Lucas v. People's Counsel for Baltimore County

KENNEY, J. This case involves a petition filed by Edgar Lucas, 1 for a special exception pursuant to the Baltimore County Zoning Regulations (“BCZR”)for an airport. Dale Lucas (the “appellant”) appeals the Circuit Court for Baltimore County’s decision affirming a determination by the Baltimore County Board of Appeals (the “Board”) that the proposed use did not meet the definition of an airport. 2 He presents the following questions for our review: 3 ²¹⁶ I. Whether the Board erred as a matter of law in finding that the proposed use at Helmore Farm is not an “airport.” II. Whether the Board erred as a matter of law in ruling that the BCZR definition of “airport” does not include helicopter operations.

III

Whether the Board erred as a matter of law by utilizing an incorrect interpretation of the Special Exception Standard.

IV

Whether the Board erred as a matter of law by incorrectly analyzing the Special Exception Requirements of BCZR § 502.1. We answer “no” to question I and affirm the judgment of the circuit court. We address the remaining questions in the interest of completeness. I. Factual and Procedural Background The Lucas property (“Helmore Farm”) is in the Greenspr-ing Valley area of Baltimore County, which borders Baltimore City.

It is bordered by Greenspring Valley Road to the north, Hillside Valley Road to the south, Falls Road to the east, and the property of appellee Susan Immelt to the west. The property is located north of the intersection of 1-83 and the Baltimore Beltway. Helmore Farm is an eighty-seven-acre tract on which thoroughbred horses are bred, raised, and trained. In addition, the farm acts as a quasi-hospital where thoroughbred horses are “laid up” during their rehabilitation process.

On the property are two primary residences, several tenant dwellings, stables, and outbuildings. It is located within a National ²¹⁷ Register Historic District and participates in Baltimore County’s agricultural preservation program. Helmore Farm, for the most part, is zoned “Resource Conservation — Agriculture,” the R.C. 2 zone. 4 The purpose of an R.C. 2 district is “to foster conditions favorable to a continued agricultural use of the productive agricultural areas of Baltimore County by preventing incompatible forms and degrees of urban uses.” 5 BCZR 1A01.1B. Aircraft have operated, 6 in connection with the thoroughbred business, in and out of Helmore Farm since 1956.

In 1997, Edgar Lucas constructed a helicopter landing pad, in a fenced-in area, on the southwestern edge of the property, approximately twenty-three feet from the property of appellee Susan Immelt. The helicopter landing site also included a windsock, perimeter lights, a guidance beam, and an all-weather observation system. The landing pad is partially ²¹⁸ paved and its dimensions are approximately 165 feet by 172 feet. In 1998, Martin Grass, Chairman of the Rite-Aid Corporation, and part owner of the thoroughbred business at Helmore Farm, commuted by helicopter from Helmore Farm to his office in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. 7 The helicopter activity caused citizen opposition and led Edgar Lucas to file a petition with the Baltimore County Zoning Commission for a special exception for operation of a landing area for both helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft at Helmore Farm.

The proposed facility would consist of the existing helicopter landing pad, in addition to a separate landing strip, approximately 200 feet wide by 1,200 feet long, for fixed-wing aircraft. Edgar Lucas filed a petition, with the Baltimore County Deputy Zoning Commission, for approval of an airport and/or helicopter operation on Helmore Farm as a legal, nonconforming use. 8 In the alternative, he sought a special exception for an airport, pursuant to BCZR Section 1A01.2.C.1. 9 ²¹⁹ A hearing took place before the Deputy Zoning Commissioner for Baltimore County (“Deputy Commissioner”), which highlighted the proposed use of the facility. Appellees appeared in opposition to Edgar Lucas’s request for the special exception. Edgar Lucas was the only witness called to testify regarding the past usage of Helmore Farm for the landing and taking-off of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters.

The Deputy Commissioner denied his request for approval of a legal nonconforming use, concluding that his testimony was insufficient to establish the requisite prior existence of an airport or helicopter operation. The Deputy Commissioner, however, approved the special exception. He based his decision on testimony and evidence presented both in support of and in opposition to Edgar Lucas’s petition, his site visit to observe the arrival and departure of a helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft, and the inclusion of “helicopters” in the dictionary definition of the word “aircraft.” The special exception, however, included several restrictions and conditions to ensure no intensified use of the facility would occur. 10 ²²¹ People’s Counsel appealed the Deputy Commissioner’s decision to the Board. The Board considered two questions on appeal: 1.

Is the site an airport permitted within the R.C. 2 zone; and, if so, are helipads and helistops permitted uses -within the meaning and definition of an “airport”; and 2. Based on the weight of the testimony and evidence submitted at the hearings, has the Appellant met his burden that the use proposed does not produce any “adverse effects above and beyond those inherently associated with such special exception uses irrespective of its location in the zone.” On February 25, 2000, the Board issued its opinion, stating: Since 1979, there have been significant amendments to other [provisions in] R.C. 2 zones, but no further amendments to the provisions relative to “airports,” “airstrips,” and helicopter uses. So, at the present time, under current BCZR regulations, we have the present status concerning where certain facilities are permitted by special exception and by right. By special exception: Airport : R.C. 2, R.C. 3, D.R. 1,[ 11 ] B.R.[ 12 1 Airstrip : M.L.R.,[ 13 J M.L.[ 14 ] ²²² Heliport, I : B.M.,[ 15 ] B.R. Heliport, II : B.L.,t 16 ] B.M., B.R., M.L.R. Helistop R.C. 3, D.R. zones By right: Airport None Airstrip None Heliport, I : M.L., M.H.[ 17 ] Heliport, II : M.R.,[ 18 ] M.L. Helistop B.L., B.M., B.R., M.R., M.L.R.; M.L., M.H. The Board went on to note that “certain helicopter operations are permitted as provided by Section 420 of the BCZR.” 19 The Board concluded that the R.C. 2 zone permits an “airport” by special exception, but prohibits “heliports,” “helistops,” or “airstrips.” Accordingly, the Board denied Edgar Lucas’s petition for either approval of an airport and/or helistop operation as a legal nonconforming use or for a special exception for an airport pursuant to BCZR § 1A01.2.C.1.

The Board determined that the definition of “airstrip” would not include helicopter operations and that a special exception would not permit the uses proposed at Helmore Farm: While the BCZR describes an airport as “any area of land or water designated and set aside for landing or taking off of aircraft,” and a helicopter fits the definition of “any ²²³ rotary aircraft,” nevertheless ... the legislative history and intent of the uses permitted by special exception in R.C. 2 zone[s] clearly precludes such uses by helicopters. Had the County Council not sought to specifically separate and define helicopter uses in various zones, this Board might believe differently, and in so doing, adopt the Appellant’s belief that the interpretation of an “airport” includes “heliport or helistop.” That however, is not the case. Clearly the Legislative Council of Baltimore County had very narrowly addressed helicopters and uses within the various zones. ' In the alternative, assuming that helicopter operations were included in the definition of “airport,” the Board examined whether appellant met his burden concerning the “impact” factors required pursuant to BCZR 502.1 and in Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1 , 432 A.2d 1319 (1981). In reaching that determination, the Board used the following standard: “The question is one of whether or not the adverse effects are greater at the proposed site than they would be elsewhere in the County where they may be established, i.e., the other areas within the R.C. 2 zones.” The Board noted that it believed that “the appellant has the burden of establishing that the impact factor caused by the proposed use is not greater at the site than the same use elsewhere in the zone (R.C. 2 zone).” The Board concluded that the impact upon the National Historic District would be greater in the Greenspring Valley than if located in other northern areas of the R.C. 2 zones.

Relying considerably on the expertise of [expert witnesses] Messrs. Dillon, Solomon and Gerber, there are individual areas in the Northern part of the county that would be less impacted than at the present site. The Board concludes that it is not a matter of finding a better site for the proposed use in the R.C. 2 zone, but rather the question is one of total impact; and the ²²⁴ Board concludes that the Appellants have not established that fact by the preponderance of the evidence to the Board’s satisfaction. Acknowledging that airports and helicopter uses have inherent negative impacts, the detrimental effects upon the smaller Greenspring Valley district would clearly have a greater negative impact than if located elsewhere in the vast acreage constituting the R.C. 2 zone of Baltimore County.

A timely petition for judicial review was filed by appellant. On September 28, 2000, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County held a hearing. The first issue before the circuit court was whether the Board erred in its determination that the proposed use did not constitute an airport. The court held that “an airport does not include a heliport or helistop and the proposed use is not an ‘airport,’ therefore it is not a permitted use in an R.C. 2 zone, and the Board’s conclusion was reasonably based upon the facts proven.” The second issue before the circuit court was whether the Board erred as a matter of law by utilizing an incorrect interpretation of the special exception standard.

Although the court thought it unnecessary to address this question, based on its finding on the first question, the court affirmed the Board’s determination regarding the adverse impact that would have been caused if the special exception had been granted. On March 20, 2001, the court issued its memorandum and order affirming the Board’s decision. Appellant then filed this appeal.

II

Standard of Review In Eastern Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 128 Md.App. 494, 514-15 , 739 A.2d 854 (1999), cert. denied, 358 Md. 163 , 747 A.2d 644 (2000), we set out the applicable standard for reviewing the decision of an administrative agency: [Cjourts recognize two standards of review of a decision of a zoning board: one for the board’s conclusions of law and ²²⁵ another for the board’s findings of fact or conclusions of mixed questions of law and fact. When reviewing the board’s legal conclusions, the court “must determine whether the agency interpreted and applied the correct principles of law governing the case and no deference is given to a decision based solely on an error of law.” When reviewing findings of fact and conclusions regarding mixed questions, however, [we] “cannot substitute [our] judgment for that of the agency and must accept the agency’s conclusions if they are based on substantial evidence and if reasoning minds could reach the same conclusion based on the record.” If a court finds no substantial or sufficient evidence to support the factual findings of the Board, the Board’s decision will be reversed because it was arbitrary and illegal. [Citations omitted.] See also Eastern Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 146 Md.App. 283, 299-302 , 807 A.2d 49 (2002) (“Eastern Outdoor 17”).

The substantial evidence test is an “assessment of whether the record before the Board contained at least ‘a little more than a scintilla of evidence’ to support the Board’s scrutinized action.” Friends of the Ridge v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 120 Md.App. 444, 466 , 707 A.2d 866 (1998), vacated in part, 352 Md. 645 , 724 A.2d 34 (1999) (citation omitted). The existence of such substantial evidence “pushes the Board’s decision into the unassailable realm of a judgment call, one for which we may not substitute our own exercise of discretion.” Friends of the Ridge, 120 Md.App. at 466 , 707 A.2d 866 . Because we repeat the reviewing task of the circuit court, this Court reevaluates, under the same standards, the decision of the agency, not that of the circuit court.

Carnage Hill-Cabin John, Inc. v. Maryland Health Resources Planning Comm’n, 125 Md.App. 183, 211 , 724 A.2d 745 (1999). The Court of Appeals has set out the applicable standard of review of the grant or denial of a special exception use: The special exception use is a part of the comprehensive zoning plan sharing the presumption that, as such, it is in ²²⁶ the interest of the general welfare, and therefore, valid. The special exception use is a valid zoning mechanism that delegates to an administrative board a limited authority to allow enumerated uses which the legislature has determined to be permissible absent any fact or circumstance negating the presumption. The duties given the Board are to judge whether the neighboring properties in the general neighborhood would be adversely affected and whether the use in the particular case is in harmony with the general purpose and intent of the plan.

Whereas, the applicant has the burden of adducing testimony which will show that his use meets the prescribed standards and requirements, he does not have the burden of establishing affirmatively that his proposed use would be a benefit to the community. If he shows to the satisfaction of the Board that the proposed use would be conducted without real detriment to the neighborhood and would not actually adversely affect the public interest, he has met his burden. The extent of any harm or disturbance to the neighboring area and uses is, of course, material. If the evidence makes the question of harm or disturbance or the question of the disruption of the harmony of the comprehensive plan of zoning fairly debatable, the matter is one for the Board to decide.

But if there is no probative evidence of harm or disturbance in light of the nature of the zone involved or of factors causing disharmony to the operation of the comprehensive plan, a denial of an application for a special exception use is arbitrary, capricious, and illegal. Schultz, 291 Md. at 11 , 432 A.2d 1319 (citations omitted; emphasis in original); see also Eastern Outdoor II, 307-09, 807 A.2d 49 .

III

Discussion A. Definitions and Legislative History We begin by reviewing the purpose of local zoning laws, which the Court of Appeals reiterated in Schultz : ²²⁷ Zoning provides a tool by which to establish general areas or districts devoted to selected uses. Indeed, the very essence of zoning is the territorial division of land into use districts according to the character of the land and buildings, the suitability of land and buildings for particular uses, and uniformity of use. [Citations omitted.] Schultz, 291 Md. at 20 , 432 A.2d 1319 . In addition, we must consider any constitutional rights that may be affected: Any discussion of any zoning matter, be it, inter aim, rezoning, special exceptions/conditional uses, 20 or variances, must always recognize that zoning is an interference (if done correctly, a permissible one) with a property owner’s constitutional rights to use his own property as he sees lit. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part: No person shall be ... deprived of ... property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

Mossburg v. Montgomery County, 107 Md.App. 1, 5-6 , 666 A.2d 1253 (1995), cert. denied, sub nom. Twin Lakes Citizens v. Mossburg, 341 Md. 649 , 672 A.2d 623 (1996). See also Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. This Court has stated the following in regard to special exceptions: [A] special exception/conditional use in a zoning ordinance recognizes that the legislative body of a representative government has made a policy decision for all of the inhabitants of the particular governmental jurisdiction, and that ²²⁸ the exception or use is desirable and necessary in its zoning planning provided certain standards are met.

Mossburg, 107 Md.App. at 7-8 , 666 A.2d 1253 . In this case, it is the identification of the proposed uses as they relate to permitted special exception uses that is at issue. The Board defined “airstrip” as “[a] runway without normal airbase and airport facilities. A clearing area serving a landing strip.” 21 Although the BCZR does not contain a definition of the term “airstrip,” the term “airport” is defined as “[a]ny area of land or water designed and set aside for landing or taking off of aircraft.” BCZR § 101. 22 In 1955, comprehensive revisions of the zoning regulations included “airports” as a special exception in certain zoning districts.

It was not until 1961 that the Council enacted Bill 56 and created the M.L.R. zone, which permitted “airstrips” and “heliports” as special exceptions. As early as 1966, the Baltimore County Planning Board, in its Final Report for Proposed Amendments to the Baltimore County Zoning Regulations, included a proposal for helicopters due to “the increasing use of helicopters in the County and inadequate provisions for helicopter landing facilities in the present Zoning Regulations.” Final report of the Baltimore County Planning Board, Office of Planning and Zoning, August 11, 1966. That report culminated in the Board’s ²²⁹ enactment of Bill 85, which defined helicopter, helicopter operation, heliport, type I, heliport, type II, and helistop as follows: Helicopter — Any rotary-wing aircraft which depends principally for its support and motion in the air on the lift generated by one or more power-driven rotors rotating on substantially vertical axes. [Bill No. 85-1967] Helicopter Operation — A landing and takeoff by a helicopter. [Bill No. 85-1967] Heliport, Type I — Any area of land, water or structural surface which meets the design standards of the Federal Aviation Agency and has been authorized by the Maryland State Aviation Administration to be used for scheduled operations by helicopter carriers certified by the Civil Aeronautics Board. [Bill No. 85-1967] Heliport, Type II — Any area of land, water or structural surface which has been authorized by the Maryland State Aviation Administration to be used for nonscheduled but regular helicopter operations and which does not serve for major support operations. As used herein, the term “major support operations” means “maintenance other than fueling; cargo loading; or any accessory operations using 2,500 square feet or more of floor area.” [Bill No. 85-1967] Helistop — Any area of land, water or structural surface which is located at least 500 feet from any property line, which has been authorized by the Director of Public Safety to be used for helicopter operations, which is not a heliport, and which does not serve for major support operations (see definition for “heliport, Type II”); or any area of land, water or structural surface which is located closer than 500 feet to a property line, which has been authorized by the Director of Public Safety to be used for not more than 15 helicopter operations per month, which is not a heliport, and which does not serve for major support operations. [Bill No. 85-1967] [Footnotes omitted.] See BCZR § 101.

In addition, Bill 85-1967 added BCZR § 420, Helicopter Operations: ²³⁰ 420.1— Notwithstanding other provisions of these regulations to the contrary, certain helicopter operations shall be permitted as provided under this Section 420. 420.2— Temporary use may be made of an area for helicopter flights for promotional activities, providing that such area shall be at least 500 feet from any occupied residence and that use permits shall be first procured from the Director of Public Safety and the Zoning Commissioner and that such permits shall be limited as to time as specified by the Zoning Commissioner. 420.3— Helicopters may be used to move equipment and supplies at construction sites, provided that a permit for such use is first obtained from the Director of Public Safety. 420.4— Helicopters may make landings on public utility rights-of-way and, with the owners’ consent, on land adjacent thereto for purposes of inspection or repairs of public utility facilities. 420.5— No special exception shall be required to permit either a Type I or Type II heliport if such use is located: at least 1,000 feet from any property line; in a D.R. 5.5 or D.R. 1 Zone; and beyond the urban-rural demarcation line. 420.6— Any helicopter operation caused by emergency is permitted at any time in any zone, in accordance with current regulations of the Federal Aviation Agency. [Footnotes omitted] These provisions permitted an “airport” and a “helistop” as special exceptions in an R.C. 2 zone. In 1970, the Council created “Density Residential” zones, permitting by special exception both “airports” and “helis-tops.” Bill 100. In 1975, Bill 98-75 reclassified all zones and created R.C., “resource conservation” zones. 23 “Airports” and “helistops” were permitted as special exceptions in the R.C. 2 and R.C. 3 zones, but were not permitted in R.C. 4 and R.C. 5 zones. ²³¹ In the late 1970’s, the Council enacted Bill 178-79, which repealed the special exception use for a “helistop” in an R.C. 2 zone, but retained the special exception for “airport” use. The new ordinance left the special exceptions for “airport” and “helistop” in other R.C. zones intact.

The current version of the BCZR regarding R.C. 2 zone uses and special exceptions permits a special exception for “airports,” but not “helistops” or “airstrips.” BCZR 1A01.2.C.1. Our examination of the special exception uses involving aviation uses permitted in the R.C. zones reflects the following: 24 [[Image here]] B. Airport Appellant argues that the Board's holding ignores the plain meaning of the word "airport" and that the proposed use at Helmore Farm should have been identified as such. Because the property will be used for both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, "airport" is the only classification that permits both types of aircraft, the proposed land use is that of an "airport" and not an airstrip, heliport, or helistop. Appellees argue that both the plain meaning of the regulations and the subsequent history related to airports, airstrips, heliports, and helistops indicate a clear legislative intent to distinguish between these various uses and that these distinctions prevent the designation of appellant's proposal as an ²³² “airport.” 25 “[T]he plain meaning rule of construction is not absolute.” Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387 , 614 A.2d 590 (1992).

Here, if we focus solely on a plain meaning of “airport,” as appellant argues, in isolation from other provisions within the ordinance, we remove it from its context within the ordinance as a whole. The Court of Appeals has noted that a statute must be construed in context, because the meaning of the “plainest language may be governed by the context in which it appears.” In this regard, words in a statute must be read in a way that advances the legislative policy involved. Courts may, therefore, consider not only the literal or usual meaning of those words, but their meaning and effect in the context in which the words were used, and in light of the setting, the objectives, and purpose of the enactment. Moreover, in such circumstances, courts may consider the consequences that may result from one meaning rather than another, with real intent prevailing over literal intent. [Citations omitted.] Baltimore County Coalition Against Unfair Taxes v. Baltimore County, 321 Md. 184, 203-04 , 582 A.2d 510 (1990).

See State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 718 , 720 A.2d 311 (1998) (statutory language is not read in isolation and must be read in the full context it appears). Paul Solomon, accepted as an expert planner with particular expertise in Baltimore County’s resource conservation zones, testified that the typical characteristics associated with an airport include: a strip to land an airplane, or series of strips and support facilities, including hangers, gas tanks, diesel tanks. So it would include the facilities to land a plane and to service a plane, and service the passengers that are involved with that airport, so it could be a very large airport, it could be a small airport, it could be simply fixed-wing. ²³³ Norman E. Gerber, accepted without objection as an expert in the field of zoning and land use planning, testified that the operation proposed at Helmore Farm describes an “airfield,” not an “airport.” Gerber based his opinion on the fact that the only two places that airstrips show up in the zoning regulations are in the ML zone and by virtue of including ML zones in the MH zone, and they were thought to be the kinds of areas where they could be paved, but didn’t have to be. They were simply a place for a plane to land ...

This seems to be the kind of activity that I heard about and read about so far being proposed here. On the other hand, an airport generally is used — it is used with more of a full service type of facilities in that there are facilities to care for the aircraft in some fashion. There are facilities to care for potential passengers, or maybe even cargo. I haven’t heard any real discussion of those kind of facilities being proposed to be placed here.

So I believe that the term “airport” is more applied to those kinds of facilities. There are only a few, quote, airports in Baltimore County. Probably the best known is the Martin State Aviation Airport. There are a couple privately owned airports which I hope one is still in operation, but I’m not sure.

There is one on Back River Neck, which has been there for some time. And there’s one out, which can be seen as you drive up 1-95, just before you enter into Harford County, I guess. To my knowledge, they are the only airports left operating in Baltimore County as an airport. Then, Martin Airport is much bigger than the other two.

They have a wide variety of the kinds of facilities I am talking about at each of those. But, to me, I believe that’s how zoning regulations views an airport and how that views an airstrip. I believe that’s perfectly consistent with the way the RC 2 zones were developed, because one would not expect to see a lot of airports in Baltimore County, even in 1969, '70, '71, '72, and '79, probably even less so today, based upon the ²³⁴ demand; the fact the Martin Airport has taken up a great deal of whatever void was thought to have been in Baltimore County in those other decades. On the other hand, an airstrip could normally be expected to be found at a lot of locations in terms of the kind of use.

So far, they have only been permitted in the ML and MH zones in Baltimore County. If the Baltimore County zoning regulations hadn’t gone to such great length to provide for helicopter operations, heliports, type I and heliport type II and helistops, and listed them specifically within zones, I would think that, in other words, if it was silent insofar as distinguishing between helicopter type operations and airports, then perhaps [helicopter use at an airport] would be correct. But that’s not the case here. Baltimore County, through its zoning regulations, chose to further define aircraft operation and talk about, at great length, helicopters, and whether they are to be permitted or not permitted.

And, as has been pointed out earlier today, but, again, for instance, airports are permitted by special exception in the RC 2. No helicopter type operation is permitted as of right except the Section 420 which is basically set up for special uses, emergencies, that sort of thing. They are not permitted. They are not listed a being permitted.

I believe further evidence, that it was clear that the regulations intended not to permit helicopter operations in RC 2. [Emphasis added.] The Board stated: Considerable weight attaches to the testimony of Mr. Paul Solomon and Norman Gerber as to the characteristics typically found in an airport use: Solomon: (1) strip or strips to land an aircraft: (2) gas tanks; (3) support facilities; (4) hangers, gas tanks, diesel tanks; (5) the facilities to land and to service a plane; (6) the facilities to service passengers; (7) parking lot (or lots); and (8) infrastructure by way ²³⁵ of road access; Gerber: “The thing that comes closest to describing the kind of operation I [read about,] heard about (during the hearings), and I believe is the airstrip.” The Board determined that the “R.C. 2 zone clearly precludes such uses by helicopters.” The Board’s conclusion was based on substantial evidence on the record and was one that reasoning minds could have reached. We are not persuaded by appellant’s argument that, because his facility would accommodate both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, and does not fit into a more distinct use category related to helicopter facilities and helistops, it must, therefore, be considered an “airport.” The Board found that the proposed facility “cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be construed as an airport. It is obvious to the Board that there are distinctions between an ‘airport’ and an ‘airstrip.’ To permit continued use thereof as an airstrip is in direct violation of’ the BCZR. The Board based it determination on the fact that an “airstrip” was not permitted in an R.C. 2 zone.

BCZR § 102.1 reads: “[n]o land shall be used or occupied and no building or structure shall be erected, altered, located, or used except in conformity with these regulations and this shall include any extension of a lawful nonconforming use.” See Kowalski v. Lamar, 25 Md. App. 493, 496 , 334 A.2d 536 (1975). In light of the legislative history, it is appropriate to view the specific designations of airstrip, helistop, and helipad as modifications of the general term “airport,” and creating distinct and separate uses for different levels of aircraft operations. The marriage of an airstrip with a helistop and helipad does not create an airport. We affirm the decision of the Board that the proposed use of Helmore Farm was not that of an airport.

Appellant has raised several other issues in this appeal, which, in light of our affirmance of the Board’s decision that the proposed facility is not an airport for purposes of a special exception within the R.C. 2 zone, we need not reach for the purposes of deciding this case. Nevertheless, we shall address these issues for completeness. ²³⁶ C. Helicopter Operations Based on his contention that his use is that of an airport, a contention rejected by the Board and us, appellant argues that the Board erred in ruling that the BCZR definition of an airport does not include helicopter operations. He argues that an “airport” permits the landing and taking off of “aircraft” and that the dictionary definition of “aircraft” includes helicopters. Again, appellees argue that the plain meaning of terms cannot be taken out of context.

Therefore, they argue that the subsequent history related to heliports and helistops expressed a legislative intent to differentiate helicopter uses from airport uses. As we previously stated, to focus on one word in isolation would remove it from its context. Although appellant is correct in his assertion that a helicopter is a type of aircraft, the legislative history and BCZR’s definitions expressly differentiate zones that permit helicopter operations. In fact, the regulations go' so far as to differentiate a type I and type II heliport and a helistop.

Based on the amended BCZR, an R.C. 2 zone permits a special exception for an “airport,” but expressly prohibits a special exception for an “airstrip,” “heliport,” or “helistop.” The use of helicopters in the R.C. 2 zone has been prohibited in the past. In 1989, Robert J. Smith, Case No. 90-1-SPHX, petitioned the Deputy Zoning Commissioner of Baltimore County for a special exception to use a helicopter in the R.C. 2 zone. The Deputy Zoning Commissioner relied on the legislative history regarding the distinction between airports and helicopter operations to conclude that the term “airport” was not broad enough in scope to provide the landing and take off of helicopters in the R.C. 2 zone. The Board in that case concluded that helicopter operations were “clearly precluded” uses within the R.C. 2 zone.

To adopt appellant’s general definition that an “airport” permits helicopter operations in the R.C. 2 zone would negate the specific zoning restrictions adopted by the Council regarding airports, helistops, and helipads and its prior intention not ²³⁷ to permit helicopter operations in the R.C. 2 zone. See Greco v. State, 347 Md. 423, 429 , 701 A.2d 419 (1997); see also Superior Builders, Inc. v. Brown, 208 Md. 539, 543 , 119 A.2d 376 (1956) (“The Act should receive a practical construction, and should be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its 'general purpose.”). We find only four zones in the BCZR that permit, by special exception or by right, the use of helicopters and an airport: the R.C. 3 (Resource Conservation — Deferral of Planning and Development); D.R. 1 (Density Residential, 1.0 dwelling unit per acre); B.R. (Business, Roadside); and M.L.

(Manufacturing, Light) zones. Unlike the R.C. 2 zone, the R.C. 3 zone was never amended, and therefore permits as a special exception both “airports” and “helistops.” BCZR § 1A02.2B1. Based on the BCZR’s history of categorizing helicopter operations separately from airports, the Board’s conclusion that the definition of “airport” does not include general helicopter operations is not wrong, as a matter of law, and was supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the Board was not in error.

D. Special Exception Standard i. Adverse Effect of the Proposed Airport Appellant argues that the Board “identified and applied an incorrect special exception standard.” Specifically, he contends that the Board erred when it “failed to properly compare the effects of the proposed use to ‘the effects normally inherent with such a use.’ ” Instead, he argues, “the Board compared the adverse impacts of the proposed Helmore Farm airport at this location to the adverse impacts of the Helmore Farm airport elsewhere in the R.C. 2 zone.” Appellees argue that appellant did not meet his burden of proving the facts required to satisfy the special exception standard. We begin by recognizing the inherent validity of special exception uses. Schultz, 291 Md. at 11 , 432 A.2d 1319 ; see Mossburg, 107 Md.App. at 7-8 , 666 A.2d 1253 .

As we have stated, special exception uses are “desirable and necessary in ²³⁸ ... zoning planning provided certain standards are met.” Mossburg, 107 Md.App. at 7-8 , 666 A.2d 1253 . The Court of Appeals in Schultz established the standard by which the adverse effects of a special exception use are to be measured. Judge Davidson stated for the Court: We now hold that the appropriate standard to be used in determining whether a requested special exception use would have an adverse effect and, therefore, should be denied is whether there are facts and circumstances that show that the particular use proposed at the particular location proposed would have any adverse effects above and beyond those inherently associated with such a special exception use irrespective of its location within the zone. Schultz, 291 Md. at 22-23 , 432 A.2d 1319 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

This Court in Hayfields, Inc. v. Valleys Planning Council, Inc., 122 Md.App. 616, 641 , 716 A.2d 311 (1998), explained the standards established in Schultz, swpra, and Mossburg, supra: In Mossburg, Judge Cathell for this Court provided an example of how to “overlay” the statutory conditions of a county’s special exception law with the restrictions in Schultz . Based on the Mossburg example, we have added the limiting language of Schultz to BCZR § 502.1(a). The test becomes: —Before any Special Exception may be granted, it must appear that the use for which the Special Exception is requested will not: a. Be [more] detrimental to the health, safety, or general welfare of the locality involved [than the effects normally inherent with such a use would be generally elsewhere in the zone]. [Citations omitted; bold added; italics in original.] See Mossburg, 107 Md.App. at 21 , 666 A.2d 1253 .

In other words, the question is not whether the proposed facility will have some adverse effect on the Greenspring Valley area; it will because there are inherently detrimental ²³⁹ effects associated with such facilities. The Board must determine whether the adverse effects of the special exceptions use in the particular location in which it is sought to be located would be greater or more detrimental than they would be generally at other locations within the R.C. 2 zone. Utilizing the standard as set out in Schultz , the Board determined that the “question is one of whether or not the adverse effects are greater at the proposed site than they would be elsewhere in the County where they may be established, i.e., the other areas within the R.C. 2 zones.” The Board noted: During the course of several hearing days, the Board heard an abundance and plethora of testimony from a number of acknowledged experts in the fields of aviation, airport planning, local planning, and general horse operations. Much of the testimony was conflicting and contradictory.

The Board recognizes that the expert witness has become a standard component of the zoning hearing. Professional planners make frequent