Maddox v. State

Joshua Maddox v. State of Maryland, No. 990 and 996, September Term, 2019. Opinion by Zarnoch, J. STATUTES – STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – CONSEQUENCES In construing a statute, the court may “consider the consequences resulting from one meaning rather than another, and adopt that construction which avoids an illogical or unreasonable result, or one which is inconsistent with common sense.” Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 427 Md. 128, 158-59 (2012) (quoting Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 75 (1986)). CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – EXTENSION OF PROBATION FOR RESTITUTION A court has the authority to impose a period of probation, set conditions and determine whether the probation is supervised or unsupervised.

State v. Alexander, 467 Md. 600, 605-06 (2020). A period of probation typically may not exceed five years. Id. Maryland Code, § 6-222(b) of the Criminal Procedure Article permits the court to extend probation beyond five years for the purpose of making restitution.

Under this statute, the court does not have the authority to impose additional conditions on a probationer other than to make restitution payments and to engage in the requirements for supervised probation. Similarly, the court does not have the authority under this statute to revoke probation or sanction a probationer for violating a condition other than making restitution payments or engaging in restitution-related misbehavior in a supervised probation. Circuit Court for Wicomico County Case Nos. 22-K-09-000928 and 22-K-09-000925 REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 990 & 996 September Term, 2019 ______________________________________ JOSHUA MADDOX v. STATE OF MARYLAND ______________________________________ Fader, C.J., Kehoe, Zarnoch, Robert A. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Zarnoch, J. ______________________________________ Filed: February 24, 2021 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2021-02-25 14:13-05:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk This case began in April 2010, when Joshua Maddox (“Maddox”) entered Alford pleas to second degree arson in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County.

At sentencing, the court imposed 24 months of probation subject to the condition that Maddox pay almost $100,000 in restitution. Maddox consented to additional extensions of his probation after the initial 24 months in order to make restitution. In ordering this extension, the court advised that Maddox must also comply with numerous conditions set by the court. Maddox filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence arguing that the court lacked the authority to impose additional conditions of probation other than the order to pay restitution.

The court denied this motion. Maddox presents one question for our review: When a court extends probation “for the purpose of making restitution” under Crim. Proc. Art. § 6-222(b), may the court impose conditions of probation in addition to the restitution obligation?

BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY I. Probation Imposition of Probation When a court sentences a defendant following a conviction, “it generally has the option of including a period of probation with respect to one or more counts.” State v. Alexander, 467 Md. 600, 605 (2020), Md. Code, Crim. Proc. § 6-225. “Probation is a creature of statute, and as such, the terms of probation are derived from statutory authority.” Bailey v. State, 355 Md. 287, 293 (1999). The court has the authority to set conditions and determine whether probation is supervised or unsupervised. Alexander, 467 Md. at 606 .

A defendant’s probation is subject to standard conditions of probation – for example, “obey all laws, report as directed to probation officer, appear in court when notified to do so, make restitution.” Id. The court may also impose special conditions – for example, a court can require a probationer to “participate in an alcohol or substance abuse program, complete a specified number of hours of community service, refrain from contact with certain persons.” Id. Typically, “a period of probation imposed by a circuit court may not exceed five years.” Id. (citing Crim.

Proc. § 6-222(a)(3)(i)). However, in cases such as the present one, “in which restitution is a condition of probation,” a circuit court may extend the period of probation for an additional five years “for the purpose of the defendant making restitution.” Id. at 606-07 (citing Crim. Proc. § 6-222(b)-(c)). A district court may extend the period of probation for an additional three years for the purpose of making restitution.

Crim. Proc. § 6-222(b)(1)(ii). Pertinent to this case, the statute states: (b)(1) For the purpose of making restitution, the court may extend the probation beyond the time allowed under subsection (a)(3)(i) of this section for: (i) an additional 5 years if the probation is ordered by a circuit court; or (ii) an additional 3 years if the probation is ordered by the District Court. (2) An extension of probation under this subsection may be unsupervised or supervised by the Division of Parole and Probation.

Crim. Proc. § 6-222(b). In addition, the court is further restricted in its authority to impose an extension of probation beyond the limit in subsection (b), as follows: (c) The Court may extend the probation beyond the time allowed under subsection (b) of this section if: (1) the defendant consents in writing; and (2) the extension is only for making restitution. -2- Crim. Proc. § 6-222(c). “The power to impose conditions of probation, however, is not unlimited, and thus, the trial court does not have unlimited discretion to order conditions of probation.” Bailey, 355 Md. at 294 .

Violations of Probation If it is alleged that a defendant has violated a condition of probation, the court may determine whether to modify or revoke the probation. See Crim. Proc. §§ 6-223, 6-224. The General Assembly has established presumptive limits on sanctions for certain types of probation violations.

Justice Reinvestment Act Amendments The General Assembly enacted the Justice Reinvestment Act (“the Act”) in 2016. 2016 Md. Laws, ch. 515. The primary goal of the Act was to reduce the prison population and invest the savings in “strategies to increase public safety and reduce recidivism.” Revised Fiscal and Policy Note for Senate Bill 1005 (June 2, 2016). The Justice Reinvestment Coordinating Council (“the Council”) found that “[a]lmost 60% of all prison admission represent failures of probation,” many of which “stem from technical violations, such as missing an appointment or failing a drug test.” Id. To achieve this purpose, the Council studied the causes of mass incarceration and identified extended sentences for technical violations of probation as one driving factor.

Justice Reinvestment Coordinating Council, Final Report, S.B. 602, 2015 Leg. at 8, 9 (Md. 2015). Prior to the Act’s amendments, if a court found that a probationer violated any condition of probation, the court had the authority to “impose any sentence that might have originally been imposed for the crime of which the probationer or defendant was -3- convicted.” Md. Code, Crim. Proc. § 6-223(d)(2) (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol., 2016 Supp.).

The amendments enacted by the Act placed limits on the sanctions for technical violations of probation. State v. Alexander, 467 Md. 600, 609 (2020). A “technical violation” is defined as “a violation of a condition of probation … that does not involve: (1) an arrest or a summons issued by a commissioner on a statement of charges filed by a law enforcement officer; (2) a violation of a criminal prohibition other than a minor traffic offense; (3) a violation of a no-contact or stay-away order; or (4) absconding.” Crim. Proc. § 1-101(q) (incorporating the definition of technical violation from Md. Code, § 6-101(m) of the Correctional Services Article).

Because the failure to pay restitution does not involve any of the aforementioned conditions, it is clear that it is considered a technical violation. If a probationer commits a technical violation of their probation, the court may revoke the probation and impose a period of incarceration between 15 to 45 days depending on how many technical violations the probationer has committed at that time. Crim. Proc. § 6-223(d)(2)(i).

II

Facts and Proceedings On April 7, 2010 Maddox entered Alford pleas to second degree arson in two separate cases1 in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County. In addition to a prison sentence, the court imposed 24 months of probation subject to the condition that Maddox pay $95,000 in restitution in Case No. 925 and $3,500 in restitution in Case No. 928. 1 The case numbers are 22-K-09-000925 (“Case No. 925”) and 22-K-09-000928 (“Case No. 928”). -4- Maddox was released from prison in March 2013 and began his probation. The Division of Parole and Probation filed a statement of charges against Maddox on February 27, 2015, alleging that he failed to make restitution in both cases.2 In May 2015, the State agreed to withdraw the pending violation of probation petitions in exchange for Maddox’s consent to extend his probation for an additional three years to March 2018, to provide additional time to make restitution. The court also reduced the amount of restitution to $4,899 in Case No. 925 and $1,101.67 in Case No. 928.

In March 2018, the State again filed a statement of charges in each case against Maddox alleging he failed to pay restitution.3 The court held a hearing on May 10, 2018 where Maddox brought money orders to indicate his ability to continue to make restitution payments. Maddox consented to a second three-year extension of his probation to March 2021. In ordering the extension, the court explained that “[t]he State at this point is really just trying to collect money … when you are also on probation, all the same conditions of probation apply… If you should violate the laws during this interim extended period of time, you’re exposing yourself to a potential violation of probation.” The court advised that Maddox would be required to pay court costs, complete mental health and drug and alcohol treatment, take any prescribed medication, make restitution payments, have no contact with the victim, and “have no affiliation with places that respond to fires or any membership with same.” 2 The State also alleged that Maddox failed to provide verification that he participated in mental health treatment and he tested positive for marijuana use. 3 The State also alleged that Maddox failed to complete drug and alcohol treatment. -5- Later that year, Maddox was charged with violating his probation. The Division of Parole and Probation alleged that he failed to complete drug and alcohol treatment and was charged with new offenses.

The Division of Parole and Probation filed a modified statement of charges in June 2019, alleging Maddox was convicted of second degree assault and malicious destruction of property in separate cases. Maddox filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence on June 25, 2019, arguing that the court lacked authority to impose conditions of probation other than that he pay restitution in his amended sentence in 2018. Following a hearing on June 26, 2019, the court denied the motion. The court reasoned that “[Legislators have] made a distinction that, if you’re on probation and you have restitution … there would also be an accompanying need for supervision in order to make sure that everything stays in place so that restitution can be collected.” The court explained that if a defendant suffered from an addiction and fails to participate in and complete addiction treatment, the likelihood of collecting restitution is “very limited.” This reasoning, the court proffered, provides the court the discretion to offer supervision and all standard conditions of probation for an additional five years.

Maddox was sentenced to four years with all but 18 months suspended in Case No. 925, and a suspended, consecutive sentence of three years and six months in Case No. 928. This timely appeal followed. -6- DISCUSSION Standard of Review The crux of this case is the construction of Crim. Proc. § 6-222 – in particular, whether the phrase “for the purpose of making restitution” limits the court’s authority to impose conditions of probation in addition to the payment of restitution. This Court reviews de novo the interpretation of a statute and “provides judicial deference to the policy decisions enacted into law by the General Assembly.” Johnson v. State, 467 Md. 362, 371 (2020) (Internal citation omitted). “We assume that the legislature’s intent is expressed in the statutory language and thus our statutory interpretation focuses primarily on the language of the statute to determine the purpose and intent of the General Assembly.” Id. “The statutory construction analysis begins with the plain language of the statute, and ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology.” Id. at 372 (Internal citations and quotations omitted).

The statute is read as a whole and “must be viewed within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute.” Id. (Internal citation omitted). “When the words of a statute are ambiguous and subject to more than one reasonable interpretation … a court must resolve the ambiguity by searching for legislative intent in other indicia.” Id. (Internal citations and quotations omitted). Maddox’s position is that the plain meaning of Crim.

Proc. § 6-222(b) limits a court’s authority to impose additional conditions on probation when the purpose of -7- extending probation is to make restitution payments. The State’s position, on the other hand, is that the only limitation on the court’s discretion in Crim. Proc. § 6-222 is the duration of the probation period. The State contends that the plain language of the statute does not limit the court’s authority to apply conditions of probation “as a means of ensuring that the purpose is actually fulfilled.” “For the Purpose of Making Restitution” Statutory Text The statute itself does not provide a specific definition for the phrase “for the purpose of making restitution,” thus we must begin our analysis with common dictionary definitions.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “purpose” as “[a]n objective, goal, or end.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). It is clear that the parties are contemplating different definitions, or interpretations, of the word, “purpose.” Maddox contends that the use of “purpose” in this context limits the court’s authority to impose any conditions other than to make restitution because no other purpose has been provided in the statute and there is no indication that the Legislature intended another purpose. Further, Maddox argues that on the basis of the doctrine “expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another),” the plain language limits the court’s authority. Griffin v. Lindsey, 444 Md. 278, 288 (2015) (Internal citations and quotations omitted).

The State emphasizes that the statute does not contain any language limiting the court’s authority to apply standard conditions of probation during the extended period of probation. The circuit court also determined that the phrase “for the purpose of making restitution” did not limit the court’s authority to impose additional conditions to help -8- achieve the ultimate purpose of restitution. For example, the court reasoned, if a defendant suffers from an addiction and fails to seek necessary treatment, it is unlikely that the defendant will pay restitution, thus necessitating mandated addiction treatment to achieve the purpose of restitution. Maddox contends that these conditions are prohibited, especially given many conditions are not logically connected to the purpose of restitution, such as receiving permission to move, take a trip, or possess a firearm, as well as special probation conditions, including his condition to have “no affiliation with places that