Maryland case law › Liller v. Logsdon

Liller v. Logsdon

261 Md. 367 (1971) · Court of Appeals of Maryland
Court of Appeals of MarylandDisposition: AffirmedSmith, J.✓ Good law
HoldingIn 1960, Chelsie A.

368 Smith, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves the question of whether mining operations at an Allegany County coal mine had ceased, thereby bringing to an end an easement, the agreement relative to which provided that it would be “automatically terminate [d] one year after mining operations cease[d].” Appellant Chelsie A. Liller (Liller) and James C. Logs-don and Mary W. Logsdon, his wife, entered into the agreement in 1960. Mr. Logsdon is now deceased and the property is owned by appellees Mary W. Logsdon and Mary Ellen Lasser who brought a bill in equity on Feb-20, 1970, to enjoin Liller from further use of the roadway. The chancellor concluded these operations had ceased and, therefore, the easement had terminated.

We shall affirm his decree. There is an intimation in the brief of the appellees that Liller had had the instrument prepared, but we note no statement in the evidence to that effect. The easement was granted “as a means of egress and ingress for trucks, vehicles, and equipment moving to and from strip mining operations conducted or to be conducted by [Liller], his heirs or assigns on property [then] occupied, leased or owned by him or which [might] in the future be owned by him and generally referred to as the ‘Chapman’ tract.” The last sentence stated: “This Easement automatically terminates one year after mining operations cease.” We approach this case bearing in mind that under Maryland Rule 886, the matter having been heard by the trial court without a jury, the evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below, Burroughs Int’l Co. v. Datronics, 254 Md. 327, 337 , 255 A. 2d 341 (1969), and Goodwin v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas.

Co., 199 Md. 121, 129-30 , 85 A. 2d 759 (1952), and bearing in mind also that under that rule “the judgment of the lower court will not be set aside on the evidence un 369 less clearly erroneous and due regard will be given to the opportunity of the lower court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” At the time the easement was granted Liller was conducting both deep and strip mining operations on the property owned by him near the Logsdon property. He made use of the easement until June of 1964 when he removed his equipment to another location and leased the mine workings and mining rights to Lionel Clark. The chancellor found that Clark removed approximately 513 tons of coal “until sometime during the year 1966.” He further found that on August 18, 1967, Liller “leased the mining tract to Peter J. Colmer, who removed, without strip mining, the following amounts of coal: 1967, one hundred nine tons; 1968, twenty-five tons; and 1969, six tons.” The only part of this finding of facts with which Liller takes issue is the chancellor’s finding that Colmer’s removal of coal was “without strip mining”. Colmer testified that deep mining ended in 1968 when the mine inspector closed down the mine, but he said he “took coal off of the strip jobs after that.” He “picked up loose coal that was around on the strip job”.

He told the court that the last coal he

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