M & G Convoy, Inc. v. Mauk

ROSALYN B. BELL, Judge. This case arises from a workers’ compensation claim filed with the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission). The employerand insurer appealed the Commission’s decision to the Circuit Court for Cecil County. That court remanded the case to the Commission to consider an issue which, while not explicitly raised before the Commission, must be resolved for a full adjudication of the case.

We will affirm the remand and affirm the circuit court’s decision that, under the circumstances of this case, the mere receipt of benefits under the workers’ compensation laws of another state does not bar the claim for such benefits in Maryland. ³⁹⁶ FACTS Henry L. Mauk was an employee of M & G Convoy, Inc. (M & G), a Pennsylvania corporation. On April 11, 1985, Mauk was attempting to chain automobiles onto a trailer when he slipped and fell off the trailer, injuring his back, right shoulder and right hip. This accident occurred in Maryland. On May 2, M & G filed a Notice of Compensation Payable with the Bureau of Occupational Injury and Disease Compensation of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Mauk neither requested that this Notice of Compensation be filed nor signed the application. Mauk began receiving weekly temporary total disability benefits in the amount of $336 in accordance with the Pennsylvania compensation statute. M & G continued to make these payments until a much later date. 1 In the meantime, on August 21, 1986, Mauk filed a claim with the Maryland Commission, based on the identical accident. On September 23, 1986, the Commission entered an award, subject to further hearing, finding that Mauk had sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, and granting temporary total disability benefits.

On August 4, 1987, Mauk filed issues with the Commission, raising the nature and extent of the permanent partial disability to his back, right shoulder and right hip, as well as whether he was permanently, totally disabled due to the combination of those injuries. On August 11, 1987, counsel for M & G filed an “Objection to Issues Filed” with the Commission. Specifically, the “objection” stated that Mauk was “desirous of discharging his attorney and that Issues [had] been filed without [Mauk’s] knowledge.” Apparently, this was not accurate. Counsel also pointed out that Mauk was being paid under Pennsylvania law and claimed that jurisdiction, therefore, was in Pennsylvania. ³⁹⁷ At a hearing before the Commission on January 22, 1988, M & G’s counsel orally raised the issue of “jurisdiction” and “election of remedies.” Subsequently, the Commission entered an order that Maryland had jurisdiction, that Mauk received temporary total disability benefits under Pennsylvania law, and had sustained a 50 percent permanent partial disability under “other cases” 2 as a result of the injury to his back, right shoulder, and right hip.

M & G moved for a rehearing, which was denied. M & G and its insurer, Ryder Systems, Inc. (Ryder), appellants, then filed an appeal and a motion for summary judgment in the circuit court. M & G and Ryder alleged that jurisdiction did not exist in Maryland, but that, if it did, as a matter of law M & G was due a credit for monies paid pursuant to the Notice of Compensation under Pennsylvania law. On November 21, 1989, Mauk filed his response and memorandum to appellants’ motion.

After a hearing, the circuit court denied the summary judgment motion, finding that there was jurisdiction. The court remanded the matter to the “Commission to determine what, if any, credit is due.” Appellants appeal, contending the circuit court erred —in failing to find Mauk’s election of a Pennsylvania remedy barred recovery under the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act as a matter of law; —in failing to find appellants were entitled to credit in the amount of $38,124, as a matter of law; and —in remanding the case to the Commission without deciding all outstanding issues on appeal in the circuit court. JURISDICTION Appellants make several arguments to support their position that, once appellee accepted benefits under Pennsylva ³⁹⁸ nia’s workers’ compensation law, he was barred from receiving benefits under Maryland’s workers’ compensation law. 3 We will deal with these arguments separately. —Magnolia, McCartin and Thomas— Appellants rely on a trilogy of United States Supreme Court decisions with some gloss from a Maryland case to support their first argument. We will look first to the Supreme Court decisions.

Prior to 1943, with virtual unanimity, state courts had held that a prior award under the workers’ compensation laws of another state was not a bar to an award under the local workers’ compensation law provided that the prior award was deducted from the present award. 4 Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 85.10 at 16-19 (1990). See also Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws § 403 (1934). Then, in 1943, a substantial change occurred. The Supreme Court held in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 , 64 S.Ct. 208 , 88 L.Ed. 149 (1943), that an injured employee could pursue his or her remedy in both Texas or Louisiana, but having chosen to pursue the remedy in the one jurisdiction, namely Texas, where the award was res judicata, the full faith and credit clause precluded him from seeking a remedy on the same grounds in Louisiana.

Magnolia, 320 U.S. at 444 , 64 S.Ct. at 216 . The Court predicated its decision on the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution, holding that the Texas decision was a final one. Magnolia, 320 U.S. at 442 , 64 S.Ct. at 215 . A few years later, the Supreme Court, again dealing with the full faith and credit clause in a workers’ compensation case, held that the employee was not estopped from proceeding in Wisconsin, despite the receipt of benefits in ³⁹⁹ Illinois.

Industrial Commission of Wisconsin v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622, 630 , 67 S.Ct. 886, 890 , 91 L.Ed. 1140 (1947). The Court limited the effect of Magnolia to those cases in which the “unmistakable language” of the statute made the remedy exclusive for purposes of the full faith and credit clause. McCartin, 330 U.S. at 628 , 67 S.Ct. at 889 . In McCartin , the Court reasoned that, because the Illinois law did not provide the “unmistakable” language necessary to invoke the full faith and credit clause and make the remedy exclusive, “the rule that workmen’s compensation laws are to be liberally construed in furtherance of the purpose for which they were enacted,” (presumably, full relief) must be followed.

McCartin, 330 U.S. at 628 , 67 S.Ct. at 889 . After considerable silence on the subject, the Supreme Court revisited the issue in 1980 in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 , 100 S.Ct. 2647 , 65 L.Ed.2d 757 (1980). The Court rendered a decision with a plurality of four with three justices concurring and two dissenting. The plurality in Thomas recognized that Magnolia had dramatically changed the law and that McCartin attempted to redress that change without overruling Magnolia.

Thomas, 448 U.S. at 273-74 , 100 S.Ct. at 2657 . In actuality, the plurality accepted much of McCartin while concluding “that the substantial interests of the second State in these circumstances should not be overridden by another State through an unnecessarily aggressive application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, as was implicitly recognized at the time of McCartin.” Thomas, 448 U.S. at 285 , 100 S.Ct. at 2663 (emphasis added). The three concurring justices expressly stated they would not overrule either Magnolia or McCartin. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 289 , 100 S.Ct. at 2665 .

They interpreted the situation in Thomas on the basis of the decision in McCartin : “I agree with the plurality that McCartin , rather than Magnolia, is controlling as between the two precedents since the Virginia Workmen’s Compensation Act lacks the ‘unmistakable language’ which McCartin requires if a workmen’s compensation award is to ⁴⁰⁰ preclude a subsequent award in another State.” Thomas, 448 U.S. at 289-90 , 100 S.Ct. at 2665 . Appellants’ interpretation of this line of cases provides an interesting juxtaposition of the dissent in Thomas and the personalities involved. The dissent, they note, brought together an interesting pairing of now Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Marshall. They both agreed with the Magnolia decision and disagreed with McCartin .

Justice Rehnquist referred to McCartin as “analytically indefensible” and stated that the two cases are “admittedly inconsistent precedents.” 4 Thomas, 448 U.S. at 290 , 100 S.Ct. at 2665 . Appellants then analyze the present make-up of the Court and conclude that the position of the dissent would now be the position of the Court; hence, we should follow Magnolia as opposed to McCartin . It is interesting that of the Thomas Court, the two dissenters, two of the plurality, and one of the concurrence remain on the Court. Two of the plurality and two of the concurrence opinion have been replaced.

While the attention of commentators, prognosticators and academicians will often focus on such speculation, that is not our function and we decline to craft our opinion based on a perceived prospective shift in the opinions of the Supreme Court without a compelling trend. Appellants would have us conclude that the principal basis for the McCartin decision was that a settlement contract included a reservation of the right to proceed under the Wisconsin law, as well as Illinois. That position does not withstand scrutiny. Had that been the principal point in McCartin , the Court would have discussed that first and ended its opinion there.

Clearly, the Court wanted to make the larger and broader statement that the language of exclusiveness must be unmistakable, and relied on the purpose of ⁴⁰¹ the legislation. As the plurality in Thomas noted, “the Court could have relied exclusively on the contract provision reserving the employee’s rights under Wisconsin law to distinguish the case from Magnolia____” Thomas, 448 U.S. at 268 , 100 S.Ct. at 2654 . Appellants argue that the Maryland Court of Appeals would follow Magnolia rather than McCartin . To support this argument, appellants rely upon Cooper v. Wicomico County, 278 Md. 596 , 366 A.2d 55 (1976), in which the Court held that the retroactive application of supplemental workers’ compensation benefits was unconstitutional.

In Cooper , the Court of Appeals cited Magnolia, and not McCartin , for the proposition that another state may not increase the judgment for the same injury. Cooper, 278 Md. at 599 , 366 A.2d 55 . The Court of Appeals cited to Magnolia because Magnolia supported that proposition, while McCartin , without contradicting the proposition, did not. This would seem sufficient reason for the choice of cases without divining some devious desire on the part of the Court of Appeals to circumvent the decision of the Supreme Court in McCartin .

Appellants’ speculation that the Court of Appeals would follow Magnolia is best answered by the opinion in Wood v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 260 Md. 651 , 273 A.2d 125 (1971). In Wood , the Court of Appeals determined the general rule relating to election of remedies and recovery in