Lynch v. R. E. Tull & Sons, Inc.

Hammond, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Maryland Rule 417 d provides that “if, after proper service of interrogatories upon a party, he fails to serve answers to ²⁶¹ them within the time allowed [by Rule 417 b], the court on motion and notice may strike out all or any part of any pleading of that party, or dismiss the action or any part thereof, or enter a judgment by default or decree pro confesso against that party.” This Court has held that upon failure of a party to answer interrogatories, under Rules 417 and 422 c, the court in the exercise of a sound discretion may punish the offending party by dismissing his action with prejudice or by entering judgment by default against him, and that this final and conclusive barring of the prosecution of his claim or assertion of his defense does not deny the offender due process of law. Baltimore Transit v. Mezzanotti, 227 Md. 8, 20-21; Guerriero v. Friendly Finance, 230 Md. 217 ; Miller v. Talbott, 239 Md. 382 ; Peck v. Toronto, 246 Md. 268 , cert. den. 389 U. S. 868 ; Pfeiffer v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.

Co., 247 Md. 56 . There have been suggestions that this ultimate sanction usually will be invoked only where the failure is wilful or contumacious, Peck, supra, Smith v. Potomac Plectric, 236 Md. 51, 62 , and Miller, supra, but the power of the court to act is not thus limited and there may be other occasions when this gravest sanction can properly be invoked. The case before us started with the filing by Lynch in December 1965 of a declaration against Tull claiming damages for breach of a plumbing contract. Tull filed a counterclaim in May 1966, and on April 13, 1967, directed nine interrogatories to Lynch.

Not having received an answer to the interrogatories, Tull, on September 15, 1967, moved for judgment by default under Rule 417 d. On September 18, three days later, Lynch answered the interrogatories and on September 21, 1967, filed an “Opposition to Motion for