Littig v. Vestry of Mount Calvary Protestant Episcopal Church

Fowler, J., delivered the opinion of the Court; . The bill in this case was filed by Ward P. Littig, executor of Kate Littig for the purpose of having a sum of money deposited in the Provident Savings Bank of Baltimore decreed to be a part of her estate. The defendants, the Vestry of Mt. Calvary Church and the Savings Bank, failed to answer.

A decree pro confesso was obtained, testimony was taken and the case was referred to Alexander H. Robertson, Esq., Auditor and Master, who subsequently filed a report holding that the fund in bank should be paid to the plaintiff as executor but that it was impressed with a trust in favor of the defendant church, and he recommended that a decree be passed directing the fund to be paid over to the plaintiff, to be by him held ⁴⁹⁵ in trust for and paid to said church. A decree was passed in accordance with this recommendation, and the plaintiff appealed. The facts are few and may be briefly stated. Miss Littig opened an account with the Provident Savings Bank of Baltimore.

The bill alleges and the testimony shows that the entry on the books of the bank is as follows: “Mt. Calvary Protestant Episcopal Church, subject to the order of Kate Littig, trustee, $500.” If this were all there could be no question whatever that this entry amounts to a declaration of trust in favor of the church. In the case of Milholland v. Whalen, 89 Md. 212 , the entry upon the books of the bank was “in account with Miss Elizabeth O’Neill in trust for herself and Mrs. Mary Whalen, joint owners, subject to the order of either, the balance at the death of either to belong to the survivor.” It was held that Mrs. Whalen as cestui que trust was entitled to the fund. In the course of the opinion delivered by the present Chief Justice it is said: “In Maryland it is not requisite that the cestui que trust should be notified of the declaration or establishment of the trust.

It is the donor’s act which originates the trust and it is the intention with which he does the act that is material. The entry unexplained is a sufficient declaration of trust, because it indicates an intention to establish a trust; but this may be rebutted.” And again quoting from Jones v. Lock, L. R. 1 Chy. App. 25, it is said : “The authorities all turn upon the question whether what took place was a declaration of trust