Lindsey v. State

Panel: Leahy, Reed, Shaw Geter, JJ. Shaw Geter, J. ³⁰⁴ Appellant, Marcus Jamal Lindsey, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County of second-degree assault and two counts of human trafficking. The court sentenced appellant to twenty years in prison for one count of human trafficking, and to concurrent ten-year sentences on the remaining counts. Appellant presents the following questions for our review, the first of which we have rephrased: 1.

Was the evidence sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction for human trafficking for placing or causing another to be placed in the hotel for prostitution? 1 ³⁰⁵ 2. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion by instructing the jury, in response to a jury note, that one count of human trafficking related to ⁷⁴⁵ alleged conduct "on or about March 3, 2016," rather than " on March 3, 2016?" 3. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the defense to play recordings of jail telephone calls involving [appellant]? 4. Did the circuit court err in barring the defense from introducing evidence that the woman whom appellant allegedly forced into prostitution was engaging in prostitution while appellant was in jail? 5.

Did the circuit court abuse its discretion by failing to clearly delineate the elements of human trafficking in the jury instructions? For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgments of the circuit court. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The State alleged that appellant took S.S. 2 to a hotel room in Rockville, attempted to force her to have sex with someone, and struck her in the face. S.S. did not testify.

The defense's theory of the case was that S.S. was appellant's girlfriend, and that she prostituted against his wishes. With respect to the second-degree assault charge, appellant admitted that he hit S.S. in the face during an argument in the hotel room, but claimed that he did so in self-defense. Solange Kpela, a housekeeper at the Radisson hotel in Rockville, testified that on March 3, 2016, she was cleaning the hallway of the second floor of the hotel when she heard a man and woman arguing and "struggling" inside room 201. Ms. Kpela explained: It sound-normally when you come in the hotel, what caught my attention, that part is to have fun, but it was something like struggling.

The male was saying, who are ³⁰⁶ you going to talk to. The lady was screaming, get away from me, you lied to me. * * * It was like, you are a hook-like this embarrasses me-you are a hook, you deserve it, who are you going to talk to. And it was back and forth. The lady was screaming, leave me alone, get away from me, stuff like that.

Ms. Kpela's first instinct was to get help for the woman. Before going to the front desk to report the incident, however, she decided to first record the argument by using her cell phone. The cell phone recording was played for the jury and admitted into evidence. Sounds of a struggle can be heard in the recording, and a female voice saying, "Marcus, stop it.

No, no, no. No. No," and "He didn't mean anything." Sandra Liuzzi, the catering sales manager at the Radisson, testified that she was at the front desk of the hotel on March 3, 2016, when a female guest approached her appearing "very frightened," "crying," and "extremely upset." Ms. Liuzzi tried to calm the guest down so that she could figure out what the problem was and get her help if she needed it. According to Ms. Liuzzi, the guest stated that "someone had hurt her," "assaulted her in some way," and that "someone was trying to make her have sex with someone." As Ms. Liuzzi was picking up the phone to call 911, the guest said, "oh my god...there he is." The man then began to approach them, but once he noticed that Ms. Liuzzi was making a phone call, he walked away. During this time, Ms. Kpela also approached Ms. Liuzzi at the front desk appearing very upset and insistent that she needed to speak with Ms. Liuzzi. ⁷⁴⁶ Ms. Liuzzi called 911, and the 911 recording was played for the jury and admitted into evidence.

In the call, Ms. Liuzzi stated to the dispatcher that a guest had been "beaten up" by "[appellant]." On cross-examination, Ms. Liuzzi acknowledged that she did not state to the 911 dispatcher that the guest had told her that someone had forced the guest to have sex, because, she explained, her goal was "just to get the police there as quickly as possible." ³⁰⁷ Rockville City Police Officer Tibbs 3 responded to the Radisson. Upon arrival, he encountered S.S., whom he observed to have a bruise on her right eye. S.S. advised Officer Tibbs that she had no identification, no wallet, and no cell phone. Montgomery County Police Detective Molly Stone of the Vice and Intelligence Unit, the lead investigator assigned to the case, arrived at the Radisson and encountered S.S., whom she observed had a "swollen mark" under her right eye and redness on the left side of her face.

The hotel folio records indicated that Kelly Nost had checked-in to the hotel and signed for the room by providing her address and phone number. The second page of the hotel folio record contained a photograph of a driver's license for Cicley Ann Lindsey-Asmani ("Ms. Asmani"), indicating that she was the individual who had rented the room. Ms. Asmani is appellant's mother. After speaking with S.S. for approximately one hour, Detective Stone accompanied her to room 201, where S.S. retrieved some clothing items and commented that appellant had taken other things from the room.

Police photographs of room 201 were introduced into evidence showing boxes of condoms, condom wrappers, condoms in the nightstand drawer, a large piece of braided hair on the floor, a cell phone in a box, a sheet of paper with a list of phone numbers, and a Verizon phone bill addressed to Ms. Asmani. S.S. directed Detective Stone to the website, "Backpage.com," where the detective located escort advertisements for S.S. and Ms. Nost by using the phone number that Ms. Nost had provided to the hotel at check-in. Print-outs of those ads were introduced into evidence. On cross-examination, Detective Stone testified that the escort ads for S.S. and Ms. Nost were associated with the e-mail addresses, "braman5, or something along those lines," and "[email protected]." On April 1, 2016, appellant was arrested at an extended stay hotel in Germantown, where he had been staying with S.S. ³⁰⁸ Montgomery County Police Detective Nicholas Jerman of the Vice and Intelligence Unit interviewed S.S. at the hotel.

Detective Jerman testified that S.S. informed him that she had posted her own ads on Backpage.com using the e-mails, "bramanfifthfloor" and "[email protected]." According to the detective, when he asked S.S. if appellant had told her to post the ads, she replied, "He never forces me to do anything. He don't even want me to do this, so I mean I can take the blame." Detective Jerman further testified that it is common for prostitutes to take the blame for their pimps. S.S.'s mother testified that she and her husband adopted S.S. when she was three-years-old, and that S.S. had not lived with them since she was sixteen-years-old. She testified that she had previously assisted with her daughter's placement in a group home, but that she had not spoken to her daughter in over three months, and that she did not know her daughter's current whereabouts. ⁷⁴⁷ Ms. Asmani and Nicole Lindsey, appellant's sister, each testified that S.S. and appellant had been dating, and that S.S. was the cousin of appellant's children's mother.

Ms. Asmani testified that she rented the room at the Radisson so that appellant could be close to the hospital where his son was being delivered because appellant was homeless and he needed a place stay to so that "he can get cleaned up, go visit his son." Ms. Asmani did not visit the hotel room that she rented for appellant. Following appellant's arrest in this case, Ms. Asmani continued to communicate with S.S., and allowed S.S. to live with her for approximately one week. The defense introduced copies of text messages between Ms. Asmani and S.S. in which Ms. Asmani asked S.S. why she lied to police by telling them that appellant had forced her to prostitute. S.S. responded by text message, saying that she had acted "out of the heat" of a "moment of anger" because she was mad that Ms. Nost was there and that she was "influencing him too much." Appellant testified that he brought S.S. to the Radisson hotel with him to be near the hospital where his son was being ³⁰⁹ delivered.

Appellant stated that S.S. was his girlfriend, that she was a prostitute, and that he had brought her to the hotel for "his reason." He stated that Ms. Nost was also a prostitute, and that S.S. had invited her to the hotel room, and that although he knew that both women had engaged in prostitution in the hotel room, he was not present in the room when they did so. According to appellant, the physical altercation between him and S.S. at the Radisson on March 3, 2016, was precipitated by a sexual encounter on the previous day involving himself, S.S., and Ms. Nost, during which S.S. was unhappy that he was not showing her enough attention. Appellant admitted that on March 3, 2016, he hit S.S. in the face after she had "yanked" his hair. Appellant acknowledged that he grabbed S.S. to keep her from leaving the room, but stated that it was not because he was forcing her to engage in prostitution.

He explained that he was trying to keep her from calling the police because he had outstanding warrants for a probation violation, and he feared that he would be arrested if the police were called. On cross-examination, appellant acknowledged that in the weeks leading up to March 3, 2016, he and S.S. stayed at ten different hotels in the Washington, D.C. and Baltimore area, for one or two nights on average. Appellant explained that he did this because he was homeless. Appellant had received a tax refund that he used to stay in these hotels, and he booked the hotels online to take advantage of discounted prices.

In response to the prosecutor's question as to whether S.S.'s escort ad was posted on Backpage.com during the two-week time period prior to March 3, 2016, appellant responded that it was not posted the "entire time," explaining: [W]hen my tax money had run out, that's when she said we start sleeping in stairwells, and stuff like that. So, she was like she's not going to live like that, and she, I guess she just started [prostituting]. Appellant was aware that S.S. was posted as an escort on Backpage.com on March 3, 2016. Appellant admitted that "[email protected]" is his e-mail account, but stated ³¹⁰ that S.S. had access to his e-mail account because their electronic devices were linked to the same iCloud account.

Appellant was aware that S.S. was engaged in prostitution in the Radisson hotel room. He testified that he did not make S.S. prostitute, he did not receive any money or financial benefit from her prostitution, and he did not place her in the ⁷⁴⁸ Radisson for prostitution. He stated that he "didn't like her doing it," and "didn't want her doing it at all" because he "didn't want to be involved with it." We shall provide additional facts as necessitated by our discussion of the issues presented. DISCUSSION I. Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for human trafficking by "knowingly harboring, taking, placing or causing another to be placed in any place for prostitution" under Maryland Code, Section 11-303(a)(1)(ii) of the Criminal Law Article ("C.L.").

Specifically, appellant claims that the evidence failed to show that he "harbored" S.S. in the hotel for the purpose of prostitution. According to appellant, the evidence "overwhelmingly established" that S.S. was at the hotel "voluntarily, and for purposes unrelated to prostitution." The State responds that the evidence was sufficient to show that appellant brought S.S. to the hotel room for the purpose of prostitution. Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to his convictions for human trafficking by force under CL § 11-303(b)(2) and for second-degree assault. We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to determine " 'whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Grimm v. State , 447 Md. 482 , 494-95, 135 A.3d 844 (2016) (quoting Cox v. State , 421 Md. 630 , 656-57, 28 A.3d 687 (2011) ); accord ³¹¹ Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 , 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

In applying that test, "[w]e defer to the fact finder's opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence, and resolve conflicts in the evidence." Neal v. State , 191 Md. App. 297 , 314, 991 A.2d 159 (2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). And, importantly, we defer to any reasonable inferences a jury could have drawn in reaching its verdict, and determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support those inferences. State v. Mayers , 417 Md. 449 , 466, 10 A.3d 782 (2010). This Court does not "inquire into and measure the weight of the evidence to ascertain whether the State has proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, but merely ascertains whether there is any relevant evidence, properly before the jury, legally sufficient to sustain a conviction." Morgan v. State , 134 Md. App. 113 , 126, 759 A.2d 306 (2000) (quoting State v. Devers , 260 Md. 360 , 371, 272 A.2d 794 (1971) ).

Importantly, "it is not the function or duty of the appellate court to undertake a review of the record that would amount to, in essence, a retrial of the case." Mayers , 417 Md. at 466 , 10 A.3d 782 (quoting State v. Albrecht , 336 Md. 475 , 478, 649 A.2d 336 (1994) ). Appellant challenges his conviction for human trafficking under CL § 11-303(a)(1)(ii) which states that "[a] person may not knowingly...place, cause to be placed, or harbor another in any place for prostitution [.]" "Prostitution" is defined as "the performance of a sexual act, sexual contact, or vaginal intercourse for hire." C.L. § 11-301(c). Appellant acknowledged that he "brought [S.S.]" to the hotel "for his reason," and that S.S. was engaged in prostitution in the hotel room. Ms. Kpela testified that she heard a woman screaming in room 201 "leave me alone, get away from me," and the response, "you deserve it, who are you going to talk to?" Immediately thereafter, S.S. was observed to be visibly ⁷⁴⁹ shaken as she sought help from the staff in the hotel lobby.

Photographs of the hotel room showed boxes of condoms, ³¹² condoms in the nightstand, condom wrappers on the floor, and a list of phone numbers. The documentary evidence showed that although Ms. Asmani rented the hotel room, it was Ms. Nost who checked-in to the hotel for appellant. Detective Stone's investigation revealed that the phone number that Ms. Nost provided at check-in was the same phone number associated with S.S.'s Backpage.com account advertising "escort" or prostitution services. Moreover, S.S.'s Backpage.com account was connected to the email address, "[email protected]," which e-mail appellant acknowledged to be his.

Appellant stated that he was aware that S.S. had posted an escort ad on Backpage.com on March 3, 2016. Appellant's explanation for his presence at the Radisson, and his denial of any involvement in S.S.'s prostitution during his stay there, was for the jury to consider and weigh against the other evidence in the case. As we have stated before, "we must give great deference to the trier of facts' opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence, and resolve conflicts in the evidence[.]" Pinkney v. State , 151 Md. App. 311 , 329, 827 A.2d 124 (2003) ; see also Kamara v. State , 184 Md. App. 59 , 79, 964 A.2d 244 (2009) (quoting Dravo v. State , 46 Md. App. 622 , 628, 420 A.2d 1012 (1980) ( "The credibility of the witnesses at trial is of course for the trier of fact [, and] the trier of fact is under no obligation to believe even uncontradicted explanations or denials of an accused")); see also Turner v. State , 192 Md. App. 45 , 81, 993 A.2d 742 (2010) (citation omitted) (observing that the jury is "free to discount or disregard totally [a defendant's] account of the incident"). Based upon the verdicts in this case, it is apparent that the jury did not credit appellant's testimony.

We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction for human trafficking by placing or harboring S.S. in the hotel for prostitution. ³¹³ II. During its deliberations, the jury sent the trial judge a note asking: With regards to the Human Trafficking-Force charge, is this charge limited to-on the day of the incident? Or, is it over the time of [appellant] and [S.S.]'s relation? In response to the jury note, the following discussion ensued among the parties and the court: COURT: [T]he answer is that [appellant] is charged with, all three charges are alleged to have occurred on March 3rd, 2016.

So I'm inclined to respond to this question by advising the jury that [appellant] is alleged to have committed this offense on March 3rd, 2016. [PROSECUTOR]: Would the court be inclined to track the language of the indictment that says on or about March 3rd, 2016? THE COURT: All right. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: May I be heard on that, Your Honor? COURT: Sure. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: This case was presented to the jury on, and it's identified on or about is a way of just in case it's not a different day. That the government wanted to, had the state wanted to charge a continuing course of conduct they could have charged between X date and Y date.

That's often done in indictments, Your Honor. That wasn't done here. On or about means-if we made a mistake, if it happened on ⁷⁵⁰ the 2nd, then it's on or about. This case was presented to the jury as if the events happened on March 3rd.

The whole case was pitched as the March 3rd. So, Your Honor, we'd request that Your Honor go with your initial instinct, that you tell the jury that the date is March 3rd. Thank you. THE COURT: All right.

The response that I'm sending back is, ["A]nswer, it is alleged in count one that [appel ³¹⁴ lant] committed this offense on or about March 3rd, 2016.["] [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, my objection be preserved today. THE COURT: It is on the record. Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to instruct the jury that the first count related to alleged conduct on March 3rd, 2016. He argues that by responding to the jury note that the count related to conduct "on or about" March 3, 2016, the court "implicitly amended the indictment" and "invited the jury to convict [him] of human trafficking that may or may not have occurred in that broader, uncharged time period." The State argues that the court's response to the jury question was a proper exercise of discretion.

The State contends that because the evidence showed that appellant brought S.S. to the Radisson sometime between February 29 and March 3, 2016, the court's response fairly described the dates on which the crime was alleged to occur, as set forth in the indictment. Maryland Rule 4-325(a) requires the court to instruct the jury at the close of the evidence and permits the court to supplement those instructions at a later time, "when appropriate." The decision of whether to supplement the instructions, including an instruction given in response to a jury question, is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed except on a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. Appraicio v. State , 431 Md. 42 , 51, 63 A.3d 599 (2013) (citations omitted). "[T]rial courts have a duty to answer, as directly as possible, the questions posed by jurors." Id. at 53 , 63 A.3d 599 .

In the present case, the evidence showed that the room at the Radisson was rented for appellant from February 29, 2016 until March 3, 2016. The prosecutor included this timeframe in his cross-examination of appellant, when he asked, " on or about March 3rd, 2016, did you place or cause to be placed [S.S.] in a place at the Radisson Hotel for prostitution?" ³¹⁵ Because the evidence showed that appellant took S.S. to the Radisson at some unspecified time between February 29 and March 3, 2016, the court's response to the jury question fairly covered those dates on which the crime, as described in the indictment, was alleged to have occurred. We are unpersuaded by appellant's argument that the court's response to the jury question permitted the jury to convict him for uncharged crimes on dates other than March 3, 2016, for which appellant was provided no opportunity to defend. See Williams v. State , 302 Md. 787 , 791, 490 A.2d 1277 (1985) ( "Every criminal charge must characterize the crime, and provide the defendant with such a description of the particular act alleged to have been committed so as to inform him of the specific conduct with which he is charged, thereby enabling him to defend against the accusation[.]").

Appellant was on notice from the indictment that the criminal offense of human trafficking by force was alleged to have occurred "on or about March 3rd, 2016" and the evidence adduced at trial was consistent with the facts as charged. We perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court's response to the jury note that the first count related to ⁷⁵¹ alleged conduct "on or about March 3rd, 2016." III. Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow him to play excerpts from recorded jail telephone calls in response to evidence of recorded jail calls introduced by the State. Appellant maintains that the doctrine of verbal completeness requires that he be permitted to play excerpts of telephone calls which were "part of one, ongoing conversation" that were "necessary to provide the proper context" for the recordings introduced by the State.

Alternatively, appellant contends that the recordings were admissible to impeach S.S.'s statement that appellant had forced her to have sex with someone at the hotel. The State responds that the excerpts of the recordings that appellant sought to admit were not admissible under the ³¹⁶ doctrine of verbal completeness because they were not a continuation of the calls that the State offered. The State further contends that the statements were not inconsistent with S.S.'s earlier statements, and that any error in excluding the excerpts of the calls was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because there was evidence before the jury that S.S. had made similar inconsistent remarks to other witnesses. The State introduced the following three excerpts from appellant's recorded phone conversations while he was in jail.

The first call from April 7, 2016, involved an unidentified male who told appellant the following: [S]he's not going to be coming back down here, and, and, and, and, not go there, so you should be good. I mean they should, they should be able to, you know, reduce everything, and just finish up your probation or whatever, and then get, get out of there. During an April 11, 2016 call, Ms. Mitchell, the mother of appellant's children and S.S.'s cousin, told appellant, "[S]he's not coming down here," and, "[S]he doesn't even know your court dates, nothing." Also on April 11, 2016, appellant stated the following in a conversation with S.S.: Don't don't be saying where you at, though, just say, just talk, talk codes... Don't be doing all kinds of shit running around, running off with people and shit.

I want to know where you at. In response to the State's evidence of the jail calls, defense counsel argued that he was entitled to play the following portions of three additional recorded telephone calls under the doctrine of verbal completeness: An April 24, 2016 call, during which S.S. stated to appellant, "Baby, I miss you so much. Oh my God. Oh my God.

Wait all I do is talk about you;" An April 28, 2016 call during which appellant told S.S., "I'm the, you know I'm the one that told you to come back down here;" and A July 5, 2016 call during which S.S. told appellant that she was trying to get a house "for us," and appellant commended ³¹⁷ her for "moving up the right way" trying to get a job as a cook and go to school, and the two professed their love for one another. Defense counsel argued to the court in support of the admission of the three jail calls as follows: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: This is a series of ongoing communications between [appellant] and his girlfriend, at the time, who are communicating about a variety of subject matter[s], including whether or not she will be coming back into the state to join him. This conversation is ongoing across several months, and goes well into July-through July ⁷⁵² 5th at least there's discussion of whether she'll be coming back or not. THE COURT: So, how does a call on April 24, April 28, and July 5 apply to a call of April 11 that would make it relevant to the doctrine of completeness?

Usually, it's something that occurs right at the same time. I mean I've seen it in deposition testimony, in prior testimony you want the rest of the statement read to put that statement into context. How does something on April 24, April 2[8] and July 5th relate to something that was said on April 11th? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, we believe the Government's proffering these calls to show or to imply that [appellant] did not want [S.S.] to come back into the area and there are clear implications that that's not the case. Over the course of the conversations with his girlfriend, there were discussions, and there were discussions both ways.

She was coming, or she wasn't coming, it was back and forth. It was a continuing, ongoing long-distance conversation in this relationship between [appellant] and, importantly, the complaining witness who's not present. THE COURT: What's the State's position? [PROSECUTOR]: Self-serving hearsay, Your Honor. Under [ Conyers v. State , 345 Md. 525 , 541, 693 A.2d 781 (1997) ], the doctrine of verbal completeness does not allow evidence that's otherwise inadmissible as hearsay to become ³¹⁸ admissible solely because it's derived from [ ] even if there is [a] single writing or a single conversation.

There are jail calls that occurred weeks, if not months later interspersed with other conversations with other individuals, as well as other conversations with the same individual. The doctrine of completeness just simply doesn't apply; they're attempting to bootstrap favorable statements that [appellant] made at another time into evidence offered for its truth, and that's not what the doctrine envisions. The court rejected appellant's request to admit the April 24-July 11, 2016 calls, finding as follows: Well, the State's seeking to introduce statements made by [appellant], on April 11, and he, clearly is the one making statements. He's responding to statements made by [S.S.].

The statements, on April 24, April 28 and July 5, made by [S.S.] and some comments by the defendant, I do not find that they are statements that fall within the doctrine of completeness for admissibility purposes. In addition, I do not find that these statements are admissible under any theory to allow them to come into evidence. So, I'm going to deny the Defense request to introduce the statements of April 24, April 28, and July 5th. "The common law doctrine of verbal completeness 'allows a party to respond to the admission, by an opponent, of part of a writing or conversation, by admitting the remainder of that writing or conversation.' " Rutherford v. State , 160 Md. App. 311 , 320, 863 A.2d 1031 (2004) (quoting Conyers v. State , 345 Md. 525 , 541, 693 A.2d 781 (1997) ).

This doctrine is codified in Maryland Rule 5-106, which states: When part or all of a writing or recorded statement is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it. ³¹⁹ As the Court of Appeals noted in Conyers , " Maryland Rule 5-106 does not change the requirements for admissibility ⁷⁵³ under the common law doctrine or allow the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence, except to the extent that it is necessary, in fairness, to explain what the opposing party has elicited." 345 Md. at 541 , 693 A.2d 781 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court then identified the three requirements for admissibility under the doctrine of completeness: (a) No utterance irrelevant to the issue is receivable; (b) No more of the remainder of the utterance than concerns the same subject, and is explanatory of the first part, is receivable; (c) The remainder thus received merely aids in the construction of the utterance as a whole, and is not in itself testimony. Id. at 541-42 , 693 A.2d 781 (citation omitted). Additionally, the doctrine of verbal completeness is subject to the rules of evidence: the utterance must be relevant, its prejudice must not outweigh its probative value, and the doctrine does not allow into evidence an utterance that is otherwise inadmissible hearsay to become admissible solely because it is derived from a single writing or conversation.

Id. at 542, 545 , 693 A.2d 781 ; see also Rutherford , 160 Md. App. at 320 , 863 A.2d 1031 . Generally, the statements sought to be admitted under the doctrine of verbal completeness are part of a single writing or conversation. The Court of Appeals has recognized, however, that "[i]n an appropriate circumstance [ ] the doctrine would permit the admission of a separate writing or conversation to place in context a previously-admitted writing or conversation." Conyers , 345 Md. at 542 , 693 A.2d 781 (emphasis omitted). In Conyers , a State's witness testified that appellant owned two handguns.

Id. at 543 , 693 A.2d 781 . The defense sought to cross-examine the witness about a conversation that she had with appellant in which he told her that he had given the guns to someone else prior to the murder. Id. Defense counsel ³²⁰ argued that the