Lovelace v. State

WOODWARD, J. Demetrius D. Lovelace, appellant, was arrested on April 1, 2008, in connection with the death of Alan Zurita. On November 12, 2008, appellant was indicted on fourteen counts, including first degree murder. Beginning on November 2, 2009, a jury trial was held in the Circuit Court for Harford County. At the close of the State’s case-in-chief on November 9, 2009, the court granted defense counsel’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal as to first degree premeditated murder, which limited that charge to first degree felony murder.

On November 12, 2009, the jury found appellant guilty of the following charges: (1) first degree felony murder; (2) robbery with a dangerous weapon; (3) robbery; (4) attempted robbery; (5) conspiracy to commit robbery; (6) possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony; (7) possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a crime of violence; and (8) possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a disqualifying crime. ⁵¹⁷ On January 25, 2010, the trial court merged for sentencing purposes the convictions for robbery and attempted robbery into robbery with a dangerous weapon, and merged the convictions for possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a crime of violence and possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a disqualifying crime into possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony. The trial court sentenced appellant to life imprisonment without parole for the first degree felony murder conviction, twenty years for robbery with a dangerous weapon, fifteen years for conspiracy to commit robbery, and five years for possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony. The sentences for robbery with a dangerous weapon, conspiracy to commit robbery, and possession of a firearm were to be served consecutively to each other, but concurrently with the sentence for first degree felony murder. Appellant was also ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $10,408.00 for Zurita’s hospital and funeral bills.

On appeal, appellant presents four questions for our review, which we have rephrased: 1. Did the trial court err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress? 2. Did the trial court err in failing to merge the conviction for robbery with a dangerous weapon into the first degree felony murder conviction for the purpose of sentencing? 3. Did the trial court err in failing to follow up on a question answered in the affirmative during voir dire of the venire? 4.

Did the trial court err by admitting a photograph of the victim with a family member? For the reasons set forth herein, we answer questions 1, 3, and 4 in the negative, and answer question 2 in the affirmative. Accordingly, we shall vacate the sentence for robbery with a dangerous weapon and otherwise affirm all of the remaining judgments of the circuit court. ⁵¹⁸ BACKGROUND 1 On April 1, 2008 at approximately 1:45 a.m., a red Mitsubishi Galant, driven by appellant, with Damon Jackson and Zurita as passengers, entered southbound on 1-95 near Havre de Grace, Maryland. There was a plan between appellant and Jackson to rob Zurita.

While appellant was driving, Jackson and Zurita got into a fight, and Jackson was shot. Appellant then stopped the car on the shoulder of southbound 1-95; Zurita exited the vehicle followed by Jackson. Jackson shot and killed Zurita. Appellant then drove Jackson to the hospital, dropped him off in front of the emergency room, and left.

The police found Zurita’s body on the shoulder of southbound 1-95 at 2:30 a.m. the same day. At approximately 12:00 p.m. on April 1, 2008, appellant was arrested and taken to the Maryland State Police Forestville Barracks. At the barracks, appellant made statements to three officers, Sergeant Christina Becker, Corporal Richard Bach-tell, and Corporal Michael Mann, over the course of two separate interviews. At the conclusion of the second interview, appellant gave a recorded statement and described the fight between Jackson and Zurita as a “robbery gone bad.” Additional facts will be set forth herein to resolve the questions presented.

DISCUSSION I. Statements First Intemew At approximately 1:15 p.m., Sgt. Becker and Cpl. Bachtell advised appellant of his Miranda rights, and appellant subse ⁵¹⁹ quently invoked his right to remain silent. According to Sgt.

Becker, appellant “continued to speak” after invoking his right to remain silent, which prompted Sgt. Becker and Cpl. Bach-tell to “cut [appellant] off’ and explain that they could not speak with him unless he waived his Miranda rights. Approximately ten minutes after appellant’s initial advice of Miranda rights, at 1:25 p.m., Sgt.

Becker re-advised appellant of his Miranda rights, and appellant signed a form waiving his rights. Thereafter, appellant told Sgt. Becker and Cpl. Bachtell that he had gone to Aberdeen to see a friend and while he was there, he saw Jackson.

Later, according to appellant, when he was driving home, appellant received a call from Jackson to come back and pick Jackson up at his home. Appellant said that he made a U-turn, went back to where Jackson was residing and saw him “standing on the side of the building bleeding and gagging and sweating.” Appellant stated further that Jackson got into his car, and appellant drove him to the hospital, where appellant dropped him off in front of the emergency room and left. At some point during the interview, Sgt. Becker played for appellant a ten-second portion of a recorded interview in which Jackson claimed that appellant shot Zurita and Jackson.

The interview with appellant concluded shortly thereafter at approximately 2:55 p.m. Second Interview At approximately 5:30 p.m., appellant was removed from his holding cell and interviewed by Sgt. Becker and Cpl. Mann in the same room as the first interview.

Sgt. Becker did not re-advise appellant of his Miranda rights, but “remind[ed] [appellant] that, in fact, his Miranda [r]ights that [she] read to [appellant] earlier, in fact, were still in effect.” In addition, at appellant’s request, the officers replayed approximately one minute of Jackson’s recorded interview. Appellant then provided a statement in which he stated that “there was a plan and talk between [Jackson] and [appellant] that they were going to rob [Zurita],” and that it was “a robbery gone bad.” ⁵²⁰ Appellant also stated that, as he was driving, Zurita and Jackson began fighting and Jackson was shot “apparently accidentally.” Thereafter, according to appellant, Zurita exited the vehicle, followed by Jackson, who shot and killed Zurita. In addition to detailing the planned robbery and the fight between Jackson and Zurita, Cpl.

Mann testified that appellant described the gun that was used to kill Zurita and offered to show him where he had thrown the gun into a river in Harford County Recorded Statement At approximately 7:00 p.m., following his statements to Cpl. Mann and Sgt. Becker during the second interview, appellant provided a twenty-one minute recorded statement in which he described the fight between Jackson and Zurita as a “robbery gone bad.” Motions Hearing On February 2, 2009, appellant filed a motion to suppress “any and all statements allegedly made by [appellant] to police” on April 1, 2008 at the Maryland State Police Forest-ville Barracks, on the ground that the statements were not voluntarily provided by appellant. In particular, appellant sought to suppress the statements made during the first and second interviews, as well as the recorded statement.

The circuit court held a hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress on March 11, 2009. Sgt. Becker testified at length during the suppression hearing regarding the first interview with appellant, and her testimony is excerpted below: [PROSECUTOR]: Prior to interviewing the [appellant], what, if anything, did you do? [WITNESS]: Just had a very brief conversation, basically to determine who was going to go in to do the interview. And it was decided that myself and [Cpl.] Batchell would go[.] ⁵²¹ [PROSECUTOR]: So it was decided that you and [Cpl.] Batchell would go in and interview [appellant].

When you first went in and met with [appellant], what was the first thing that you did? [WITNESS]: The first thing I did was introduce myself and [Cpl.] Batchell to [appellant] explaining to him that we were from the Maryland State Police Homicide Unit. [PROSECUTOR]: What was the next thing you did? [WITNESS]: The next thing was we began to read [appellant’s] Advice of Miranda Rights, utilizing the MSP Form # 180. [PROSECUTOR]: Sergeant, I show you what’s marked for identification as State’s 1, and ask if you can identify that for the record. [WITNESS]: Yes. This is the initial Advice of Miranda Rights that I read to [appellant]. [PROSECUTOR]: And the information that is filled out on that form, who completed the form? [WITNESS]: The information at the top was completed by myself, and [appellant] signed it, and it was witnessed by Corporal Bachtell. [PROSECUTOR]: And that is a copy of the actual form that was used that day? [WITNESS]: That’s correct. [PROSECUTOR]: And it contains the signature of [appellant]? [WITNESS]: That’s correct. [PROSECUTOR]: What time did you advise him of his Miranda Rights? [WITNESS]: We began at 1:15,13:15 hours. [PROSECUTOR]: And what did you do after you read [appellant] his Miranda Rights? ⁵²² [WITNESS]: I asked [appellant] if, in fact, he understood his rights. He indicated that he did. I asked if he would sign the first line which is the acknowledgment that says I have read or have had read to me this explanation of my rights.

And [appellant] signed that. [PROSECUTOR]: And what was the next thing that occurred? [WITNESS]: The next thing that occurred was [appellant] asked if the guy died. And— [PROSECUTOR]: What was your response? [WITNESS]: And my response to that was, in fact, someone died. We are from the Homicide Unit or we wouldn’t be having this conversation with him. [PROSECUTOR]: Did he make an election as to continue the interview or speaking to you at that point? [WITNESS]: At that point, he made a comment to the fact that he wasn’t going to talk to us. As I started writing “Declined to be interviewed,” on the Miranda form, which is what we do when someone chooses not to speak with us, [appellant] continued to speak. [PROSECUTOR]: Did you, in fact, note, “Decline to be interviewed,” on the form? [WITNESS]: Yes, in fact, I did. [PROSECUTOR]: And that appears on the signature line underneath the section that says, “Waiver of Miranda Rights,” correct? [WITNESS]: Yes, it does. [PROSECUTOR]: Now you said he continued to speak to you at that point? [WITNESS]: Yes, he did. [PROSECUTOR]: What, if anything, did you do to initiate conversation? [WITNESS]: Nothing.

I was writing the “Declined to be interviewed,” when [appellant] made the comment that all he did was take somebody to the hospital. And myself and Corporal Batchell explained to him, ⁵²³ you know, “We can talk to you but, you know, we’ll listen to you as long as you want to talk with us, but we can’t do that until you waived your Miranda Rights if you want to talk to us or have any further conversation, because we can’t violate those rights. [PROSECUTOR]: What did you do at that point? [WITNESS]: At that point, [appellant] indicated that, in fact, he did want to speak to us. I took another Miranda form and again, went through his Miranda Rights with him again. [PROSECUTOR]: I show you what’s been marked for identification as State’s Exhibit 2 and ask if you can identify that document for the record. [WITNESS]: Yes. This is also a Maryland State Police Form No. 180, Advice of Miranda Rights from 13:25 hours, 1:25 p.m. [PROSECUTOR]: That is the second form that you used to advise [appellant] of his Miranda Rights? [WITNESS]: That’s correct.

Yes, it is. [PROSECUTOR]: And did [appellant] sign off on that form ? [WITNESS]: Yes, he did. He signed acknowledging that he had been read them and also he was read the paragraph—the waiver paragraph, and, in fact, he signed the waiver. [PROSECUTOR]: And his signature appears on the form? [WITNESS]: Yes, it does. [PROSECUTOR]: Now prior to his signing the form waiving his rights, what threats, if any, did you make to him at that point? [WITNESS]: There were no threats made of any kind. ⁵²⁴ [PROSECUTOR]: So the first Advice of Rights was 1:15 p.m. and the second one was 1:25 p.m.? [WITNESS]: That’s correct. [PROSECUTOR]: And again, you made no threats to him at that point? [WITNESS]: No, we did not. [PROSECUTOR]: At any time, did you display your weapon to him? [WITNESS]: No, we did not. [PROSECUTOR]: How were you dressed that day? [WITNESS]: I would have been dressed in civilian clothes, much as I am today. When we talk with—when we are interviewing someone who is a suspect, our weapons are actually removed and they are locked up in a lockbox or the trunk of our car. One or the other. [PROSECUTOR]: And at that point it was just you and [Cpl.] Batchell? [WITNESS]: That’s correct. [PROSECUTOR]: How was [Cpl.] Bachtell dressed? [WITNESS]: He would also have been in civilian plain clothes. [PROSECUTOR]: Where would his weapon have been? [WITNESS]: It would have either been secured in a lock-box at the barrack or in the trunk of his car. [PROSECUTOR]: What promises, if any, did you make to [appellant] to have him speak to you? [WITNESS]: None.

No promises were made. [PROSECUTOR]: Now did there come a time during the interview that you played a portion of [Jackson’s] statement? [WITNESS]: Yes, there did. [PROSECUTOR]: Why did you do that? ⁵²⁵ [WITNESS]: There came a point in the interview where I explained to [appellant] that, in fact, [Jackson] had identified him as the shooter. [PROSECUTOR]: And what did you do? What was [appellant’s] response at that point? [WITNESS]: [Appellant] did not believe, and indicated that, in fact, that I had lied to him, and, in fact, had told him that [Jackson] was deceased. [PROSECUTOR]: And what did you do then? [WITNESS]: And I reiterated to [appellant] that, in fact, I had not lied to him. I had never specifically said who was deceased, that I had just told him at the beginning of the interview that, in fact, someone was dead and named no specific name. [PROSECUTOR]: Now was it at that point that you played the portion of the Jackson interview? [WITNESS]: Yes. When [appellant] still appeared that he did not believe that, in fact, that was true, I played approximately 10 seconds of the interview.

Just enough of the interview to let [appellant] hear [Jackson] claiming that, in fact, [appellant] was the shooter. [PROSECUTOR]: And what, if anything, did he say after you played that portion of the Jackson interview. [WITNESS]: At that point he was angry. More so, at that point, he was angry with [Jackson]. He went on to tell us that there was a moral code and that basically no one was supposed to talk to the police. [PROSECUTOR]: Now approximately what time did the interview end? [WITNESS]: At approximately, I believe, 14:55. [PROSECUTOR]: Which would be what time? [WITNESS]: Which would be 2:55 p.m. [PROSECUTOR]: What happened to the defendant at that point? ⁵²⁶ [WITNESS]: At that point, the defendant was placed back into the holding cell. (Emphasis added).

On cross-examination, Sgt. Becker elaborated on what happened after appellant invoked his right to silence: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So did you take that no as that [appellant] invoked his right to silence? [WITNESS]: I did. I write, “Declined to be interviewed,” on the Miranda. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So I guess about 18:16 he already invoked his right to silence, correct? [WITNESS]: That’s correct. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So at that point in time, did you get up as [appellant] was asking questions? [WITNESS]: Did I get up? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Did you get up from your seat? [WITNESS]: No. I was still writing, “Declined to be interviewed,” when [appellant] was continuing to speak to Corporal Bachtell and myself. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So as [appellant] continued to speak to you and Corporal Bachtell, you immediately began to read the second Advice of Rights to him, correct? [WITNESS]: No. There was discussion[ ] with [appellant]. [Appellant] continued to speak after he made the comment that he didn’t want to speak to us. I was writing, “Declined to be interviewed.” [Appellant] continued to speak to us during that time.

I mean, obviously, he had already said he didn’t want to speak to us, and at that point in time, Corporal Bach-tell and myself cut [appellant] off and said, “We can talk to you as much as you want to talk to us, but, in fact, we have to, you know, we have to advise you of your rights, and you have to be willing to waive those rights if, in fact, you want to speak to us.” ⁵²⁷ There was, I would say, probably easily 5 to 10 minutes of conversation for him to understand that, you know, we would listen to whatever he had to say. We were willing to talk to him as long as he wanted to talk to us, but that, in fact, he needed to understand his Miranda Rights, and we were not going to violate those and he had to, in fact, waive those. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So you continued to talk to [appellant]? There was never a break in communication between you and [appellant] when he invoked his right to remain silent, was there? [WITNESS]: [Appellant] continued to talk to us. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: There was never a break in communication between you and [appellant] and [Cpl.] Bachtell once he invoked his right to remain silent, correct? [WITNESS]: [Appellant] continued to speak to [Cpl.] Bach-tell and myself as I was writing, “Declined to be interviewed.” [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I’m asking this a third time. There was never a break in communication between you and [appellant] and Corporal Bachtell, correct? [WITNESS]: No, there was not.

(Emphasis added). On re-direct examination of Sgt. Becker, the prosecutor confirmed that Sgt. Becker and Cpl.

Bachtell did not question appellant during the approximate ten-minute time period from when appellant invoked his right to remain silent and the second advisement of his Miranda rights: [PROSECUTOR]: And how many times while after you advised him in writing, “Declined to be interviewed,” did you initiate questions to [appellant]? [WITNESS]: Never. [PROSECUTOR]: How about Corporal Bachtell, did he initiate any questions? ⁵²⁸ [WITNESS]: No, there were no questions. [PROSECUTOR]: No questioning during that time? [WITNESS]: There was no questioning during this time. [PROSECUTOR]: So he continues to speak, and it is at that time that you then do the second advisement of rights? [WITNESS]: That’s correct. [PROSECUTOR]: So within a 10 minute period, he is now being advised a second time of his Miranda rights? [WITNESS]: That’s correct. Appellant also testified at the suppression hearing. The trial court summarized appellant’s testimony in its Memorandum Opinion and Order, filed on May 13, 2009: [Appellant’s] memory of the first interrogation is somewhat different than Sgt. Becker’s. [Appellant] acknowledged that he understood his Miranda rights, and that after he initially refused to make a statement, Sgt.

Becker told him that Damon Jackson accused [appellant] of shooting him and [Zurita]. [Appellant] said he signed the Miranda waiver because he felt that he was falsely accused and had to defend himself. He also stated that Sgt. Becker played a recorded copy of Jackson’s statement in which Jackson stated that [appellant] shot him and [Zurita]. According to [appellant], he was given his second Miranda waiver after hearing Jackson’s recorded statement.

In denying appellant’s motion to suppress, the trial court made the following relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law: In the case sub judice, Sgt. Becker stated that although [appellant] initially invoked his right to remain silent, he continued to speak while she was completing the MSP Advice of Rights form. She testified that [appellant], without being solicited, stated that all he did was to take a guy to the hospital and later asked whether or not the guy died. Sgt.

Becker testified that the ten minute conversation that followed [appellant’s] invocation of his Miranda [rights] was ⁵²⁹ initiated by [appellant], and that during that time, she and [Cpl.] Bachtell explained to him that they could not talk to him without a Miranda waiver. Despite [appellant’s] assertions to the contrary, the suppression hearing transcript shows her testimony to be consistent in this regard. On the other hand, [appellant] testified that after he declined to be interviewed, he was advised by Sgt. Becker that Jackson told the police that [appellant] shot Zurita.

After [appellant] told Sgt. Becker and [Cpl.] Bachtell that he did not believe them, they played a tape with Jackson’s recorded accusations. He further stated that “... when I heard the tape saying I shot him ... that’s when I agreed to sign the form and talk to them.” When asked why he decided to speak to the police, [appellant] stated that he “. .. felt like he was lied on ... when I heard the statements of me being accused of doing something I didn’t do, I spoke.” Notwithstanding [appellant]^ claim that Jackson’s statement was played immediately after he invoked his right to remain silent, he subsequently indicated that he was not re-advised of his Miranda rights after the tape was played. [Appellant’s contention that he was not re-advised could give rise to an inference that the tape was not played until after he was given a second Miranda warning which would be consistent with Sgt. Becker’s testimony. [Appellant] argues that the absence of a reasonable period of time between his invocation of his right to remain silent and the execution of his waiver of his Miranda rights is evidenced by Sgt.

Becker’s admission that she “... never got out of her chair, never left the room, never had a break in communications with [appellant], and did not allow any type of cooling down period.” However, the same set of facts would support Sgt. Becker’s contention that it was [appellant] who initiated and continued the conversation after he earlier had invoked his rights. If [appellant] reinitiated or continued discussion of the offense, which this court believes he did, then the police may question a suspect without regard to lapse of time between the election to remain silent and the reinitiated interroga ⁵³⁰ tion. See[ ] Raras v. State, 140 Md.App. 132, 153 [ 780 A.2d 322 ] (2001); Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 [ 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 ] (1994).

Moreover, as in the Raras case, the uncontroverted evidence establishes that at the start of the reinitiated interview, [appellant] was presented with and signed an Advice of Miranda Rights form waiving his Miranda rights. There is no credible evidence before the Court that [appellant’s] statement was in anyway coerced, or that his election to remain silent was in any way overborne by police conduct. [Appellant] in fact acknowledged that he voluntarily signed the Maryland State Police Advice of Miranda Rights form. Standard of Review In Lee v. State, 418 Md. 136 , 12 A.3d 1238 (2011), the Court of Appeals set forth the standard to be applied when reviewing a trial court’s disposition of a motion to suppress evidence: In undertaking our review of the suppression court’s ruling, we confíne ourselves to what occurred at the suppression hearing. We view the evidence and inferences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the prevailing party on the motion, here, the State.

We defer to the motions court’s factual findings and uphold them unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous. We, however, make our own independent constitutional appraisal, by reviewing the relevant law and applying it to the facts and circumstances of this case. Id. at 148-49 , 12 A.3d 1238 (citations and quotations omitted). Analysis Appellant’s argument centers on the admissibility of the statements that he made during the first interview with Sgt.

Becker and Cpl. Mann. After appellant argues that these statements should have been suppressed, appellant contends that, “[i]f the original waiver of the right to remain silent was improper, then the subsequent interview and [recorded] statement taken in the afternoon by Cpl. Mann remained tainted and should be suppressed as well.” Thus we will focus our ⁵³¹ analysis on the admissibility of the statements that appellant made during the first interview.

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, because appellant’s “right to cut off questioning” was not “scrupulously honored,” in violation of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). According to appellant, Mosley “distinctly sets the framework by which Miranda can be satisfied in [an] interrogation after the right to remain silent has been invoked.” Appellant points to the four factors in Mosley that are to be considered in determining whether a defendant’s right to cut off questioning has been scrupulously honored: “that the police ‘[1] immediately ceased the interrogation, [2] resumed questioning only after the passage of a significant period of time [more than two hours] and [3] the provision of a fresh set of warnings, and [4] restricted the second interrogation to a crime that had not been a subject of the earlier interrogation.’ ” Id. at 106 , 96 S.Ct. 321 (alterations by appellant). With respect to the first two factors, appellant contends that there was “never a break in communication” between Sgt. Becker, Cpl.

Bachtell, and appellant during the first interview, and that the officers did not attempt to cease the interview after appellant invoked his right to remain silent. Additionally, appellant claims that “at best 9 minutes passed before [appellant] was explicitly asked to waive his right to remain silent.” Appellant therefore argues that'“little to no time” passed before the officers resumed questioning, far shorter than the two hours of time that passed between the two interviews in Mosley . Regarding the third factor, appellant concedes that he did sign a Miranda waiver “a mere 10 minutes” after invoking his right to remain silent, and that this fact does not weigh against the State. As to the final factor, appellant points out that the subsequent questioning related to the same homicide and therefore was not related to another crime.

Because the totality of the circumstances indicate that his right to cut off ⁵³² questioning was not scrupulously honored, appellant concludes that his statements should not have been admitted at trial. The State responds that an analysis of the factors in Mosley as applied to the instant case is “wholly unnecessary,” because appellant reinitiated contact with the police and thus waived his previously invoked right to silence. In particular, the State contends that, because appellant initiated further communication with the police, “there was no need ... for the police to ‘break off communications,’ ‘allow [for] the passage of a sufficient amount of time,’ [or] ‘restrict the second interrogation to a crime that had not been a subject of the earlier interrogation.’ ” Appellant relies heavily on Mosley , a case in which the Supreme Court addressed the extent to which the police may reinitiate interrogation of a suspect after the suspect invokes his or her right to remain silent. In that case, Mosley was arrested for two robberies and was brought to the police department, where he was advised of his Miranda rights and signed the police department’s constitutional rights notification certificate. 423 U.S. at 97 , 96 S.Ct. 321 .

When police began questioning Mosley regarding one of the robberies, he indicated that he did not want to answer any questions. Id. The police ceased interrogation and took Mosley to his cell. Id.

Approximately two hours later, another officer brought Mosley to a different room for questioning about a homicide that was unrelated to the robberies. Id. at 97-98, 104 , 96 S.Ct. 321 . Prior to this questioning, the officer advised Mosley of his Miranda rights and Mosley once again signed the notification certificate. Id. at 98 , 96 S.Ct. 321 .

This time, however, Mosley chose to speak with the police about the homicide and made a statement implicating himself in the crime. Id. Mosley was subsequently charged in the homicide and sought to suppress the incriminating statement, which the trial court denied. Id. at 98-99 , 96 S.Ct. 321 .

On appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals, Mosley argued that the statements that he made during the second interrogation violated ⁵³³ his Fifth Amendment rights, because the police questioned him after his initial invocation of his right to remain silent. Id. at 99 , 96 S.Ct. 321 . The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed Mosley’s conviction on the ground that the second interrogation was a “per se violation of the Miranda doctrine.” Id. Further appeal was denied by the Michigan Supreme Court.

Id. The Supreme Court of the United States vacated the judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals. Id. at 107 , 96 S.Ct. 321 . In doing so, the Court held that no “passage in the Miranda opinion can sensibly be read to create a per se proscription of indefinite duration upon any further questioning by any police officer on any subject, once the person in custody has indicated a desire to remain silent.” Id. at 102-03 , 96 S.Ct. 321 .

The Court enunciated the following rule: “[T]he admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his ‘right to cut off questioning’ was ‘scrupulously honored.’ ” Id. at 104 , 96 S.Ct. 321 . The Court found that Mosley’s right to remain silent was in fact “scrupulously honored,” because “the police here immediately ceased the interrogation, resumed questioning only after the passage of a significant period of time and the provision of a fresh set of warnings, and restricted the second interrogation to a crime that had not been a subject of the earlier interrogation.” Id. at 106 , 96 S.Ct. 321 (emphasis added). In the case sub judice, it was appellant, not the police, who resumed the conversation following appellant’s invocation of his right to remain silent. Sgt.

Becker testified that appellant “continued to speak” as she was writing “Declined to be interviewed.” According to Sgt. Becker, appellant then said that “all he did was take somebody to the hospital.” After appellant made this comment, Sgt. Becker testified that she explained to him that they could not talk to him until he waived his Miranda rights. Indeed, Sgt.

Becker stated that there was “easily 5 to 10 minutes of conversation for [appellant] to understand that.” Appellant then “indicated that, in fact, he did want to speak” to Sgt. Becker and Cpl. Bachtell. ⁵³⁴ Sgt. Becker took out a second Advice of Miranda Rights form and went over appellant’s rights with him again.

Appellant signed the form, acknowledging that he had been read his rights, and this time also signed that he waived those rights. The second advice of rights was signed ten minutes after the first advice of rights, at 1:25 p.m. During this ten-minute time period, Sgt. Becker stated that neither she nor Cpl.

Bachtell initiated any questions to appellant, and that appellant “continued to speak nonstop.” The trial court found Sgt. Becker’s testimony regarding appellant’s reinitiation of communication to be credible. The trial court stated: If [appellant] reinitiated or continued discussion of the offense, which this court believes he did, then the police may question a suspect without regard to lapse of time between the election to remain silent and the reinitiated interrogation. See[ ] Raras v. State, 140 Md.App. 132, 153 [ 780 A.2d 322 ] (2001); Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 [ 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 ] (1994).

Moreover, as in the Raras case, the uncontroverted evidence establishes that at the start of the reinitiated interview, [appellant] was presented with and signed an Advice of Miranda Rights form waiving his Miranda rights. (Emphasis added). We agree with the State that Mosley does not govern the admissibility of appellant’s statements to the police, because it was appellant himself who reinitiated the conversation with the police after he invoked his right to remain silent. Moreover, we hold that the statements made by appellant after the reinitiation of conversation with police did not violate his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent under Miranda.

We shall explain. In Raras v. State, the appellant was arrested in connection with conspiracy and solicitation to commit murder, and arrived at the police station between 3:00 and 3:15 p.m. 140 Md.App. 132, 142-43 , 780 A.2d 322 , cert. denied, 367 Md. 90 , 785 A.2d 1292 (2001). The appellant was placed in an interview room ⁵³⁵ and advised that the police knew that she