Lumar Sales, Inc. v. State

Barnes, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal involves the propriety of an order of the Baltimore City Court (Rasin, J.), dated August 25, 1972, declaring a 1971 Cadillac, Maryland License No. LL-3452, forfeited to the State of Maryland to the use of Donald D. Pomerleau, Police Commissioner of Baltimore City, it having been in close proximity to contraband controlled dangerous substances (heroin and cocaine) or controlled paraphernalia which otherwise had been used in connection with the illegal distribution, dispensation or possession of controlled dangerous substances or controlled paraphernalia, pursuant to Code (1971 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 297. The appellant, Lumar Sales, Inc. (Lumar), entered into a contract to sell the Cadillac in question on March 15, 1972, to “Delores Jada.” The sale was made pursuant to Code (1969 Repl.

Vol.) Art. 83, § 128, et seq. by which Lumar reserved title to the automobile by using a conditional sales contract, duly recorded among the Chattel Records of the Superior Court of Baltimore City. The existing security interest is for $5,328. Lumar’s salesman took a credit statement from “Delores Jada” and telephoned it into the First National Bank of Maryland to make a credit report. The applicant for the loan had stated that she was buying her home.

The bank ³⁵⁷ verified with the mortgagee that the applicant, “Delores Jada,” was purchasing the home at 1641 Kingsway and that she was employed as a beauty stylist at the place of employment she had given. Credit was also verified with the Chesapeake Furniture Company in the name “Delores Jada.” The bank then telephoned Lumar that because the applicant had no previous automobile financing experience, it would be unable to handle the financing based upon the information it had acquired. Inasmuch as everything had “checked out,” Lumar decided to finance the Cadillac itself. Lumar had no reason to believe that “Delores Jada” was “anyone else.” Lumar also filed its security interest in the Cadillac with the Motor Vehicles Administration.

On June 10, 1972, Officer David Harris of the Central Police District in Baltimore met with a reliable informant who stated that he had just bought two bags of heroin from “Fat Lucille.” The informant told Officer Harris that Fat Lucille and another female would be selling narcotics from a brown Cadillac parked in the 1500 Block of Pennsylvania Avenue. Officer Harris and another plainclothes detective proceeded immediately to that area where they saw the Cadillac in question. Within a ten-minute period, the officers observed approximately ten known drug addicts approach the vehicle, pass money into the car, receive a small package and thereafter walk away. The two officers then approached the Cadillac, placed the two women under arrest and, in checking Fat Lucille’s pocketbook, discovered a .38 caliber Charter Arms revolver containing five unspent bullets as well as 19 glassine bags containing a white powder later determined to be heroin.

Fat Lucille also pulled a tin foil wrapper from her bra containing 50 glassine bags containing heroin and still later provided a change purse from her underwear containing 20 glassine bags of heroin and 11 tin foil wrappers containing cocaine. The two women were later duly warned of their rights and booked for violation of the narcotic laws. ³⁵⁸ Officer Harris testified that Fat Lucile was Lucille Westcott. She also used the name Delores Jada which was on the registration card of the Cadillac. He stated that “she goes by several aliases” in addition to Delores Jada, i.e., Lucille Allen, Lucille Logan, Lucille Fisher and Ethel Smith.

On June 14, 1972, the State of Maryland filed a petition to forfeit the Cadillac to the use of the Police Commissioner of Baltimore City in the Baltimore City Court. On July 7, 1972, Lumar, as a party in interest and claimant, filed an answer to the State’s petition and show cause order, asserting its right to the Cadillac, that forfeiture would be improper under Art. 27, § 297 and that the proposed forfeiture would violate both the due process clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions. It prayed that the automobile be returned to it. In the hearing before Judge Rasin (specially assigned to the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City), the above facts were given and arguments were heard on behalf of the respective parties.

Judge Rasin concluded that under the then applicable law the Cadillac should be forfeited. From an order of August 25, 1972, forfeiting the Cadillac to the State, Lumar entered a timely appeal to this Court. The original provision for statutory forfeiture of vehicles used in the concealment or transportation of narcotic drugs was contained in Chapter 471 of the Acts of 1951, effective June 1, 1951. This Act provided that such vehicles should not be forfeited “unless the owner thereof authorized or permitted such use or employment.” Chapter 403 of the Acts of 1970 was a substantial revision of the criminal provisions in regard to narcotic and other drugs, designated as “controlled dangerous substances.” This statute made important changes in the existing law in regard to the forfeiture of vehicles and other property used, or intended to be used, to transport or facilitate the sale, receipt, possession or concealment of controlled dangerous substances.

Art. 27, ³⁵⁹ § 297 (a) in regard to forfeitures generally provided in subsection (4) that all vehicles so used should be “subject to forfeiture and no property right shall exist in them” except (a) conveyances used by a common carrier in the