Lillian C. Blentlinger, LLC v. Cleanwater Linganore, Inc.

Watts, J. This case involves a Development Rights and Responsibilities Agreement (“DRRA”), which is governed by Md. Code Ann., Land Use (2012) (“LU”) §§ 7-301 to 7-306 (“the DRRA statute”), and is defined as “an agreement between a local governing body and a person having a legal or equitable interest in real property to establish conditions under which development may proceed for a specified time.” LU § 7-301(b). A “local governing body,” in turn, “means the legislative body, the local executive, or other elected governmental body that has zoning powers under this division.” LU § 7-301(c). The purpose of a DRRA is to allow developers and local governing bodies, such as a county, to negotiate terms and conditions under which development may occur. A DRRA serves to streamline the various approval processes that must occur for a complex development project.

To that end, one of the key aspects of a DRRA is controlled by the “freeze provision” of the DRRA statute, LU § 7-304(a), which permits parties to agree to freeze certain laws, rules, regulations, and policies as of the time of the execution of the DRRA. LU § 7-304(a) provides: “Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the local laws, rules, regulations, and policies governing the use, density, or intensity of the real property subject to an agreement shall be the local laws, rules, regulations, and policies in force at the time the parties execute the agreement.” 1 The effect of the freeze provision is that developers are able to move forward, with certainty regarding the applicable laws, with development projects that may extend over a long period of time. Importantly, pursuant to LU § 7-303(a), to be valid a DRRA must contain certain requirements. And, like any other contract, a DRRA must be supported by consideration.

In this case, we decide whether a DRRA must be supported by “enhanced public benefits” to be valid—ie., whether a DRRA must confer an enhanced public benefit to the county, and whether the DRRA at issue is supported by adequate consideration. 2 We hold that, based on the plain language and legislative history of the DRRA statute, as well as relevant case law, to be valid a DRRA is not required to confer an enhanced public benefit 3 on a county. In other words, there is no evidence in the DRRA statute, its legislative history, or case law demonstrating an intent to require an enhanced public benefit as part of a DRRA. And, we hold that the DRRA at issue in this case is not required to confer any enhanced public benefit to the county, and is supported by sufficient consideration. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.

BACKGROUND This case arose under the following circumstances. Lillian C. Blentlinger, LLC and William L. Blentlinger, LLC, Petitioners, own two parcels of land (“the Property”) in Frederick County, Maryland (“the County”), Respondent, totaling approximately 279 acres. The Blentlinger family farmed the Property for generations before deciding to explore the possibility of developing the Property for other uses. Since 1959, the Property had been zoned for agricultural use.

In 2006, for the first time, the Property was designated for Low Density Residential (“LDR”) land use as part of the 2006 New Market Region Plan. Being designated for LDR land use permits a property owner to apply for a Planned Unit Development (“PUD”). Frederick County Code (2014) (“FCC”) § 1—19— 10.500.2(A) provides, in pertinent part, that a “PUD District may only be established where the tract of land receiving the PUD District has a County Comprehensive Plan Land Use designation of [LDR], Medium Density Residential, or High Density Residential.]” A PUD is a “floating zone[] established to provide for new development and redevelopment within identified growth areas that result in an integrated mixture of commercial, employment, residential, recreational, civic and/or cultural land uses as provided within the appropriate Frederick County Comprehensive, Community, or Corridor Plan.” FCC § 1-19-10.500.1. Sometime in 2007, however, the Frederick County Board of County Commissioners (“the BOCC”) 4 removed the Property’s designation for LDR land use.

During the 2008 update of the New Market Region Plan, the Property’s designation was changed to agricultural/rural. During the 2010 Comprehensive Plan update, the Property’s designation remained agricultural/rural. With the 2012 Comprehensive Plan, the Property’s designation was changed back to LDR, and the Property was included in the Linganore Community Growth Area. Since 2012, the Property has been designated for LDR land use.

On February 25, 2014, after the Property had been re-designated for LDR land use, Petitioners filed an application to rezone the Property from agricultural to PUD zoning as well as a Phase I Concept Plan. Petitioners proposed developing the Property to have 720 residential dwelling units, including a mix of single-family homes and townhomes, and included an approximately twenty-five-acre site for a future middle school. On March 11, 2014, Petitioners filed an application or petition for a DRRA, and included a draft DRRA to be entered into between Petitioners and the BOCC. The DRRA petition incorporated by reference the PUD application and the Phase I Concept Plan.

In a letter dated May 5, 2014, Jim Gugel (“Gugel”), the Planning Director for the Frederick County Planning and Development Review Department, advised Petitioners that, on April 15, 2014, the BOCC “accepted” the DRRA petition. On July 30, 2014, at a public hearing, the Frederick County Planning Commission (“the Planning Commission”) unanimously voted (five to zero, with two members absent) to recommend the approval of the application to rezone the Property from agricultural to PUD. On October 8, 2014, Planning Commission staff recommended that the “Planning Commission find that the location, character, and extent of the proposed [DRRA] for the [ ] Property are consistent with the County Comprehensive Plan.” Also on October 8, 2014, at a public hearing, the Planning Commission reviewed the draft DRRA, and, in accordance with its staffs recommendation, voted to find the draft DRRA consistent with the Frederick County Comprehensive Plan. On October 22, 2014, Gugel and an Assistant County Attorney issued a staff report recommending that the BOCC review the proposed DRRA “and any conditions related thereto in deciding whether to approve or deny the [ ] DRRA.” On November 6, 2014, the BOCC conducted a public hearing on the PUD application and the DRRA, and witnesses testified and were subject to cross-examination.

At the hearing, members of the public and counsel for Cleanwater Linganore, Inc., RALE Inc., Nikki Chauvin, Jimmy D. Duffy, Joyce A. Duffy, Paul D. Garcia, Tracy E. Garcia, Dang Mindte, Carrie Payne, Pamela Pennington, Carol Swandby, Reggie Wade, and Patricia Wells (collectively, “Cleanwater”), Respondents, cross-examined witnesses and provided public comment. During the hearing, the BOCC voted four-to-one to approve the PUD rezoning application, but limited the total unit count to 675 residential dwelling units, including 500 single-family homes and 175 townhomes, 5 on the condition that no building permit for the construction of a residence could be obtained before January 1,2020. As to the DRRA, during the hearing, Cleanwater’s counsel questioned Petitioners’ counsel about any “greater public benefits” that the DRRA offered, and the following exchange occurred: [CLEANWATER’S COUNSEL]: [W]ould the applicant please explain what greater public benefits the DRRA provides above and beyond those that would be otherwise obtainable absent the DRRA? [PETITIONERS’ COUNSEL]: A certainty that the project would not lose zoning, wouldn’t lose density, wouldn’t lose its comprehensive plan, a certainty as to what—how the development will proceed in terms of the laws that are in effect when it goes to Phase I and in subsequent years. You know, all of that is certainly public benefit, and that’s the whole reason why, or one of the main reasons why these DRRAs are available to localities within the state. [CLEANWATER’S COUNSEL]: And what you described certainly would reflect the certainty that the property owner would achieve as a result of the DRRA, but what are the greater public benefits in terms of infrastructure or other— [PETITIONERS’ COUNSEL]: I mean, it’s one and the same.

That’s the argument. I mean, how is it to the greater good or how is it to public benefit, and by public meaning not just a property owner if the—if the zoning can change willy-nilly, if property rights can be given and taken away based on, you know, whatever, you know, however the winds change. I mean, it’s Maryland law. I mean, obviously it’s—the way common law in Maryland has developed it’s that zoning is up for grabs unless there’s valid—unless there’s recognizable vertical construction based on a validly issued building permit, and all the parties have tried to address this through legislation at the state in terms of vesting and this was the compromise.

And so obviously by virtue of there being a DRRA available to folks in the state it’s—to the public in the state it’s to the greater public good. Otherwise, the state wouldn’t have passed the law. As my co[-]counsel ... is referencing, I mean, the school site, the roads, the representations as to making all of the improvements that are required under the [Adequate Public Facilities Ordinance], I mean, it’s all right here. It’s all spelled out in the DRRA.

Cleanwater’s counsel also cross-examined Gugel about the DRRA and the following exchange occurred: [CLEANWATER’S COUNSEL]: Under the DRRA is there anything in the—what are [Petitioners’] responsibilities under the DRRA with respect to transportation improvements? [ ] GUGEL: Nothing specific. It defers to what would be identified as part of a subsequent [Adequate Public Facilities Ordinance Letter of Understanding], At different points during the hearing, Cleanwater’s counsel questioned Gugel about the middle school site, and the following exchanges occurred: [CLEANWATER’S COUNSEL]: Would this property owner be required to proffer the [ ] middle school site whether or not there is a DRRA in this case? [] GUGEL: Well, the PUD, I mean it—the new PUD regulations do give that discretion on requiring public site dedication. The old regulations were kind of on a per acre basis. But given the symbol on the site and the rezoning request, it would have been conditioned even without a DRRA. * * # [CLEANWATER’S COUNSEL]: And under the school dedication requirement I just would like to confirm that there is no guarantee that the school site will be dedicated, it’s contingent on acceptance by the Board of Education; is that correct? [ ] GUGEL: Yeah, the site itself.

I mean, the Phase I PUD does establish thresholds, timing thresholds of when that dedication and conveyance must occur. [CLEANWATER’S COUNSEL]: But acceptance depends on the Board of Education? [] GUGEL: Correct. Gugel also testified that, “in the event that the Board of Education] does not approve the public school site or determines not to accept conveyance then [Petitioners] shall retain fee simple ownership of the public school site and may use the public school site in a manner consistent with other uses in the project.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the BOCC voted four-to-one to approve the DRRA. On November 24, 2014, the BOCC enacted Ordinance No. 14-27-682, approving Petitioners’ PUD application and the Phase I Concept Plan for the development, subject to certain conditions (“the PUD Ordinance”). As discussed at the hearing before the BOCC, one of the conditions of the PUD Ordinance limited the number of dwelling units to be constructed in the development.

Specifically, the PUD Ordinance provided that “[a] maximum of 675 dwelling units may be constructed, comprised of no more than 175 townhomes, and the remaining units being single-family detached.” Another condition stated that the development needed to “[p]rovide a diversity of single[-]family lot sizes.” Yet another condition concerned the middle school site, stating: [Petitioners] shall dedicate and convey to the County a 24.5 +/- acre middle school site to the [Board of Education (“the BOE”) ], in fee simple, upon i) the recordation of the subdivision plat for the 100th lot in the Project or within two (2) years of the recordation of the subdivision plat for the 1st lot in the Project, whichever occurs first; and ii) [the] BOE’s acceptance of the conveyance of land for the Public School Site. [Petitioners] and [the] BOE shall enter into a Memorandum of Understanding [ ], which shall set forth the rights and responsibilities of the parties in connection with development of the school site, prior to final, unconditional approval of the Phase II (Execution) Plan for the portion of the Project that contains the school site. In the PUD Ordinance, another condition stated that Petitioners were to “[pjrovide two (2) neighborhood parks of at least 20,000 square feet each to be centrally located, with one in the northern land bay, and the other in the central land bay.” And, consistent with the BOCC’s vote at the hearing, the last condition of the ordinance provided that, “[w]ith the exception of structures on the Public School Site and models for the Project, neither Frederick County, nor any agency, department, division and/or branch thereof shall issue any structural building permits, prior to January 1, 2020.” On the same day, November 24, 2014, the final DRRA executed by Petitioners and the BOCC was recorded among the Land Records of Frederick County (“the Blentlinger DRRA”). We briefly summarize some of the Blentlinger DRRA’s relevant provisions. Section 2.2A of the Blentlinger DRRA, concerning permissible uses and density, provides that the development shall be developed as a PUD in accordance with the provisions of the Frederick County Code, so long as the overall density and intensity of the development is not increased, and a maximum of 675 residential dwelling units are permitted pursuant to the PUD Ordinance.

In Section 2.2C, Petitioners agree to comply with applicable laws should they revise the mix of residential unit types, subject to the cap of 675 residential dwelling units, and to pay any adjusted school construction fees resulting from a change in the unit types. In Section 2.2E, concerning limitation on building permit issuance, Petitioners “acknowledge[ ] and agree[] that[,]” “with the exception of structures on the Public School Site and models for the Project,” “neither Frederick County, nor any agency, department, division and/or branch thereof shall issue any structural building permits, prior to January 1, 2020.” In Section 2.4, Petitioners agree to make a payment to the County in lieu of building moderately priced dwelling units, as permitted by the Frederick County Code. Article III of the Blentlinger DRRA sets forth the parties’ agreement with respect to community facilities and infrastructure improvements. Section 3.1, concerning road improvements, provides that, to fulfill the Adequate Public Facilities Ordinance (“the APFO”) requirements, 6 Petitioners will either construct or fund construction of road improvements or contribute to escrow funds for road improvements.

In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, Petitioners agree to comply with the sewer and water improvements as required by the APFO Letter of Understanding, and to pay tap fees in accordance with the fee schedule in effect at the time of building permit application. Section 3.4 concerns schools. And, in Section 3.4A, Petitioners agree to pay the school construction fee as a condition of the APFO, notwithstanding the sunset of a school construction fee ordinance. Pursuant to Section 3.4B, all “[ajpplicable [s]chool [ijmpact [f]ees shall be paid at the time of the issuance of building permits in accordance with the fee schedule in effect at the time of the issuance of building permits.” Section 3.4C concerns “[sjchool [s]ite [dedication,” and provides, in relevant part, as follows: [Petitioners] shall convey in fee simple to the Frederick County Board of Education (“BOE”), with no monetary consideration paid, the Public School Site shown on EXHIBIT 6, totaling a minimum of 24.5 ± buildable acres, to serve the Project and the surrounding region.

The Public School Site will be conveyed to the BOE upon: i) the recordation of the first subdivision plat for lots in the Project; and ii) BOE’s acceptance of the conveyance of land for the Public School Site .... A separate Memorandum of Understanding (“BOE MOU”) between the BOE and [Petitioners] shall be executed prior to unconditional Phase II approval for residential dwelling units in the Project (assuming commercially reasonable efforts by both parties), which MOU shall establish and control other aspects of the Public School Site and the rights and responsibilities of the parties relative to the Public School Site, and the construction of a public school .... In the event that the BOE does not approve the Public School Site or determines not to accept conveyance of the Public School Site, then [Petitioners] shall retain fee simple ownership of the Public School Site, and may use the Public School Site in a manner consistent with other uses with the Project. [Petitioners] acknowledge[ ] that use of the Public School Site may require regulatory approvals, including but not limited to, revision of the [PUD] Ordinance. (Emphasis in original).

As to property acquisition for public infrastructure, Section 3.5A provides: In the event that some of the public infrastructure improvements, at the collector road or higher facility level, required by this DRRA or the APFO to be made by [Petitioners] will require the acquisition of public right-of-way from third-party property owners, [Petitioners] shall exercise commercially reasonable efforts to secure such right-of-way without the assistance of the County. Section 3.5B provides that, if Petitioners demonstrate to the County that they are unable to secure a public right-of-way through commercially reasonable efforts, then Petitioners may request that the County or the State Highway Administration assist in such acquisition at Petitioners’ “sole cost and expense.” Section 3.5B further provides that, should the County approve Petitioners’ request for assistance, then the County or the State Highway Administration “shall have two years to acquire the needed right-of-way.” And, Section 3.5C provides that, if the County decides not to acquire the right-of-way, or the two-year time period of assistance has passed, then Petitioners “may be permitted to make a contribution to the County equal to the entire anticipated project development costs, which shall include but not be limited to costs for: design, engineering, right-of-way acquisition, management, inspection, etc. in lieu of constructing the public infrastructure improvements!,]” unless the applicable APFO letter of understanding provides otherwise. Article IV of the Blentlinger DRRA, concerning the terms of the agreement, provides: This Agreement shall constitute covenants running with the land and shall run with and bind the Property so long as the Project is under development, provided that this Agreement shall terminate and be void twenty-five (25) years after the Effective Date of this Agreement unless extended by an amendment complying with all procedures required in this Agreement, the County Ordinance and the State law. The parties acknowledge and agree that the Term of this Agreement is justified by the: (1) substantial economic investment made and/or to be made by [Petitioners] for the development of the Project; (2) substantial investment in, and construction of, extensive public and private infrastructure by the parties; (3) public purposes to be advanced by development of the Project in accordance with the Development Laws; (4) uncertainty of future market demands and political pressures; and (5) expectations of the parties.

Article V of the Blentlinger DRRA concerns development review and Article VI concerns survival and transfer of obligations. Article VII deals with breach of the Blentlinger DRRA and the parties’ respective remedies. Section 7.1 concerns breach by Petitioners, and Section 7.1 A provides that, if Petitioners fail or refuse to perform obligations under the Blentlinger DRRA, and fail to cure that default within a certain period of time, then the BOCC “may seek and obtain equitable relief to enforce the terms and conditions of th[e] Agreement[,] either through a decree for specific performance or an injunction.” Section 7.1A further states that, if specific performance or an injunction is not available due to actions taken by Petitioners, “then the BOCC shall be entitled to bring a legal action for damages.” In Section 7.1B, Petitioners waive the right to a “trial by jury in connection with any proceedings brought to enforce the terms of’ the Blentlinger DRRA. Section 7.2A provides that the same remedies are available to Petitioners in the event of a breach by the BOCC.

And, in Section 7.2B, the BOCC also waives the right to a jury trial. Section 8.1A provides that Petitioners “shall comply with all Development Laws” as defined in the Blentlinger DRRA, stating: Except as otherwise specifically provided herein, the local laws, rules, regulations and policies governing the use, density or intensity of the Property, including but not limited to, those governing development, subdivision, growth management, impact fee laws, water, sewer, stormwater management, environmental protection, land planning and design, and adequate public facilities (hereafter collectively the “Development Laws”), shall be the local laws, rules, regulations and policies, if any, in force on the Effective Date of the Agreement, and [Petitioners] shall comply with all Development Laws. And, Section 8.1B provides: If the BOCC determines that compliance with Development Laws enacted or adopted after the Effective Date of this Agreement is essential to ensure the health, safety or welfare of residents of all or part of Frederick County, the BOCC may impose the change in laws, rule, regulations and policies and the effect thereof upon the Property. Section 8.3, concerning fees, states that, except as otherwise provided in the Blentlinger DRRA, Petitioners “shall pay all fees (specifically including but not limited to impact fees, school mitigation fees[,] and water and sewer connection fees) required by Frederick County at the rate in effect at the time the fee is due.” Section 8.3 further states that, in the event that any of the fees are eliminated due to a change in the law and “replaced with a procedure or requirement that would impose some other burden on” Petitioners, then Petitioners “may elect to pay the impact fee in effect prior to the change in the law.” Section 9.7 of the Blentlinger DRRA, titled “Authority to Execute,” states: The BOCC hereby acknowledges and agrees that all required notices, meetings, and hearings have been properly given and held by the County with respect to the approval of this Agreement, and [Petitioners] agree[] not to challenge this Agreement or any of the obligations created by this Agreement on the grounds of any procedural infirmity or any denial of any procedural right.

The BOCC hereby warrants and represents to [Petitioners] that the person(s) executing this Agreement on its behalf have been properly authorized to do so. [Petitioners] hereby warrant[] and represent ] to the BOCC (1) that [they are] the fee simple, record owner[s] of the Property, (2) that [they have] the right, power and authority to enter into this Agreement and to agree to the terms, provisions, and conditions set forth herein and to bind the Property as set forth herein, and (3) that all legal actions needed to authorize the execution, delivery and performance of this Agreement have been taken. Finally, Section 9.12 of the Blentlinger DRRA, addressing appeals, states: The County DRRA Ordinance allows any person aggrieved by this Agreement to file an appeal to the Circuit Court for Frederick County within 30 days of the date on which the parties execute the Agreement. If the effect of the decision of the Circuit Court revises this Agreement in any material way, then either party to this Agreement may terminate the Agreement by providing notice to all parties to this Agreement within 30 days of the date the Circuit Court decision becomes final and all appeals thereof have been finally determined, and, in this event, the other party so notified hereby agrees to mutually consent to the termination and to comply with all applicable laws concerning termination of a DRRA. Any such termination of this Agreement pursuant to this Section 9.12, shall not in any way affect the validity of any Development Approvals which have been obtained for the Project at the time of termination, including, but not limited to, APFO approvals.

Exactly thirty days after the Blentlinger DRRA was recorded, on December 24, 2014, Cleanwater filed in the Circuit Court for Frederick County (“the circuit court”) a petition for judicial review, challenging, among other things, the validity of the PUD Ordinance and the Blentlinger DRRA. On June 8, 2015, Cleanwater filed a memorandum in support of the petition for judicial review. In relevant part, Cleanwater contended that the Blentlinger DRRA was void for lack of consideration because Petitioners had failed to provide “any ‘enhanced public benefits’ as consideration!!.]” Cleanwater further argued that the middle school site was subject to BOE approval, which was uncertain, and that, as such, “[t]here is no guarantee that the school site will be dedicated.” (Emphasis omitted). On August 21, 2015, Petitioners filed a memorandum in opposition to the petition for judicial review.

Petitioners contended, in pertinent part, that the Blentlinger DRRA was supported by “adequate consideration.” Also on August 21, 2015, the County filed a memorandum in response to Cleanwa-ter’s memorandum, arguing that substantial evidence supported the BOCC’s approval of the PUD Ordinance, and that such approval fulfilled the requirements of State and County law. Although the County did not specifically address whether the Blentlinger DRRA was supported by adequate consideration, the County asserted that “[t]he decisions challenged by [Cleanwater, ie., the PUD Ordinance and the Blentlinger DRRA,] were approved by the BOCC based upon substantial evidence in the record and in accordance with applicable requirements of State and County law.” On September 14, 2015, Cleanwater filed a reply memorandum, again contending that the Blentlinger DRRA was not supported by adequate consideration because there was no evidence in the agreement showing that the County provided vested rights in exchange for enhanced public benefits. On September 28, 2015, the circuit court conducted a hearing on the petition for judicial review. On November 4, 2015, the circuit court entered an opinion and order affirming the BOCC’s adoption of the PUD Ordinance and approval of the Blentlinger DRRA.

The circuit court rejected the argument that the Blentlinger DRRA was not supported by adequate consideration, and concluded that the Blentlinger “DRRA imposes both binding obligations and legal detriment to” Petitioners. On December 1, 2015, Cleanwater filed a notice of appeal. On February 3, 2017, in a reported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions to vacate the Blentlinger DRRA. See Cleanwater Linganore, Inc. v. Frederick Cty., 231 Md.App. 620, 625, 643 , 153 A.3d 874, 877, 888 (2017).

In pertinent part, the Court of Special Appeals held that the Blentlinger DRRA was void for lack of consideration because it lacked any enhanced public benefits to the County. See id. at 625, 637 , 153 A.3d at 877, 884 . According to the Court of Special Appeals, many of the provisions of the Blentlinger DRRA do not reflect enhanced obligations of the developer. Rather, they reflect the obligations the developer would otherwise be required to satisfy during the course of the development of the property if no DRRA were in place.

Indeed, the benefits relied upon by the developer (specifically those relating to road, sewer, water improvements, and tap fees) are required of the developer under the County’s [APFO]. Id. at 639-40 , 153 A.3d at 886 . As to the middle school site, the Court of Special Appeals stated that it did not need to “decide whether the conveyance of a middle school site constitutes an enhanced public benefit to” the County, and explained: Because [Petitioners] retain[ ] fee simple ownership of the middle school site if the BOE “does not approve the Public School site or determines not to accept conveyance of the site,” this “benefit,” at the time of execution and recordation of the DRRA, was a conditional promise and potentially an illusory one to boot. Indeed, the offer by [Petitioners] to proffer the property in fee simple is not a definitive compulsory obligation to do anything other than offer the site for a middle school contingent on acceptance by the Board of Education.

Id. at 641, 642 , 153 A.3d at 886, 887 (brackets omitted). The Court of Special Appeals ultimately determined that the Blentlinger DRRA conferred no enhanced public benefit to the County, and concluded: As the developer’s testimony and its counsel’s argument reflects, the public benefit conferred by the [Blentlinger] DRRA consists of the developer’s vested rights in the project and the applicant’s obligations to satisfy ... APFO[ ] infrastructure requirements. Clearly, every development must satisfy APFO requirements regardless of whether a DRRA is executed.

A DRRA, in contrast, requires the applicant to provide some public benefit beyond complying with statutory land use standards and otherwise satisfy [APFO] infrastructure requirements. The [Blentlinger] DRRA [ ] does not require the applicant to unconditionally convey property for a middle school or otherwise provide any extra or enhanced benefit to Frederick County or its citizens. Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, the [Blentlinger] DRRA is void for lack of consideration. Id. at 643 , 153 A.3d at 888 .

Thereafter, Petitioners filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari, raising the following two issues: 1. Did the Court of Special Appeals err by holding that a DRRA, in order to be valid, must include “enhanced public benefits” to the local governing body? 2. Did the Court of Special Appeals err by holding that Petitioners’ proffer of a 24.5 +/- acre school site did not constitute adequate consideration for the DRRA, con-eluding instead that the proffer of the school site was a “conditional promise and potentially an illusory one to boot?” On May 9, 2017, this Court granted the petition. See Blentlinger, LLC v. Cleanwater Linganore, 453 Md. 7 , 160 A.3d 546 (2017).

STANDARD OF REVIEW In Grasslands Plantation, Inc. v. Frizz-King Enters., LLC, 410 Md. 191, 203-04 , 978 A.2d 622, 629 (2009), this Court set forth the standard of review that applies to an administrative agency’s decision, stating: When reviewing the decision of a local zoning body, ... we evaluate directly the agency decision, and, in so doing, we apply the same standards of review as the circuit court and intermediate appellate court. Our role is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency’s findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law. In applying the substantial evidence test, we have emphasized that a court should not substitute its judgment for the expertise of those persons who constitute the administrative agency from which the appeal is taken. Our obligation is to review the agency’s decision in the light most favorable to the agency, since their decisions are prima facie correct and carry with them the presumption of validity.

Even with regard to some legal issues, a degree of deference should often be accorded the position of the administrative agency. Thus, an administrative agency’s interpretation and application of the statute which the agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight by reviewing courts. We are under no constraint, however, to affirm an agency decision premised solely upon an erroneous conclusion of law. (Citations, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted).

See also Cty. Council of Prince George’s Cty. v. Chaney Enters. Ltd. P’ship, 454 Md. 514, 528 , 165 A.3d 379, 387 (2017) (“Judicial review of an administrative agency action is typically limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency’s findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law.” (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). And, in Attar v. DMS Tollgate, LLC, 451 Md. 272, 279 , 152 A.3d 765, 769 (2017), we explained that “we may not substitute our judgment for that of [the administrative agency] unless the agency’s conclusions were not supported by substantial evidence or were premised on an error of law.” (Citation omitted).

Because this case also involves statutory interpretation, we set forth the relevant rules of statutory construction: The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the General Assembly. As this Court has explained, to determine that purpose or policy, we look first to the language of the statute, giving it its natural and ordinary meaning. We do so on the tacit theory that the General Assembly is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant. When the statutory language is clear, we need not look beyond the statutory language to determine the General Assembly’s intent.

If the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written. In addition, we neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words that the General Assembly used or engage in forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute’s meaning. If there is no ambiguity in the language, either inherently or by reference to other relevant laws or circumstances, the inquiry as to legislative intent ends. If the language of the statute is ambiguous, however, then courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives, and the purpose of the enactment under consideration.

We have said that there is an ambiguity within a statute when there exist two or more reasonable alternative interpretations of the statute. When a statute can be interpreted in more than one way, the job of this Court is to resolve that ambiguity in light of the legislative intent, using all the resources and tools of statutory construction at our disposal. If the true legislative intent cannot be readily determined from the statutory language alone, however, we may, and often must, resort to other recognized indicia—among other things, the structure of the statute, including its title; how the statute relates to other laws; the legislative history, including the derivation of the statute, comments and explanations regarding it by authoritative sources during the legislative process, and amendments proposed or added to it; the general purpose behind the statute; and the relative rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions. In construing a statute, we avoid a construction of the statute that is unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense.

In addition, the meaning of the plainest language is controlled by the context in which it appears. As this Court has stated, because it is part of the context, related statutes or a statutory scheme that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal must also be considered. Thus, not only are we required to interpret the statute as a whole, but, if appropriate, in the context of the entire statutory scheme of which it is a part. Bellard v. State, 452 Md. 467, 481-82 , 157 A.3d 272, 280-81 (2017) (citation and brackets omitted).

MOTION TO STRIKE In this Court, the County filed a brief contending, for the first time, that to be valid a DRRA must be supported by enhanced public benefits, and arguing that the Blentlinger DRRA does not require any enhanced public benefit, and, thus, is invalid. 7 On brief, the County also asserts that “the absence of an enhanced public benefit has a particularly acute impact on the reserved legislative powers of the County in the present case because the scope of the Blentlinger[ ] DRRA exceeds that authorized by” the DRRA statute. The County maintains that Section 8.1 A of the Blentlinger DRRA—ie., the “freeze provision”—exceeds the County’s authority under the DRRA statute. Petitioners filed in this Court a motion to strike the County’s brief and a memorandum in support, contending, in pertinent part, that the County is judicially estopped from arguing that the Blentlinger DRRA is invalid and that the County’s contention concerning the freeze provision of the Blentlinger DRRA is not properly before the Court. Specifically, Petitioners assert that, in the circuit court and the Court of Special Appeals, the County contended that the Blentlinger DRRA is valid; as such, Petitioners maintain that the County is judicially estopped from now changing its position and arguing that the Blentlinger DRRA is invalid.

Petitioners also contend that any issue as to the freeze provision is not before this Court because the issue was not raised in a petition for a writ of certiorari or a cross-petition. The County filed an opposition to the motion to strike, contending that judicial estoppel applies only where three circumstances are present, including where a party takes a factual position that is inconsistent with a position that it took in previous litigation. The County argues that it has not taken a factual position that is inconsistent with one that it took in previous litigation, and asserts that its change in position in the same litigation relates to the legal requirements governing the validity of a DRRA. The County maintains that it “raised the discussion of the freeze provision of the [Blentlinger] DRRA, not to create a separate issue for this Court to decide, but for the purpose of showing that the prejudice to the County of not requiring a DRRA to contain enhanced public benefits is particularly acute[.]” Cleanwater also filed an opposition to the motion to strike “jointing] in” the County’s opposition.

On August 30, 2017, this Court issued an order providing “that action on the motion [to strike] be, and it is hereby, deferred pending oral argument.” We now address the motion to strike, and we deny the motion. It is undisputed that, up until proceedings in this Court, in the circuit court and the Court of Special Appeals, the County took the position that the Blentlinger DRAA is valid. Indeed, on brief, the County readily acknowledges that in arguing that the Blent-linger DRRA is invalid it “has changed its position in this case from that which it argued before the [circuit [c]ourt and [the] Court of Special Appeals.” Judicial estoppel has been defined as “a principle that precludes a party from taking a position in a subsequent action inconsistent with a position taken by him or her in a previous action.” Dashiell v. Meeks, 396 Md. 149, 170 , 913 A.2d 10, 22 (2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[J]udicial estoppel applies when it becomes necessary to protect the integrity of the judicial system from one party who is attempting to gain an unfair advantage over another party by manipulating the court system.” Id. at 171 , 913 A.2d at 23 . To that end, [b]efore judicial estoppel may be applied, three circumstances must exist: (1) one of the parties takes a [ ] position that is inconsistent with a position it took in previous litigation, (2) the previous inconsistent position was accepted by a court, and (3) the party who is maintaining the inconsistent positions must have intentionally misled the court in order to gain an unfair advantage.

Id. at 171 , 913 A.2d at 22 (citation omitted). In Underwood-Gary v. Mathews, 366 Md. 660 , 667 n.6, 786 A.2d 708 , 712 n.6 (2001), this Court noted that “[¿judicial estoppel has been defined as a principle that precludes a party from taking a position in a subsequent action inconsistent with a position taken by him or her in a previous action.” (Emphasis added) (citation omitted). And, in Mona v. Mona Elec. Grp., Inc., 176 Md.App. 672, 726 , 934 A.2d 460 , 481 (2007), reconsideration denied (Nov. 26, 2007), the Court of Special Appeals concluded that judicial estoppel did not apply, explaining, in relevant part: Mark’s claim in this case ... is not inconsistent with any position taken in previous litigation.

Indeed, there was no “previous litigation.” Instead of pointing to previous litigation in which Mark took an inconsistent position, MEG complains that Mark took inconsistent positions within this litigation. Specifically, MEG argues that, at the outset of this case, Mark alleged that MEG was legally obligated to pay a dividend in order to cover any debts he owed to MEG, but that assertion is inconsistent with Mark’s later assertion that MEG acted illegally in making deductions from those dividends to cover his alleged debts. As MEG acknowledges, however, any inconsistency in Mark’s position occurred within this litigation. Accordingly, the doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply.

(Emphasis in original). In other words, judicial estoppel applies where a party takes a position in subsequent litigation that is inconsistent with one taken in previous litigation, not where a party takes an inconsistent position within the same litigation. Here, we conclude that the prerequisites that must exist before judicial estoppel may be applied are not satisfied. In our view, the County’s change in position occurs in the same litigation; in other words, the County did not take a position in a previous action or litigation and then change that position in new litigation.

And, there is no evidence whatsoever in the record that the County intentionally misled the court to gain an unfair advantage. Given that the first and third prerequisites for the application of judicial estoppel are not established, we need not address the remaining circumstance, i.e., whether the previous inconsistent position was accepted by the court. As to the contention that the County is raising a new issue concerning the validity of the freeze provision and that the issue is not properly before the Court, to the extent that the County is raising such an issue, we shall decline to consider any question as to the validity of the freeze provision in the Blentlinger DRRA. Notably, the County contends that it is not challenging the validity of the freeze provision, but rather it is arguing that the existence of the freeze provision is prejudicial in light of the alleged lack of adequate consideration, ie., enhanced public benefits.

Nonetheless, we observe that none of the parties raised any issue as to the validity of the freeze provision in a petition for a writ of certiorari or a cross-petition. Accordingly, the issue is not properly before this Court. See Md. R. S—131(b)(1) (“Unless otherwise provided by the order granting the writ of certiorari, in reviewing a decision rendered by the Court of Special Appeals ..., the Court of Appeals ordinarily will consider only an issue that has been raised in the petition for certiorari or any cross-petition and that has been preserved for review by the Court of Appeals.”); Vito v. Grueff, 453 Md. 88 , 126 n.9, 160 A.3d 592 , 614 n.9 (2017) (This Court noted that an “issue was not squarely addressed by the circuit court, nor raised by [the party] in a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari. Thus, the issue is not properly preserved for our review.”).

To the extent that any issue as to the freeze provision is, as the County posits, simply a point made in support of the contention that, in order to be valid, a DRRA must be supported by enhanced public benefits, there is no reason to grant the motion to strike the County’s brief on that ground. As a final point, Petitioners argue that the County’s brief should be stricken because the County relies on facts and exhibits outside of the record—specifically, facts about the 2014 County election. Although information about the 2014 County elections is included in the County’s brief ostensibly to explain its change in position with respect to the validity of the Blentlinger DRRA, because that information is not relevant to the issues before the Court in this case, we need not consider it. As such, we conclude that the inclusion of information regarding the 2014 election does not warrant granting the motion to strike.

DISCUSSION 8 The Parties’ Contentions Petitioners contend that to be valid a DRRA need not include a provision requiring that enhanced public benefits be bestowed upon a local governing body, and, thus, the BOCC did not err in approving the Blentlinger DRRA, as there was sufficient consideration. Petitioners argue that neither the plain language of the DRRA statute, nor the County’s statutes governing DRRAs, nor the legislative history of the DRRA statute, includes the term “enhanced public benefits” or requires that a DRRA include enhanced public benefits. Petitioners assert that, because the DRRA statute and the County’s statutes governing DRRAs are unambiguous and clearly do not require a DRRA to include enhanced public benefits to a local governing body, our analysis should end there. Petitioners maintain that Court of Special Appeals’s reliance on Queen Anne’s Conservation, Inc. v. Cty.

Comm’rs of Queen Anne’s Cty., 382 Md. 306, 322 , 855 A.2d 325, 334 (2004), is misplaced because that case did not address the consideration that is needed for a DRRA to be valid and mentioned the term “enhanced public benefits” only in dicta. Petitioners assert that they have undertaken “significant commitments” in the Blentlinger DRRA, including the proffer of the middle school site, as well as detriments, which constitute sufficient consideration for the Blentlinger DRRA. Petitioners maintain that the Blentlinger DRRA creates binding obligations on them that provide many benefits to the County, including, for example, Petitioners’ agreement to pay school impact fees, as well as pay water and sewer capacity fees, and Petitioners’ agreement to secure public rights-of-way from third-party property owners without assistance from the County. Petitioners contend that the County also received other benefits, such as “certainty as to the timing and scope of the development of the project over the span of twenty-five [ ] years.” Petitioners argue that, in addition to being subjected to binding obligations, they incurred detriments under the Blentlinger DRRA, including, for example, a limit on the number of residential dwelling units to be built, and a waiver of the right to challenge the Blentlinger DRRA or any of its obligations on the ground of any procedural infirmity or any denial of a procedural right.

Petitioners assert that the middle school site proffer is an additional benefit to the County and the BOE, and serves as additional consideration supporting the Blentlinger DRRA. Petitioners maintain that even a conditional promise constitutes consideration for a contract, and that their promise to proffer the middle school site constitutes consideration for the Blentlinger DRRA. Cleanwater responds that the plain language and legislative history of the DRRA statute, as well as case law, lead to the conclusion that enhanced public benefits as consideration are required for a DRRA to be valid. Specifically, Cleanwater contends that LU § 7—303(a)(9) requires the local governing body to obtain enhanced public benefits from the developer in exchange for conferring vested rights.

Cleanwater argues that enhanced public benefits are benefits, “secured in the public interest, in excess of those that a developer would be required to provide in the ordinary course of development.” Cleanwater asserts that, in Queen Anne’s Conservation, 382 Md. at 322 , 855 A.2d at 334 , this Court expressly stated that a DRRA must be made “in consideration of enhanced public benefits!!,]” which is consistent with the DRRA statute’s legislative history. Cleanwater contends that the Court of Special Appeals correctly held that the Blentlinger DRRA was not supported by sufficient consideration due to the lack of an enhanced public benefit to the County. Cleanwater argues that the middle school site proffer does not constitute consideration because it was a condition of rezoning, and would have been required even absent a DRRA. Cleanwater asserts that, because the middle school site was required for Petitioners to secure rezoning of the Property, the middle school site did not serve as an enhanced public benefit given in exchange for the Blentlinger DRRA.

Cleanwater also maintains that the other benefits identified by Petitioners are required under the APFO and other statutes, and thus do not constitute enhanced public benefits. In sum, Cleanwater contends that the County received nothing from Petitioners in exchange for the Blent-linger DRRA, and that, as such, the Blentlinger DRRA is “void for lack of consideration (ie., enhanced public benefits).” Like Cleanwater, the County responds that a DRRA must bestow enhanced public benefits upon a local governing body. Also like Cleanwater, the County relies on Queen Anne’s Conservation to support its position, and argues that the Blentlinger DRRA imposes no obligation on Petitioners that the PUD Ordinance did not already impose, and does not impose any obligation on Petitioners that is not otherwise required by law. Consideration for Contracts In Cheek v. United Healthcare of Mid-Atl., Inc., 378 Md. 139, 147-49 , 835 A.2d 656, 661-62 (2003), we discussed consideration for a contract in some detail, stating: To be binding and enforceable, contracts ordinarily require consideration.

In Maryland, consideration may be established by showing a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee. In particular, we have recognized that for[ ]bearance to exercise a right or pursue a claim, can constitute sufficient consideration to support an agreement. A promise becomes consideration for another promise only when it constitutes a binding obligation. Without a binding obligation, sufficient consideration does not exist to support a legally enforceable agreement.

An illusory promise appears to be a promise, but it does not actually bind or obligate the promisor to anything. An illusory promise is composed of words in a promissory form that promise nothing. They do not purport to put any limitation on the freedom of the alleged promisor. If A makes an illusory promise, A’s words leave A’s future action subject to A’s own future whim, just as it would have been had A said nothing at all.

Similarly, the Restatement of Contracts explains that words of promise which by their terms make performance entirely optional with the promi-sor whatever may happen, or whatever course of conduct in other respects he may pursue, do not constitute a promise. Likewise, the promise is too indefinite for legal enforcement is the promise where the promisor retains an unlimited right to decide later the nature or extent of his performance. The unlimited choice in effect destroys the promise and makes it merely illusory. (Citations, brackets, ellipsis, and internal quotation marks omitted).

See also Cty. Comm’rs for Carroll Cty. v. Forty W. Builders, Inc., 178 Md.App. 328, 384-85 , 941 A.2d 1181, 1213 , cert. denied, 405 Md. 63 , 949 A.2d 652 (2008) (“In Maryland, consideration may be established by showing a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee.” (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). And, in Vogelhut v. Kandel, 308 Md. 183, 190-91 , 517 A.2d 1092, 1096 (1986), we stated that “[i]t is basic contract law that courts generally will not inquire as to the adequacy of consideration!;,]” explaining: The policy behind this rule was best expressed [in a previous ease]: It is not the province of the Courts to interfere with the natural right of parties to contract, and to exercise their own will and judgment upon the subject; and they will have the power to estimate the value of the consideration and the benefits to be derived from their contracts, where there is no incompetency to contract, no fraud or surprise, and no rule of law is violated. It follows, therefore, that anything which fulfills the requirement of consideration, that is, one recognized as legal, will support a promise, whatever may be the comparative value of the consideration and of the thing promised.

A benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee is sufficient valuable consideration to support a contract. Legal detriment means giving up something which immediately prior thereto the promisee was privileged to retain, or doing or refraining from doing something which he was then privileged not to do, or not to refrain from doing. (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Requirements of DRRAs LU § 7-303 sets forth both the required and permissible contents of a DRRA, providing in full as follows: (a) Required contents.—A development rights and responsibilities agreement shall include: (1) a legal description of the real property subject to the agreement; (2) the names of the persons having a legal or equitable interest in the real property subject to the agreement; (3) the duration of the