Madrid v. State

Darwin Naum Monroy Madrid v. State of Maryland, Case No. 1937, September Term, 2017. Opinion by Meredith, J. CRIMINAL LAW – HOMICIDE – CLAIM OF DURESS. Duress is not a defense to an intentional murder of an innocent person, but could, under circumstances where all elements of duress are present, mitigate the crime of murder to voluntary manslaughter. But a threat of harm at a future time does not support the mitigation defense of duress.

The threat of harm must be a present threat of immediate death or serious bodily injury that will be inflicted if the coerced act is not carried out. And a claim of duress is not available to a defendant who intentionally or recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was reasonably foreseeable that he would be subjected to coercion. CRIMINAL LAW – PARTICIPATION IN A GANG. Maryland Code, Criminal Law Article, § 9-804 prohibits a person from participating in a criminal gang by committing or participating in a crime listed in § 9-801, knowing that the gang has committed, attempted to commit, or solicited two or more of the crimes listed in § 9-801.

CRIMINAL LAW – CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION – INCRIMINATING STATEMENT – IMPROPER INDUCEMENTS. In order for the prosecution to introduce an incriminating statement that was made by a defendant during a custodial interrogation, there must be a showing that: the defendant was advised of the defendant’s right to remain silent, the right against self-incrimination, and the right to counsel, in accordance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966); the defendant must have knowingly and voluntarily waived the Miranda rights; and the interrogating officers must not have induced the defendant to make an incriminating statement by threatening the defendant or by making promises or representations that the defendant would be given special consideration or assistance in exchange for making the statement. But a mere exhortation to tell the truth is not enough to make a statement involuntary. Circuit Court for Prince George’s County Case No. CT160618B REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 1937 September Term, 2017 DARWIN NAUM MONROY MADRID v. STATE OF MARYLAND Meredith,* Berger, Nazarian, JJ.

Opinion by Meredith, J. Filed: October 1, 2020 *Meredith, J., now retired, participated in the argument and conference of this case while an active member of the Court; after being recalled pursuant to Maryland Constitution, Article IV, Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act Section 3A, he also participated in the decision (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. and adoption of this Opinion. 2020-10-01 13:33-04:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk At the conclusion of a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Darwin Naum Monroy Madrid (“Madrid”), the appellant in this case, was convicted of participating in the murder and attempted murder of two members of an enemy gang in Prince George’s County. He was also convicted of two counts each of first-degree assault, use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or crime of violence, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and participation in a criminal gang in violation of Md. Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2015 Supp.), Criminal Law Article (“CL”), § 9-804. After sentencing, he noted this direct appeal.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Madrid asks this Court: 1. Did the circuit court err in denying Mr. Madrid’s motion to suppress his custodial statements to police? 2. Did the trial court err by refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of duress? 3. Is the evidence insufficient to sustain Mr. Madrid’s convictions for participation in a criminal gang under § 9-804(a) of the Criminal Law Article?

We answer “no” to all three questions, and shall affirm the judgments of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The following facts are drawn from the evidence presented at Madrid’s trial. In 2014, at the age of 14, Madrid immigrated to the United States from Guatemala, and resided with his mother, stepfather and sister in Prince George’s County. He began to attend high school, where he took classes that included English as a second language, algebra, and science.

On one occasion when he was in one of the school’s restrooms, some individuals attempted to rob him, but some members of the MS-13 gang came to his defense and prevented the robbery. After that experience, he began to develop a relationship with the gang members who had come to his defense, and he began to do favors for them, such as giving them $10 or $15 when they needed money. With the passage of time, the MS-13 gang members with whom he associated would give him assignments, or “orders,” for him to perform duties for them. One order was for him to report “anything strange,” such as the sighting of a member from another gang.

He considered himself to be an “esquina” (entry-level member of the lowest rank) in the MS-13 gang. Another assignment he would be asked to perform from time to time was to “pick up rent” from individuals who had small businesses such as selling beer without a license or selling drugs. The largest amount of rent he had picked up for the gang was $1,500. Many times, the orders given to Madrid would be communicated via telephone from an individual in El Salvador named Delincuente, who was the highest ranking gang member with whom Madrid had any contact.

He described Delincuente as “the Word,” the person who gives orders to other gang members. Madrid indicated that the frequency of the orders he was given increased over time. He explained: “It gets to 2 the point where it’s . . . almost daily.” And he said that, if a gang member does not follow the rules, “[t]hen the person gets punished.” Madrid testified that he had been punished only once. At one point after he had been in the gang a few months, he attempted to limit his entanglement with MS-13 by failing to always answer the phone when they called, failing to return some of the phone calls, and making excuses to avoid some of their requests.

As a result, he received “a minor punishment” the gang called “Thirteen seconds.” For thirteen or so seconds, three members of the gang hit him with their bare hands, but, he said, “I didn’t have like big injuries, major injuries.” But he understood that the MS-13 gang sometimes administers more serious punishments, such as beating the offender with bats to the point of breaking legs or inflicting death. On the evening of April 16, 2016, Madrid went to the Galaxy nightclub. While there, he met up with three other MS-13 gang members he knew as Alex, Henry, and Hellboy. He received a phone call from Delincuente, who called from El Salvador to ask him to look around the club and report back whether there were members of another gang at the nightclub.

Madrid was ordered to check particularly for members (he described as “chavalas” or chavalos) from the 18th Street gang. Madrid did not see any chavalas, but Hellboy assured him that he had seen them. So Madrid called Delincuente and told him that the enemy gang members were there. He was told to wait at the nightclub.

Madrid went outside to wait for further instructions. Another MS-13 member he knew as Stuart came out to wait with him. After a few minutes, he received another call. The instructions were to go to the residence of an enemy gang member named Carlos 3 Tenorio-Aguirre and wait there until Carlos came home that night.

So Madrid and Stuart scurried to the apartment complex where they knew Carlos resided, running most of the way. Soon after Madrid and Stuart arrived at the apartment complex, a car appeared. Madrid did not know who was in the car, but Stuart approached the car and was given a backpack. The car then departed.

In the backpack were three guns. Stuart gave one of the handguns to Madrid. They were then joined by Alex and Hellboy, who waited with them until Carlos and another member of the 18th Street gang—Gamaliel Nerio-Rico— returned home. According to Madrid’s testimony at trial: “We waited for them to park the car and to get out of the car.” And then: “We made the attack.

We tried to carry out the orders we were given.” Madrid, along with two other members of the MS-13 gang, shot at Carlos and his companion Gamaliel for “10 to 15 seconds. It was fast.” Both of the targeted men appeared to be dead. The attack was captured on video surveillance recordings in which Madrid was plainly visible, as he admitted when he was on the witness stand. After the ambush, Madrid and the other three members of the MS-13 gang ran to the back of the apartments, and then ran to an isolated location.

They put the three firearms back in the backpack. The same car that had delivered the backpack showed up, and Stuart gave the backpack to a person in the car, which then drove away. On the evening of April 18, 2016, Madrid was arrested at his mother’s apartment building. At the police station, he gave a video-recorded statement to Detective Luis 4 Cruz, the homicide detective who interviewed him in Spanish, Madrid’s native language.

In the statement, Madrid admitted he had shot the enemy gang member who died (Nerio- Rico), and had emptied his gun shooting at the second enemy gang member (Tenorio- Aguirre) who survived despite being struck by twelve bullets. The grand jury for Prince George’s County indicted Madrid on nine counts: murder (Count 1); attempted first-degree murder (Count 2); two counts of first-degree assault (Count 3 and Count 4); two counts of use of a handgun in a felony or crime of violence (Count 5 and Count 6); two counts of participating in a criminal gang (Count 7 and Count 8); and conspiracy to commit murder (Count 9). Prior to trial, Madrid filed a motion to suppress the recorded statement he gave to Detective Cruz, arguing: (1) that the Miranda advisement was inadequate for him to knowingly waive his rights; and (2) that his incriminating responses were not voluntary because the interviewing detective had improperly induced him to confess. The court denied the motion to suppress his statement.

At trial, Madrid did not dispute his participation in the murder and attempted murder. The version of facts set forth above is based upon Madrid’s own trial testimony. His fellow gang member Manuel “Alex” Beltran also testified at trial and identified Madrid in the video recording of the attack that was admitted into evidence at trial. Madrid testified at trial that he shot the members of the 18th Street gang to carry out an order he had been given by the person in El Salvador named Delincuente, whom he had never met but with whom he had spoken on the phone multiple times.

Madrid testified that, if he disobeyed an order from a superior in the gang, he would be punished by 5 members of the MS-13 gang, and punishment could include severe beatings and even death. Madrid testified that he shot the two members of the 18th Street gang because, if he did not carry out the order of a “green light” for Carlos, “that green light would have been for me.” He did not assert, however, that he had received any specific threat on April 16 or 17 prior to the time he participated in the shooting of the enemy gang members. The trial court rejected Madrid’s request to instruct the jury regarding duress as a possible mitigating factor. The jury convicted Madrid on all counts.

After sentencing, this appeal followed. I. Motion to Suppress Prior to trial, Madrid filed a motion to suppress the statement he gave to Detective Cruz, contending that it was obtained from him in violation of the Fifth Amendment because the advisement of Miranda rights was inadequate for him to knowingly waive his rights, and the incriminating statement was involuntary under the United States Constitution, the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and Maryland common law. Madrid argued that, among other things, his young age, lack of prior contact with the justice system, status as a recent immigrant to the United States, and the short of amount of time which Detective Cruz spent reading Madrid the Miranda advisement—which Madrid calculated at 36 seconds—added up to circumstances under which the court should conclude that his waiver of rights was neither knowing nor voluntary, and the incriminating statement was not made voluntarily. Detective Cruz was raised speaking Spanish.

His parents are from El Salvador, and he still speaks to them in Spanish. He conducted the interview of Madrid in Spanish. 6 A transcript of the interview which included both the Spanish interview and an English translation was admitted in evidence at the suppression hearing, at which both Detective Cruz and Madrid testified. Detective Cruz testified that he interviewed Madrid at approximately 11 p.m. on the night of April 18 at the Criminal Investigations Division. The interview was recorded, and the suppression court reviewed the audio-video recording.

The recording showed that Detective Cruz was unarmed and dressed in business attire. Detective Cruz and Madrid spoke to each other in Spanish. Voices were not raised. Detective Cruz did not have Madrid sign a written waiver of rights form, but the detective read the Miranda rights advisement from a card and, after reading each element of the Miranda advisement, he looked at Madrid and asked “O.K.?” to assure himself that Madrid understood.

According to Detective Cruz, Madrid nodded in the affirmative. Madrid never gave him any reason to suspect that he did not understand any part of the advisement. The suppression court agreed with the detective’s testimony that Madrid responded “si” when Detective Cruz asked him after the final advisement: “Do you understand, do you understand the rights? Yes?

Yes?” Detective Cruz testified that Madrid gave no indication of being under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and that he was “a bit apprehensive, but cooperative” and “responsive” to the questions. Detective Cruz testified that Madrid never asked to see or speak to an attorney or his parents or anyone else outside the room. Detective Cruz also testified that he made no promises or threats to Madrid, and specifically denied ever telling him that it would be “better for him” if Madrid talked to the police. 7 Madrid testified that he was “cold” and “disoriented” when he was placed in the interview room. Madrid testified that he did not remember Detective Cruz reading him his rights.

Madrid could not say that he either understood or did not understand his rights because he did not remember them being addressed. Madrid claimed that, while at the station, before being placed in the interview room where his statement was recorded, Detective Cruz opened the door and told Madrid it would be better for him if he talked. But Madrid also testified that his response to that statement was that he “just stayed quiet.” There was no claim of any physical abuse or verbal threat. At the suppression hearing, defense counsel pointed to just two specific statements he attributed to Detective Cruz that allegedly overbore Madrid’s will to remain silent.

The first was the alleged statement that Detective Cruz said that it would be better for Madrid if he talked. But, even Madrid said that this comment was made before the interview began, before the Miranda advisements were given, and that his response was to stay quiet. The second statement that was alleged to be coercive was made by Detective Cruz early in the interview after Madrid asserted that nothing unusual had happened after he left the Galaxy nightclub on the night in question. Detective Cruz then said: “I can play this game with you all night if you want, but I’m not in that kind of, of, of, I don’t wanna waste time, understand?

I know in your mind you know why you’re here O.K.?” But the transcript of the interview shows that, even after that statement was made, Madrid continued to maintain: “I don’t know what you’re talking to me about.” 8 It was only after Detective Cruz told Madrid of the extensive amount of incriminating evidence that the investigators had already gathered that Madrid decided he wanted to confess. In the transcript, the following comments were made by the detective immediately before Madrid’s first inculpatory admission: [CRUZ:] Your mom[,] even though she says this last year you lost it somewhat, she says you’re a hard worker, but that you spend too much time on the street. I know it’s, it’s easy to get lost in this country, this country’s damned [sic], understand? But that doesn’t mean or indicate you’re a bad person, understand?

Now . . . I don’t know what got into your head the night this happened. That’s something you can tell me, were you threatened or what? Or did you want to do this, what was it? [MADRID:] I did it. [CRUZ:] Sorry? [MADRID:] Just that I did it. [CRUZ:] Why?

You’re not a monster. It’s, it’s not that simple, why did you do it? You wanted to go up in the gang or what? So then why? [MADRID:] He [one of the chavalas who was shot] had a problem with me too.

Before I was coming that day, he’d argue with me and everything. The court viewed the video recording of the interview, considered the testimony at the hearing, and denied the motion to suppress. Because some of the court’s credibility findings are intertwined with its colloquy with defense counsel, we will reproduce that portion of the suppression hearing: [COUNSEL FOR MADRID]: Very brief, Your Honor. We’re talking about 36 seconds.

And I don’t know if the average law student can understand being read their rights in 36 seconds. But, we’re talking here 9 about a juvenile who is cold, confused, disoriented. This waiver was not knowingly [sic]. [THE COURT]: He didn’t seem disoriented in the video. Did you see anything in his demeanor on the video? [COUNSEL FOR MADRID]: Well, Your Honor, it was his testimony that he felt disoriented. [THE COURT]: I know.

But, you can’t tell it in his demeanor, so therefore it’s very hard for me. And I’m just asking did you see anything. [COUNSEL FOR MADRID]: No, I did not. [THE COURT]: I’m not saying it wasn’t cold in there because they might have had the air on and he only had a shirt. A lot of people don’t like air. I believe he was cold. [COUNSEL FOR MADRID]: All right.

So, we do know that it was late at night. He was sleeping when he had the opportunity. And I don’t think a 16-year-old at that time can understand enough, and I don’t think he did. [THE COURT]: It is not a blanket for any juvenile. It has to be case by case as to what occurred with this particular juvenile and the next juvenile, et cetera. [COUNSEL FOR MADRID]: Right.

And this juvenile came from another country, where he hasn’t heard about Miranda before or he hasn’t had any interaction with the police force. [THE COURT]: That’s a fact that sometimes you don’t believe when someone gets on the stand and says they’re not familiar because they’ve watched a lot of TV, et cetera. And I understand that, but that doesn’t negate whether or not, in fact, Miranda was provided in the manner it was supposed to be provided. That’s what I have to look at as well, right? [COUNSEL FOR MADRID]: Right. And that part I agree.

But, he didn’t understand, that’s my whole point. [THE COURT]: He said he did. He said yes. No one else said yes but him. I mean I watched him in the video.

I have to say that his mannerism in the video is very similar to his mannerism as he testifies on the stand. He’s very soft spoken. He doesn’t speak up. And I think that he exhibited 10 --- it so much mirrors his behavior.

That’s just his personality, period. I don’t think he’s a big --- you know, just sitting, but he conveys [sic]. I mean I accepted his answers under oath today. Why would I not accept it in the Miranda given [sic] of the rights?

I’m not sure why not. It is the same to me. He acted the same. To be honest with you, I thought Detective Cruz was a 16-year-old [sic].

I thought he was very calm and very methodical about how he went about asking the questions and what he did with your client. I thought he, you know --- because I’ve seen some videos. I have to be honest with you. I thought some detectives were off the hook in terms of their mannerisms.

I did not see that. I think that you take that into account when you have a 16- year-old in front of you as well. But, you keep going I mean if you still see some violation of the Miranda. I don’t think he has [to make] a choice, card or form.

Yes, it may be in Spanish, but even if you have one in Spanish, if a person doesn’t have a higher grade of reading level, they might not understand reading in Spanish. I mean you just never know. But, if you do it verbally, then you have that face-to-face. [COUNSEL FOR MADRID]: Right. And I do agree that the detective had a choice about what mechanism to use. [THE COURT]: Right. [COUNSEL FOR MADRID]: But, they have to choose one that actually conveys the meaning to the person that has to hear it.

That’s not what happened here. [THE COURT]: Not from the video. He answered. He said yes, and then he kept talking. [Detective Cruz] provided the Miranda in the way it calls for under the law with respect[] [t]o the voluntariness, and that one statement, [“]we are not going to play all night,[ˮ] that just to me is just a statement that, look, we are not going to be here all night. You either talk or you don’t talk.

It’s really up to you. Is that the statement where you say it is not --- [COUNSEL FOR MADRID]: Yes. I agree with Your Honor up to a point - -- 11 [THE COURT]: I don’t get another statement. I didn’t hear anything in terms of him saying [“]you are going to have to talk tonight.[ˮ] I didn’t hear that on the video.

I’m sorry. [COUNSEL FOR MADRID]: That’s page seven. Page seven is the one I was talking about.[1] [THE COURT]: All right. So, I deny your motion with respect to the suppression of the statement both on the grounds of Miranda violation and voluntariness. Thank you.

(Emphasis added.) We note that, in Madrid’s brief in this Court, in addition to the two statements attributed to Detective Cruz that were argued at the suppression hearing (“it is better for you if you talk” and “I can play this game with you all night if you want”), he points to two other statements Detective Cruz made during the interview, neither of which was argued during the suppression hearing. First, he asserts that, in preliminary remarks, the detective told Madrid that he knew Madrid was in the country illegally. In his written motion to suppress, Madrid said: “While he [Detective Cruz] presents this fact in a benevolent light, the effect is to establish a position of power and control in the conversation.” 1 On page seven of the transcript of the recorded interview, after asking Madrid some background questions and beginning to seek Madrid’s narrative of the prior evening’s events, and after Madrid claimed he did not know why he was there, Detective Cruz said to Madrid: “I can play this game with you all night if you want, but I’m not in that kind of, of, of, I don’t wanna waste time, understand? I know in your mind you know why you’re here OK?” Madrid contended at the suppression hearing that this statement “overbore his will” and “subvert[ed] the required Miranda advice[.]” There is no other statement on page seven that could be characterized as either coercive or an inducement to confess. 12 Second, he points out that the detective told Madrid that his life was in danger from both gangs: from MS-13 because he failed to complete his mission, and from 18th Street gang because of the attack.

In his written motion to suppress, Madrid said: “While he [Detective Cruz] does not explicitly complete the thought, the implication is clear that to avoid gang violence upon himself, Darwin needs to confess.” When Madrid testified at the suppression hearing, he made no mention of either of these statements as inducements that encouraged him to confess. Even if we assume arguendo that he did not waive his arguments regarding these statements by failing to bring them to the attention of the court during the suppression hearing, neither of these statements was an improper inducement for Madrid to make an involuntary confession. And, for the reasons we will explain, the suppression court did not err in denying the motion to suppress the statements Madrid made during the recorded interview. As a preliminary issue, the State argues that Madrid waived his right to challenge the suppression court’s ruling by stating at trial that the defense was not objecting to the prosecutor’s proposed use of the pretrial statement in connection with the direct examination of Detective Cruz.

We conclude that, under Maryland Rule 4-252(h)(2)(C), defense counsel did not waive any right of appeal by failing to renew objections at trial to the admission of portions of the statement. Rule 4-252(h)(2)(C) states: If the court denies a motion to suppress evidence, the ruling is binding at the trial unless the court, on the motion of a defendant and in the exercise of its discretion, grants a supplemental hearing or a hearing de novo and rules otherwise. A pretrial ruling denying the motion to suppress is reviewable on a motion for a new trial or on appeal of a conviction. 13 The rule clearly provides that the suppression court’s denial of the motion “is binding at the trial unless” (emphasis added) there is “a supplemental hearing or a hearing de novo” to relitigate the issue. Neither of those contingencies occurred in this case.

The defendant did not move for a supplemental hearing or hearing de novo, and the court did not exercise its discretion to revisit or alter the denial of the motion to suppress the statement. Those were the cards the defendant was required to play with at trial. No further preservation of the arguments made in the pretrial suppression motion was necessary because Rule 4-252(h)(2)(C) expressly provides: “A pretrial ruling denying the motion to suppress is reviewable . . . on appeal of a conviction.” The current language of the rule could not be more explicit. The result might be otherwise if the defendant moved first (i.e., before the prosecutor) to offer the evidence at trial; but that did not happen in this case.

To the contrary, Madrid successfully objected to the admission of the transcript of the interview. By acquiescing in the suppression court’s ruling, and not objecting when the prosecutor proposed to play the recording for the jury and then have Detective Cruz translate the Spanish statements, Madrid did not waive the right to seek appellate review of the pretrial ruling pursuant to Rule 4-252(h)(2)(C). Turning to the merits of the suppression ruling, we note that, in Gonzalez v. State, 429 Md. 632 , 647–48 (2012), the Court of Appeals described the standard for appellate review of the denial of a motion to suppress an incriminating statement as follows: When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, “we confine ourselves to what occurred at the suppression hearing. We view the evidence and inferences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the prevailing party on the motion, here, the State.” Lee v. State, 418 Md. 136, 148 , 12 A.3d 1238 (2011) (citations and internal 14 quotation marks omitted). “We defer to the motions court’s factual findings and uphold them unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous.” Id.

(quoting State v. Luckett, 413 Md. 360, 375, n.3 , 993 A.2d 25 (2010)). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the evidence, and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence come within the province of the suppression court. Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486, 499 , 924 A.2d 1129 (2007) (“Making factual determinations, i.e.[,] resolving conflicts in the evidence, and weighing the credibility of witnesses, is properly reserved for the fact finder. In performing this role, the fact finder has the discretion to decide which evidence to credit and which to reject.” (internal citations omitted)). “We, however, make our own independent constitutional appraisal, by reviewing the relevant law and applying it to the facts and circumstances of this case.” Lee, 418 Md. at 148–49, 12 A.3d 1238 (quoting Luckett, 413 Md. at 375, n.3 , 993 A.2d 25 ).

A criminal defendant’s inculpatory statements to police cannot be used against him unless the dictates of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, as well as due process under the United States Constitution, the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and Maryland common law are satisfied. We made clear in Williams v. State, 219 Md. App. 295 (2014), aff’d, 445 Md. 452 , 128 A.3d 30 (2015), that this analysis has multiple components: In Maryland, the overarching law regarding the use of a criminal defendant’s confession against him is clear. The introduction of a confession as evidence against an accused at trial is permitted only after it is determined that the confession was (1) “voluntary under Maryland nonconstitutional law, (2) voluntary under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and (3) elicited in conformance with the mandates of Miranda.” Costley v. State, 175 Md. App. 90 , 105–06, 926 A.2d 769 (2007) (quoting Winder v. State, 362 Md. 275 , 305–06, 765 A.2d 97 (2001)). Thus, a confession must clear all three hurdles before its use as evidence against a criminal defendant is permitted. 15 *** The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that, “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend.

V. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court explained that the “privilege against self- incrimination” embodied in the Fifth Amendment applies to individuals who are subjected to custodial interrogation by law enforcement officials. 384 U.S. 436, 467 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). “One of the Court’s stated aims in establishing the Miranda rule is to ‘assure that the individual’s right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process.’” Lee v. State, 418 Md. 136, 149 , 12 A.3d 1238 (2011) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ). In order to combat the “inherently compelling pressures” of custodial interrogation, “which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely,” any person taken into custody must receive the benefit of certain widely familiar procedural safeguards: He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 479 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 . “After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement.” Id. at 479 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 . However, “‘[t]he rights expressed in the Miranda warning pertain throughout the interrogation.’” Ballard, 420 Md. at 488, 24 A.3d 96 (quoting Lee, 418 Md. at 150 , 12 A.3d 1238 ).

Any and all requests by the person being questioned to exercise his or her Miranda right to silence must be “scrupulously honored” by police, and have the effect of “cut[ting] off questioning.” Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). Stated another way, if “the right to remain silent is invoked at any point during questioning, further interrogation must cease.” Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 388 , 130 S.Ct. 2250 , 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010). 16 219 Md. App. at 314-16 . With respect to the adequacy of the Miranda advisement in this case, when Madrid was asked at the suppression hearing if he understood “any rights that Detective Cruz read to you, any legal rights,” he responded, “I don’t remember because I don’t remember him telling me my rights. I don’t remember specifically him telling me my rights.” But the video recording clearly established that Detective Cruz did provide Madrid the advice of rights required by Miranda.

Madrid gave no indication in the recording that he was confused or did not understand anything Detective Cruz had explained to him. Madrid replied in the affirmative when Detective Cruz asked him if he understood the rights that had just been read to him. And, in the answers Madrid gave to questions posed immediately before and immediately after the Miranda advisement, Madrid responded appropriately, giving no indication that he was having any difficulty understanding the detective’s statements. Counsel for Madrid conceded at the suppression hearing that Detective Cruz read the required Miranda statements to Madrid in a language that he “understands.” But, counsel urged the suppression court to find that the warnings were not adequate for Madrid to knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement.

In his brief in this Court, Madrid points out that the Court of Appeals held in Moore v. State, 422 Md. 516 (2011), that an inculpatory statement made by a 16-year-old defendant should have been suppressed as involuntary. The Court of Appeals observed in Moore that “ʻgreat care must be taken to assure that statements made to the police by juveniles are voluntary before being permitted in evidence.’” Id. at 531 17 (quoting Jones v. State, 311 Md. 398, 407 (1988)). But in Jones, the Court had declined to hold that an incriminating statement given by a 17-year-old was involuntary and inadmissible. The Jones Court explained, 311 Md. at 407 -08: Our cases have held that the age of a juvenile, in itself, will not render a confession involuntary; rather, we have applied the totality of the circumstances test in determining the validity of a juvenile’s waiver of constitutional rights and the traditional voluntariness of a juvenile’s confession.

The absence of a parent or guardian at the juvenile’s interrogation is an important factor in determining voluntariness, although the lack of access to parents prior to interrogation does not automatically make a juvenile’s statement inadmissible. In the present case, no evidence was presented that Jones ever requested to see his guardian. (Citations omitted.) In Gonzalez, the Court of Appeals rejected arguments similar to those made by Madrid as to why the Miranda waiver should be held unknowing or involuntary, explaining, 429 Md. at 657 -68: Nor was Petitioner’s waiver rendered unknowing by the facts that, at the time, Petitioner was 18 years old, uneducated, and a recent immigrant to the United States unacquainted with this country’s criminal justice system. Without more, these facts do not render Petitioner unable, as a matter of law, to make a knowing (or, for that matter, involuntary [sic]) waiver of his Miranda rights.

Indeed, in McIntyre v. State, 309 Md. 607 , 526 A.2d 30 (1987), this Court affirmed a trial court’s determination that a valid waiver had been obtained from an individual of a much younger age (15 years old), who, evidently, had no prior exposure to the criminal justice system. Id. at 625 , 526 A.2d 30 . In contrast, the Moore Court held that the statement of a 16-year-old defendant should have been suppressed in a case in which the incriminating statement was not made until six hours after the Miranda rights had been read and the defendant had asked to 18 speak with his mother thirteen times. 422 Md. at 526-27, 531 . But, in Madrid’s case, there was neither a coercive delay in questioning, nor a lengthy interrogation, nor an expression of any desire on Madrid’s part to speak with anyone outside the interview room.

Under the totality of circumstances, we are persuaded that the suppression court did not err in finding that there had been compliance with Miranda. As the Court of Appeals stated in McIntyre v. State, 309 Md. 607, 625 (1987): “Applying the relevant totality test to the particular facts of this case, we conclude from our independent review of the record that the trial judge could properly conclude, and did determine with sufficient clarity that the State’s proof that there was a knowing and voluntary waiver of constitutional rights satisfied the preponderance of the evidence test.” With respect to the voluntariness of Madrid’s confession, there is a two-part test to assess voluntariness under Maryland common law: Under that test, an inculpatory statement is involuntary under Maryland common law if (1) any officer or agent of the police promises or implies to the suspect that he will be given special consideration from a prosecuting authority or some other form of assistance in exchange for the suspect’s confession, and (2) the suspect makes a confession in apparent reliance on the police officer’s explicit or implicit inducement. Lee v. State, 418 Md. 136, 161 (2011) (citing Hillard v. State, 286 Md. 145, 153 (1979) (emphasis added). In Williams, 219 Md. App. at 330-31 , we provided this overview of appellate review of a claim that a confession was involuntary: As an appellate court, we “undertake[] a de novo review of the [suppression court]’s ultimate determination on the issue of voluntariness.” 19 Knight v. State, 381 Md. 517, 535 , 850 A.2d 1179 (2004).

Our review is guided by the following principles of Maryland nonconstitutional law. “[A] confession that is preceded or accompanied by threats or a promise of advantage will be held involuntary, notwithstanding any other factors that may suggest voluntariness, unless the State can establish that such threats or promises in no way induced the confession.” Hill v. State, 418 Md. 62 , 75–76, 12 A.3d 1193 (2011). In evaluating whether a confession was improperly induced by the police, we are guided by the two-pronged test set forth in Hillard v. State, 286 Md. 145 , 406 A.2d 415 (1979), and explained again recently by the Court of Appeals in Hill: [A]n inculpatory statement is involuntary and must be suppressed if: (1) any officer or agent of the police force promises or implies to a suspect that he will be given special consideration from a prosecuting authority or some other form of assistance in exchange for the suspect’s confession, and (2) the suspect makes a confession in apparent reliance on the police officer’s explicit or implicit inducement. Both prongs of the Hillard test must be satisfied before a confession is deemed to be involuntary. The first prong of the Hillard test is an objective one.

In other words, when determining whether a police officer’s conduct satisfies the first prong, the court must determine whether a reasonable person in the position of the accused would be moved to make an inculpatory statement upon hearing the officer’s declaration; an accused’s subjective belief that he will receive a benefit in exchange for a confession carries no weight under this prong. Ultimately, the court must determine whether the interrogating officers or an agent of the police made a threat, promise, or inducement. The threat, promise, or inducement can be considered improper regardless [of] whether it is express or implied. If the suppression court finds that the law enforcement officer improperly induced the accused, then the second prong of the Hillard test requires the court to determine whether the accused relied on that inducement in making the statement he or she seeks to suppress.

Specifically, the court must examine whether there exists a causal nexus between the inducement and the statement[.] 20 [Hill v. State, 418 Md. 62 ] at 76–77, 12 A.3d 1193 (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Madrid does not point to any factual errors made by the suppression court with respect to first level findings of fact, nor does he contend that any of the State’s witnesses at the suppression hearing were not credible. Madrid did not testify that he was “overwhelmed” by what Detective Cruz said to him; and Madrid did not testify that he made the inculpatory statements because of anything Detective Cruz said or did or threatened.2 We recognize that a threat or promise of assistance can be improper regardless of whether