Longshore v. State

BELL, Chief Judge. In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that a police officer may stop and detain a person briefly for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that criminal activity “may be afoot.” 392 U.S. 1, 30 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 911 (1968); see also Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430, 433 , 572 A.2d 1086, 1087-1088 (1990), Anderson v. State, 282 Md. 701, 706 , 387 A.2d 281, 284 (1978) (“[T]he real thrust of Terry is directed at instances in which there is reasonable suspicion that someone is about to commit or has just committed a crime”). In this case, we again consider under what circumstances a brief detention or investigative stop becomes a de facto arrest, for the justification of which, rather than mere reasonable articulable suspicion, probable cause must be shown. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1989) (explaining that reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause); see also Quince, 319 Md. 430, 433 , 572 A.2d 1086, 1088 (holding that the level of suspicion required for a stop is less demanding than that for probable cause), Watkins v. State, 288 Md. 597, 606 , 420 A.2d 270, 275 (1980) (holding that the reasonable suspicion justifying an investigative stop involves a significantly lower degree of objective evidentiary justification than does a probable cause for arrest).

I. In the case sub judice, the Charles County Sheriffs Department received a tip from a confidential informant. Claiming that he had both witnessed and videotaped a drug transaction ⁴⁹⁵ in front of the Saint Charles Towne Mall, the informant produced a videotape showing two men, John Carlson, and the petitioner, Reginald Longshore (“Longshore”), get into a Ford Expedition, which was parked in the mall parking lot and remain there for a short time, while a third person stood by the driver’s door. No drugs, paraphernalia, or money could be seen on the videotape. The police detective, Smith, nonetheless, set up surveillance at the mall and with regard to Carlson’s vehicle, a Toyota.

Longshore drove away from and, a short time later returned to, the mall. Upon his return, he was followed into the mall by a second detective, Clark, who then observed him meeting with the two people with whom he earlier had been seen, and recorded, in the videotape. As was the case in the videotape, although the three people were together, no drugs actually were observed on this occasion. When Carlson drove away from the mall, his car was stopped by the police.

He consented to being searched. According to the officers, uncovered in the search was a “quantity of marijuana and cocaine.” 1 At about the same time, a certified drug sniffing dog, Tonya, was brought to the mall to scan Longshore’s Ford Expedition, which was again parked on the mall parking lot. Longshore was, at the time, still inside the mall. Tonya scanned Long-shore’s Expedition and two other cars in the parking lot, with negative results; Tonya did not alert to the presence of any drugs in any of the cars.

Subsequently, Longshore left the mall, driving his Expedition. He was stopped by a third detective, Detective Edge. Detective Edge informed Longshore that he believed that there were drugs in his vehicle. When Longshore declined to consent to a search of the vehicle, Detective Edge, although aware of the prior negative scan, called for Tonya to scan the ⁴⁹⁶ Expedition again.

While waiting for Tonya to arrive, Long-shore was placed in handcuffs. Tonya arrived within two minutes and the scan was conducted. During this second scan, the driver’s side window was down, and, as with the first one, the engine was turned off. Upon scanning the exterior of the vehicle, this time, Tonya alerted, indicating the presence of drugs in the area of the rear “wheel well underneath the vehicle.” A subsequent search uncovered no drugs in the rear area of the vehicle or underneath it, however.

Tonya then was allowed into the vehicle, at which time she alerted to the center console area of the ceiling. A search of that area uncovered a pill bottle containing crack cocaine. 2 Longshore was indicted by a Charles County grand jury on charges of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of cocaine. He moved, prior to trial, to suppress the pill bottle and the cash as the fruits of an illegal search of his truck and of his person. The Circuit Court for Charles County denied the motion.

Regarding the stop of Long-shore’s vehicle, the court ruled that the informant’s videotape and the drugs found in Carlson’s car provided sufficient reasonable suspicion to warrant the stop, which it found continued for no more than 15 minutes before the discovery of the drugs in the ceiling console. The court did find that Longshore had been handcuffed at the scene before Tonya arrived to perform the second scan. The suppression court also addressed Tonya’s reliability. It noted that Tonya’s training officer and custodian “testified at great length as to Tonya’s training and certifications and they weren’t really challenged by anyone at the hearing.” The court concluded that “Tonya is a reliable indicator as to the presence of controlled dangerous substances.” ⁴⁹⁷ Regarding the search of Longshore’s vehicle, the court ruled that probable cause existed once the dog alerted to the presence of drugs.

It also indicated that the videotape alone gave the police probable cause to search. At trial, the officers involved gave testimony that was generally consistent with the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing. Longshore was subsequently found guilty of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute and was sentenced to fifteen years incarceration, the first ten of which were to be served without parole. An appeal to the Court of Special Appeals was noted by Long shore.

That Court, in an unreported decision, affirmed the trial court judgment. The Court of Special Appeals addressed the question, “Did the suppression court err in denying the appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle and his person?” Longshore’s argument was similar to the one he makes sub judice, namely, that, when he was handcuffed, he was effectively arrested, and that the police did not, at that time, have probable cause to effectuate a warrantless arrest. The State argued, in response, that the initial stop was simply a detention and that it was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion. Even if the detention constituted an arrest, it maintained, the police possessed probable cause to justify it.

The Court of Special Appeals held that the stop was an arrest, not a detention, but concluded, ultimately, that the stop was supported by probable cause. Longshore filed, in this Court, a petition for writ of certiorari, and the State filed a conditional cross-petition. 3 Both petitions were granted by this Court. Longshore v. State, 385 Md. 161 , 867 A.2d 1062 (2005). ⁴⁹⁸ A. When an appellate court reviews a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion to suppress evidence under the Fourth Amendment, it will consider only the facts and information contained in the record of the suppression hearing. State v. Nieves, 383 Md. 573, 581 , 861 A.2d 62, 67 (2004); Laney v. State, 379 Md. 522, 533 , 842 A.2d 773, 779 (2004); Dashiell v. State, 374 Md. 85, 93 , 821 A.2d 372, 376 (2003) (quoting State v. Collins, 367 Md. 700, 706-07 , 790 A.2d 660, 663-64 (2002)); Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. 554, 569 , 774 A.2d 420, 429 (2001).

An appellate court further will view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing on the motion, in this case, the State. Nieves, 383 Md. at 581 , 861 A.2d at 67 ; Laney, 379 Md. at 533 , 842 A.2d at 779 ; Dashiell, 374 Md. at 93 , 821 A.2d at 376 -77 (quoting Collins, 367 Md. at 707 , 790 A.2d at 664 ); Wilkes, 364 Md. at 569, 774 A.2d at 429; Riddick v. State, 319 Md. 180, 183 , 571 A.2d 1239, 1240 (1990). Moreover, when there is a conflict in the evidence, an appellate court will give great deference to a hearing judge’s determination and weighing of first-level findings of fact. It will not disturb either the determinations or the weight given to them, unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous.

Nieves, 383 Md. at 581-582 , 861 A.2d at 67 ; Laney, 379 Md. at 533-34 , 842 A.2d at 779-80 ; Dashiell, 374 Md. at 93-94 , 821 A.2d at 378 ; State v. Rucker, 374 Md. 199, 207 , 821 A.2d 439, 444 (2003); Riddick, 319 Md. at 183 , 571 A.2d at 1240 ; Perkins v. State, 83 Md.App. 341, 346 , 574 A.2d 356, 358 (1990). See Rule 8-131. 4 ⁴⁹⁹ An appellate court, however, under an independent de novo review standard, must consider the application of the law to those facts in determining whether the evidence at issue was obtained in violation of the law, and, accordingly, should be suppressed. Nieves, 383 Md. at 581-582 , 861 A.2d at 67 ; Laney, 379 Md. at 533-534 , 842 A.2d at 779-780 ; Dashiell, 374 Md. at 93-94 , 821 A.2d at 378 , Rucker, 374 Md. at 207 , 821 A.2d at 444 ; Stokes v. State, 362 Md. 407, 413-14 , 765 A.2d 612, 615 (2001); Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 368 , 735 A.2d 491, 497 (1999). Indeed, appellate courts make their “own independent constitutional appraisal, by reviewing the law and applying it to the peculiar facts of the particular case.” Jones v. State, 343 Md. 448, 457 , 682 A.2d 248, 253 (1996).

With this in mind, we turn to the case sub judice. The Court of Special Appeals held that, when Longshore was placed in handcuffs, he was effectively arrested. Having so held, it needed also to decide whether there was probable cause to support that arrest. The power of the Court of Special Appeals, as an appellate court, is, like this Court’s and any appellate court’s, plenary; it is bound by the record in making those determinations, however.

Making factual determinations, ie. resolving conflicts in the evidence, and weighing the credibility of witnesses, is properly reserved for the fact finder. See Binnie v. State, 321 Md. 572, 580 , 583 A.2d 1037, 1041 (1991); McKinney v. State, 82 Md.App. 111, 117 , 570 A.2d 360, 363 , cert, denied, 320 Md. 222 , 577 A.2d 50 (1990). In performing this role, the fact finder has the discretion to decide which evidence to credit and which to reject. See State v. Stanley, 351 Md. 733, 750 , 720 A.2d 323, 331 (1998) (“Weighing the credibility of witnesses and resolving any conflicts in the evidence are ⁵⁰⁰ tasks proper for the fact finder”).

See also Velez v. State, 106 Md.App. 194, 202 , 664 A.2d 387, 391 (1995), cert, denied, 341 Md. 173 , 669 A.2d 1361 (1996). The Court of Special Appeals did not err in deciding that the petitioner was arrested, rather than, as the trial court found, merely detained. As we shall see later, however, there was no substantial basis for its conclusion, if not finding, that probable cause existed when the petitioner was arrested. B. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ... and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause____” U.S. Const, amend.

XIV

See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 , 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1691 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1090 (1961), Dashiell v. State, 374 Md. 85, 94 , 821 A.2d 372, 377 (2003), Wallace v. State, 373 Md. 69, 79 , 816 A.2d 883, 889 (2003), State v. Wallace, 372 Md. 137, 145 , 812 A.2d 291, 296 (2002). The Fourth Amendment is not a guarantee against all searches and seizures, however, only those that are unreasonable. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1573 , 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985). See also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 , 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 550-51 , 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1875 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 , reh’g denied, 448 U.S. 908 , 100 S.Ct. 3051 , 65 L.Ed.2d 1138 (1980).

See also State v. Collins, 367 Md. 700, 708 , 790 A.2d 660, 664 (2002) (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1573 , 84 L.Ed.2d 605, 613 (1985), stating that the Fourth Amendment guards against “unreasonable searches and seizures”); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 494 , 479 A.2d 903, 907 (1984) (holding that the reasonableness standard of constitutional validity of a seizure usually requires, at minimum, that facts upon which intrusion is based be capable of measurement against objective standard, whether this be probable cause or less stringent ⁵⁰¹ test); Givner v. State, 210 Md. 484, 494-495 , 124 A.2d 764, 769 (1956) (holding that prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures do not prohibit reasonable searches and seizures). A warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place for a felony, or a misdemeanor committed in an officer’s presence, is consistent with the Fourth Amendment if the arrest is supported by probable cause. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 , 96 S.Ct. 820, 825 , 46 L.Ed.2d 598, 606 (1976), see also Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 , 121 S.Ct. 1536, 1557 , 149 L.Ed.2d 549, 577 (2001) (stating “[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe an individual has committed even a very minor offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender”), State v. Evans, 352 Md. 496 , 723 A.2d 423 (1999) (for lawful arrest for commission of felony to occur under Maryland law, police officer must have probable cause to believe suspect has committed a felony, and must either physically restrain suspect, or otherwise subject suspect to his or her custody and control), Woods v. State, 315 Md. 591 , 556 A.2d 236 (1989) (warrantless arrest was proper, where police knew that felonious homicide had been committed and had received from several reliable sources defendant’s statements, both before and after murder, which implicated defendant). Moreover, “[p]robable cause exists where ‘the facts and circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed [by the person to be arrested].” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-176 , 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311-1312 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 , 1890 (1949), quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 , 45 S.Ct. 280, 288 , 69 L.Ed. 543, 555 (1925).

See also Anderson v. State, 282 Md. 701 , 387 A.2d 281 (1978) (invalidating an illegal search when the police lacked reasonable grounds to stop the suspects); State v. Wilson, 279 Md. 189 , 367 A.2d 1223 (1977) (holding a search illegal when police observations were insuffi ⁵⁰² cient to support a probable cause determination that goods were stolen). In Maryland, the perimeters of an arrest were defined in Bouldin v. State, 276 Md. 511 , 350 A.2d 130 (1976). There, this Court opined: “It is generally recognized that an arrest is the taking, seizing, or detaining of the person of another (1) by touching or putting hands on him; (2) or by any act that indicates an intention to take him into custody and that subjects him to the actual control and will of the person making the arrest; or (3) by the consent of the person to be arrested____ It is said that four elements must ordinarily coalesce to constitute a legal arrest: (1) an intent to arrest; (2) under a real or pretended authority; (3) accompanied by a seizure or detention of the person; and (4) which is understood by the person arrested____ “We have defined an arrest in general terms as the detention of a known or suspected offender for the purpose of prosecuting him for a crime. McChan v. State, 238 Md. 149 , 207 A.2d 632 (1965); Cornish v. State, 215 Md. 64 , 137 A.2d 170 (1957).

Our cases make clear ... that in ordinary circumstances ‘there is a detention only when there is a touching by the arrestor or when the arrestee is told that he is under arrest and submits[, but where] there is no touching, the intention of the arrestor and the understanding of the arrestee are determinative, for in order for there to be an arrest in such case, there must always be an intent on the part of one to arrest the other and an intent on the part of such other to submit.’ 238 Md. at 157 , 207 A.2d at 638 . Ordinarily, therefore, there can be no arrest where there is no restraint or where the person sought to be arrested is not conscious of any restraint.” 276 Md. at 515-516 , 350 A.2d at 133 (some citations omitted). Thus, generally, a display of force by a police officer, such as putting a person in handcuffs, is considered an arrest. See Grier v. State, 351 Md. 241, 252 , 718 A.2d 211, 217 (1998) (holding that when the defendant was put “on the ground” he was under arrest), Morton v. State, 284 Md. 526, 530 , 397 A.2d ⁵⁰³ 1385, 1388 (1979) (holding that the defendant was arrested when he was removed from a building and placed in a patrol car under guard), and Dixon v. State, 133 Md.App. 654, 673 , 758 A.2d 1063, 1073 (2000) (holding that defendant was arrested when his car was blocked in, he was removed, and then handcuffed).

But see Swift v. State, 393 Md. 139, 156 , 899 A.2d 867, 877 (2006) (holding that defendant not in custody and was free to leave even though a police car “merely” blocked the defendant’s). In Grier, 351 Md. 241 , 718 A.2d 211 , the issue in this Court concerned the propriety of the admission by the trial court of the defendant’s post-arrest silence and whether, if that ruling was error, that error was harmless. The defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of attempted robbery with a deadly weapon, mayhem with the intent to disfigure, and other related offenses. He had been arrested after police officers, to whom it had been reported that Grier had attacked the man with whom he earlier was seen struggling and stolen that man’s backpack, observed him enter a dead-end alley and throw something onto a porch. 351 Md. at 245, 718 A.2d at 213 .

When he exited the alley, the officers “got him and put him on the ground and then took him into custody.” 351 Md. at 245, 718 A.2d at 213 . Addressing the nature and effect of the evidence elicited by the question, “What, if any explanation did the defendant offer to you [as to] why he was or why this was taking place?,” id. at 251-52 , 718 A.2d at 216 , this Court observed: “After Grier came out of the dead-end alley, the officers immediately arrested him. The officers pursued Grier, ‘got’ him, and put him on the ground. Once [Grier] was on the ground and in the custody and control of the police officers, he was certainly under arrest.

See Bouldin v. State, 276 Md. 511, 515-16 , 350 A.2d 130, 133 (1976). Although Officer Harley may have had the right simply to detain and question [Grier] before placing him in custody, he did not do so.” 351 Md. at 252, 718 A.2d at 216-17 . Morton also involved the admissibility of challenged evidence. 284 Md. at 528 , 397 A.2d at 1387 . The defendant had ⁵⁰⁴ been convicted in the Criminal Court of Baltimore of robbery with a deadly weapon and a related handgun charge.

Id. at 527 , 397 A.2d at 1386-87 . He was alleged to have been one of two men, each brandishing a gun, who robbed a eabdriver. 284 Md. at 528 , 397 A.2d at 1387 . One of the robbers escaped capture, while the other was apprehended. 284 Md. at 528 , 397 A.2d at 1387 . The day following the robbery, officers, acting on information from a pharmacist, stopped the defendant and frisked him. 284 Md. at 528 , 397 A.2d at 1387 .

At that time, the defendant was wearing a black leather jacket and carrying a plastic bag. 284 Md. at 528 , 397 A.2d at 1387 . Finding nothing, the officers told the defendant that he could leave, and he did; however, the officers kept the defendant under observation. 284 Md. at 528 , 397 A.2d at 1387 . Later, after receiving information that the defendant “may have been wanted for something,” the officers surrounded a neighborhood recreation center that they saw him enter. 284 Md. at 528 , 397 A.2d at 1387 . An officer confronted the defendant inside the recreation center, informing the defendant of the information the police had received, 284 Md. at 528 , 397 A.2d at 1387 , and telling the defendant to accompany him, bringing all of his possessions, including the black leather jacket and plastic bag. 284 Md. at 528 , 397 A.2d at 1387 .

When the defendant responded that those items had been given to his cousin who had left the recreation center, 284 Md. at 528 , 397 A.2d at 1387 , the officer, whose information was that no one had exited the recreation center since the defendant had entered, 284 Md. at 528 , 397 A.2d at 1387 , put the defendant in a patrol car with another officer. He then re-entered the recreation center to search for the jacket and the bag. 284 Md. at 528 , 397 A.2d at 1387 . The items were found and searched, revealing a handgun and a quantity of marijuana. 284 Md. at 528-529 , 397 A.2d at 1387 . The officer subsequently returned to the patrol car and informed the defendant that he was under arrest, after which the defendant was taken to police headquarters. 284 Md. at 529 , 397 A.2d at 1387 .

On this set of facts, this Court held: ⁵⁰⁵ “We think it clear that the appellant was arrested when Rice removed him from the recreation center and placed him under guard in the police patrol car. We said in Bouldin v. State, 276 Md. 511 , 350 A.2d 130 (1976), that an arrest is the taking, seizing or detaining of the person of another, Inter alia, by any act that indicates an intention to take him into custody and that subjects him to the actual control and will of the person making the arrest. On the record before us, Rice’s manual seizure of the appellant and the subsequent restraint of his liberty plainly constituted an arrest, there being nothing to show that the appellant voluntarily consented to the restrictions placed upon his freedom by the arresting officer.” 284 Md. at 530 , 397 A.2d at 1388 . In a case decided by the Court of Special Appeals, Dixon v. State, 133 Md.App. 654 , 758 A.2d 1063 (2000), the defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.

An informant’s tip led Montgomery County police to search the trunk of a car driven by the defendant. Recovered as a result of that search were nine bags of marijuana. 133 Md.App. at 657 , 758 A.2d at 1065 . The informant, in addition to describing the car that the defendant would be driving, had told police that the defendant would be transporting ten pounds of marijuana to the second level garage at the Montgomery Mall at 8:15 pm that evening. 133 Md.App. at 659 , 758 A.2d at 1066 . After preliminary surveillance of the defendant, during which photographs were taken, the police arrived at the parking garage. 133 Md.App. at 660 , 758 A.2d at 1066 .

The defendant’s car was already there, and at 8:15 pm, Dixon emerged from a side stairwell, walked in the direction of his vehicle, looked around “as if he was looking for someone,” and exited the garage level by the way he had come. He returned a short time later, and got into his car. 133 Md.App. at 660 , 758 A.2d at 1066 . At that time, several police cars blocked in the defendant’s car, 133 Md.App. at 660 , 758 A.2d at 1066 , and the defendant was removed from the car by the officers and handcuffed. 133 Md.App. at 660 , 758 A.2d at 1066 . The ⁵⁰⁶ defendant’s car was searched without either a search warrant or the defendant’s consent. 133 Md.App. at 660 , 758 A.2d at 1066 .

Discovered, as a result of the search, were the nine gallon-size bags of marijuana. 133 Md.App. at 660 , 758 A.2d at 1066 . The Court of Special Appeals, citing Terry and several cases that followed it, opined: “As we see it, the events in the garage exceeded an investigatory stop under Terry and its progeny. Accordingly, we do not agree with either the State or the trial court that appellant was merely detained prior to the car search. Instead, we conclude that the officers arrested appellant at the time they blocked his car, removed him from h is vehicle, and handcuffed him.” 133 Md.App. at 673-674 , 758 A.2d at 1073 , citing Grier, 351 Md. at 252 , 718 A.2d at 216-217 , Morton, 284 Md. at 530 , 397 A.2d at 1388 , Wiegmann v. State, 118 Md.App. 317, 330 , 702 A.2d 928, 934 (1997).

There are instances in which a person, who is not under arrest, may be detained. Without effecting an arrest, a police officer with reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that criminal activity “may be afoot,” may stop and detain a person, briefly, for investigative purposes. Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 30 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 911 (1968). See also Nathan v. State, 370 Md. 648, 661 , 805 A.2d 1086, 1094 (2002), Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 384 , 735 A.2d 491, 506 (1999), Derricott v. State, 327 Md. 582, 587 , 611 A.2d 592, 595 (1992), State v. Lemmon, 318 Md. 365, 377 , 568 A.2d 48, 55 (1990).

The reasonableness of a Terry stop is determined by considering “[w]hether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Id. at 20 , 88 S.Ct. at 1879 , 20 L.Ed.2d at 905 . Further, analysis of the scope of the stop requires balancing “the nature and quality of the intrusion on personal security against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. ⁵⁰⁷ 221, 228, 105 S.Ct. 675, 680 , 83 L.Ed.2d 604, 611-612 (1985). See also Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430 , 572 A.2d 1086 (1990) (holding that strong concerns for public safety and for effective crime prevention and detection clearly justify stop and frisk where there exists reasonable suspicion of ongoing or imminent criminal activity), Jones v. State, 319 Md. 279 , 572 A.2d 169 (1990) (holding that an officer is entitled to make a forcible stop if the officer has reasonable grounds — he or she are able to point to specific and articulable facts that warrant such an intrusion — for doing so). Reasonable suspicion is, to be sure, a less demanding standard than probable cause.

United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 , 109 S.Ct. at 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d at 10 . Stokes v. State, 362 Md. 407 , 765 A.2d 612 (2001), Graham v. State, 325 Md. 398 , 601 A.2d 131 (1992), Quince, 319 Md. 430 , 572 A.2d 1086 , Jones, 319 Md. 279 , 572 A.2d 169 . In Stokes, we observed, in that regard: “While there is no litmus test to define the ‘reasonable suspicion’ standard, see Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 , 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1661 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911, 918 (1996) (noting that it is impossible to articulate, with precision, what ‘reasonable suspicion’ means), it has been defined as nothing more than ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity,’ United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690, 695 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 629 (1981); see also Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695-96 , 116 S.Ct. at 1661 , 134 L.Ed.2d at 918 , and as a common sense, nontechnical conception that considers factual and practical aspects of daily life and how reasonable and prudent people act. See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695 , 116 S.Ct. at 1661 , 134 L.Ed.2d at 918 .” Id. at 415, 765 A.2d at 616 .

Thus, an investigatory stop typically is justified where there is some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity. Stated differently, if, under the totality of the circumstances, a police officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity by the person stopped, then the stop and temporary detention is justified. ⁵⁰⁸ United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690, 695 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 628 (1981), Stokes, 362 Md. 407, 413 , 765 A.2d 612, 615 , Graham, 325 Md. 398, 404 , 601 A.2d 131, 134 , Quince, 319 Md. 430, 434 , 572 A.2d 1086 , 1088, Jones, 319 Md. 279, 287 , 572 A.2d 169, 173 . Moreover: “The officer, of course, must be able to articulate something more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch”.’ The Fourth Amendment requires ‘some minimal level of objective justification’ for making the stop. That level of suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.

We have held that probable cause means ‘a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found,’ and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause.” Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 , 109 S.Ct. at 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d. at 10 (citations omitted). See also Dashiell v. State, 374 Md. at 97, 821 A.2d at 379 (holding that, in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience), Derricott v. State, 327 Md. 582, 593 , 611 A.2d 592, 598 (1992) (requiring reasonable suspicion to be based on more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’ ”). In addition to stops and brief detentions, other intrusive police actions are permitted when they are conducted in furtherance of the goal of protecting the safety of the officer. See State v. Smith, 345 Md. 460, 465 , 693 A.2d 749, 751 (1997), Graham, 325 Md. 398, 408 , 601 A.2d 131, 136 , Quince, 319 Md. 430, 434 , 572 A.2d 1086 , 1088, Jones, 319 Md. 279, 283 , 572 A.2d 169, 171 .

Pat-down searches, known commonly as frisks, “[are] not to discover evidence, but rather to protect the police officer and bystanders from harm.” Smith, 345 Md. at 465 , 693 A.2d at 751 . Pat-down searches are allowed where the officer: “... has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has ⁵⁰⁹ probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 , 88 S.Ct. at 1883 , 20 L.Ed.2d at 909 (citations omitted).

As the Court of Special Appeals noted in its unreported opinion sub judice, the permissible scope of a Terry stop has expanded in the past few decades, allowing police officers to neutralize dangerous suspects during an investigative detention using measures of force such as placing handcuffs on suspects, placing the suspect in the back of police cruisers, drawing weapons, and other forms of force typically used during an arrest. United States v. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221, 1224-25 (7th Cir.1994). See also In re David S., 367 Md. 523, 533 , 789 A.2d 607, 613 (2002) (noting that in the three decades following the Supreme Court’s decision in Terry, the permissible scope of a Terry stop has been expanded), Aguilar v. State, 88 Md.App. 276, 284, 594 A.2d 1167, 1171 (1991) (noting that “[t]he scope allowed for a Terry search has been expanded”). Nevertheless, Maryland has recognized very limited instances in which a show of force, such as placing a suspect in handcuffs, is not an arrest.

This Court has upheld the use of such force when done to protect the officer, see In re David S., 367 Md. 523 , 789 A.2d 607 (2002), and the intermediate appellate court has upheld use of such force when done to prevent a suspect’s flight, see Trott v. State, 138 Md.App. 89 , 770 A.2d 1045 (2001). The specific circumstances of each of these cases informed the analysis in each of these cases. In In re David S., a juvenile defendant was adjudicated delinquent by the District Court of Maryland sitting in Mont ⁵¹⁰ gomery County as a juvenile court, 5 based on a finding that he possessed a controlled substance with the intent to distribute. Subsequently, an officer with the Rockville City Police Department was engaged in the surveillance of a house on Moore Drive, which was believed to be an open air drug market. 367 Md. at 529, 789 A.2d at 610 .

The officer spotted one, Hall, a suspected drug dealer, engage in a drug transaction, 367 Md. at 529, 789 A.2d at 610-611 , but before officers could arrest him, the suspect fled into a house, as others dispersed. 367 Md. at 529, 789 A.2d at 611 . Later that same evening, the officer spotted Hall and David S., a juvenile, walking together on Ashley Avenue. When they stopped in front of an abandoned building, 367 Md. at 529-530, 789 A.2d at 611 , David S. walked behind the building and, upon returning, he had an object, which he showed to Hall before stuffing it into the front waistband of his pants. 367 Md. at 530, 789 A.2d at 611 . The officer believed that David S. had placed a handgun into his waistband. 367 Md. at 530, 789 A.2d at 611 .

The officer radioed other officers to stop the individuals. 367 Md. at 530, 789 A.2d at 611 . The officers, upon approaching David S. and Hall, drew their guns and ordered them to lie on the ground. 367 Md. at 530, 789 A.2d at 611 . Neither suspect resisted. When a hard object was felt in the area of Davis S.’s waistband, the officers pulled out his tucked-in shirt ⁵¹¹ and observed a black object protruding from his pants. 367 Md. at 530, 789 A.2d at 611 .

The object was removed from the waistband, and, upon inspection, was found to contain cocaine. 367 Md. at 530, 789 A.2d at 611 . David S. claimed that he was seized and arrested without probable cause. 367 Md. at 531, 789 A.2d at 611 . The State claimed, to the contrary, that the permissible scope of the Terry stop had not been exceeded notwithstanding that the officers effected the stop utilizing a hard or forceful take down and handcuffing of David S. 367 Md. at 530 , 789 A.2d at 611 . Reviewing Terry and its progeny allowing hard take downs, this Court concluded: “In the case at bar, we hold that the police had reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, to believe that [David S.] committed, or attempted to commit, a crime and that he had a gun in his waistband. [The officer] saw [David S.] and Hall engage in what appeared to be a burglary, and he saw [David S.] place a dark object, which looked like a handgun, in the front of his waistband.

Therefore, the police were justified in conducting an investigatory stop of [David S.] and Hall. “We hold that the stop was a legitimate Terry stop, not tantamount to an arrest. Several police officers conducted a ‘hard take down’ of [David S.].... The officers, with their weapons drawn, forced [David SJ to the ground and placed him in handcuffs. This conduct was not unreasonable because the officers reasonably could have suspected that [David SJ posed a threat to their safety.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, as they appeared to the officers at the time, in order to maintain their safety, handcuffing [David SJ and placing him on the ground for a brief time was reasonable and did not convert the investigatory stop into an arrest under the Fourth Amendment. Although this is a severe form of intrusion, we conclude that under the circumstances, it was reasonable.” 367 Md. at 539-540, 789 A.2d at 616 . In Trott , the defendant was stopped by a police officer, when the officer noticed him, shortly after hearing a loud ⁵¹² crash, pushing a woman’s bicycle, “with a ‘kid’s tote ... attached to the back’” and containing a number of items, including a snowblower, weedwacker, tire, and tow hitch, towards him. 138 Md.App. at 94-95 , 770 A.2d at 1048 . When the officer approached the defendant and asked what happened, 138 Md.App. at 95 , 770 A.2d at 1048 , the defendant explained that his car had broken down and that he did not wish to leave his belongings behind. 138 Md.App. at 95 , 770 A.2d at 1048 .

The officer recognized the defendant’s name, given at the officer’s request, as someone who had been involved in numerous break-ins in the past. 138 Md.App. at 95 , 770 A.2d at 1048 . Moreover, when he radioed for backup, he was informed to “be careful” because the defendant “was wanted and to hold him, because he was going to run.” 138 Md.App. at 95 , 770 A.2d at 1048 . As the field interview progressed, the defendant became more “nervous” and “jittery.” Worried that the defendant may have heard his radio transmission, the officer placed the defendant in handcuffs for, as he put it, “his and my safety.” 138 Md.App. at 95-96 , 770 A.2d at 1049 . A warrant check revealed what he had been told, that there was an outstanding arrest warrant for the defendant. 138 Md.App. at 96 , 770 A.2d at 1049 .

Thereafter, twelve minutes after first approaching him, the defendant was placed under arrest. 138 Md.App. at 96 , 770 A.2d at 1049 . The defendant claimed that, even if the initial stop was justified, his being handcuffed turned the stop into an arrest that was not supported by probable cause. 138 Md.App. at 118 , 770 A.2d at 1061-1062 . The Court of Special Appeals disagreed. First, it noted that “the handcuffing of [the defendant] was justifiable as a protective and flight preventive measure pursuant to a lawful stop and did not necessarily transform that stop into an arrest.” 138 Md.App. at 118 , 770 A.2d at 1062 . 6 ⁵¹³ The intermediate appellate court held that, under the factual circumstances surrounding the defendant’s detention, the police officer’s use of handcuffs was appropriate. 138 Md.App. at 120 , 770 A.2d at 1063 .

It reasoned that the facts that the defendant was known to be involved in “break-ins,” that the officer was warned by other officers that the defendant would run, and that the defendant had become increasingly “nervous” and “jittery” were a sufficient basis to allow the officer, ⁵¹⁴ who was alone and on foot, to handcuff the defendant. 138 Md.App. at 120-121 , 770 A.2d at 1063 . The Court of Special Appeals warned, however: “This is not to suggest that every time a police officer handcuffs a suspect that that restraint is not an arrest. In fact, in most instances, placing a suspect in handcuffs does amount to an arrest, which must then be supported by probable cause.” Id. at 121 , 770 A.2d at 1063-64 , citing In re David S., 135 Md.App. 363, 369 , 762 A.2d 970 (2000); Dixon v. State, 133 Md.App. 654, 673 , 758 A.2d 1063 (2000). The petitioner argues, as he did in the Court of Special Appeals, that, when he was asked to step out of the car and placed in handcuffs before the drug dog’s second scan, he was effectively arrested.

Like the Court of Special Appeals, we agree with this argument. Having reviewed Grier, Morton, Dixon, In re David S., and Trott in context, we hold that Longshore was arrested when he was asked to step out of the car and placed in handcuffs, and that no special circumstances existed that justified the police officers placing him in handcuffs. The officers conceded that he was stopped because they believed him to possess drugs. Unlike the circumstances in In re David S., there was no suspicion that a violent crime had occurred, nor any reason to believe that Longshore was armed or dangerous.

The arresting officer acknowledged that, despite Long shore’s nervousness, he was cooperative and did not exhibit any threatening behavior. The officers did not indicate that they were, in any way, concerned for their safety. Moreover, there was no reason to believe that Long-shore was a flight risk. There was no indication by the police that they believed, nor any objective basis for concluding, that Longshore would run.

In addition, the incident occurred in the middle of the day, not at 3:30 a.m. as in Trott . We agree with the Court of Special Appeals that: “There was no evidence elicited at the suppression hearing that the police handcuffed appellant because of safety or flight concerns. Detective Edge testified that appellant was ⁵¹⁵ cooperative, and there was no evidence suggesting that he was a flight risk. Without more, we agree with appellant that when he was handcuffed, the police had effectuated an arrest.” Because Longshore was neither a flight nor safety risk, there was no justification for placing Longshore in handcuffs.

This was, therefore, no mere detention; it was, in fact, an arrest. Consequently, to be a valid arrest, probable cause was required. Accordingly, we reject the State’s argument that the arrest was nothing more than a detention. The State contends that “[a] step-by-step analysis of the circumstances shows that the police initially conducted a brief detention, or Terry stop, that was justified by the reasonable suspicion that Longshore had drugs in his vehicle and arrested him when the drug detection dog alerted to the presence of drugs in the vehicle.” The State asserts that a “totality of the circumstances” analysis should apply.

In re David S., 367 Md. at 535, 789 A.2d at 614 . Citing In re David S. for the proposition that neither handcuffing nor pointing a gun at a suspect necessarily transforms a stop into an arrest, 367 Md. at 535, 789 A.2d at 614 , the State notes that the police are permitted to take “reasonable measures to neutralize the risk of physical harm and to determine whether the person in question is armed.” 367 Md. at 535, 789 A.2d at 614 , citing United States v. Alvarez, 899 F.2d 833, 838 (9th Cir.1990) (holding that the defendant was not under arrest when the officers approached his vehicle with guns drawn and ordered him out of the car). While we agree that reasonable measures can be used to neutralize harm, we have already concluded that, and explained why, In re David S. is inapposite. Longshore was suspected neither of being dangerous nor of being armed.

The State’s reliance on Farrow v. State, 68 Md.App. 519 , 514 A.2d 35 (1986), also is unavailing. The distinction between a Terry stop and an arrest is not defined simply by the length of detention, the investigative activities during the detention, and whether the suspect was removed to a deten ⁵¹⁶ tion or interrogation area. Indeed, despite the changes in the contours of the Terry doctrine, there currently still are no bright lines to determine when an investigatory stop and frisk becomes an arrest and is elevated to the point that probable cause is required. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685 , 105 S.Ct. at 1575 , 84 L.Ed.2d at 615-616 (concluding that “[m]uch as a ‘bright line’ rule would be desirable, in evaluating whether an investigative detention is unreasonable, common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria,” and that “[a] court making this assessment should take care to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such cases the court should not indulge in unrealistic second guessing”).

Instead, Terry dictates that each detention be evaluated within the factual circumstances of individual cases. 392 U.S. at 29 , 88 S.Ct. at 1884 , 20 L.Ed.2d at 910 . See State v. Smith, 345 Md. at 468 , 693 A.2d at 753 (noting that the reasonableness of a Terry stop and frisk must be “assessed on a case-by-case basis”). In Farrow , the police set up surveillance on a jewelry store property that had been robbed by two African-American men, and, over the course of two days, observed two men, one of whom was the defendant Farrow, acting suspiciously, walking and driving back and forth in front of the store. 68 Md.App. at 521-522 , 514 A.2d at 36 . Using binoculars, police noticed a “bulge” underneath Farrow’s shirt. 68 Md.App. at 522 , 514 A.2d at 36 .

They thereafter surrounded Farrow’s car at an intersection, approached the car with guns drawn, opened the door, pulled Farrow face down on the pavement, and handcuffed him. 68 Md.App. at 522 , 514 A.2d at 36 . A search of the car yielded a .32 caliber handgun. 68 Md.App. at 522 , 514 A.2d at 36 . Farrow argued that, even if the stop were justified, the means used to detain him were unreasonable, and converted the stop into an arrest that lacked probable cause. 68 Md. App. at 524 , 514 A.2d at 37 . The Court of Special Appeals noted that, when justified by the circumstances, flexible police responses are appropriate while conducting a Terry stop. 68 Md.App. at 525 , 514 A.2d at 37-38 , citing, e.g., Hensley, 469 ⁵¹⁷ U.S. 221, 105 S.Ct. 675 , 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (police approaching suspect’s car with guns drawn), United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701 (9th Cir.1983) (officers approached car with drawn guns, ordered uncooperative suspect to lie in ditch, and handcuffed him did not transform the stop into an arrest).

On the question of Farrow’s arrest, the intermediate appellate court opined: “The distinction between a Terry ‘stop’ and an arrest, then, is not in the method of detention, but rather has to do with the length of the detention, the investigative activities during the detention, and whether the suspect is removed to a detention or interrogation area.... * * * * “... we hold that, in this situation, where police were facing men that were strongly suspected of being armed robbers, the officers were justified in taking complete control of the situation for that period of time necessary to accomplish the ‘frisk.’ The need for further investigation was pre-empted when an illegal handgun turned up within the lawful perimeters of the ‘frisk.’ ” 68 Md.App. at 526-527 , 514 A.2d at 38-39 . The State does not explain how this case is any different than Trott or In re David S. We have already confirmed that police officers, in certain situations, such as those evidencing the need for officer safety and to prevent flight, have authority, albeit limited authority, to use force to enforce a stop. Neither of those circumstances is present in the case sub judice. Farrow, therefore, is inapplicable, as Longshore was not suspected of being armed and, unlike in Farrow , an illegal handgun was not later discovered, thus providing some validation for any suspected dangerousness.

Nor is Lee v. State, 311 Md. 642 , 537 A.2d 235 (1988) helpful. This Court permitted a hard take down where the defendant had been suspected of murder and was believed to be carrying a concealed weapon. Neither factor is present in the case sub judice. The State also cites Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 376 , 735 A.2d 491, 501 (1999), for the proposition that no one factor is ⁵¹⁸ dispositive under a “totality of the circumstances” analysis.

This Court, however, while acknowledging, in that case, that the facts of each case are different resulting in there never being one particular factor that is dispositive, also opined that there did exist certain factors of which courts could take note that would be probative of the question whether the police action was reasonable: “Although the inquiry is a highly fact-specific one, courts have identified certain factors as probative of whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave.... These factors include: the time and place of the encounter, the number of officers present and whether they were uniformed, whether the police removed the person to a different location or isolated him or her from others, whether the person was informed that he or she was free to leave, whether the police indicated that the person was suspected of a crime, whether the police retained the person’s documents, and whether the police exhibited threatening behavior or physical contact that would suggest to a reasonable person that he or she was not free to leave.” 355 Md. at 377 , 735 A.2d at 502 . The State ultimately argues that “[u]nder the totality of circumstances here, where Longshore was placed in handcuffs for several minutes pending the arrival and the scanning of the vehicle by the drug detection dog; where Longshore appeared to be ‘extremely nervous,’ and the police were aware of Longshore’s prior drug arrests, the actions of the police were reasonable.” This argument is unavailing. First, as already noted, Longshore was not a flight risk nor was he considered dangerous.

There was no reason to put him in handcuffs while awaiting the drug detection dog’s arrival. Moreover, this Court has cautioned against, “placing too much reliance upon a suspect’s nervousness when analyzing a determination of reasonable suspicion.” Ferris, 355 Md. at 389 , 735 A.2d at 509 (citations omitted). Finally, this Court has also stated: “Prior drug arrests do not necessarily yield reasonable suspicion that an individual is secreting weapons or drugs ⁵¹⁹ on his person at the time of his arrest on a drug offense, because to allow the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard to be satisfied based upon a person’s status, rather than an individualized assessment of the circumstances, would undermine the purpose for requiring officers to justify their reasons for searching a particular individual.” Nieves, 383 Md. at 597 , 861 A.2d at 77 . 7 Penultimately, the cases that the State cites for the proposition that it was reasonable for officers to assume that, “where ⁵²⁰ drugs are, weapons are as well,” are negated by the State’s evidence, the testimony of the police officers, that Longshore was not suspected of a violent crime and that he did not exhibit violent behavior. Finally, the State questions the applicability of Grier , noting that the issue of the validity of the arrest was not the paramount issue in the case.

It finds Morton similarly unhelpful, noting that it is factually distinguishable. The State also points out that the Court of Special Appeals discussion of the arrest issue in Dixon was largely dicta and not central to the case. We reject these arguments. We hold that, notwithstanding some factual differences to the case sub judice, Grier, Morton, and Dixon each provide the appropriate model for determining “when” someone is arrested.

C. When there is a conflict in the evidence, an appellate court will give great deference to a hearing judge’s first-level factual and credibility determinations. See, e.g., Nieves, 383 Md. at 581-582 , 861 A.2d at 67 , Laney, 379 Md. at 533-534 , 842 A.2d at 779-780 . Findings of fact and credibility determinations are to be made by trial courts, not appellate courts. ⁵²¹ See State v. Green,