufacturer of the light is entitled to believe that one installing the light together with any insulation that may be applied near it would heed the warnings. The failure to heed the warning in this case is the proximate cause of the fire.

Further, the Court finds that the [Hoons] were on further notice that there may be problems with the insulation and the cause of the fire by the fact that other fixtures operated properly causing them to blink and indicating problems. If there is a problem with one fixture with blown-in insulation, the Court finds that one is on notice that there may be problems with other fixtures and that they should be checked. The Court finds that the subsequent malfunction or improper design of the [SHTP] switch on this particular lamp ... that its failure to operate in this particular case does not provide the [Hoons] with another avenue for the jury to make a determination because the Court finds, for the [] reasons stated, that the Defendant Lightolier is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” [Alterations added.] ⁵⁵¹ C. Court of Special Appeals Proceedings On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, the court stated that “[t]he major issue presented in this appeal is whether the motions judge was legally correct in granting summary judgment on the ground that the third party’s failure to heed the manufacturer’s warning was the sole proximate cause of the fire.” 7 Hoon, 158 Md.App. at 651 , 857 A.2d at 1185 . Recognizing that “ ‘there may be more than one proximate cause of an accident,’ ” id. at 655 , 857 A.2d at 1188 , the intermediate appellate court held that “a jury could reasonably find that there were two concurrent proximate causes of the fire ...

(1) Gede’s negligence in failing to heed Lightolier’s warning and (2) Lightolier’s defective design (or negligent manufacture) of the SHTPs.” Id. at 672 , 857 A.2d at 1197 . Because of what it considered to be this possible additional proximate cause of the fire, the Court of Special Appeals held that the Circuit Court erred in granting Lightolier’s summary judgment motion.

II

Standard of Review As indicated, the matter now before us was resolved in the Circuit Court on summary judgment. Whether summary judgment was granted properly is a question of law. The standard of review is de novo and we are concerned with “whether the trial court was legally correct.” Goodwich v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 843 Md. 185 , 204, 680 A.2d 1067, 1076 (1996); see also Livesay v. Baltimore County, 384 Md. 1, 9 , 862 A.2d 33, 38 (2004); Walk v. Hartford Casualty, 382 Md. 1, 14 , 852 A.2d 98, 105 (2004); Murphy v. Merzbacher, 346 Md. 525, 530-31 , 697 A.2d 861, 864 (1997). The trial court, in accordance with Maryland Rule 2-501(e), shall grant a motion for summary judgment “if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as ⁵⁵² to any material fact and that [the moving party] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The purpose of the summary judgment procedure is not to try the case or to decide the factual disputes, but to decide whether there is an issue of fact which is sufficiently material to be tried.

See Goodwich, 343 Md. at 205-06 , 680 A.2d at 1077 ; Coffey v. Derby Steel Co., 291 Md. 241, 247 , 434 A.2d 564, 567-68 (1981); Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302, 304 , 413 A.2d 170, 171 (1980). Thus, once the moving party has provided the court with sufficient grounds for summary judgment, the non-moving party must produce sufficient evidence to the trial court that a genuine dispute to a material fact exists. See, e.g., Hoffman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Washington County Nat’l Sav. Bank, 297 Md. 691, 712 , 467 A.2d 758, 769 (1983).

This requires “producing] facts under oath, based on the personal knowledge of the affiant to defeat the motion. Bald, unsupported statements or conclusions of law are insufficient.” Id. (alteration added). With these considerations in mind, we turn to the case sub judice.

III

Discussion Lightolier’s primary contention on this appeal is that the doctrine of misuse applies under the facts as heretofore described and that such misuse of the non-IC rated fixture bars any recovery the Hoons claim against Lightolier. Whether Lightolier is correct as to this issue requires this Court to examine the doctrine of misuse and its application, if at all, to the circumstances surrounding the destructive fire of November 2, 1998. This Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine of misuse and its possible barring effect on strict liability in tort claims twenty years ago in Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581 , 495 A.2d 348 (1985). That case concerned a product liability suit brought by a woman against a fabric manufacturer and the seller of a nightgown which ignited and caused injury to her.

At the time of her injury, the woman was wearing the nightgown inside out, draping the exposed pockets across the burners of a stove. In deciding whether the trial court was correct in instructing the jury on product ⁵⁵³ misuse as a possible defense to the strict liability claim, we initially recognized our adherence to the view of § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides: “402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer (1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold. (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).

Thereafter, we stated in Ellsworth that: “ ‘Under § 402A, various defenses are [] available to the seller in an action based on strict liability in tort. These defenses are set forth and explained in the official comments following § 402A. For example, the seller is not liable where injury results from abnormal handling or use of the product (Comment h), where mishandling or alteration after delivery of the product renders it unsafe (Comment g), or if warnings or instructions supplied with the product are disregarded by the consumer where, if used in accordance with these warnings, the product would be safe (Comment j).’ ” Ellsworth, 303 Md. at 591-92 , 495 A.2d at 353 (emphasis added) (quoting Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 346 , 363 A.2d 955, 959-60 )). We then made it clear that, in ⁵⁵⁴ product liability actions, misuse of a product, if proven, negates a design defect claim and occurs when the product in question is used in a manner not reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer and/or seller.

Ellsworth, 303 Md. at 595-96 , 495 A.2d at 355 . As the Court of Special Appeals correctly noted in Simpson v. Standard Container Co., 72 Md.App. 199 , 527 A.2d 1337 , cert. denied, 311 Md. 286 , 533 A.2d 1308 (1987), however, this reasonable foreseeability test must be applied with caution “because, with the benefit of hindsight, any accident could be foreseeable. Without care, the imposition of strict products liability could result in a manufacturer’s becoming an insurer for every injury that may result from its product.” Id. at 206 , 527 A.2d at 1341 . In Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 138 Md.App. 136 , 770 A.2d 1072 (2001), aff'd, 368 Md. 186 , 792 A.2d 1145 (2002), a three-year-old child was killed when he discovered a handgun under his parents’ mattress, loaded an ammunition magazine into the gun and, while playing with the gun, accidentally fired it, suffering a fatal bullet wound to his head.

The instruction manual for the handgun included warnings that “‘Firearms should always be stored securely and unloaded, away from children and careless adults’ and ‘Firearms should be securely locked in racks or cabinets when not in use.’ ” Id. at 173, 770 A.2d at 1094 . The mother of the child thereafter sued the gun manufacturer for strict product liability based on defective design of the handgun. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted summary judgment in favor of the handgun manufacturer. On appeal to the intermediate appellate court, one issue to be addressed was whether the placement of the handgun under the mattress was a misuse of the handgun.

In holding that this did in fact constitute misuse of the handgun, the Court of Special Appeals, applying the holdings in Ellsworth and Simpson , stated that “had [the warnings] been followed, the tragic accident in this case would not have occurred.... Instead, however, [the father] stored the handgun under his mattress, evidently within reach of his son. There can be no debate that this was an affirmative action on [the father’s] ⁵⁵⁵ part that clearly contravened, the warnings contained in the instruction manual. [The father’s] improper storage of the handgun was misuse, thus defeating appellant’s defective design claim.” Id. at 174, 770 A.2d at 1094 (alterations added) (emphasis added). Insofar as Lightolier contends that the use of one of its non-IC rated fixtures in an area where thermal insulation came within three inches of the fixture, thereby entrapping substantial heat and causing the fire, was a misuse of the non-IC rated fixture, we agree.

Even under a reasonable foreseeability standard, while it was not a misuse for the Hoons to have the non-IC rated fixtures installed in their home for lighting purposes, it was a misuse of the product for the Hoons to contract for the installation of blown-in cellulose insulation without taking adequate steps to ensure that the insulation installers heeded the warnings relating to the fixtures. There is little doubt that, because the thermal insulation was installed after the non-IC rated