Livers v. Ardinger

Page, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case the motion to dismiss the appeal must prevail. ³⁷ The forty-first rule of the Circuit Court for Washington County, provides that every exception must be noted at the time of the ruling made, but may be reduced to writing and submitted to the Judge or Judges for his or their signature, within a reasonable time after the trial. It further provides, that “in every case, unless otherwise expressly allowed by the Court, the bill of exceptions shall be prepared and submitted to the Court during the sittings of the term at which such exception shall be taken.” Ever since the statute of Westminster 2nd, the principle that “no bill of exceptions is valid, which is not for matter excepted to at the trial,” has been well settled; and also, that it was " seasonably taken ” must appear affirmatively therein, is equally well settled. Balt.

Building Asso., &c., v. Grant, 41 Md. 564 ; U. S. v. Carey, 110 U. S. 51 . The reduction of the exception to proper form may, however, be deferred to some more convenient time after the trial, but in the absence of a special rule it must be presented for the signature of the Court, within and during the same term at which it was taken. State, use of James v. Kent Co., 83 Md. 384 . To these requirements respecting the period, during which bills of exception may be presented to the Court for its signature, the rule of the Washington County Court adds another ; viz., that in every case, the bills of exception shall be submitted to the Court, “ during the sittings of the term ” at which it shall be noted.

In the case of Schulze v. Fox, 53 Md. 40 , which was an appeal from the Baltimore City Court, where there was a rule of Court requiring bills of exceptions to be submitted to the Court during the sittings of the Court, unless otherwise expressly allowed, the case was tried at the January term, and on the morning of Monday, the twelfth of May, which was the first day of the following term and before the calling of the May term, the Court, upon application, passed an order extending the time to prepare and file the exception. Upon these facts the Court held that there was “ nothing to show that the ³⁸ sittings of the January term did not continue during the whole term, and the question therefore is, was the order extending the time passed during the term. ” In the case at bar, there is no order of the Court extending the time, and therefore the only question is, was the Court for Washington County “sitting” within the meaning of the rule, on the tenth day of April, the day on which the bills of exception were presented to the Judges for their approval and signature. How then must the phrase, “ during the sittings of the term ” as employed in the rule, be construed ? An inspection of the record will show that the February term of the Washington County Court was never formally adjourned until the May term actually began.

After the continuous sittings from day to day ceased; after the jury was discharged for the term, and presumably after the general business, as indicated by the calendar, had been disposed of, there were sittings on special days, during which special matters were attended to; as for instance, on one occasion, a motion to quash was heard; on another, several parties were sentenced to