Long v. Runyeon

Smith, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. We shall hold in this case that a District Court judge ⁴²⁶ improperly attempted to force a settlement. We recognize, however, that in Chertkof v. Harry C. Weiskittel Co., 251 Md. 544, 550 , 248 A. 2d 373 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U. S. 974 (1969), Chief Judge Hammond for the Court referred to the fact that courts look with favor upon the compromise or settlement of law suits in the interest of efficient and economical administration of justice and the lessening of friction and acrimony. He pointed out that often a trial judge can be the catalyst in producing such a settlement.

Appellee, Richard L. Runyeon, married the granddaughter of appellant, Maurice L. Long. They desired to purchase a home. Mr. Long loaned them the sum of $5,000 for use as a down payment, taking in return a note for that amount. It specified that it was to bear interest at 5% and should be payable in monthly installments of $100.

This apparently was modified by agreement of the parties by adoption of an amortization schedule under which $94.36 per month would be paid, including principal and interest at 5%, for five years. Mr. and Mrs. Runyeon separated. About a year after this money was borrowed they entered into an agreement relative to their property rights. Under it title to the land in question was transferred to Mr. Runyeon.

He agreed to pay the monthly payments to Mr. Long until the indebtedness was liquidated. He continued such payments, however, for only about three months after the agreement was signed. Mr. Long brought suit in the District Court of Maryland in Baltimore County for the sum due him. Mr. Runyeon appeared at trial.

Several attempts at settlement were made at the instance of the court, including a conference between counsel, Mr. Runyeon, and the judge in chambers. After the last such conference, counsel for Mr. Runyeon was asked whether there was a defense. He said, “Defense rests.” The judge then said: All right, the court is prepared to enter judgment for — in excess of $4,000. The court, however looks to Mr. Dugan’s client [i.e.

Mr. Runyeon] and acquaints him with the fact that under our law you could, within 30 days file an appeal, but that involves certain financial hardships in that a transcript of this ⁴²⁷ trial would have to be made. I assume Mr. Dugan is not in the habit of working for nothing, so financial hardships would come in from that aspect, and the case would have to be reviewed by the Circuit Court. I can not tell you what the Circuit Court would do with it. On the other hand, the Circuit Court is bound under our rules by findings of fact read into the record by the judge, and I am prepared to read into the record various findings of fact on this case.

Now, based upon those findings, I have to, trained in law, feel that the court will probably sustain the judgment entered in this court and then you end up with a lot of expense and out of pocket a lot of money and still a judgment. Do you want — would you favor my giving you a five or ten minute opportunity to work something out with the other side? If so you’d better tell Mr. Dugan to ask me to hold off entering a ruling. With that, counsel for Mr. Runyeon asked for an opportunity to confer with his client again.

Further negotiations took place, after which counsel for Runyeon informed the court that the parties “were very close on the amount for settlement, but the plaintiff was demanding a lump sum payment, at the present time, [but his] client [was] only in a position to make an agreement for monthly payments on the amount.” To this the judge retorted that the plaintiff was clearly wrong to demand a lump sum payment, because he should not be asking for any more than he would get by way of judgment and that would be a judgment upon which it would be necessary to execute, with no guaranty of a lump sum payment. He added, “And if that’s what’s holding you up I think you are wrong.” Counsel for Long then suggested that there might be some middle ground. After further negotiations the trial court gave Mr. Runyeon the choice of his entering up a consent judgment for $2,250 to be paid monthly or his entering a consent judgment for less if Mr. Runyeon “c[a]me up with no less than $300 cash within two weeks time.” Counsel for Mr. Long does not ⁴²⁸ appear to have been involved, although he was present. Mr. Runyeon agreed, according to the trial judge, “To come up with $300 cash [to] be paid to [counsel for Mr. Long] within three weeks,” after which the judge said he would hold the case sub curia and would enter a consent judgment in the amount of $1,825 “as soon as that $300 has been paid,” the judgment to carry interest and to have provision for the payment of $12 court costs.

Mr. Runyeon was asked if he would consent. He said he would, after which the record